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AlH Historical Quarterly 














OF MAN. Richard A. Thompson 3 


EUROPEAN INTERVENTION IN 1861. Philip J. Sheridan ... 18 


MIDDLE AGES. H. Wayne Morgan 30 


THE MISSISSIPPI. Dorothy J. Ernst 44 


1865-1900. Vincent P. De Santis 67 


PHILIPPINE COMPANY. James F. Cloghessy 80 



THE PAMPAS. 5". Samuel Trifilo 116 


SURROUNDING LINCOLN, 1860-1865. Robert H. Zoellner . . 131 


SPANISH CIVIL WAR, 1936-1939- Eugene H. Korth, S.J. . . . 151 


EMPIRE IN THE WEST. Doyce B. Nun/s, Jr 170 


1861-1865. Elisabeth Joan Doyle 185 


CAMPAIGN OF 1936. Donald R. McCoy 195 


ILLINOIS. James P. Jones 219 

THE LOYOLA LEO XIII SYMPOSIUM. Edward T. Gargan .... 231 

BOOK REVIEWS 53, 121, 244 

NOTES AND COMMENTS 60, 127, 251 

INDEX 253 


A 1 ^ 


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An Historical Review 


An Historical Review 





NATURE OF MAN .... Richard A. Thompson 3 


EUROPEAN INTERVENTION IN 1861 . P/^/V/'/? /. Shendan 18 


MIDDLE AGES H. Wayne Morgan 30 


THE MISSISSIPPI • Dorothy J. Ernst 44 








Published quarterly by Loyola University (The Institute of Jesuit History) 
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Entered as second class matter, August 7, 1929, at the post office at 
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An Historical Review 



Francis Parkman on the Nature 
of Man 

Francis Parkman stands at the front rank of America's Nine- 
teenth Century historians. New facts may be added to the existing 
knowledge of the titanic Anglo-French struggle for North America 
which he recorded. Certainly new interpretations of greater sig- 
nificance for later generations are yet to appear. None of this, 
however, alters the unusual durability of the Parkman histories. 
Few studies of the human record have promised to stand the 
test of time as well as the works of this brilliant New England 

The magnificent volumes of Parkman's work are naturally 
the result of a painstaking accumulation of evidence. Even more, 
of course, these studies are the product of their author's incisive 
mind. So significant, indeed, is Parkman's role in American 
scholarship that both the casual and the serious student of American 
history have almost as much interest in the development of Park- 
man's thinking as they have in his actual histories. 

Of particular interest is the problem of Parkman's ideas on the 
nature of man. Concepts of human nature are important because 
they form basic assumptions which do a great deal to determine the 
social, political, economic, and religious ideas of all men. To 
understand Parkman's own view of human nature is, therefore, to 
have a more complete grasp of the significance of his historical 
scholarship. -"^ 

1 For the only summary of the history of the idea of "Human Nature 
in American Thought," see the two excellent articles by Merle Curti. 
These are, "The Age of Reason and Morality, 1750-1860," Political Science 
Quarterly, LXVIII (September, 1953), 354-375; and "The Retreat From 
Reason in the Age of Science," Ibid., LXVIII (December, 1953), 492-510. 
For an application of the human nature analysis to the thought of one 
man, see also Curti's "Woodrow Wilson's Concept of Human Nature," 
Midwest Journal of Political Science, I (May, 1957), 1-19. 



There is, for example, much in Parkman's voluminous writing 
which appears to justify the belief that he was staunchly anti- 
democratic. Certainly it is true that he was highly critical of a 
great deal of the American society in which he lived. It is pos- 
sible, however, that an examination of Parkman's ideas of human 
nature will force an alteration or a modification of the impression 
that he was anti-democratic. At the very least, the study will 
provide a deeper understanding of those views. 

Parkman's non-historical writings" reveal at once that he made 
a basic distinction between a fundamental nature common to all 
men and the diversities of character resulting from the impact of 
environment. This view, which he held in common with many 
men of the Nineteenth Century, was set forth clearly in a passage 
of his one novel, Vassall Morton. 

Take a savage from his woods or his prairies, and, school him as you will, 
the ingrained savage will still declare itself. Take the most polished of man- 
kind, turn him into the wilderness, and forthwith the dormant savage be- 
gins to appear. Hunt him with enemies, gnaw him with hunger, beat him 
with wind and rain, and observe the result; how the delicate tissues of 
civilization are blown away, how rude passions start into life, how his 
bodily cravings grow clamorous and importunate, how he grows reckless of 
his own blood and the blood of others. ^ 

Thus Francis Parkman vividly asserted his belief that all men 
have the same basic nature in which the character of the savage 
is present in all men in some degree. To him the true difference 
between the savage who had been educated and the man of civilized 
culture was no more than an equation of the distance each had 
traveled from actual savagery. Because he was more recently 
removed from the primitive stage, the educated savage would 
revert to man's fundamental nature more readily than a cultured 
person in whom the "war-like instinct" was neither extinguished 
nor repressed, but simply refined and civilized.^ 

This view of the effect of culture on man pointedly demon- 
strated Parkman's belief that environment was a more important 
force than heredity in establishing the character which emerged 

- Complete bibliographies of the non-historical works of Parkman 
(upon which this article is based) will be found in Wilbur L. Schramm, 
(ed.), Francis Parktnan, Representative Selections, New York, 1938; and 
in Mason Wade, Francis Parkman: Heroic Historian, New Yorlv, 1942. 

3 Vassall Morton, Boston, 1856, 244. All works cited are by Parkman 
unless otherwise noted. 

4 "The Weak Side of Our Armies," Boston Daily Advertiser, June 
30, 1863. 


from man's basic nature. He emphasized his environmentalist 
position still further in a review of a book on the Indian tribes 
of the Pacific Coast. Parkman declared himself at loss to under- 
stand the degraded character of the tribes of Central Cahfornia in 
view of the great abundance of their environment.^ Had he be- 
lieved in the greater importance of heredity, he would have en- 
countered no difficulty. 

It is not surprising, therefore, to discover that Parkman described 
the fighting qualities of the soldiers of the Civil War in terms 
of the sections of the nation from which they came. Southerners 
were naturally militant because their society encouraged warlike 
qualities in its men. The martial spirit was more abundant in men 
from the Northwest than in those from the Northeast because 
of the less advanced and more imperfect culture of the former 

Environment determined even the calibre of political leader- 
ship. Admitting that it was hard to find the source of the "con- 
ditions of human greatness," Parkman nevertheless remained con- 
vinced that greatness would never emerge where it was not 
wanted. A nation which asserted its belief in the idea of demo- 
cratic equality by choosing men of indifferent character for office 
CQuld never produce great leaders.'^ 

A distinctly American character was also the result of a unique 
environment. Exploitation of the continent had made Americans 
a parvenue nation with all attendant "faults and follies." Rising 
too rapidly, Americans lacked modesty and dignity. Their pre- 
occupation with material gain cramped the growth of a higher 
form of individual and national character. Although often feeling 
deeply about the issues which concern a democratic state, Parkman 
contended that Americans generally displayed little patience with 
demands for their sustained attention to anything but their daily 
business. The result was that politics in the United States were 
characterized by an apathetic good nature.^ 

"Rising in the world" was an American national disease natural 
to a people who were unhappy unless in pursuit of something. The 

5 Review of Bancroft's Native Races of the Pacific States in the 
North American Review, CXX (January, 1875), 41. 

6 "The Weak Side of Our Annies." 

7 "The Failure of Universal Suffrage," North American Review, 
CXXVII (July- August, 1878), 15. 

8 "Our Nation's Ordeal," Boston Daily Advertiser, September 4, 1861; 
"The Tale of the Ripe Scholar," Nation, IX (December 23, 1869), 560; 
"The Failure of Universal Suffrage," 11. 


Civil War proved that the war spirit still existed among the people 
but it was being steadily undermined by pre-occupation with trade. 
Parkman protested that commercial honor was being confused with 
true honor. He was convinced that Americans were growing more 
proud of a good bargain than of manhood vv^hile things vital to 
the true worth and nobility of man were coming to be regarded 
as mere sham.^ 

Parkman held the domination of material interests also respon- 
sible for the lag in American scholarship. Except where they bore 
directly upon material considerations, the arts and sciences v/ere 
regarded as agreeable but non-essential decorations. A lack of 
"high interest or ruling idea" gave the United States a widespread 
but superficial culture which expressed itself in a popular litera- 
ture often frivolous and corrupt. Only in the writing of history 
had Americans demonstrated scholarship and literary skill — a fact 
Y/hich Parkman found curious in a people given so completely 
to living in the present and the future.^'' 

Despite the importance which Parkman attached to the environ- 
ment in establishing the character of man, there were inequalities 
among men which he asserted were hereditary. A society of com- 
plete equality of opportunity v/ould promptly show a great diversity 
of individual reactions to similar environmental stimuli. Inherent 
diversities were, however, distinctions of degree rather than of 
type. The idea of inherent differences among men did not, there- 
fore, contradict Parkman's belief that all men had a fundamental, 
war-like and savage nature modified only by the environment. All 
human nature was composed of the same essential elements but 
these were mixed by heredity in such different proportions and 
subjected to such different controlling factors in the environment 
that the result was contrasts among men which were as significant 
as similarities.^-^ 

The idea that man's character developed from a basic human 
nature through its contact with the environment was a distinct 
characteristic of the thought of the Age of Reason. John Locke 
contributed to the Enlightenment, among other things, a new view 
of human nature which held that man was not born damned but 
rather with a set of innate capacities which could be developed 

9 Vassal Morton, 32, 36-37; "The Weak Side of Our Annies." 

10 "The Tale of the Ripe Scholar," 559; "Our Nation's Ordeal"; 
Review of Read's Historical hiquery Concerning Henry Hudson-, in the 
Atlantic Monthly, XIX (June, 1867), 764. 

11 Vassall Morton, 372; "The Failure of Universal Suffrage," 6. 


through sensory experience. Thus, as would be true of men in 
any period who regarded the environment as significant in man's 
development, the men of the Enlightenment placed great faith 
in the power of education to improve human society. -^^ 

Certainly Parkman had such a faith. Thus he could comment 
that "If one cannot learn to be enthusiastic in regard to the actuali- 
ties of human nature, he can console himself by a boundless faith 
in its possibilities." He also insisted that, if the average man 
was allowed to believe there was no one better than himself, he 
would never rise above his own level. But Parkman's conviction 
that education could improve the character of man did not mean 
he thought that basic human nature could be changed. Rather 
there was a better side in man's nature which was sound and 
rational. Education could alter the balance of the characteristics 
of human nature to emphasize the most desirable without chang- 
ing the basic nature of man.^^ 

While Parkman included organized processes and institutions 
in his definition of education, he insisted that education had a 
more comprehensive meaning which involved all influences rising 
from "proper" surroundings. Too many people associated edu- 
cation with "school houses, school masters, lyceums, public libraries, 
colleges and diplomas." Vital education came from the "currents 
of life itself." All of man's experiences were a part of Parkman's 
idea of the educational process. He was explicit in the assertion 
that suffering and conflict would temper the mind, light the way 
to truth and strengthen the spirit. Even physical courage might be 
developed through mental habits.-^* 

Francis Parkman did acknowledge the importance of formal 
education but he took a dim view of most institutionalized processes 
as he then knew them. Because the best minds of his time tra- 
ditionally went into the ministry, secular scholarship was at a low 
level while the arts and sciences were left largely to those who could 
do nothing else. The result was that, when cultural nationalism 
began to demand original scholarship, the "mountain" of American 

12 Curti, "The Age of Reason and Morality, 1750-1860," 358-359. 

13 Vassall Morton, 86; "The Failure of Universal Suffrage," 12-13, 
16; "Our Best Classes and the National Politics," Boston Daily Advertiser, 
July 21, 1863. 

14 "Why Our Army is not the Best in the World," Boston Daily Ad- 
vertiser, October 14, 1862; "Aristocrats and Democrats," Ihid., July 14, 
1863; Vassall Morton, 209, 236. 


educational institutions was "convulsed to deliver a mouse" of 
feeble academic effort. -^^ 

Parkman even joined the anti-intellectual critics of formal 
education in his assertion that the older brand of scholarship failed 
to meet the demands of the feverish activity of that day. The self- 
made man, his wealth and accomplishments, filled the public eye. 
The education offered by American colleges and the status of 
scholarship then current seemed to justify amply the deprecation 
of learning by the anti-intellectuals. Parkman never tired of in- 
sisting that the colleges must get into the main stream of life. 
On one occasion he went so far as to remark that if scholars had 
more contact with the American wilderness "it would be well for 
their bodies and their immortal souls. "-^^ 

With this remark Parkman appears to be anticipating, not the 
romantic flight from reason, but the James-Dewey concept of the 
mind as the "capacity of the organism" in which the organism 
could adapt itself to changing situations through "problem solv- 
ing." The nature of Parkman's belief in the potentialities of man 
is reflected in his concepts of the desirable aims of education. He 
insisted that education must not seek to cram a miscellany of 
facts into the mind. Education should attempt the development 
of the mind's powers of observation, of comparison and analysis, 
and of reasoning. Education should further strengthen and in- 
struct the moral sense of man, leading him to knowledge of him- 
self and so to personal modesty. A large body of persons thus 
educated would form a powerful bulwark against the demagogues 
that infested the democracy. -^"^ 

Inasmuch as Parkman's ideas of education reflected his belief 
in man's capacity for growth and development, it is not surprising 
that Darwinian ideas of evolution also appear in Parkman's thought 
at many points. For the individual, he insisted, conflict and ad- 
versity were essential for the development of true manhood. Ad- 
versity was necessary for the operation of natural selection, with- 
out which man would degenerate. Continuous good fortune, he 
insisted, would weaken and pervert any person. Conflicts of mind 
and spirit were as desirable as physical struggle, yet in discussing 
the elements which temper the nature of man, Parkman expressed 

15 "The Tale of the Ripe Scholar," 558-559. 

16 Ibid., 559; "Exploring the Magalloway," Harper's Magazine, XXIX 
(November, 1864), 73G. 

17 Curti, "Retreat from Reason in the Age of Science," 497; "The 
Tale of the Ripe Scholar," 560. 


himself entirely in terms of physical combat and stated explicitly 
that physical action was essential to the attainment of high manly 
char act er.-"^^ 

It followed naturally, therefore, that Parkman regarded the 
Civil War as a great regenerating influence upon an American 
manhood which he believed had sunk to a low ebb during the 
preceding decade. The desirability of physical conflict was further 
suggested in his observation that "a lofty purpose may turn timidity 
into heroism." The virtue of physical struggle was also reflected 
in the very structure of Parkman's novel, Vassall Morton. The 
villainous Vinal is depicted as having a relatively weak bodily 
constitution while Morton, so obviously heroic, is physically strong 
and delights in muscular exertion. ^^ 

Parkman's emphasis on physical conflict was doubtless a re- 
flection of his own long and painful illness which meant so much 
confinement for this lover of the out-of-doors. His struggle be- 
tween a desire to die and an urge to live appeared to convince him 
that there was a close inter-relation of body and spirit. Vassal 
Morton's fictional imprisonment seems to have symbolized Park- 
man's own confinement, and the struggles of the two men, one 
real and the other imagined, were really the same. Parkman's 
belief in the interaction of mind and body is suggested, then, in 
Morton's contemplated suicide which he rejected by an instinctive 
and higher appeal to his "better nature." Certainly this attitude 
was characteristic of the rationalist psychology of the early Nine- 
teenth Century which also presupposed a duality of mind and body. 
Base impulses arose from the body but, with proper training of 
the mind, the use of reason and the will could correct and improve 
both the individual and society as a whole. ^° 

According to Parkman, the ability of every man was subject 
to a "universal law of growth and achievement." Thus the man 
who knew himself and who set goals which he pursued would be 
a success. The man who ignored his own nature was doomed to 
failure. But while he saw that men have limitations, Parkman 
insisted that "men make more limits for themselves than nature 

18 "Our Nation's Ordeal," "The Woman Question," North American 
Review, CXXIX (October, 1879), 304; Vassall Morton, 208. 

19 "Conservativism," Boston Daily Advertiser, October 17, 1862; Vas- 
sall Morton, 143, 185. 

20 Vassall Morton, 200; Curti, "Retreat From Reason in the Age of 
Science," 492. For an account of Parkman's illness, see his autobiographical 
letter written to Dr. George Ellis in 1868 and reprinted in Schramm, 
Francis Parkman, 3-14. 


makes for them." Obviously man might, through education which 
provided self-kuowledge, greatly extend his limits. ^-^ 

While Parkman found a sound and rational "better half" in 
people, it was evident to him that this side of man's nature was 
too often obscured in the continuing battle of principles which was 
ever waged within each being. It was precisely man's failures in 
this battle which led so many people into an undignified scramble 
for the material spoils of politics. ^^ 

This scramble for gain led Parkman to conclude that human 
nature had not changed much since man first appeared on earth. 
It has been noted that, although he was an environmentalist, Park- 
man did not claim that exterior conditions could alter the essential 
nature of man. Changes in environment might shift the em.phasis 
in man's character, but they could not make man into something 
entirely new. Man ever acted in his own interest, but interests 
differed among men. Material gain attracted only a part of the 
population. The "better sort" of men remained aloof from politics 
because the rewards they sought were not found there and they 
found the scramble itself repulsive. Parkman picked no quarrel 
with man's inclination to act in self-interest. He did believe, 
however, that education would show men that their own interests 
were identical with those of the community."^ 

Parkman was also explicit in expressing his views of the dif- 
ferences between the nature of men and the nature of women. 
He drew an analogy between the two sexes and the tvv^o electrical 
properties of the magnet. In both instances, he declared, each 
element required its opposite in order to function and thus was 
drawn to the other. The degree to which a man or a woman was 
emphatically masculine or feminine determined the strength of the 
individual's need for the other sex. This need, felt by both men 
and women, was intellectual as well as physical. The force of 
this common demand could bring about a wide area of under- 
standing between sexes but, however well-developed such under- 
standing might become, there would always be some aspects of 
the nature of one sex which members of the other could never 
fully comprehend. 

21 "The Woman Question," 309-310; Vassall Morton, 216-217. 

22 "The Failure of Universal Suffrage," 12-13; Vassall Morton, 
216-217; "Our Best Classes and the National Politics." 

23 "Our Best Classes and the National Politics"; "The Failure of 
Universal Suffrage," 8-9. 


Despite some definite advantages which the United States of- 
fered to women, Parkman found there were also shortcomings in 
the American environment. These handicaps were in the nature of 

An overstrained and morbid activity, an incessant tension of nerv'es, bred 
partly by climate, but incomparably more by the peculiar social conditions 
of the country where all kinds of competition, spurred by all kinds of 
stimulus, keep mind and body always on the stretch. 24 

Thus the conflict and adversity which Parkman found so essen- 
tial for the development of men was actually harmful to women. 
The masculine preoccupation with material and practical pursuits 
and the male concern with ambitions and rivalries made men much 
more ignorant of the beauties of life than women. It was, there- 
fore, the role of women, with their more delicate sensibilities and 
greater passivity of temperament, to set the moral standards of 
society and provide moral leadership. Parkman found proof that 
this was the peculiar duty of women in the admittedly unjust double 
standards of censure for moral lapses, since the more severe con- 
demnation was always reserved for the female transgressor. 

Parkman was sure that at least half the weakness of woman 
sprang from the "sensitiveness of her bodily organization." Physi- 
cally, the differences between men and women were "ordained by 
God and Nature" and man, who did not make these differences, 
could not unmake them. Women were more delicate than men, both 
physically and mentally and, in women, the relations betv^^een body 
and mind were more intimate and subtle. 

But if the relationships between woman's inherent physical na- 
ture and her mind had an intimacy peculiar to her sex it is a bit 
surprising to find Parkman denying that female mental qualities vv^ere 
inherited. If he was aware of the apparent contradiction in these 
two points, he gave no indication of it. 

A possible explanation is suggested in Parkman's declaration that 
he believed men and women stood at about the same level of in- 
tellectual ability but that their ideas were inevitably expressed in 
different ways. This suggests that, while differences between men 
and women were inherent, within the frame of these differences 
development of both sexes remained largely a matter of environ- 
ment. Thus a woman might develop intellectually as much as a 
man, but her growth would assume a somewhat different character 

24 "The Woman Question," 311. 


because of the closer association of the woman's mind with her in- 
herited bodily condition. 

A distinction existed in Parkman's mind between man's "resolu- 
tion and the "will" of woman. The former, he held, was subject 
to reason while the latter was not. Feminine nature had an "im- 
petuous" quality which caused Parkman to declare that "It's not a 
woman's province to be reasonable." 

The differences between men and women resulted, therefore, 
from the influences of both heredity and environment. The relation 
of women to men was varied by differences of race, mode of life, 
and degree of civilization. Parkman agreed that woman's position 
had improved and that further improvement might be expected. At 
the same time he insisted that, no matter how much liberty an ad- 
vanced society might provide for its women, they must always exist 
under restrictions not imposed on the male. Women could not 
hope to live without these social laws. Unless there was a radical 
alteration in human nature — for which Parkman found not the 
slightest promise — women could not be emancipated equally with 
men. It was not, he insisted, a matter of mere "custom, habit, or 
public opinion," but the existence of an "all-pervading force" found 
in the men of all societies, in all times, which would insist upon this 
distinction for women. "^ 

The implication of this reasoning was, of course, that the special 
nature of women was due more to the special nature of men than to 
any other factor. Parkman thus stood squarely on one of the 
major inconsistencies of the thinking of the men of the Enlighten- 
ment. Certainly the idea of the inferior status of women was out 
of tune with the general view of human nature in the Age of Reason. 
This held that all mankind had capacities which, given proper train- 
ing, could realize better individuls and a better world of reason. 
Jefferson was drawn into the inconsistency on the status of women 
but Franklin was not. Although Franklin was certainly a man of the 
Enlightenment, in that climate of opinion his feminism was a 
minority view which was forced to wait for the impetus of the Trans- 
cendentalist element of the Romantic movement. 

Parkman stood somewhere between Jefferson and Franklin. Ob- 
serving that universal suffrage could function only with a high level 
of material prosperity and with the lengthy development of a tradi- 

25 For this section on the natui'e of women, the entire article, "The 
Woman Question," is pertinent. Significant passages are also found in 
Vassall Morton, 44, 84-85. 


tion of self-government, he conceded that women could learn 
politics. But he argued, women should not be granted the vote be- 
cause only men had received adequate training. The process of 
preparing women would require generations. Even with the train- 
ing that men had received, there were still far too many unqualified 
voters without adding to their number. ^^ 

The entire span of Parkman's life was encompassed in a period 
in which a frank discussion of sex was taboo. Yet in Vassal! Mor- 
ton, published in 1856, he managed to describe some of his concepts 
of the sexual drive. Morton felt the awakening of such a desire 
in the form of a sharpening of all his senses to the extent that it 
seemed almost a malady — a malady which the author declared 
"will sometimes visit those of the ruder sex whom it attacks with 
virulence." Parkman was also aware of the problem of what would 
now be called sublimation, for he related that, within Morton, his 
chivalrous instincts struggled with the "urgency of a vigorous 
blood." The same good qualities which caused Morton to fight his 
physical desires also taught him to let his energy escape in constant 
bodily exercise rather "than in any less commendable recreations."^'^ 

Later in life Parkman abandoned even these thinly veiled cir- 
cumlocutions for direct statement. He listed, as some of the major 
drives in men, the forces of hunger, thirst, self-preservation, avarice, 
malice and envy. Aside from the added force of religion, however, 
he contended that most of the nobler desires and energies drew their 
impulse from the impact of sex. The sex urge, Parkman insisted, 
was due to basic intellectual differences between men and women 
as much as it was due to physical attraction. In a very modern vein 
he noted that, while there was much variation as to the degree of 
power which the sex drive had in individuals, the whole human race 
was subject to it and to its ramifications. Other forces might super- 
sede it in certain individuals at specific times, but none of the other 
drives exhibited the character of universality which could be claimed 
for sex. No other desire or motivating element was so prolific of 
results — both for evil and for good.^^ 

Parkman's views of human nature were also revealed in his con- 
cept of class. He insisted that all ideas of human equality were fal- 
lacious and that all societies constructed upon such ideas were 

26 Curti, "The Age of Reason and Morality," 370-373; "The Failure 
of Universal Suffrage," 8; "The Woman Question," 318. 

27 Yassall Morton, 134. 

28 "The Woman Question," 305-306. 


unstable. For him, the "best class" was the "cultivated class" on 
which wealth had no direct bearing. He admitted that many of 
the so-called "Brahmin caste" were in the "best class," but it is 
significant that he did not include all of them. At another point 
Parkman described the "best class" as those "who by education and 
association have gained a more liberal development than falls to 
the general share." This rather consistent tendency to regard the 
"best class" as the product of the educational environment rather 
than of wealth or heredity — although he doubtless would have 
pointed out limitations of native ability — was a fairly early conclu- 
sion in his thinking."^ 

Being himself a member of the "Brahmin caste," and also well- 
educated both by the formal process and through extensive travel, it 
is evident that Parkman's concept of the "better classes" painted a 
picture of the situation in which he found himself. There is a 
very strong odor of class snobbishness in his earlier work. Later in 
life his self-image of social superiority faded a bit but never entirely 
disappeared. His picture of the "better class," therefore, never 
really changed. '^^ 

Parkman believed that there v/ere two kinds of inequality, one 
of which was fictitious and the other real and natural. Fictitious 
inequalities included such things as rank, title, privilege, and wealth 
while natural inequalities existed in the factors of character, ability 
and culture. Those who had superior endowments of the second 
group of qualities formed the "best class." This concept of "real" 
inequality is also seen in Parkman's view that the record of man's 
progress was the history of the leading minds among men. Without 
these minds, even material progress would have been imperfect. A 
single great mind might develop ideas which millions of poorer 
minds, however aggregated, could never conceive.^ -^ 

Although Parkman was quite obviously devoted to the "great 
man" concept of history,^" there is no reason to ascribe this to the 
influence of Carlyle. It should be kept in mind that men as diverse 
in frame of reference as Jefferson and Hamilton both expected that, 
in the natural order of things, leadership in society would fall to 
an aristocracy of talent and ability. Such a view is common, in all 

29 "Our Best Classes and the National Politics"; "The Weak Side of 
Our Armies"; Vassall Morton, 372. 

30 For the most recent scholarship on Parkman and his social en- 
vii'onment see the sympathetically critical Wade, F7-ancis Parkman. 

31 "The Failure of Universal Suffrage," 4-5. 

32 Wade, Francis Parkman, 448-452. 


ages and places, to those who are convinced that they possess the 
requisite talent and ability. 

Parkman's definition of the "better class" could, ho vv' ever, be 
colored by his other prejudices. A case in point was his different 
attitudes towards the Indians and the Acadians, the latter being the 
French settlers forcibly removed by the British from Nova Scotia 
in 1775. In writing of the American Indians, Parkman noted with 
considerable approval that most of them showed conspicuous re- 
spect for native superiority as well as a willingness to be subject to 
it. Yet in discussing the influence of the learned Jesuit priests — of 
whom he strongly disapproved — over the Acadians after the French 
and Indian War, Parkman was severely critical. He declared that 
the largely illiterate Acadians had become enfeebled by mental sub- 
jection to their priests. This had been true for so long that these 
people could no longer think for themselves. The result was that 
the Acadian needed their priests not only for their spiritual problems, 
but to guide them in their daily lives. Parkman's different views 
of the "best" leadership in these two societies was prompted by a 
marked anti-Catholic bias. This is borne out in his frank statement 
that having experienced both, he much preferred the society of the 
Sioux tepee to that of an Italian monastery. ^^ 

'In commenting upon the differences in the nature of peoples, 
Parkman had little to say on the subject of "race" as a designation 
of classes of people distinguished according to defined physical 
types. He often used the word "race" to mean a cultural or na- 
tional group, but more frequently he applied it in the species sense 
to refer to the "human race." He did, however, make extensive 
comments on one ethnic group that would fall within the modern 
anthropoligist's understanding of a distinct race. These were the 
American Indians. 

Speaking of the Iroquois, but indicating that his ideas had more 
general application, Parkman claimed that the Indian was less sensi- 
tive to pain than the white man but that this also made the Indian 
less given to passion than the "higher races" of men. This was, he 
asserted, a matter of training. The fact that these fierce and war- 
like people lived peaceably in villages without the coercion of 
superiors he explained in terms of developed character and habit. 

33 "Mannei's and Customs of Primitive Indian Tribes," North Amer- 
ican Review, CI (July, 1865), 51; "The Acadian Tragedy," Harper's 
Magazine, LXIX (November, 1884), 878; The Journals of Francis Park- 
man, New York, 1947, 1:101, quoted by editor Mason Wade in an editorial 
note from an unidentified letter. 


Parkman believed that the Iroquois had evolved more intense spirit 
of nationality than any other people since the Spartans and he ob- 
served that, contrary to popular notions, Indians in general were a 
gregarious people.^* 

Parkman asserted that the Great Indian orator, Red Jacket, was 
in many ways, characteristic of his race. He noted that Red Jacket 
was in no sense a broad intellect, but was remarkably shrewd and 
subtle, possessing an amazing power of sarcasm. But this Indian 
leader insisted that he could find no advantage for his people either 
in civilization or in Christianity. He persisted, instead, in a "cur- 
ious Indian idea" that one divine government existed for his own 
people and another for the white race. Far from concluding that 
the Indian's limited vision was inherent, Parkman declared that it 
was due to the fact that the contact of the Indians with whites was 
limited either to missionaries of narrow vision or to other whites 
of the lowest character. The implication is clear that Parkman be- 
lieved that if he were given the right environmental opportunities, 
the Indian could learn and advance his estate as well as anyone.^^ 

Shortly after the close of the last Indian wars in the United 
States, Parkman stated his views on the sources of Indian character 
in most emphatic terms. Insisting that the Indian was worth sav- 
ing, he declared that the nation had an obligation to help him ad- 
just to a new life. The Indian would not understand sentimentality, 
he warned, but he would understand justice and honor. Then, to 
counteract the objections of those who still nourished the frontier 
hatred of the Red Man, he examined the character of the Indian in 
purest Darwinian terms. Refusing to be drawn into any futile ef- 
fort at comparing white and Indian morality, he noted that, with 
the Indians, 

The law of the survival of the fittest bore upon them with peculiar harsh- 
ness; and the fittest were with them the boldest, the hardiest, the most 
crafty and the fiercest. It is by the working of this pitiless law through 
countless generations that the distinctive qualities of the Indian have been 
formed and wrought out of him in one generation or two.^^ 

Here it is evident that Parkman believed natural selection through 
the law of the "survival of the fittest" was operative on man. The 

34 "Manners and Customs of Primitive Indian Tx-ibes," 40, 50-52, 59. 

35 Review of Stone's Life and Times of Red Jacket, in the Atlantic 
Monthly, XIX (March, 1867), 384-385. 

3G "Letter on the Indian Rights Association," Critic, VIII (May, 
1886), 248. 


pressure of the environment acted to depress the weak still further 
while the traits of those best suited to survival in the Indian's 
environment were transmitted to their offspring. The process of 
natural selection could be altered — but only over a great period of 
time by a gradual alteration of the environment. 

Parkman's m.ajor biographer, Mason Wade, has quite properly 
made much of the Romantic influence in Parkman's work. At the 
same time, however, through all of Parkman's thought on the na- 
ture of man, a single theme consistently predominated. This was, 
of course, the tremendous emphasis which he placed on the role of 
the environment in molding human nature. With all men born 
savages, and with all men possessed of the same components in their 
nature, inherent differences existed among men in the form of vary- 
ing endowments of the multiple elements of human nature. But 
even the influence of these components could be altered by environ- 
mental conditions which Parkman declared v/ould shift the empha- 
sis from one facet of an individual's nature to another. As an 
environmentalist, Parkman actually moved into one of the major 
streams of thought traditional to the Age of Reason. 

It has been said of the great Roman historian, Tacitus, that he 
could not have attacked the degeneration of Nero's Rome had it 
not been for the fact that high standards of personal and public 
virtus remained the Roman ideal. In similar sense, Parkman's 
strictures against American life in his own time were born of his 
conviction that, within admitted limitations, man had an almost 
infinite capacity for improvement. 

Parkman often Vv^rote in anger and sometimes he wrote in disgust; 
but he never wrote without hope. Because he had overcome so 
many obstacles himself, he believed that others could do the same. 
He specifically declared his faith in the high potential of mankind. 
His concern for education, to be improved along broadly defined 
lines, only underscored his basic faith in the improvability of man. 
Parkman criticized the democracy in which he lived, then, because 
he believed its people had not attained the standards which he was 
certain their basic nature placed within their reach. The fact that 
he should set those standards so high made Parkman's view of hu- 
man nature a true compliment to his fellow men. 

Richard A. Thompson 
Ohio University 

The Committee of Mexican 

Bondholders and European 

Intervention in 1861 

The origin of British investments in Mexico dates from a letter 
of March 26, 1822, of Francisco de Borja Migoni, a Mexican mer- 
chant residing in London, to General Agustin Iturbide. Migoni, 
having heard of the financial problems facing his native land, wrote 
to Iturbide offering his services to assist the destitute national trea- 
sury by attempting to raise a loan in England.-^ That Mexico v^as in 
need of a loan at this period of her history is evident from the 
fiscal records of 1819- In that year, the ninth of the revolution 
against Spain, the total revenues of Mexico were $9,646,657, and 
the total expenditures amounted to $10,212,373. In order to cover 
this deficit of $565,716, the Mexican government inaugurated 
"forced loans" in the amount of $12,500,000 from the Catholic 
Church and private individuals.^ 

Forced loans, however, were not sufficient to meet the expenses 
of the debt-ridden administration. Therefore, the Mexican Con- 
gress on June 25, 1822, approved Migoni's suggestion by authorizing 
the government to 

"... seek among foreign powers a loan of twenty-five to thirty million pesos 
in such manner and under such conditions as its well known zeal may con- 
sider least onerous to the nation. "3 

Actually, the amount desired as a loan was not extravagant because 
by April, 1823, the national debt of Mexico had reached the stag- 
gering figure of $45,000,000."* One cause of the early financial 
chaos of the young nation was the fact that, since Spanish forces 
had remained in control of San Juan de Ulloa off Vera Cruz for 
four years after the mainland had won freedom, the Mexican cus- 
toms officials could not collect import duties, the most important 
item in the national revenue.^ Walter F. McCaleb suggests that 
the principal cause of the financial difficulties was the inexperience 
of government officials, long accustomed to viceregal adminstration 

1 Edgar Turlington, Mexico and He?- Foreign Creditors, New York, 
1930, 21. 

2 Walter Flavins McCaleb, The Public Finances of Mexico, New 
York, 1921, 23. 

3 Turlington, Mexico, 22. 

4 Ibid., 25. 

5 Hubert Herring, A History of Latin Ame^-ica : From the Beginnings 
to the Present, New York, 1956, 305, note 1. 



of financial affairs. Thus, after 1821, these officials were unable 
to solve the complex financial problems which accompanied their 
country's newly found freedom. Mexico, in the words of McCaleb, 
was "like a child suddenly possessed of a gigantic toy, with its 
puzzling mechanism."^ 

Whatever the cause, the fact remained that the country was 
faced with an astronomical debt. The nation had then turned to 
Migoni hoping that through his intercession a foreign government 
would come to the rescue. On May 14, 1824, the Mexican Govern- 
ment approved a contract made by Sefior Migoni with B. A. Gold- 
schmidt and Company, Bankers of London, for a loan of £3,200,000 
at five per cent.'^ By this contract Goldschmidt and Company agreed 
to place at the disposal of the Mexican Government, within fifteen 
months, the sum of £1,600,000. In return for this money, the 
Mexican Government issued bonds for £3,200,000 redeemable with- 
in thirty years from October 1, 1823, and bearing interest at the 
rate of five per cent per annum. For the payment of interest and 
the maintenance of the redemption fund of £32,000 a year, the 
Mexican Government gave a general pledge of its entire revenues 
and a special pledge of one-third of all duties collected at Vera 
Cruz after April 1, 1825.^ It was this Migoni-Goldschmidt trans- 
action which later served as the foundation for the claims of the 
Committee of Mexican Bondholders which are so well expressed 
in The Times (London), 1861. 

Goldschmidt sold the bonds to the public at fifty-eight per cent 
of their face value, leaving a gross profit of a million pounds with 
an expected yield to investors of 8.26 per cent.^ For the next 
thirty years, this group of speculators was continually appealing to 
the British Foreign Office to secure for them the revenues to which 
they were entitled by contract and of which they were deprived by 
the anarchical Mexican Government. Shortly after their original 
investment these investors formed a Committee of Mexican Bond- 
holders at London in 1829 to protect their foreign interests. ^° The 
formation of this committee is in itself an indication of the lack of 
confidence that the investors had in the Mexican Government. The 
fact that the date of the Committee's organization coincided with 

6 McCaleb, Public Finances of Mexico, 24. 

7 Thomas R. Lill, National Debt of Mexico: History and Present 
Status, New York, 1919, 12. 

8 Turlington, Mexico, 35, 86. 

9 Corporation of Foreign Bondholders, Sixty-Fourth Annual Report, 
London, 1937, 344. 

10 Turlington, Mexico, 11. 


that of the revolution of General Anastasio Bustamante against 
President Vicente Guerrero may be regarded as an explanation for 
the investors' shortlived trust in the government of Mexico. The 
earlier ouster of Iturbide and the subsequent overthrow of Guerrero 
convinced the Bondholders of the impossibility of the Mexican 
Government's position. 

The floundering efforts of the new republic to develop a stable 
government following independence are summarized by Professor 
Herring in the following manner: 

The public treasury was drained by greedy rulers and costly wars, while 
successive administrations were forced to conclude disadvantageous bar- 
gins with foreign bankers. ... In this period Mexican political life was 
fixed with the curse of Personalismo, a doctrine which discards constitutions, 
political parties, and ideals, and exalts the anarchic rule of the demagogue. ^ 

Besides the Bondholders there were other citizens who in the 
early 1820's had begun risking their capital in Mexico by organizing 
and investing in seven mining associations.-^" Paradoxical as it may 
seem, the British-controlled mining companies were extremely pros- 
perous throughout the forty years of Mexican anarchy. By 1861 
stock in the United Mexican Mining Company was the most sought- 
after investment on the London Stock Exchange.-^^ Clearly, in spite 
of the existing anarchy, the British investors were shrewd enough to 
realize that a profit could still be realized in the potentially wealthy 
young nation. The Bondholders also must have sensed that their 
investment was not so insecure as it superficially appeared. Ample 
proof of this is found in an examination of the annual publication 
of the trade and navigation statistics of the port of Vera Cruz for 
the three years, 1856-1858: 


Official statement for the three years, 1856-58 
Total 1856 1857 1858 

Imports $17,720,582 $11,224,415 $10,033,569 

Exports 8,942,988 11,384,765 2,915,576 

Import duties 4,757,397 2,155,386 1,517,930 

Export duties 243,035 375,382 100,617 

11 Herring, History of Latin America, 306. 

12 J. Fred Rippj^ "English Investments in Mexico: A Study of 
Bonanzas and Heartbreaks," The Journal of Business of the University 
of Chicago, XXV (October, 1952), 242. 

13 The Times, London, January 2, 1861, p. 7, coL 4. 

14 "Tlie Trade and Prospects of Mexico," The Bankers' Magazine: 
Journal of the Money Market and Commercial Digest, XXI (1861), 77. 


In order to understand the significance of the imports and exports 
at Vera Cruz for the period 1856-58 and the relationships of the 
duties collected during that period to the Bondholders, it is neces- 
sary to review quickly the provisions of a law passed by the Mexican 
Congress on October 14, 1850. This law, which effected the 
seventh alteration and second conversion of the original debt con- 
tract, provided that the Bondholders would henceforth receive 
twenty-five per cent of the import duties and five per cent of the 
export duties in the Gulf ports. ^^ By the law of 1850, then, the 
Bondholders, according to the official statement for the years 
1856-58, should have received $2,082,928 of the import duties 
and $35,901 of the export duties, a three-year grand total of 
$2,118,829. But, with the beginning of the revolution of Ayutla 
in March, 1854, the foreign debt became abeyant. 

The import and export statistics of the port of Vera Cruz show 
that theoretically the state was in a position to pay the Bondholders 
the money due them by virtue of the law of October, 1850. The 
revolution of Ayutla, however, precluded any possibility of satisfy- 
ing the Committee of Mexican Bondholders. The Vera Cruz il- 
lustration further furnishes convincing proof that the anarchic rule 
of Mexico was the fundamental cause of the Mexican Government's 
inability to meet its financial obligations. The port of Vera Cruz 
was in no sense an exception but rather an example of the general 
policy followed throughout Mexico at this time. 

One of the first acts of the new government under President 
Ignacio Comonfort, one of the leaders in the Ayutla revolution, was 
to issue a decree authorizing the Bondholders to name agents in 
each of the ports of the Republic, with authority to collect the 
amounts due direct from the importers and exporters. -^^ Comon- 
fort's attempt to placate the Bondholders was of little consequence, 
however, as his stay in power was of brief duration. Factions 
within the Constitutional Party, partly attributable to the insolvent 
condition of the national treasury and also to the growing divsion 
between the clerical and constitutional party, led to Comonfort' s 
resignation and the beginning of the bloodiest v/ar in Mexican 
history — the War of the Reform. Two political parties were in- 
volved in this war, one representing the Church and the army, the 
other composed of the group favoring the recently promulgated 

15 Lill, National Debt of Mexico, 36. For a detailed account of the 
seven alterations in the original Bond issue from 1824 to 1850 see Turling- 
ton, Mexico, 49-100. 

16 Lill, National Debt of Mexico, 39. 


Constitution. The clerical or conservative forces had headquarters 
at Mexico City and were headed by General Felix Zuloaga and 
later by General Miguel Miramon. The Constitutional forces were 
presided over by Benito Juarez, who established his government at 
Vera Cruz. Because Juarez was at the customs city of Vera Cruz, 
it was to his party-^''' that the first definite overtures were made in 
behalf of the Committee of Mexican Bondholders. 

On January 24, 1859, Captain Hugh Dunlop of the British 
Navy in command of H.M.S. Tarter sent a letter to Governor 
Manuel G. Zamora of Vera Cruz. Dunlop wrote: 

In order to remove the just indignation with which Her Majesty's 
Government has viewed the frequent infringement of the rights of British 
subjects in Mexico, and to bring this question of grievances to a prompt 
and satisfactory' termination, the Undersigned submits for ratification the 
Articles herewith appended: — 

To be charged on the whole customs revenue [at Vera Cruz] ; twenty- 
five per cent for the Mexican Bondholders in London. 

The immediate payment to Her Majesty's Consul at Vera Cruz of 7,680 
dollars due to the London bondholders. . . . 

That the authorities in possession of Vera Cruz insist upon the assign- 
ments to the British creditors being punctually and fully paid at Tampico 
to the agent for the debt; and in case of failure to do so, the claim to be 
made good from the Custom House at Vera Cruz at the expiration of one 
month's notice. i^ 

On February 7, 1859, Zamora, who referred to himself as "the 
mouthpiece" of Juarez, wrote to Dunlop that: 

The British creditors' assignments shall be paid punctually and in full, 
the Constitutional Government having taken measures to carry out this 
obligation with the most entire good faith. 

Besides the payment of the . . . twenty-five per cent, belonging to holders 
of Mexican bonds in London, there shall now be set apart eight per cent 
of the Custom-house dues on foreign vessels (with the exception of French 
vessels, which are already very heavily taxed) for the payment of arrears 
of interest. . . . 

The amount now due to the holders of Mexican bonds in London, and 
which was left unpaid in September last, shall be paid. 

The Government of Vera Cruz will continue using every effort to en- 

i''' The use of the word party, rather than govetniment, is proper 
because at the inception of the Civil War, Zuloaga, and not Juarez, was 
recognized as the head of the de facto government; see Edgar L. Erick- 
son (ed.), British Sessional Papers: House of Commons, 1861, LXV, 
339, New York, (Readix Microprint, n. d.) ; hereinafter cited as British 
Sessional Papers. 

i8 British Sessional Papers, 339, 340. 


force the payment of the British assignments by the Customs-house at 
Tampico. . . . i^ 

Though Governor Zamora, the spokesman for Juarez, had given 
his word of honor that British holders of Mexican bonds would be 
paid "punctually and in full," the Juarez Government failed to keep 
its promise. As a result of this latest infraction a new agreement 
was reached at Vera Cruz on December 15, I860, between Captain 
W. Cornwallis Aldham, Dunlop's successor as commander of the 
British squadron in the Gulf of Mexico, and Melchor Ocampo, 
Foreign Minister in the Juarez Government. The new agreement 
contained the following provisions: 

An additional ten per cent on all import duties, from all vessels, shall 
be assigned at the Customs houses of Vera Cruz and Tampico, to repay the 
sums withheld in both ports during the present year; and when these sums 
are paid up, the said new assignments of ten per cent, shall cease and re- 
turn to the National Treasury. 

The payment of the assignments shall commence on the first of Janu- 
ary, 1861, excepting that of the new ten per cent, which shall not commence 
until the first [of] February, by which time the Sea Customhouse of this 
port shall furnish her Majesty's Consul with a complete and exact state- 
ment of the sums unpaid by it during the whole of the present year. . . . 

The Government engages solemnly not to tolerate in [the] future the 
violation of the present or the Dunlop Convention, and to remove from 
office any officer or public employe appertaining to or dependent on it 
who shall again attempt to infringe the present arrangement of that of Cap- 
tain Dunlop .... 20 

Three months prior to the Aldham-Ocampo agreement the 
Juarez forces, financially pressed in the last months of the war, had 
seized over a million pesos of foreign funds which were chiefly 
the property of citizens of Great Britain, France, Spain, and Ger- 
many. The consuls of those powers immediately reported the 
confiscation to their home Governments. George B. Matthew, the 
British charge d'affaires, wrote to Lord John Russell, British 
Foreign Secretary, on September 28, I860: 

I regret to have to communicate to your Lordship . . . the seizure of the 
conducta of silver [at Laguna Seca} proceeding from Guanaxuato and San 
Luis Potosi to Tampico for embarcation, in which various British subjects 
had money to the amount of between £80,000 and 100,000 sterling. ^i 

As would be expected, this unscrupulous theft of the property of 

19 Ihid., 343. 

20 Ihid., 345, 346. 

21 Ibid., 266. 


British subjects caused fiery editorials to appear in British newspa- 
pers demanding an apology from the Juarez party."" Matthew wrote 
to General Santos DegoUado, the general under whose authority 
the crime had been committed, urging him to consider the resti- 
tution of the $400,000 of stolen money.^^ 

In the event that DegoUado should refuse to return the stolen 
funds, Matthew on December 9, I860, wrote to Captain Aldham: 

In this disagreeable and difficult position I see no alternative but in the 
forcible occupation of the Custom-houses of Vera Cruz and Tampico (and 
if necessary, of those places), should our just demands be rejected."^ 

It is the parenthetical phrase of Matthew's letter that is preg- 
nant with significance. Here was the British charge d'affaires 
suggesting to the commanding officer of a British naval squadron 
that Her Majesty's troops forcibly occupy the cities of Vera Cruz 
and Tampico. Admittedly, Matthew's letter was not an official 
statement of the British Foreign Office, but it does reveal the dras- 
tic steps a high-ranking governmental official was contemplating in 
order to protect the investments of Her Majesty's subjects. 

Understandably, the Committee of Mexican Bondholders did 
not fail to give the DegoUado seizure of the silver train at Laguna 
Seca their undivided attention. In the summer of 1861 the Com- 
mittee presented a series of resolutions to Lord Russell demanding 
that he formulate a definite policy in order to resolve their claims 
of $10,000,000 against Mexico. One of the resolutions dealt with 
the theft (by DegoUado) of commercial house property from an 
official conduct a. "^ President Juarez realized that his cause would 
be very seriously jeopardized if the British Foreign Office, which still 
had not recognized him, should turn against his party. He there- 
fore ordered that the British money be returned and that DegoUado 
stand trial on the charge of treason to the Constitutional Govern- 
ment.^^ That the Laguna Seca incident did not erupt into an inter- 
national war may be attributed, at least in part, to this decisive 
action on the part of the chief executive of the liberal forces. 

The Juarez forces were not alone in their seizure of British 
property. The Miramon Government aggravated the situation by an 
even more serious blunder: On November 17, 1860, Leonardo Mar- 

22 The Times, February 19, 1861, p. 5, col. 4. 

23 British Sessional Papers, 300. 

24 Ibid., 309. This letter was a contributing factor in effecting the 
Aldham-Ocampo agreement, pi'eviously discussed. 

25 The Times, July 4, 1861, p. 10, cols. 1, 2; July 9, 1861, p. 11, col. 5. 

26 Ralph Roeder, Juarez and His Mexico, I, New York, 1947, 250-255. 


quez, Miramon's leading general, wrote to Charles Whitehead, the 
Bondholders' agent in Mexico City, indicating the audacity of the 
Miramon-Marquez forces: 

As the moneys belonging to the public funds which are in your custody, 
destined to the payment of the bondholders of the foreign debt contracted 
in London, are not yet derived in definite payment, and in the actual cir- 
cumstances may run much risk ... his Excellency, the General-in-chief of 
said forces, in compliance with his duty, and in order to save his respon- 
sibility in respect to the valuable property, has directed that you place the 
said sums at the disposal of the Commisariat of the army; with the under- 
standing that only the accounts absolutely necessary shall be removed from 
the chests in which they may be found. . . . This day you will please to 
deliver the sum of 200,000 dollars, for which the Commisary-General will 
give you a receipt. God and Law. 27 

When Whitehead refused to turn over the money,^^ Marquez 
replied that he was sending Colonel Don Antonio Juaregin to carry 
out Miramon's order.-^ And the orders were ruthlessly carried out. 
Juan B. Pacheco, Spanish Ambassador to the Miramon Government, 
v/as in the British Legation at the time of the robbery of the $600,000 
belonging to the British investors. In a letter to Matthew, Pacheco 
reported that the Miramon forces had broken through "a closed 
door, shut, and stamped with the seals of that [British] legation. "^° 

An immediate result of the seizure of the Bondholders' money 
was the official severance by the British Foreign Office of all dip- 
lomatic relations with the Miramon Government.^^ After the seizure 
of the Bondholders' money at the British Legation there followed a 
barrage of letters to Lord Russell demanding that the British Gov- 
ernment take action. On December 15, I860, David Robertson, 
Member of Parliament and Honorary Chairman of the Committee 
of Mexican Bondholders, wrote to Russell describing the Bond- 
holders as: 

... a most respectable body, many of them whose fathers, husbands, and 
brothers embarked their all in the funds in 1825 to aid the Mexican Govern- 
ment and people to achieve their independence, to which the British Govern- 
ment of that day lent their open countenance and avowed support. 32 

As spokesman for the Committee of Mexican Bondholders, Robert- 
son added: 

27 British Sessional Papers, 280, 281. 

28 Ibid., 282. 

29 Ibid. 

30 Ibid., 287. 

31 Ibid., 274. 

32 Ibid., 296. 


As a body of ill-used Englishmen we feel confident that we shall not seek 
in vain at your Lordship's hands for immediate redress. . . .33 

On the 12th of January, 1861, Lord Russell assured Robertson and 
the Committee of Mexican Bondholders: 

Her Majesty's Government will hold the Mexican nation, by whatever 
Government it may happen to be ruled, responsible for the money recently 
seized at Mexico. 34 

Russell's reply, written after the triumph of the Juarez forces, was 
temporarily effective in pacifying Robertson and the Committee. In 
the months following the robbery the Bondholders were by no 
means alone in their loud protests against the Miramon pillage. 
Robert Phillimore, the foremost jurist in England, remarked that 
the act of seizing public funds under the seal of the Legation as- 
sumed the public character of an offense against the Queen of 
England. ^^ 

Echoes of the Miramon seizure even reached the British House 
of Commons. On February 12, 1861, one week after the reconven- 
ing of Parliament, Henry Bristow, M.P., asked Lord Ruesseli what 
measures his office had taken or were going to take to protect 
British interests in Mexico. Russell replied that after the recent 
shameful robbery committed by General Miramon, Her Majesty's 
Government had informed Matthew to contact Juarez, and "to 
intimate that we would recognize his Government if he would 
acknowledge responsibility for our financial losses. "'^^ 

The public excitement over Miramon's embezzlement of Bond- 
holders' funds and the general financial chaos in Mexico in the 
momentous year of 1861 is clearly seen in the columns of The 
Ti?nes, which in the 1860's was the world's most influential news- 
paper. And inasmuch as Lord Russell was not regarded with favor 
by John Thadeus Delane,^'^ editor of The Times, 1841-1877, the 
newspaper did not hesitate to ally itself with the Bondholders 
against the Foreign Secretary. Russell was attacked by the editor of 
The Times as a man who 

. . . has shown by his past course that British property may with perfect 
impunity be seized and misappropriated in that country [Mexico] the 

33 Ibid., 297. 

34 The Times, May 30, 1861, p. 7, cols. 1, 2. 

35 Joaquin D. Casasus, Historia de la deuda contraida en Londres, 
Mexico, Imprenta del Gobierno, 1885, 340. 

36 T. C. Hansard, Parliamentartj Debates, CLXI, London, 1861, 340, 341. 

37 William Dodgson Bowman, The Story of the Times, London, 
1931, 235. 


bondholders are evidently at the mercy of the Government, and in a posi- 
tion no bettter than if they had never given up three-fourths of their claims 
in order to obtain the concession of the customs' duties as a fancied security 
for the remainder. 3 8 

A week later, Lord Russell again found himself censured — this 
time in the House of Lords by William Graham. The subject was 
the recently reported^ ^ escape of Miramon with the connivance of 
the French Minister in Mexico. Graham directed Lord Russell to 
ask the French Government to explain their assisting General 
Miramon, the embezzler of the Bondholders' money. "^^ 

In the meantime, the British charge d'affaires had presented Lord 
Russell's condition of recognition of Francisco Zarco, Juarez's Sec- 
retary of State. The conditions were that all the just claims of the 
British subjects be acknowledged by the Juarez regime. On Febru- 
ary 23, 1861, Zarco notified Matthew that the conditions were ac- 
cepted, whereupon recognition was accorded. "^^ It is difficult to 
understand just how Juarez proposed to fulfill his acceptance of 
the British claim. Mexico was an effete nation, exhausted by its 
recent civil war. Furthermore, almost all the major revenues of 
the country were assigned to foreign creditors. The total assign- 
ments for the ports of Vera Cruz and Tampico in January, 1861, 
were at the preposterous figure of ninety-two per cent.'^^ Juarez 
was in a dilemma. He was faced with the mutually exclusive prob- 
lems of satisfying the uncompromising claims of the foreign bond- 
holders and establishing an adequate budget for the operation of his 

By the end of April a decision was reached. Seiior Jose Mata, 
the Minister of Finance, notified Whitehead that the present Mexi- 
can Government did not consider itself liable for the $600,000 
confiscated by Miramon."*^ The Committee of Mexican Bondholders, 
on hearing of Mata's statement, called a special meeting to dis- 
cuss the effect of the Mexican government's decision on their in- 
vestments. At this meeting, presided over by David Robertson,^^ 
a resolution was passed which provided that: 

38 The Times, March 15, 1861, p. 10, cols. 5, 6. 

39 Ibid., March 19, 1861, p. 10, col. 5. 

40 Hansard, Parliamentary Debates, CLXII, 249, 350. 

41 British Sessional Papers, 330-332. 

42 Turlington, Mexico, 124. 

43 The Times, May 30, 1861, p. 7, cols. 1, 2. 

44 The fact that a member of Parliament was the chairman of the 
meeting clearly indicates the prestige and influence of the Committee 
of Mexican Bondholders. 


The British Government be warranted by the principles of international 
law to intervene in Mexico to enforce the just demands of the Bondholders. ^5 

If the Committee of Mexican Bondholders were the first to pass 
a resolution calling for intervention in Mexico, they were by no 
means the only ones favoring the idea. On July 19, 1861, Dubois 
de Saligny, French Minister in Mexico, had written to Edouard An- 
toine Thouvenal, French Minister of Foreign Affairs, proposing that 
England, France, and Spain seize the Mexican custom houses to as- 
sure the payment of their respective claims.''^ Ten days later the 
Mexican Congress by a vote of 112 to 4 passed a law which sus- 
pended all payments on the nation's indebtedness for a period of 
two years.'*^ It was as a direct result of this act that the British 
Government on July 26, 1861, severed diplomatic relations with 
the Juarez administration.'*^ Paradoxically the suspension of diplo- 
matic relations for financial reasons occurred almost simultaneously 
with the arrival in Britain of $317,020 in specie and bullion from 
Vera Cruz."*^ Though this treasure of private British mining as- 
sociations was not connected with the claims of the Committee of 
Mexican Bondholders, it clearly was an indication of the vast wealth 
in Mexico at the height of the nation's bankruptcy. 

When the news of the debt suspension reached England, John 
Delane wrote an editorial demanding that British arms be used to 
assist the Bondholders to recover their investments.^ ° And on 
September 18, the Bondholders wrote Lord Russell demanding the 
intervention of British and French troops to protect their past in- 
vestments.^^ Following this plea by the British investors, Lord 
Russell on October 7, 1861, wrote Henry Wellesley Cowley, Eng- 
lish Ambassador at Paris, directing him to contact the French 
Minister of Foreign Affairs and inform him that: 

The dem.ands of the Three Powers [Spain, France, and England] must be 
drawn up with precision and care. They would comprehend the delivery 
of the Forts of San Juan de Ulloa and the Forts at Tampico to the Allied 
Forces to be retamed by them until reparation for their wrongs is obtained. 

45 The Times, July 5, 1861, p. 5, cols, 1, 2. The research of this 
writer has not uncovered any intervention resolution enacted by other 
organizations prior to July 5, 1861. Thus, possibly the distinction of 
being the first belongs to the Committee of Slexican Bondholders. 

46 William Spence Robertson, "The Tripartite Treaty of London," 
The Hispanic American Historical Revieiv, XX (May, 1940), 168. 

47 The Times, August 30, 1861, p. 5, cols. 1, 2. 

48 Ibid. 

49 Und., p. 8, col. 3. 

50 Ibid., September 6, 1861, p. 6, cols. 4, 5. 
5t Ibid., September 18, 1861, p. 10, col. 3. 


For this purpose the Custom Houses of Vera Cruz and Tampico must 
be placed unreservedly in the hands of Commissioners appointed by the 
Combined Power s.^ 2 

In the last week of October, 1861, representatives from Spain, 
France, and England met at London to discuss a military expedition 
against Mexico as a result of Mexico's failure to meet its contracted 
obligations.^^ On October 31, 1861, the negotiations ended, and 
European intervention officially began. Among the provisions in 
the London Pact of Intervention, the following was of chief im- 
portance to the Committee of Mexican Bondholders: 

The troops will occupy Vera Cruz and the other cities on the coast 
where Custom-Houses are established. If, after a given delay, the Govern- 
ment of General Juarez has not paid up the money it owes, an advance will 
be made on the capital. 5 4 

With the beginning of armed intervention there did not im- 
mediately follow a return of the Committee of Mexican Bond- 
holders' money. In fact the British citizens who had purchased the 
thirty-year Mexican Bonds in 1824 were not completely reimbursed 
until 1888 — sixty- four years later. That story, however, is not 
within the scope of this paper. The evidence which has been pre- 
sented in this essay clearly indicates that the Committee of Mexican 
Bondholders was a major factor in effecting European intervention. 
The constant pressure exerted by the Committee and their ally, The 
Times, on Lord Russell eventually bore fruit at the Tripartite Con- 
ference. The basic tenet of the Committee of Mexican Bondholders 
was that the British flag must follow and protect British investments. 
On October 31, 1861, after years of remonstrances to their govern- 
ment, the pleas of the Committee of Mexican Bondholders were 
finally heard. Intervention in their behalf was now to become a 

Philip J. Sheridan 

St. Mary's University 
San Antonio, Texas 

52 Robertson, "Tripartite Treaty," 173. 

53 Lord Russell was primarily interested in a military occupation 
of Mexico. For a severe censorship of the shady transactions of the 
British Foreign Secretary at the tripartite conference, see Karl Blind, 
"An English Government and the Mexican Republic," Westminister Review, 
CLXII (October, 1904), 357-365. 

5 4 The Times, November 7, 1861, p. 7, col. 5. 

The Founding Fathers and the 
Middle Ages 

The reliance of the American founding fathers upon historical 
precedent is well known. No modern man, they argued, could 
understand his world unless he studied history. Such was especially 
true for republicans and democrats, who had much to learn from the 
mistakes of their predecessors, and the speeches and letters of the 
men who formed the federal govrnmnt are studded with allusions to 
the classical republics. It was John Adams who suggested that the 
history of Greece ought to serve as an octagonal mirror, whose 
many sides would reflect the past and present, showing modern 
republics the defects present in themselves and in their predeces- 
sors, thus helping to remedy the defects. Who could understand 
republican government who did not know the history of Greece and 
Rome? Who could hope to avoid the problems that beset Athens 
and the Roman Republic unless he studied them in detail ? 

While the attraction of the founding fathers for Greece and 
Rome is both interesting and instructive, their distaste for what 
followed classical civilization is equally so. Few of the men who 
went to the federal convention, or who corresponded or advised 
with the men who did, showed any interest in the middle ages. 
Their thoughts ran to Greece and Rome as water runs downhill, 
and the ten centuries that separated the fall of western Rome and 
the Ninety-nine Theses was for them more remote than the ages 
of Pericles and Cicero. Thomas Jefferson spoke for most of his 
educated contemporaries when he styled the middle ages "the 
Dark Ages," and dismissed them as an arid era. "We have seen, 
indeed, once within the records of history, a complete eclipse of 
the human mind continuing for centuries," he wrote John Adams 
in his old age.^ And Adams easily agreed. To him, feudalism 
and the middle ages was "A thousand years of barons' wars, caus- 
ing universal darkness, ignorance, and barbarity, ended at last 
in a simple monarchy. . . ."" 

1 Jefferson to Adams, September 12, 1821; in Andrew Lipscomb 
and Albert E. Bergh (eds.), The Writings of Thovias Jefferson, Wash- 
ington, 1905, XV, 334. 

2 Charles Francis Adams (ed.), The Works of John Adams, Boston, 
1850, VI, 251. 



In the booklists and recommendations for reading which they 
circulated among themselves and friends, neither Jefferson nor 
Adams, Madison nor Washington recommended many studies deal- 
ing with the middle ages. In his recommendations to friends and 
students, Jefferson passed easily from Plutarch and Tacitus to 
Robertson and Bolingbroke. He did so partly because literature 
on the medieval period was scarce, but largely because he felt 
that the whole era offered little in the way of instruction to his 
contemporaries. He preferred the histories of Greece and Rome 
in the ancient world, and those of France and England in the 
modern world. ^ 

There were reasons for this. In almost every way, the Greeks 
and Romans appeared to eighteenth century men as more modern 
than their medieval counterparts. The Greek, at once so erratic 
and brilliant, and the Roman, shifty but constructive, offered both 
a lesson and an enlightenment that was not rivaled for the found- 
ing fathers by anything in the middle ages. The interplay of 
politics, the problems of national growth and development, the 
emergence of political theories and institutions, and the luster 
and accomplishments of famous men seemed clearer in a Greek or 
Roman setting. In short, to the founding fathers, the Greeks and 
Romans resembled eighteenth century men more than did medieval 

The middle ages was a period of unity, or so everyone had 
been taught, but that unity was more apparent than real to the 
founding fathers. The medieval unity did not correspond to the 
unity of the Roman Republic. To the founding fathers, it was 
more a spiritual unity than a temporal one. The men of their 
generation thought in political and sociological terms, and this is 
the key to understanding their attitudes toward the middle ages. 
To them much of the middle ages seemed to be a v/rangle over 
religious beliefs; the emphasis lay on faith rather than works, and 
the generation of 1789, schooled in war and revolution, preferred 
for its purposes to look to the latter for success in government and 
society. The only great political development of the period was 
the common law, and this seemed to the founding fathers to be in 
spite of rather than because of the medieval setting. Much of 

3 Jefferson, Writings, XVI, 124-129; Ibid., XIX, 103-105; J. C. Fitz- 
patrick (ed.), The Writings of George Washington, Washington, 1939, 
II, 515-517; Gaillard Hunt (ed.), The Writings of James Madison, Wash- 
ington, 1904, II, 132-134. 


medieval life seemed to them to be the last bitter dregs of the 
Roman aip of tea, the final price paid by the successors of the 
Romans when they failed to maintain order and unity in their 

The middle ages stood to the founding fathers as a rickety 
bridge spanning the chasm from ancient to modern times. Its 
contribution to government v/as feudalism, a system that seemed to 
be only an evasion of responsibility. Intrigued with government, 
the founding fathers thus tended to equate feudalism with medieval 
life, overlooking other aspects of the period. John Adams dog- 
matically asserted that everyone knew "the feudal system to be 
inconsistent v/ith liberty and the rights of mankind."^ The feudal 
law remained for him a "dark ribaldry of heraldry" which culminated 
in "the most mischievous of all doctrines, that of passive obedience 
and non-resistance."'' The original colonists, according to Adams, 
had come to the new world to escape the remnants of feudal life 
that remained in Europe. "They detested all the base services 
and servile dependencies of the feudal system. They knew that 
no such unworthy dependencies took place in the ancient seats of 
liberty, the republics of Greece and Rome. . . ."^ 

James Madison, who did considerable research on the subject 
of confederacies, and who was a close student of history, thought 
as little of medieval institutions as Adams. He looked upon 
medieval power politics as a long series of struggles between local 
lords who resisted the advances made toward governmental con- 
solidation pursued by the greater nobles. The result was political 
confusion and social unrest. The situation seemed to him to have 
been chronic. "Had no external danger enforced internal harmony 
and subordination," he wrote in the 45th Federalist, "and par- 
ticularly, had the local sovereign possessed the affection of the 
people, the great kingdoms of Europe would at this time consist 
of as many independent princes as there were formerly feudatory 

The middle ages might offend Madison's sense of harmony 
and Jefferson's sense of liberty, but to Hamilton the whole period 
was a lesson in the evils of disunion. The very feudal system 
carried within itself the seeds of its own destruction, for it created 
friction where none would have existed had there been unity. 

4 Adams, Works, IV, 455. 

5 Ibid., 454. 

6 Ibid. 


"The consequences o£ this situation were a continual opposition 
to the authority of the sovereign, and frequent wars between the 
great barons or chief feudatories themselves." Nothing could 
better reflect the need for national unity. "This period of European 
affairs is emphatically styled by historians, the times of feudal 
anarchy."^ To him, nothing so easily condemned the feudal 
economy as the welter of restrictions which had arisen as a con- 
sequence of this political disunion in the states of the Holy Roman 
Empire.^ To Hamilton, the sum of medieval politics was confeder- 
ation, and he saw nothing worth salvaging from it. Confederation 
failed where it needed success most, in the possession and dispen- 
sation of unified national authority, because it was based on the 
medieval idea of division of power among the component parts 
of the political system. 

The separate governments in a confederacy may aptly be compared with the 
feudal baronies; with this advantage in their favor, that from the reasons 
already explained, they will generally possess the confidence and good-will 
of the people, and with so important a support, will be able effectually to 
oppose all encorachments of the national government. It will be well if 
they are not able to counteract its legitimate and necessary authority. ^ 

It was with much uncertainty that the delegates met in Phila- 
delphia during the hot summer of 1787. Could they frame a 
new government.'* Could this government be a republic, and 
would it last,-^ In order to answer these questions and to guide 
their discussions they turned repeatedly to history and the lessons 
of past republics. None was more searching in his inquiry than 
John Adams. Racing against time in London, where he was on 
a diplomatic mission, he wrote the first volume of his A Defense 
of the Constitutions of Government of the United States of America, 
in order to make his study of historic republics available to the 
delegates. He devoted much space to the Greek and Roman re- 
publics and concluded that they had much to offer in the way of 
precedent to any New American republic. 

He also devoted much of his book to a discussion of the Italian 
republics of the middle ages, and found little solace in their ex- 
amples. Their singular virtue seemed to be a warning not to 
repeat their histories. "The history of one is, under different 

7 Henry Cabot Lodge (ed.), The Works of Alexander Hamilton, 
Federal Edition, New York, 1904, XI, 132-133. 

8 See his Federalist, 22. 

9 See his Federalist, 17. 


names and various circumstances, the history of all; and all, ex- 
cepting two or three that are still decided aristocracies, had the 
same destiny, an exit in monarchy. "^° As far as Adams was con- 
cerned, not much of worth had survived from the welter of city 
states and duchies raised up in the name of republicanism in 
medieval Italy. "During [the middle ages}, republics without 
number arouse in Italy; whirled upon their axles or single centers; 
foamed, raged, and burst, like so many waterspouts upon the 
ocean. They were all alike ill constituted; all aHke miserable; 
and all ended in similar disgrace and despotism. "^^ Thus they 
illustrated graphically for Adams and his contemporaries that out 
of medieval political disunity had come in the end the thing which 
they feared most — monarchy. 

It is true that Adams wrote with a purpose, and that that pur- 
pose colored his selection of material and his judgm.ents, but his 
conclusions generally reflected the thinking of his contemporaries. 
He thought the feudal system, especially as mirrored in the German 
principalities, the height of folly. "Nothing ought to have more 
weight in America, to determine her judgment against mixing the 
authority, of the one, the few, and the many, confusedly in one 
assembly, then the wide spread miseries and final slavery of almost 
all mankind, in consequence of such an ignorant policy in the 
ancient Germans."^" He could never forgive the middle ages 
for not having produced a system of balanced government. -^^ 

Endeavoring to leave no stone unturned in his quest for his- 
torical insight, Madison likewise turned to the middle ages to 
examine its republics. He agreed with Adams that it was hardly 
worth the quest except to illustrate pitfalls to be avoided. His 
two lengthy research memoranda, which provided material for his 
remarkable speeches at the Federal Convention, were largely con- 
cerned VN^ith Greek and Roman history, but he also made notes on 

10 Adams, Works, V, 332. In writing the Defense, Adams consulted 
numerous authors, copied from most of them, and quarreled v\-'ith all 
of them. He displayed knowledge of the work of a number of students 
of medieval Italian history, especially Machiavelli and Guiccardini, upon 
whom he drew liberally for his chapters on Florence. The whole thing 
seemed at times to be a satire. "Kings, nobles, and people claimed the 
government in turn; and after all the turbulence, wars, and revolutions, 
which compose the history of Europe for so many ages, we find simple 
monarchies established everywhere." Ibid., IV, 297. 

11 Ibid., VI, 217 

12 Ibid., IV, 298. 

13 For an elaboration of Adams' political philosophy and his ideas 
on balanced government, see Correa M. Walsh, The Political Science of 
John Adams, New York, 1915. 


the fourteenth century Swiss confederation. He concluded that it 
was a marriage de convenance, and had little to bind it together; 
there was no common coinage; cantons were of different sizes; 
different kinds of government prevailed in different areas. To 
him, the whole thing provided "a striking proof of the want of 
authority in the whole over its parts. "-^^ He also weighed the 
Italians and found them wanting. Like Adams he looked to 
Greece and Rome, not to the middle ages, for proper examples. 

As the delegates to the Federal Convention debated through 
the summer heat, they studded their remarks with allusions to the 
classical republics, hoping to discover precedents which would pre- 
vent error and which would light the path they were taking toward 
their new republic. They seldom turned with favor to any medieval 
examples. In pleading for a stable central government, Madison 
condemned confederation by comparing it to the "feudal licentious- 
ness of the middle ages of Europe. . . ."-^^ 

Gouverneur Morris shortly rose to support the Virginian. He 
considered the German Confederation of his day a feudal relic 
and earnestly desired that its example be avoided in the new United 
States. The Germans were threatened not only by foreign powers 
but also by internal disunion. "From whence does this proceed.'* 
Frorn the energy of the local authorities, from its being considered 
of more consequence to support the Prince of Hesse, than the 
happiness of the people of Germany."^^ 

For Hamilton, the whole feudal period boded ill for effective 
government. With his predilection for strong central government, 
he admired the example of Charlemagne in the middle ages, but 
"The great feudal chiefs . . . exercising their local sovereignty, soon 
felt the spirit and found the means of encroachment, which re- 
duced the imperial authority to a nominal sovereignty."-^'^ He 
thought that nothing better illustrated the course of all confedera- 
tions, and nothing ought to be more sedulously avoided by the 
framers of the new constitution than such feudal divisions. 

The one great surviving medieval political structure which illus- 
trated the course of feudal politics to the founding fathers was the 
Holy Roman Empire, which Jefferson called "a burlesque on gov- 

14 Madison, Writings, II, 375-379. 

15 Max Farrand (ed.), The Records of the Federal Convention, New 
Haven, 3 vols., 1911, I, 448; Cf. Ibid., 326, 449. 

16 Ibid., 552. 

17 Ibid., 285. 


ernment. . . ."^^ To them it was indeed neither Holy nor Roman 
nor an empire. Madison devoted most of the 19th Federalist to a 
discussion of its merits and demerits, and this pamphlet reflected 
the biting v/ords he had used regarding it in the Convention itself. 
In medieval Germany, he reported, "The most furious private 
wars, accompanied with every species of calamity, were carried 
on between the different princes and states." The result was the 
disappearance of any unity which the confederation may ever have 
had. "In the eleventh century the emperors enjoyed full sovereignty: 
In the fifteenth they had little more than the symbols and decora- 
tions of power." 

The German confederation of the eighteenth century had de- 
veloped out of this medieval confusion, but to Madison it was 
little more than a false front disguising an aged and decayed 
structure. Even in the eighteenth century, according to him, it 
rested on the principle which had brought feudalism to grief — 
unbalanced and divided sovereignty — and consequently it was but 
a hollow shell, prey to quarrels within and foes without He 
passed a harsh judgment on it and medieval politics in general 
when he wrote: 

The history of Germany is a history of wars between the emperor and the 
princes and states; of wars among the princes and states themselves; of 
the licentiousness of the strong, and the oppression of the weak; of foreign 
intrusions; of requisitions of men and money disregarded or partially com- 
plied with ; of attempts to enforce them, altogether abortive, or attended with 
a slaughter and desolation, involving the innocent with the guilty; of gen- 
eral imbecility, confusion and misery. 

Only family pride and the weakness of the component parts 
held the Confederation together. The Holy Roman Empire stood 
for the founding fathers as a sad reminder of the confusion bred 
by feudalism, of the impossibility of union under anything like con- 
federation, and of the lessons of medieval politics.-^^ 

At first glance it seems strange that the founding fathers 
should have so completely condemned feudalism. With its elaborate 
system of checks and balances that guaranteed certain liberties 
to servant and master alike, and in its elaborate precautions against 
usurpations of these basic rights, it contained some of the seeds 

18 Jefferson, Writiyigs, I, 52. 

19 Cf. Robert C. Binkley, "The Holy Roman Empire versus the 
United States," in Conyears Read (ed.), The Constitution Reconsidered, 
New York, 1938, 271-285. 


of the constitutionalism and balanced government that the fathers 
were so anxious to establish. ^° 

Their attitude can be explained partly by their almost com- 
plete lack of objective historical information dealing vv^ith the period 
from 800 to 1200. The strongest arguments against feudalism, 
however, were the "feudal relics" that survived in Europe, especially 
the Holy Roman Empire. The founding fathers agreed that the 
medieval period may have produced some advances in law, but 
feudal politics in action were simply too chaotic for them. 

In the largest sense, the founding fathers disliked the feudal 
system because they did not believe that it had ever worked for 
the good of the whole people and had never lent itself to just 
government. The political power in the feudal system had been 
placed in the wrong place, among the nobles and kings, with no 
broader base of support and responsibility in the people as a whole. 
"The common people had no adequate and independent shares 
in the legislatures, and found themselves harrassed to discover who 
was the sovereign and whom they ought to obey, as much as they 
ever had been or could be to determine who had the most merit. ""-^ 
Thus, instead of producing the pyramid of loyalty and service 
which it envisioned, feudalism had brought faction and strife 
among the nobility, each contending for greater power, to the 
perpetual detriment of the people as a whole. Feudal economics, 
in hand with feudal politics, had bound the people to the soil and 
they were accorded no voice in their government. The whole 
feudal system was so intricately balanced that, ironically, it became 
unbalanced in operation. In theory it balanced political powers 
against each other; in practice, it pitted them against each other. 
That genuine democracy or representative government would have 
been too advanced for the medieval system seems never to have 
occurred to the founding fathers, who simply assumed that the 
failure to have either in the medieval scheme was the failure of 
the age, not the men. 

20 Cf. Charles Mcllwain, "The Fundamental Law Behind the Con- 
stitution of the United States," Ibid., 3-15. Even John Adams was willing 
to admit that some good had been accomplished by the medieval nobility 
and that "the nobles have been essential parties in the preservation of 
liberty, whenever and wherever it has existed. In Europe they alone 
have preserved it against kings and people, wherever it has been pre- 
served ; or, at least, with very little assistance from the people. . . . By 
nobles I mean not peculiarly an hereditary nobility, or any particular 
modification, but the natural and actual aristocracy among mankind." 
Adams to Samuel Adams, October 18, 1790; Adams, Works, VI, 417. 

21 Ibid., VI, 251. 


When the new constitution was finished, Madison thought 
he detected traces of feudalism in it but felt that they would be 
negated by other aspects of the new system. He certainly hoped so. 
"And what has been the progress . . . of the feudal constitutions?" 
he asked of Jefferson. "In all of them a continual struggle be- 
tween the head and the inferior members. . . .""" But he felt that 
the balance of power struck in the new federal constitution would 
avoid conflict; pov/er would flow up from the "subordinate mem- 
bers," resting always on the consent of the people. Moreover, the 
careful division of responsibilities and powers in the three branches 
would not be permitted to dissolve into feudal anarchy if proper 
care were taken. 

But politics was not the only subject upon which the founding 
fathers touched when they read history; they realized only too well 
that the law under which they lived was a product of history, 
especially English history. In their own minds, the founding fathers 
differentiated England from the rest of Europe in all things, and 
especially regarding the middle ages. John Adams knew only too 
well how much English law had developed during the middle 
ages. He had spent countless hours over the law books as a 
young man and the whole experience, arid in memory as well as 
in fact, led him to agree for once with Rousseau that the feudal 
system was "the most iniquitous and absurd form of government.""^ 
He looked with horror upon the twin products of medieval legal- 
ism, the canon and the feudal law. "Since the promulgation of 
Christianity, the two greatest systems of tyranny that have sprung 
from this original, are the canon and the feudal lavv-.""^ He 
thought that a combination of lord and clergy had enslaved Europe 
for a thousand years. Though he admitted that English law Vv-as 
composed of a combination of classical and medieval precedent, 
he avowed that the former had been more beneficial than the 
latter. Out of the blending of heritages had come a law "which 
avoids the inconveniences, and retains the advantages of both." 
Appeals to medieval legal precedent left him cold, and he thought 
it only folly "to go back to the institutions of Woden and of 
Thor. . . .""^ He looked upon Magna Carta and later legal develop- 
ments as wise progressions away from medieval legal institutions. 

22 Madison, Writijigs, V, 25. 

23 Quoted in Zoltan Haraszti, John Adams and the Prophets of 
Progress, Cambi'idge, Mass., 1952, 80. 

24 Adams, Works, III, 449. 

25 Ibid., IV, 298. 


In that long and rich correspondence which passed between 
Thomas Jefferson and John Adams, there are numerous references 
to the medieval saints and their writings. Both knew of such 
figures as Thomas Aquinas, Saint Jerome, and Saint Augustine, 
though their information came from secondary sources. Both men 
felt grievously handicapped hy their lack of adequate reference 
materials on the history of the Church, and Jefferson lamented 
that his knowledge of medieval religious figures came only from 
haphazard secondary sources. ^^ He was intrigued by ideas on the 
nature of the soul put forward by some of the saints but could not 
pursue the subject due to lack of sources. ^"^ 

Both Adams and Jefferson looked upon the saints v/ith a 
jaundiced eye. They were in the forefront of a generation skeptical 
of clerical activities, and they hardly accepted the miracles attributed 
to the saints. They felt that much of this was but an effort to 
sustain religious authority. Believing as they did that the middle 
ages was a time of clerical domination, they found only more 
evidence to condemn the period rather than to glorify it in their 
studies of medieval church figures. Neither objected to the lives 
of the saints and church fathers, it should be noted, so much 
as to the use to which they had been put by religious authority. 

To the study of the lives of the saints, Adams applied the 
same intellectual diligence and sharp tongue that had brought more 
earthly flesh to ruin. Exasperation often outran scholarship as 
he read. "From all that I have read, of the legends, of the lives, 
and v/ritings of the Saints, and even of the Fathers, and of ec- 
clesiastical history in general, I have no doubt that the Acta 
Sanctorum is the most enormous mass of lies, frauds, hypocrisy, 
and imposture, that ever was heaped together on the globe."^^ A 
confirmed believer in the separation of church and state, Adams 
disliked the unity betv/een the two in the middle ages. Indeed, 
it was this cooperation betv^^een king and priest that had initially 
soured his attitude tov/ard the period."^ 

Like Jefferson, he hated the censorship and oppression v/hich 
he thought abounded during the middle ages, and lamented the 
loss to scholarship of many pagan writings. In such sentiments he 

^6 Jefferson, Writings, XIV, 14-20, 322-329; Adams, Works, X, 105. 

27 Jefferson, Writings, XV, 264-269. 

28 Ihid., XIV, 322-329. 

29 Cf. Adams, Works, V, 479. 


was joined by others, who tended to identify the medieval period 
with clerical domination and usurpation. "° 

So biased and critical an attitude in the founding fathers is 
partially explained by the critical and unappreciative secondary 
histories available to them. Adams had thoroughly read Gibbon, 
Hume, and Robertson, and felt that their discussion of the medieval 
period Vv'as so prescient that he himself need not add anything to 
it.^-^ Jefferson read and recommended Robertson's History of 
Charles the Fifth, which the author prefaced with a long intro- 
duction covering the period from the fall of Rome to the fifteenth 
century.^^ To Robertson, the two centuries after Rome's fall were 
the very nadir of civilization and he saw nothing but disorder in 
the feudal system that entrenched itself in Europe between 800 
and 1200. However admirable it was in theory, he thought, it 
was politically chaotic in practice. "The bond of political union 
was extremely feeble; the sources of anarchy were innumerable," 
he said of the period of feudalism. ^^ In the resulting tug of war 
between kings and nobles, Europe descended into the "Dark Ages." 

An universal anarchy, destructive In a great measure, of all the advantages 
which men expect to derive from society prevailed. The people, the most 
numerous as well as the most useful part of the community, were either 
reduced to a state of actual servitude, or treated with the same insolence and 
rigour as if they had been degraded into that wretched condition. 3* 

If the eighteenth century reader doubted Robertson's unfavor- 
able view of the medieval period, he could turn elsewhere, but 
the judgement was not likely to be much less severe. In his cele- 
brated History of England, David Hume drew a much more detailed 
and generally more sympathetic picture of England in the medieval 
period. Jefferson greatly disliked Hume's toryism but admired his 
style, and his work was immensely successful in his day. However 
much he admired certain aspects of medieval law, the social re- 
sponsibilities inherent in the feudal system, and the chivalric ideal, 
Hume had little respect for the actual workings of medieval society. 

yo Adams, Works, VI, 480. Madison agreed that the separation of 
Church and State was a felicitous doctrine in which "the genius and 
courage of Luther led the wav. . . ."; in The Letters and Other Writings of 
James Madison, Philadelphia, 3 vols., 1865, III, 242-243. 

31 Adams, Works, IV, 298. 

32 Jefferson, Writings, XVI, 124-129. 

33 William Robertson, History of the Reign of Charles the Fifth, 
London, 2 vols., 1857, I, 13. 

31 Ibid., 14, 16. 


It appeared to balance povv^ers, yet "it was almost impossible to 
preserve harmony in its parts. . . ."^^ Strife among the nobles 
ruined the system because "the loose policy, incident to the feudal 
constitutions, maintained a perpetual, though secret, hostility, be- 
tween the several members of the state. ..." The lower elements 
of society were perpetually and purposely impoverished by the 
system. "A great part of them were serfs, and lived in a state of 
absolute slavery or villainage" while "The barons and gentry, liv- 
ing in rustic plenty and hospitality, gave no encouragement to the 
arts. . . ."^^ In reading Hume, the founding fathers passed over 
his more favorable comments on the possibilities inherent in the 
medieval system and noted only that he seemed to agree with 
everyone else in a generally harsh judgement of the period. 

In his history of the middle ages, published in 1818, Henry 
Hallam presented a wealth of detail which had either eluded 
or repelled his predecessors. He made a genuine effort to view 
the middle ages as a whole and his work corrected many erroneous 
judgments of the period. He presented a far more favorable view 
of the period than any previous scholar. While he admired some 
aspects of the feudal system and medieval politics, crediting them 
with having saved Europe from universal monarchy after the fall 
of Rome, he could not shake off doubts that the feudal system left 
much to be desired. "Though private wars did not originate in 
the feudal customs, it is impossible to doubt that they were per- 
petuated by so convenient an institution, which indeed owed its 
universal establishment to no other cause."^"^ Socially and cul- 
turally, he divided the middle ages into two periods, the Dark 
Ages of 500 to 1000, and the later middle ages, which he admired, 
from 1100 to 1400.^8 

Both Jefferson and Adams knew of Hallam's work,^^ but it 
doubtless came too late to change their attitudes toward the medieval 
ethos. Hallam's respect for the common law, medieval culture, 
and the arts and life of the later middle ages could not disguise 
for the founding fathers what they considered the general con- 
fusion and intellectual aridness of the era. These and similar sec- 

35 David Hume, The History of England From the Invasion of 
Julius Caesar to the Revolution in 1688, London, 6 vols., 1800, I, 312. 

36 Ibid., 487-488. 

37 Henry Hallam, View of the State of Europe During the Middle 
Ages, London, 3 vols., 1853, I, 269. See his estimate of feudalism in 
Ibid., 144-270. 

38 Ibid., II, 269-270, 316-317. 

39 Jefferson, Writings, XVI, 124-129; Adams, Works, VI, 563n. 


ondary sources were the makers of their unfavorable attitudes 
toward the middle ages. 

It was left to Thomas Jefferson to view the problem in its 
entirety. As has already been noted, he dismissed the middle ages 
as an arid waste, lumping ten centuries under the opprobium 
""Dark Ages." The middle ages were to him the permanent en- 
campment of the barbarians that over-ran Rome. There were many 
fallacies and false principles abroad in his own day and "All of 
these were legitimate principles in the dark ages which intervened 
between ancient and modern civilizations, but exploded and were 
held in just horror in the eighteenth century."*^ He held that the 
French Revolution, and that of his own countrymen, had been in 
some measure efforts to overthrow the surviving aspects of medieval- 
ism in modern life. To the end of his days he prided himself on 
his part in the abolition of the "feudal dues" of entail, primogeni- 
ture, and quit rents in Virginia. In saying all that he did about 
the middle ages, Jefferson merely repeated the attitudes of his 
educated contemporaries. He loved Greece and Rome more than 
the middle ages because he considered them more modern. It was 
not a coincidence that Don Quixote, the great burlesque on medieval 
institutions, was among his favorite books. 

The key to Jefferson's dislike of the medieval period is his 
belief that it was an era during which the arts and sciences 
languished. Though he v/as by no means a slavish admirer of 
classical civilization, he found in it a growth and freedom which 
he missed in the middle ages. 

Such were the attitudes of the founding fathers toward the 
middle ages. Often they were erroneous, just as their attitudes 
toward classical civilization were erroneous. But then, as now, v>4iat 
men think as well as what men know determines their actions and 
shapes their beliefs. This attitude is largely a result of the unfavor- 
able treatment accorded the middle ages by contemporary historians. 
The very revival of classical literature and learning that had come 
with the renaissance seemed to be a repudiation of medieval art 
and culture. In his old age, John Adams enjoyed the romantic 
novels of Walter Scott, especially The Lady of the Lake and The 
Lay of the Last Minstrel, but he never took them seriously. Indeed, 
he could not forbear injecting his politics into a discussion of their 
merits. "These Scottish and German romances show in a clear light 

40 Jefferson, Writiyigs, VII, 449. 


the horrors of the feudal aristocraq^," he wrote Benjamin Rush, 
"as the histories of Ghengis Khan and Tamariane shew the same 
anarchy in the Asiastic aristocracy."'*^ 

Even if adequate and favorable secondary sources on the middle 
ages had been available to the founding fathers, it is doubtful that 
it would have impressed them as deeply as classical literature. The 
whole eighteenth century educational system was based upon the 
ancient classics; men's minds ran to Greece and Rome with the force 
of habit. 

In fairness to the middle ages it must be noted that the founding 
fathers did not possess the rich store of knowledge available to 
later generations on the arts, literature, and cultural hfe of the mid- 
dle ages. Had they known this, they too would doubtless have 
studied the era more closely. There were men and things in the 
middle ages that v/ould surely have interested a Jefferson or an 

The ancient world still seemed more real and more profitable 
for study to Jefferson's generation than did the middle ages. Taci- 
tus seemd as modern as yesterday and Plutarch's Lives could have 
been written in 1789. Pericles and the power politics of the Pelo- 
ponnesian wars seemed as real as any of the wars of Louis XIV or 
William III. The middle ages remained distant to the founding 
fathers largely because of medieval life itself. From any vantage 
point, it seemed radically different both from their own and from 
classical patterns of behavior. It remained for another Adams of 
a later generation, who perhaps needed unity more, to find the 
Good Life in the medieval unity. Such was not the case with the 
generation of his great-grandfather. 

H. Wayne Morgan 

University of California 

Los Angeles 

41 Quoted in Haraszti, John Adams, 16. 

Search for Fortune along the 

Pratt Letters, 1860-1861 

Despite the feverish activities regarding the promotion of rail- 
roads, in the years just preceding the Civil War the Mississippi 
River remained the great commercial highway for the interior of 
the country. Along it passed a wide variety of produce, stimulating 
and nourishing the growth of many towns and private enterprises. 
After the admission of Minnesota in 1858 a solid tier of states 
bordered each bank, while multiplication of bulging warehouses and 
comfortable homes at many spots along its course testified to the 
local prestige if not always to the solid wealth of the ov/ners. Not 
every man possessed the necessary qualities to wrest a fortune from 
the river traffic. In the prevailing enthusiasm of the era many 
men underestimated the degree to which patient, careful, experienced 
attention to detail proved the underlying clue to success, rather than 
spectacular seizure of sudden gifts of fortune. 

To the person who would see the whole picture of business 
activities along the river, failure of a man to make the mark that 
he so confidently expected may also be an important indication of 
the conditions that prevailed in a given era. In Albert H. Pratt 
we see a very ambitious and optimistic young man, who first ap- 
peared in 1859 along the upper stretches of the Mississippi in the 
employ of the extremely shrewd and successful Milwaukee entre- 
preneur, Daniel Wells, Jr.^ A series of letters subsequently unfolds 
the story of his determination to strike out for himself, but the 
pressure of the debt owed to Wells, the uncertainties of the produce 
market in early I860, and his utter lack of capital forced him to 
seek employment which would guarantee him a salary. In these 
circumstances he decided to transfer the base of his operations 

1 Daniel Wells, Jr., (1808-1902) made his first trip to Wisconsin 
in 1835 to invest in lands, and the following year moved his residence 
from Maine to Milwaukee, then a town of 40 white inhabitants. For 
years he prospered as a surveyor, merchant, and o^vner of well-located 
stores, hotels, and warehouses. During 1853-1857 he served in the House 
of Representatives, where he proved adept at securing land grants for 
railroads in Wisconsin and Minnesota. In 1859 he was active as a grain 
dealer, owner of extensive lumber interests, president of several banks, 
and director of railroads and insurance companies. 



farther down the Mississippi, and he fixed upon St. Louis as the 
most likely spot in which to quickly recoup his fortunes. 

The place of Pratt's origin is uncertain; perhaps he was a trans- 
planted New Englander like so very many of the young men who 
worked for Wells. Evidently he had no roots in Milwaukee, for he 
was unable to obtain a good position there, and the few names 
mentioned in his letters were those of prominent businessmen who 
were friends or partners of Wells. Possibly he had some friends 
or relatives in the nearby Wisconsin town of Racine, for he returned 
there during illness and while searching for employment, but his 
letters give no clue concerning home or family. As far as it can 
be traced, the business record of A. H. Pratt begins on May 28, 
1859, when he appeared as bookkeeper for the new La Crosse and 
La Crescent Bank opened by Daniel Wells, Jr. in Hokah, Minne- 
sota.^ For some months he constituted the sole office force; and 
he bustled about, ordering a counter made for the office at a cost 
of $25, overseeing the hauling of a safe from the steamboat landing, 
and arranging for a bed so that he could sleep in a small back room 
rented with the business quarters.^ The amount of actual banking 
business transacted at this place was very small, for the bank had 
been brought into existence largely to facilitate advantageous pur- 
chase of produce from the Minnesota farmers, and to serve as a 
convenient observation post for the railroad and land speculations 
of Wells in this new state.^ Hence Pratt's time was occupied chiefly 
with the purchase of grain, and the accounts show his drawing ex- 
pense money for frequent trips to La Crosse and St. Paul, evidently 
in the interests of his employer.^ 

Pratt did not remain satisfied, however, with his salary of 
$250 for a three month period, for toward the end of September, 
1859 he left Hokah and the affairs of the La Crosse and La Cres- 
cent Bank.^ During the next tv/o months he ranged up and down 

2 Statement of Transfer of Capital Stock of the La Crosse and 
La Crescent Bank, located at Hokah in the State of Minnesota, dated 
May 28, 1859, and witnessed by A. H. Pratt. All manuscript citations 
are from the Daniel Wells, Jr., Papers in the Milwaukee County His- 
torical Society of Milwaukee, Wisconsin. 

3 Undated letter from Pratt to Wells, obviously soon after his arrival 
in Hokah. 

4 Statements of Accounts with La Crosse and La Crescent Bank, 
JvTly 1 and September 20, 1859; Pratt to Wells, June 30 and September 
2, 1859. 

5 Pratt to Wells, July 13, August 24, and September 2, 1859. 

6 Pratt's salary July 1-October 1, 1859, given in the Quarterly Report 
of the La Crosse and La Crescent Bank, dated September 20, 1859. Letter 
from J. Thomas Foster to Wells, September 19, 1859, shows he had 
already arrived to take over the duties of bookkeeper. 


this section of the river, purchasing grain and distributing it for 
storage at La Crosse, Trempeleau, Winona, Hastings, and St. Paul.'^ 
Considerable new responsibility now devolved upon him, for he had 
entered into an agreement with Daniel "Wells, Jr. and his brother- 
in-law, William Brown, Jr., of Milwaukee,^ by which each of them 
was to receive one-third of the profits from the sale of this pro- 
duce. Pratt continued to use the credit and business connections 
of Wells, but his expenses were only advanced and not guaranteed 
to him.'' Thus all hope of profit for him depended upon his own 
judgement concerning the probable course of the market during the 
next few months. The prices which he paid to suppliers v/ere 
based on quotations appearing in the Milwaukee Sentinel}^ which 
he received two days late at points along the upper river. Since 
these transactions took place in the fall of the year, another major 
decision involved the question of how much to purchase after the 
close of navigation on the river, when much of the trade halted 
abruptly. Early in December, 1859, Pratt reported that he had trans- 
ferred his activities to Prairie du Chien, Wisconsin and McGregor, 
Iowa; all traffic on the river had ceased, and he expected to cross 
over between them on foot. Here for the first time he expressed 
discouragement over sharp competition and a declining market; 
and he pleaded with Brown to telegraph him, daily if necessary, 
whenever changes occured in the market prices quoted in Milwau- 

His restlessness and discouragement deepened, and early in 
January, I860, Pratt wrote Weils that he v/ished to terminate their 
business arrangement, citing meagerness of profits for him and 
hinting at dissatisfaction with the policies of Brown. At the same 

7 Pratt to Wells, October 20 and 27, 1859; Foster to Wells, January 
9, 1860. 

8 William Brown, Jr., (?-1862) was a former clerk for the American 
Fur Co. when he arrived in Milwaukee from Michigan in 1836; the same 
year he opened a store in the name of Brown & Miller. By 1839 he had 
married Susan Wells and was prominent enough to be appointed to 
the first Board of Commissioners of the Wisconsin Marine and Fire In- 
surance Co., which actually engaged in a general banking business. James 
S. Buck, Pioneer History of Mihvaukee, 4 vols., 1876-1886, I, 91, 97, 232-233. 
The Milwaukee City Directory for 1859-1860 lists his residence, but no 
business address. 

9 Pratt to Wells, August 24, 1860. 

10 The Milwaukee Sentinel was founded 1837 as a Vv'cekly, and became 
the first daily paper in Milwaukee in 1844. Bayrd Still, Mihvaukee, the 
History of a City, Madison, 1948, 67-68. 

11 Pratt to William Brown, Jr., from Prairie du Chien, Wisconsin, 
December 2, 1859 ; Pratt to Wells, from McGregor, Iowa, December 20, 1859. 


time he expressed his high hopes of entering a partnership with an 
estabhshed commission man in Milwaukee, while confessing that 
his great aim during the preceding months had been to demonstrate 
sufficient ability as an agent so that Wells would consider it worth 
while to give him a permanent place as a partner in one of his many 
business firms. -^^ Later in the month Pratt was still carying out 
some banking errands for Wells in Prairie du Chien, and sending 
quotations on produce from McGregor, but he acknowledged the 
existence of a debt to his former employer and patron, and pre- 
sumably he was chiefly engaged in some personal speculations.-^^ 
By March Wells evidently was pressing him for payment. This time 
Pratt wrote from Racine in a tone both deferential and pleading, 
emphasizing his own ill-health and the impossibility in current hard 
times of collecting money due him, but also refusing to sign a note 
covering the debt. At the same time he promised to repay in full, 
and asserted that if he could not obtain a suitable position in Mil- 
waukee he intended to go "where I can."-^"^ 

In his search for a place where he could utilize experience gained 
in the river trade of the upper Mississippi it is not surprising that 
such a young man thought of St. Louis. During the very same 
months Pratt's successor at Hokah, J. T. Foster, currently handling 
banking matters for Wells at La Crosse, kept urging the importance 
of St. Louis as a market for the produce of the region. -^^ The advice 
was judged important enough for Wells to arrange an account that 
would facilitate currency exchange and credit for him in St. Louis. -^^ 
Albert Pratt, however, could hardly have knovv^n of this particular 
development, for he had purposely avoided contact with Wells for 
some weeks, and he appeared confident that he could succeed in 
that city without a reference from his former employer. 

There follow three letters from Missouri, covering a period of 
about six months in I860, and describing business activities in St. 
Louis. In these Pratt's tone changes from the ebullience and brash- 
ness of a young man about to snatch up a fortune to one of ag- 

12 Pratt to V/ells, January 8, 1860. 

13 Charles Ray, cashier of the Bank of Prairie du Chien to Wells, 
January 25, 1860; Pratt to Wells, January 18 and 26, 1860. 

14 Pratt to Wells, March 9 and April 18, 1860. 

15 J. T. Foster to Wells, March 1, 13, 19, 28, and 30, 1860. 

16 Daniel V/ells, Jr., was president and owner of the Green Bay 
Bank of La Crosse in 1860. Statement of Accounts for Api-il 7, 1880, 
contains the first listing of an account with J. J. Anderson & Co., Bullion 
& Exchange Brokers, St. Louis. 


grieved recital of business reverses, and finally to a plea for aid in 
extricating himself from an unfortunate plight. 

Ironton, Missouri June 22, 1860'^'^ 
My Dear Sir: 

In justice to myself, and to you, I ought to explain my reasons for 
not fulfilling my agreement; "to come and see you as soon as I was able." 

I was sick longer than I expected; and when sufficiently recovered to 
carry out my previous intentions, my money, — that I had of Mr. Inbusch to 
support myself until I could get a situation — was nearly exhausted. 

The times were dull at the North, and St. Louis seemed to be the only 
place where I could hope for success. I had not enough money to defray 
my expenses to both places. I looked upon both as evils, and of the two, 
choose that which offered the best inducements. 

I arrived in St. Louis May 2d reduced to my bottom dollar. There was 
no show for a salaried berth there, all kinds of business being very dull. 
I took it as coolly as possible, finally made a raise, & started in business 
for myself. Leased the "Terre Haute Alton and St. Louis RR" for the 
News Agency in company with "Buel" who once had the "La C [rosse} 
RR."18 y^Q pay $500 per annum rent. At present it is very dull & pays 
only five to eight dollars per day. At an average, it will pay 2000$ or 2500$ 
per annum. During the State Fair and the Campaign we hope to clear 
between 500 and 1000$. We are aiming to get all the words out of St. 
Louis, within the next year. 19 

In addition to this I have a traveling agency that pays me between two 
and three hundred dollars per month, and my expenses are very light. 

"Durant and Co." St. Louis will corroborate my statement. "Durant" 
is Son in law of Cashier Scott of the St[sic} Bank. 20 

Now what I wish to ask, is this; — that you will not attribute to ingrati- 
tude or bad intentions, my failure to keep my promise. God knows I am 
grateful, very grateful for your many kindnesses, and if I know my own 
heart I meant nothing wrong. I have always tried to do what was right, 
and always shall. I have learned some useful lessons in the past few 
months. One of which is to use no mans capital but my own in carrying 
out my plans. Another — that I can do better to work for myself. 

17 Permission has kindly been given by the Milwaukee County His- 
torical Society to publish the following letters. Except where otherwise 
indicated, they are given in full, with the original spelling and punctuation. 

18 A connection is possible with the family of Henry Buel of Red 
Wing, Minnesota, who wrote Wells October 19, 1859, to suggest that a 
son in business in St. Paul would be glad to buy wheat for Wells. 

19 The importance of timeliness in the receipt of nevi's, including 
market prices, led to rapid expansion of news seiwices. St. Louis in 
1860 could boast of ten newspapers, while telegraphic connections had 
been established with the east as early as 1847. Frank Luther Mott, 
America7i Journalism: 1690-1950, New York, 1950, 244-248, 283. 

20 The Milwaukee City Directory for 1859-1860 lists Moses S. Scott 
as cashier of the State Bank of Wisconsin, located in Milwaukee. 


I will pay you as soon as I can, with interest satisfactory, and want you 
should give me a little time. Should have written before. But wanted to 
get into business first, & form some idea of my chances for paying my 
debts. This year if I have my health, I will draw between three and five 
thousand dollars besides paying every cent I owe. 

If I have erred. Forgive me. For I wish to count you among my 
friends. I have loved and esteemed you as I never did man before, and if 
I have forfeited your friendship, I owe it to the fruit of the seed you 
sowed — my ambition. When last in Milwaukee and in need of a situation 
J. A. Noonan^i wanted a Bookkeeper. He did not offer me the place, 
but called me "flighty." Of course I would not then ask it of him. While 
in St. Louis — he wanted I should come and see him — supposing that I 
was in Racine — reduced to an extreme that he could get me for a song. 
But he missed his man for once. He ought to have known me better. I 
certainly had a better opinion of him. I wish you to know how the mat- 
ter stands — as he will probably give you a different version. 

I go from here through the Southern and Southwestern portion of the 
State. I will probably return to St. Louis about the 1st of Oct. I hope to 
be able to pay you before that time & think there is no doubt but that 
I will. I shall visit you next spring if my business will permit, when I 
will account to you for the years business and adventures. 

Give my kindest regards to Mrs. Wells & remember me kindly to 
Judge Pringle,22 and believe me as Ever, 

Faithfully yours. 

Two months later Pratt confessed his prospects had been sub- 
stantially reduced, as he revealed disappointments regarding his 

Hannibal, Mo. August 24, 186023 
My Dear Friend: 

I returned to St. Louis a week since & found your letter. I am very 
grateful for your kindness and good wishes, & will try to deserve them. . . . 

When I returned to St. Louis, I found that my partner in my RR 
business had become so elated with our success (we made at the start 10$ 

21 Josiah A. Noonan (1813-1882) was an experienced printer and 
newspaperman when he came to Mihvaukee from Nevv^ York in 1836. 
Very active in politics as a Democrat, he served as editor of the Mihvaukee 
Courier, 1841-1845, and as Postmaster of Mihvaukee 1843-1849 and 
1853. In 1857 he retired from politics to devote more time to his paper 
mill, and he continued in related fields until his death. Lieut. Col. Jerome 
A. Watrous, (ed.), Memoirs of Milwaukee County, 3 vols., Madison, 1909, 

I, 433-43G. 

22 Benjamin Pringle v/as associated with Wells in railroad and lum- 
ber speculations; he was evidently not a resident of either Wisconsin or 
Minnesota, but during 1859-18G0 he spent some time in St. Paul in hopes 
of influencing the Minnesota legislature. Pringle to Wells, September 

II, 1859, January 28 and February 8, 1860. 

23 The paragraph omitted recapitulates the conditions under which 
Pratt had accumulated the debt to Wells. „ _ ....:- ■,;.•//" 




per day dear) that he went on one grand spree, raised the devil generally, 
let the sup't see him, in fact called him his nigger — & of course lost the 
road. It was quite a damper on me, for I was obliged to pay some debts 
& it took a good two thousand dollars out of my pocket for the year. I 
had set my mark at 4000$ clear profit this year. But will fail to connect 
on that amount unless I strike some other business that I can combine 
with my present trade. 

Remember me kindly to all & believe me 

Yours very truly, 

I go to St. Louis in a few days — will you not be there at the Fair? 

After another wait of several months, the next letter revealed 
still more of his business ventures: 

Paris, Monroe County, Missouri November 1, I860 
Dear Friend: 

Can you not send me a recommend that if necessary will enable me to 
secure a position with the grain dealers of St. Louis. I wish to continue 
in that business & if I can furnish good recommends as to character, etc. 
there is a man in St. Louis who will give me a chance to get even should 
wheat continue to fall. 

My partner left me in the lurch in my RR business & I lost consid- 
erably by him. I was also engaged as State Agent for a fine Sewing 
Machine — in which but with little trouble I could clear 10$ per day. Now, 
just as I have got clear of RR obligations, the Supreme Court decides that 
our patent is an infringement. I am not discouraged. But it is very dis- 

If I am worthy of a good recommend, you will confer a favor by send- 
ing me one, in the care of Durant & Co. St. Louis. 

& oblige Yours Very Truly 

Have just recovered from a severe illness (fever) & never was as well in 
my life. 

Albert Pratt remained in Missouri for several more months, dur- 
ing which no record of further adventure remains. These were the 
eventful months following the election and inauguration of Abra- 
ham Lincoln, and the outbreak of the Civil War; they were also 
months of great uncertainty for the river trade, and many a suc- 
cessful and experienced man found the difficulties overwhelming. 
Early in the summer of 1861 Pratt abandoned his hopes of fortune 
in this area and returned to Wisconsin in a new and chastened 
mood. The next letter gives his final version of conditions pre- 
vailing in Missouri. 

Dear Sir: 


Racine July 1st, 1861 

I returned to this place about a month since. Was obliged to leave 
Missouri in consequence of the troubles there. 

As soon as I can get a Situation I will do what I can towards paying 
you. Should have done so before, but I could not make any collections 
before coming away, as there has been almost a famine in Mo. for a year, 
and the money I brought with me has been discredited. But I am getting 
used to hard luck and have learned to take it coolly. If the few I owe 
will wait with patience & faith I hope to be able to bring everything out 
right soon. The past two years have been full of bitter experience to me 
and I am now ready to settle down to anything that will pay board and 
clothes, and stick to it. If you know of any openings, (I don't care if 
it is breaking on a Railroad) be kind enough to inform me and you will 

Yours Truly, 

One more letter written in 1861 seems to show that Albert Pratt 
had indeed learned his lesson, for he was willing to demonstrate 
the genuineness of his new resolves by accepting a minor position, 
with a salary much lower than the one he hacl considered inadequate 
two years earlier, when he was the bookkeeper for Daniel Wells, 
Jr. at Hokah, Minnesota. However, the familiar tone of optimism 
is still very much in evidence: 

Chicago Dec. 22, 1861 
Dear Sir: 

I am informed that you were in Chicago a few days since, and made 
some Enquiries concerning me, but did not see fit to call. I conclude there- 
fore that I have offended you, and regret it the more, because I have never 
wronged you, — or any other one — intentionally. 

The last two years have been full of errors, but their reward has ac- 
companied them. If they have developed the man, and made me more 
self-reliant, then have I gained. The rest is lost. Now, profiting by ex- 
perience, I am trying to retrieve the Past. 

Through the influence of your letter of recommend, (for which I have 
again to thank you) together with one from M. S. Scott, Esq. I succeeded 
in obtaining a Situation as bookkeeper in a Grocery house here, at a salary of 
400$ per year. It is commencing at the lower round of the ladder, but that 
I shall succeed in attaining the summit, I have no doubt. I have already a 
Prospect of advancing a step, by a change to a larger house. Should I 
make the change, I shall endeavor to make it permanent. In any event, I 
think my Salary will be increased on the 1st of January, in which case, I 
will use all possible self denial until I can liquidate my obligations to you. 

Whenever you are in Chicago, and it is convenient for you to call, I 
shall be very glad to see you. 

My kind regards to your family — and believe me 

Yours Affectionately, 


Here the record ends; whether Albert Pratt made a fortune 
anywhere, or even whether he finally repaid his debt to Daniel 
Wells, Jr. cannot now be known. Perhaps he settled down to be- 
come a solid businessman in Chicago, for the sole remaining bit of 
correspondence is dated from there in 1867; but it is merely a hasty 
note of introduction for a friend who sought a position in the lum- 
ber business, and it reveals nothing concerning his personal affairs."*^ 
In any case, however, it is unlikely that Albert Pratt ever forgot the 
stirring years of 1859-1860 and his adventures while seeking his 
fortune along the Mississippi. 

Dorothy J. Ernst 

University of Wisconsin 

24 Pratt to Wells, May 23, 1867. 

Book Reviews 

Crown and Parliament in Tudor-Stuart England; A Documentary Constitu- 
tional History, 1483-1714. By Paul L. Hughes, Robert F. Fries, eds. 
New York, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1959. Pp. xvi, 359. $6.95. 

The teacher of English history, both by choice and necessity, must put 
great emphasis upon constitutional development and the use of relevant 
documents. Various one-volume and multi-volume collections of important 
documents, covering all or subdivisions of England's history from Anglo- 
Saxon times to the present, have long been readily available to teacher and 
student. 'When another appears, it must prove its worth by being suffi- 
ciently different and useful to supplant existing works. 

Crown and Parliament in Tudor-Stuart England, by two professors of 
De Paul University's history faculty, makes good claim either to supplant 
or at least to supplement some of the books now being used. It treats 
a fairly narrow field of history, 1485-1714, a period of intense constitu- 
tional development. Because perenially there is a strong interest in the 
Tudor-Stuart era, the limitation to these two hundred and twenty-nine years 
permits greater concentration on depth. The documents chosen by the 
editors, covering the range of legal, political, ecclesiastical and economic, 
are placed chronologically in chapters divided by reigns from Henry VII to 
Anne, including the Interregnum. At the beginning of each chapter is 
an introduction, which in every case is well written and shows that the 
authors possess a real familiarity with the constitutional developments of 
the period treated. Each individual document also has a brief explanation 
pointing out its relevance. One finds very full citations from the legisla- 
tion of Henry VII, the varied laws, so pregnant of future importance, of 
the reigns of Henry VIII, Edward VI and Mary, the significant ecclesiasti- 
cal and economic legislation of Elizabeth I, and the most important legal 
enactments which in sum total represent the fundamental constitutional 
changes of the Stuart era. Over half of the book, in fact, is devoted to 
the period 1603-1714. 

'What impresses one is the care with which the authors determined the 
extent of the documents to be quoted; they are given in sufficient length 
(and with modern versions of spelling) to be useful for classroom use and 
as a handbook for undergraduate and graduate work alike. For those who 
have learned their constitutional history through such a biased work as M. 
R. Tanner's Tudor Constitutional Documents, the present book will prove 
refreshing because of its lack of prejudice. One finds only details of in- 
terpretation rather than any major point of interpretation or of fact with 
which to disagree. Although this reviewer is tempted to criticize here and 
there the choice and the omission of a few documents, he feels that the 
judgement of the two editors must prevail, considering the limitations of 
space and the validity of their experience in teaching constitutional history. 

The over-all conclusion is that this book must be viewed as very ser- 
viceable to teachers and to both undergraduate and graduate students. It 



must further be added that the volume is attractive in appearance, that it 
contains a minimum of typographical errors, and that the structure of the 
book (which includes an index) represents careful planning to make it very 
useful to the reader. The bibliography at the end, of both general and 
special works on Tudor-Stuart history, is another recommendation of the 
serviceability of this volume. 

William R. Trimble 
Loyola University, Chicago 

Alexis de Tocqueville in the Chamber of Deputies. His views on Foreign 
and Colonial Policy. By Mary Lawlor, S.N.D. Washington, D.C., The 
Catholic University of America Press, 1959. Paper. Pp. xi, 201. 

Last year, commemorations marking the centenary of Tocqueville's 
death gave evidence of the increasing interest in the remarkable French 
thinker. This dissertation on Tocqueville' s career in the French Chamber 
of Deputies is directed toward a neglected area in the field of Tocqueville 
studies. The sub-title indicates the scope of the work with its concentra- 
tion on an anaysis of Tocqueville's speeches and of his reports on foreign 
and colonial policies during his deputyship in the Chamber under the 
Bourgeois Monarchy. For this material, the author has relied on the Beau- 
mont edition of Tocqueville's Oeuvres completes, the volumes published thus 
far in the definite edition by J. P. Mayer, he Moniteur Universel, and 
articles by Tocqueville in Le Siecle. 

After the Revolution of 1830, the young magistrate in the Court of 
Versailles gave allegiance to the new regime as the only valid political 
possibility for France at the time. In his first candidacy for the legislature 
in 1837, Tocqueville was defeated; his career as a deputy began with his 
election in 1839, four years after the publication of the first volume of 
his famous Democracy in America. He served as a representative from La 
Manche until February 1848, when another revolution of greater portent 
swept away the Bourgeois Monarchy. The author begins with a description 
of Tocqueville's entrance into politics in which she emphasizes his in- 
sistence on being a free man without party or commitments. She devotes 
succeeding chapters to the Egypto-Syrian phase of the Eastern Question, 
the Right of Search, Slavery in the French Colonies, and Algeria. Ap- 
pendices are included. 

The crisis over the Eastern Question which led Tocqueville to urge the 
government to go to war if necessary, rather than permit the powers to 
regulate the Question without France, reveals him as an "ardent nationa- 
list." His plea for a strong foreign policy went unheeded; and the real 
goal of his speech on the Right of Search — negotiations with England to 
abolish the slave trade by abolishing the market — was not achieved. When 
Tocqueville's views roused some opposition in England he disclaimed any 
responsibility for the deterioration in Anglo-French relations. Tocqueville's 
correspondence with his English friends, John Stuart Mill, Nassau Wil- 
liam Senior, and Henry Reeve, as presented here, throws light on the 


positions on both sides of the channel. When the Ministry shelved his 
report to the Chamber of Deputies on slavery in the colonies, Tocqueville 
turned to the press. Six articles calling for the abolition of slavery appeared 
in Le Siecle in 1843. His comments and advice on Algeria show his con- 
tinuing interest in the problem. Though Tocqueville did the unusual by 
ultimately supporting the government's compromise bill regulating slavery 
and was willing to support its policy "on the neutral terrain of Africa," 
here again, the action of Louis Philippe's government disappointed him and 
his recommendations bore little fruit. 

This informative study fills a gap in the literature on Tocqueville. 
But some readers might wish further enlightenment on the motives of the 
do-nothing government in certain instances and a more explicit concluding 
discussion on the opening question, "Hov/ close is the correlation between 
theory and practice in politics?" To the reviewer, some of the judgements, 
such as the thesis stated in the preface that "an intensive nationalism was 
the core of his political thought," might be questioned. Also, examination 
of the extent of Tocqueville's commitment to imperialism would probably 
qualify the assertion that he "was an imperialist." If Tocqueville's query 
as to the time and method of ending slavery is "one of the few examples of 
[his] practical questions during this period," one may wonder whether these 
speeches and reports disclose "an urgent practicality" as a facet of his 
character. The dissertation, however, is an interesting contribution to the 
story of Tocqueville, the deputy. 

Margaret M. O'Dwyer 

Loyola University, Chicago 

Lincoln Finds a General, Volume Five. By Kenneth P. Williams. Mac- 
millan Co., New York, 1959. Pp. 395. $7.50. 

Kenneth P. Williams, the Indiana University mathematician turned his- 
torian did not live long enough to finish the last two chapters of this 
volume. On July 1, 1958, he retired from his teaching career with the 
title of Distinguished Service Professor of Mathematics. On September 
5, 1958, he died, after having outlined Chapters X and XI of Volume V, 
but before he was able to write them. Chapter X would have been concerned 
with the battle of Chattanooga, November 24-25, 1863; Chapter XI would 
have included an account of Grant's receiving his commission as Lieutenant 
General from President Lincoln on March 8, 1864. On that date Lincoln 
would have found his general and Williams might have felt that the 
record was complete, because in his preface to Volume One he had de- 
clared that "Lincoln's chief military problem was to find a general equal to 
the task the north faced in the Civil War." 

However, had he lived it seems perhaps more likely that Professor 
Williams would have written not only two more chapters but also two more 
volumes, both concerned with the last year of the war and including Sher- 
man's campaigns in 1864 and 1865 as well as Grant's sustained campaign 
against Richmond. We would then have had a very comprehensive history 


of the major phases of the military history of the federal armies in the 
Civil War. Although not entirely finished, this set has been described 
as "a major work of scholarship written in the grand style on a grand 
scale." Volumes I and II, published in 1949, covered the campaigns in 
the East from the outbreak of the war in April 1861 to the victory of the 
North at Vicksburg on July 4, 1863. Volume III, which appeared in 
print in 1952 told of Grant's early career, of the campaigns including Shiloh 
and Corinth and the first efforts to take Vicksburg. Volume IV, pub- 
lished in 1956, related the story of the campaigns culminating in the cap- 
ture of Vicksburg. 

This volume gives us detailed accounts of the federal defense of 
Helena, located on the Mississippi some distance north of Vicksburg, and 
the surrender of the Confederates at Port Hudson also located on the 
Mississippi but south of Vicksburg. The volume ends v/ith the defeat of 
Rosecrans at Chickamauga on September 20, 1863, and with the plans of 
Grant to go to the rescue of Rosecrans, besieged in Chattanooga. Through- 
out each chapter, one detail is given after another with the result that the 
reader has a very graphic picture of every event described. This is very true, 
for example, of the Battle of Helena, July 4, 1863, the day that Vicksburg 
fell to Grant. We learn that the successful Union defense of Helena was 
the result not only of the soldiers and land batteries concerned but also of 
the gunboat Tyler firing at the Confederates from its position in the Mis- 
sissippi River. We learn that some of the Union troops took from some 
of the captured Confederates the "reliable muzzle loading Enfields" of their 
captives and used them instead of the "poor breech-loading carbines" 
formerly used by those sam.e Union soldiers. 

The notes given at the back of each volume are exceptionally detailed, 
many of them extending over more than a page and some of them for 
two or three pages. The Official Records are used continuously as are also 
contemporaneous newspaper accounts as well as scores of other primary 
and secondary sources. Admittedly not easy reading, the volumes by 
Kenneth P. Williams will nevertheless give you a comprehensive view of 
the military phases of the Civil War which you will perhaps get from 
no other writer. His five volumes have become an essential part of the 
history of the Civil War. 

Paul Kiniery 

Loyola University, Chicago 

Gallant Pelham, American Extraordinary. By Charles G. Milham. The 
Public Affairs Press, Washington, D.C, 1959. Pp. 250. 

When on May 6, 1863, the London Times reported that the shell which 
killed Major John Pelham "... extinguished one of the purest and bravest 
spirits which [had] been yielded up in this desolate war," it expressed the 
conviction with which one concludes Charles G. Milham's Gallant Pelham, 
American Extraordijiary, one of the best recent publications on the War 
Betv/een the States. The work is all the more remarkable because it was 


written, not by a native southerner, as its sympathetic treatment would lead 
the reader to believe, but by a native of New York who spent most of 
his life in the state of his birth. 

To collect his material, the author visited all the places with which 
the "boy hero" had had contact, and interviewed more than forty people 
who had known him. He searched the historic record, and found hardly 
more than passing references to one who was considered Lee's greatest 
artillery genius. Even a search for Pelham's letters proved almost fruit- 
less, for most of them have disappeared. It is remarkable that, in view 
of these circumstances, Milham was able to reconstruct so complete and de- 
tailed an account. 

John Pelham was born in 1839 near Jacksonville, Alabama. Des- 
cended from English nobility who had settled in Virginia, he counted among 
his forebears individuals who had held high rank in earlier American 
wars, and among immediate family connections such persons as John Single- 
ton Copley and Henry Clay. His father was a planter and John, along 
with his brothers, spent most of his early life out-of-doors. Selected for 
West Point at the age of eighteen, he was a student there when the war 
began. Pelham was commissioned a first lieutenant in the Confederate 
Artillery and ordered to Virginia. He soon found himself under the im- 
mediate command of J. E. B. Stuart with whom he is said to have ex- 
perienced "... one of the most notable associations of military minds in 
the war." Later, he was almost as intimately associated with Thomas J. 
Jackson and Robert E. Lee. 

As commander of Sttiart's horse artillery, the gallant Pelham fought 
twice at Manassas, through the Peninsula Campaign, and at Sharpsburg and 
Fredericksburg. Official records show clearly that it was Pelham's guns, 
skillfully placed and accurately aimed, which played a major part in bring- 
ing victor)^ or averting disaster. Stuart looked upon him as "all but 
brother," and referred to him as "... the noble, the chivalric, the gallant 
Pelham." Both Jackson and Lee frequently spoke and wrote of him, not 
as colorfully, but equally as sincerely. At tv/enty-four John Pelham died 
at Kellysville, a battle so minor that it would hardly be noted, had it not 
been the occasion of his death. His body lay in state in the Confederate 
Capitol, and was escorted to the train by representatives of the Confederate 
Government. He lies buried among members of his family at Jacksonville. 

Charles Milham spent many years on this work, but died before its 
publication. The biography is presented, not in a dry historic manner, but 
in a more popular style which makes reading pleasant and easy. Careful 
examination of the text, documentation, and bibliography convinces one 
that historic truth is not violated. If, in the plethora of Civil War 
literature with which we are being deluged, we find other works equally 
as valuable, accurate, and readable, we shall indeed be fortunate. 

Kenneth M. Jackson 
Loyola University, Chicago 


We the People, The Economic Origins of the Constitution. By Forrest 
McDonald. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 111., 1958. Pp. 
viii, 436. $7.50. 

Since the publication of Charles A. Beard's An Economic Interpretation 
of the Constitution of the United States, a veritable storm has raged in 
historical circles over its accuracy. Beard, unwittingly it seems, fathered a 
school of historians who vigorously preached and defended his "interpreta- 
tion." With equal vigor Beard's critics challenged his position and accused 
him of interpreting the past for the benefit of the Progressive Movement, 
at the peak of its popularity the very year this essay was first published. 
Some few, in an effort to discredit his hypothesis, even went so far as to 
attach the epithet "Marxian" to his work. But the stronger the denuncia- 
tion, the more firmly did the thesis seem to take hold. Ultimately, all 
students of American history were obliged to genuflect before it, reverently 
or irreverently. The first systematic analysis of the methodology of the 
thesis came with the publication of Robert E. Brown's Charles Beard and the 
Constitution, in 1956. The present study by Forrest McDonald is the latest 
and most significant entry in a growing bibliography on this subject. 

The Beard thesis can be viewed in three ways: as propaganda, as a 
form of historical methodology, or as history. The present study considers 
it under the last heading accepting without qualification Beard's system of 
interpretation and his method of testing it. In short, the author takes the 
Beard hypothesis — that economic elements were the prime motivating fac- 
tors in the writing and ratification of the Constitution — and applies it to 
the material, asking the very questions which Beard said would have to be 
asked before his thesis could be proven conclusively. The result is an 
exhaustive analysis of the economic interests present during the drafting 
and ratifying of the Constitution. The personalty and realty of each in- 
dividual associated with this process are carefully and fully delineated. Dr. 
McDonald's conclusion was that: "On all counts ... Beard's thesis is 
entirely incompatible with the facts." (p. 357) 

Such a conclusion, of necessity, makes the work essentially negative in 
character. An hypothesis has been tested and found totally inadequate. 
The importance of a work of this type can be measured only in terms of 
the significance which is attached to the thesis it attempts to analyze. If 
the Beard thesis is no longer accepted as a meaningful interpretation of the 
Constitution, the present work is unnecessary. A cursory examination of 
any textbook in American history v/ill reveal that such is not the case. 
The Beard thesis, although somewhat less popular than it was in the 
decade of the thirties and earlier, still has a significant following in Ameri- 
can historical circles. The present work, a complete, total, and devastating 
refutation of Beard's position, is of utmost importance, for subsequent 
studies of the Constitution must be cast in the image of its conclusions. 

The positive aspects of this monograph, although comparatively brief, 
are also worthy of note. Toward the end of his study the author raises 
t"wo significant questions. Is there another economic interpretation (besides 
Beard's) that might be advanced as a tenable thesis to explain the Con- 


stitution, and what conclusions, if any, on methodology and the entire 
concept of economic interpretation of historical phenomena can be drawn 
from this analysis? In answering the first question the author maintains 
that this study indicates quite clearly that: "It is . . . not even theoretically 
possible to devise a single set of alignments . . . that would explain the 
contest (i.e. the writing and ratifying of the Constitution) as one in which 
economic self-interest was the principal motivating force." (p. 398) As 
to the second question, he challenges the usefulness of any methodology 
which begins with a single, all-embracing hypothesis, endorsing instead an 
inductive approach which recognizes the pluralistic forces at work in any 
historical phenomena. This, I suspect, is the methodology he intends to 
employ in the subsequent volumes on this subject referred to in his Preface. 
With the removal of the Beard thesis as a meaningful criterion for 
analyzing this period, the way is now opened for a new and fresh inter- 
pretation. Dr. McDonald has the first and strongest claim on the subject. 
When that new analysis is made economic factors will undoubtedly be an 
important part of the story, but they will never be elevated to the unique 
position given to them by Beard and his followers. Dr. McDonald, with 
this singular example of scholarship in depth, has destroyed the Beard 
thesis and made a distinct contribution to American historiography. 

John J. Reardon 
Loyola University, Chicago 

A Guide to American Catholic History. By John Tracy Ellis. The Bruce 
Publishing Company, Milwaukee, 1959. Pp. viii, 147. Paper. $2.50. 

This very servicible implement for the study of the history of the 
Catholic Church in America from 1492 to 1959 has its contents arranged 
in what Monsignor Ellis thought would be the most convenient form. The 
ten larger sections are: published Guides to materials and bibliographies; 
Manuscript Depositories; General Works in Catholic history; Studies in 
Diocesan, Sectional, and Parish History; Biographies, Correspondence, and 
Memoirs; Histories of Religious Communities; Education; Special Studies, 
under nine classifications; Periodicals; and Catholic Historical Societies. 
The items are numbered consecutively from 1 to 814. There is an unusually 
detailed index which simplfies the task of finding authors and books and 
classifications of materials. The modest price should make it readily 
available to students. 

Jerome V. Jacobsen 
Loyola University, Chicago 

Notes and Comments 

Sources of Our Liberties, edited by Richard L. Perry, under the 
general supervision of John C. Cooper, was pubhshed last Septem- 
ber by the American Bar Foundation and is distributed by New York 
University Press and by Associated College Presses. This con- 
tribution amply fulfills the purpose stated in the Forevv'ord by Mr. 
Cooper: "To present in a single usable volume the historic docu- 
ments constituting the major legal sources of our individual liberties." 
The need for this book has long been felt and several notable at- 
tempts have been made to satisfy it in part by publications of some 
of the documents. The Committee on American Citizenship of 
the American Bar Association, headed by Mr. Cooper, proposed that 
the scattered doaiments be brought together and assigned the task 
to the American Bar Foundation, the research affiliate of the ABA. 
The Sloan Foundation made two grants to bring the project to this 
happy conclusion. The research by a number of authorities was 
directed by Mr. Perry who composed the excellent introductions to 
the thirty-two documents presented. Half of these are from Thorpe, 
five from Pickering, three from Tansill, three from United States 
Statutes, and the others from various source books. 

The careful and pertinent selections from Magna Carta through 
the English colonial charters, the Revolutionary Congresses, and the 
Constitutions of the new States to the First Ten Amendments to 
the Constitution of the United States, establish legally that the in- 
dividual liberties of American citizens depend upon historic laws 
"limiting the authority and discretion of men wielding the power 
of government." Each of the documents is thus a foundation stone 
"on which the structure of our individual liberties has long stood." 
Mr. Perry places each stone in its proper position. Each introduction 
follows the same form, giving the origins of the document, its 
contemporary and later significance, and its effects. In the margins 
of the wide pages are the paragraph topics in italics. The footnotes 
contain all one would wish for further study. The type and format 
is excellent. A selected bibliography and good index complete the 
volume in 456 pages. The work has value for all citizens, and 
many values for scholars, lawyers, justices and legislators. It is 
listed at the reasonable price of five dollars. 

* * * * 


After some years of diligent research Dr. Alberto Francisco 
Pradeau of Los Angeles, California, has brought forth his documents 
and study on the expulsion of the Jesuits from their missions in 
northwest Mexico and southern Arizona under the title La Expul- 
sion de los ]esuitas de las Provincias de Sonora, Osthnuri y Sinaloa 
en 1 767, published in 1959 by Antigua Libreria Robreda, Jose Porrua 
e Hijos of Mexico City. The paper bound work gives complete 
details of the suppression of the Society of Jesus as it was carried 
out in this one sector of the vast Spanish Empire. 

In the seven hundred miles of mountainous and desert area 
between Sinaloa and Tucson, Arizona, Dr. Pradeau found forty- 
eight missions and visitas under the care of fifty-two Jesuit fathers, 
many of whom were from central Europe. He gives biographical 
sketches of each of these exiles. The first block of documents con- 
tains the royal decree of February 27, 1767, ordering the Conde de 
Aranda, President of the Council of the Indies, to draft all instruc- 
tions and to issue orders to all colonial officials for the arrest and 
exile of every Jesuit in his colonies. Aranda's long instruction of 
March 1 specified in twenty-nine articles the procedures for the 
removal of the fathers from their missions, colleges, universities and 
parishes and for the confiscation of their properties. The utmost 
secrecy was to prevail. The sealed orders reached Viceroy Marques 
de Croix on May 31 and were sent by special post to the officers in 
Sinaloa and Sonora. Croix ordered each to open the packet on 
June 25 and to arrest the fathers simultaneously in the night of June 
30. The following morning the Jesuits were prisoners on the roads 
to ports of embarcation. Many of the missionaries died en route or 
in jails. Governor Pineda's official reports and letters of the 
arrests and journey written by the fathers follow. The long journal 
heretofor attributed to Father Sterkianowski is now proved to be 
that of a Father Jaime Matheu who organized the narrative from 
writings and verbal accounts of exiles passing through Spain. All 
in all, this is a solid book, well annotated, a contribution to the 
history of the Pacific States and an authoritative work on the tragic 
event in the long history of the Jesuits. 

The Papers of Henry Clay, Volume I, The Rising Statesman, 
1 797-1814, edited by James F. Hopkins and Mary W. M. Hargreaves, 
Associate Editor, was brought forth December 6, 1959, by the Uni- 


versity of Kentucky Press, Lexington. This is the first of ten volumes 
of a truly monumental work and everyone aiding in its production 
should receive rousing congratulations and deep gratitude from the 
legions of scholars to vv^hom it will forever be a boon. The modest 
introduction of the Editor reveals the astonishing nature of the task 
to be performed, and a study of any one of the papers exemplifies 
the meticulousness with which the rules for editing are being fol- 
lowed. This volume includes Clay's incoming and outgoing cor- 
respondence from the time of his arrival in Kentucky as a young 
lawyer in 1797 to the end of 1814, when as American Commissioner 
he co-signed dispatches of the Treaty of Ghent. The papers in- 
clude all personal business papers, legislative proposals, reported 
speeches, and his personal diplomatic contributions. The editors 
omit or summarize items of a non-personal nature, as land deeds, 
court files, and suits in which he partook as counsel. The original 
autograph items had to be found, filmed, classified, and used as 
checks against later copies or printings, an enormous task. A des- 
criptive note follows each entry. More, footnotes placed within the 
entry identify persons, places, and special subjects. The mechanical 
part of the editing indicates tremendous patience. The type is 
beautiful, a revival of the Baskerville, cut about 1760. The binder 
has done a notable service in pressing the 1037 pages into a pliable 
form and a Bradford Buckram cover. The list price is reasonable, 
fifteen dollars. 

* * * * 

Mexko 1825-1828: The Journal and Corespondence of Edward 
Thornton Tayloe, edited by C. Harvey Gardiner, is published by 
The University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill. When Joel 
R. Poinsett went to Mexico as United States Minister to the new 
republic he took with him as private secretary Edward Thornton 
Tayloe of the prominent Virginia family. Tayloe, twenty-two years 
old in 1825, just out of Harvard where his studies were undistin- 
guished, was not on salary. His father paid his expenses, hoping to 
land a diplomatic appointment for his son. The three years which 
young Tayloe spent in Mexico ended his diplomatic career. He 
subscribed to Poinsett's policy of meddling in the internal affairs of 
the country and of seeking commercial gains for American com- 
panies. The only fruit of his stay is his journal and letters which 
Professor Gardiner here presents in a well-printed illustrated volume 
of 212 pages, including an ample index. Tayloe traveled some 


2000 miles, chiefly examining mines, and he described all the physi- 
cal features of mountains, towns, mines, roads, and farms, the 
beautiful and the annoying of Mexico, just as has been done by 
numerous tourists before and since. He never enters into the 
thoughts of the "amiable" but "miserable" people, whose Catholic 
religion he repeatedly holds in contempt. He made one mistake of 
criticising the governmental officials in a letter to his brother who 
had the remarks published, and thereafter Tayloe gave no valuable 
information, not even the reasons for Poinsett's "resignation," as he 
terms the recall. The book will be flavorable to all who have 
visited Mexico. Its list price is $5. 

Blue grass Craftsman, Being the Reminiscences of Ebenezer Hiram 
Stedman, Paper?naker, 1808-1883, edited by Frances L. S. Dugan 
and Jacqueline P. Bull, was published last October by the University 
of Kentucky Press. Born in 1808 near Boston, Ebenezer Hiram 
Stedman began to write his memoirs in the form of letters to his 
daughter in 1878, and the papers together with his two manuscripts 
on the history of papermaking gathered dust until the two enter- 
prising editors brought them before the public in this neatly printed 
volume. Since Stedman wrote phonetically his spelling, grammar, 
and punctuation are abominable, and all credit must be given to 
those who typed the copy, set it in print, and proofread it. The 
"Bluegrass Craftsman" was a noted papermaker in Kentucky. His 
father had moved the family from Massachusetts and had set up 
the business of making paper about 1823. In the face of fires and 
floods and innumerable hardships, each recounted stoically by 
Stedman, he and his brother carried on the state's biggest paper 
industry until the Civil War reduced Stedman to bankruptcy and 
forced him to seek new work in Texas. His rambling, repetitious 
recollections of people, places and events will be read with mingled 
enjoyment and sadness by Kentuckians, and they will prove inter- 
esting to many general readers. Scholars, however, will be wary 
of trusting the memory of the septuagenarian, but they may well 
pay heed to the footnotes of the editors. Just before taking leave 
of Kentucky Stedman wrote a short history of the craft of paper- 
making in early Kentucky, the "Buisness that I have bin engaged in, 
for the last fifty years." This is published as an appendix of 


eleven pages. The book runs to 226 pages including a brief index 
and is listed at five dollars. 

There is a very beautiful map in the James Ford Bell Collec- 
tion of the University of Minnesota. Recently added to the other 
items on the Portuguese discoveries and trade in Africa, India, and 
Brazil, the map or chart was drawn by Jorge Reinel about 1534 to 
illustrate the development of trade and navigation and to indicate 
the commercial rivalries of the time. This has now been repro- 
duced in a handsome brochure by Philip W. Porter entitled Benin 
to Bahia, with a descriptive sub-title, "A Chronicle of Portuguese 
Empire in the South Atlantic in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Cen- 
turies, Vv^ith Comments on a chart of Jorge Reinel." The foreword 
is by John Parker, Curator of the Bell Collection. After chronicling 
the expansion of commerce from the time of Prince Henry, Pro- 
fessor Porter tells what is known of the famed cartographer, Jorge 
Reinel, and gives an interpretation of the meaning of the chart. 
Altogether, this is an attractive and interesting brochure. 


An Historical Review 


An Historical Review 





ELECTIONS, 1865-1900 .... Vincent P. De Santh 61 


PHILIPPINE COMPANY .... James F. Cloghessy 80 



IN THE PAMPAS F. Samuel TrifHo ll6 







Published quarterly by Loyola University (The Institute of Jesuit History) 
at 50 cents a copy. Annual subscription, $2.00; in foreign countries, $2.50. 

Entered as second class matter, August 7, 1929, at the post office at 
Chicago, Illinois, under the Act of March 3, 1879. Additional entry as 
second class matter at the post office at Effingham, Illinois. Printed in 
the United States. 

Subscription and change of address notices and all communications should 
be addressed to the Managing Editor at the publication and editorial 
offices at Loyola University, 6525 Sheridan Road, Chicago 26, Illinois. 


An Historical Review 



Catholicism and Presidential 
Elections, 1865-1900 

Since it was not until 1928 that a Catholic won the nomination 
for President it might be assumed that the factor of Catholicism 
seldom if ever received any attention in previous presidential elec- 
tions. While it never gained the national prominence that it had 
in 1928, Catholicism was dragged into practically every presidential 
election in the post-Civil War generation. Yet as an issue it 
played a minor and subordinate role, and never came close to 
being a determining factor in the outcome of any one of these 
contests. This significant fact has sometimes been obscured by the 
exaggerated importance that has been attached to the amount of 
anti-Catholic propaganda used in some of these campaigns. But 
the appearance of much of this bias on a few occasions meant 
nothing more than that the parties were using every possible means 
to win votes and to discredit their opponents. 

What Catholic issue there was in American politics in the 
Gilded Age grew out of the traditional anti-Catholicism that existed 
in the United States. This assumed that Catholics could not be 
trusted in public office, since they owed their political allegiance 
first to Rome, and because they sought to destroy the Republic and 
to abolish freedom of speech and of the press and religious toler- 
ation. Also as Catholics grew in numbers and political strength 
in the increasing industrial areas after the Civil War, and as the 
importance of rural areas, strongholds of Protestantism, began to 
decline, more and more the rural elements came to look upon 
Catholics as representing the most degrading features of urban 
life — slums, saloons, gambling houses, and corrupt political ma- 
chines. Many Americans also feared that Catholics would destroy 



the public school system if they got into public office, and some 
of the actions and statements by Catholics helped to increase this 

While the question of Reconstruction overshadowed all other 
issues in the presidential elections of the decade following the 
end of the Civil War, Catholicism, in a minor way, became in- 
volved in all three of them. In 1868 the most widely circulated 
charge by the Democrats against Schuyler Colfax, Grant's running 
mate, was that he had an anti-Catholic record. The Republicans 
retaliated when they attempted to discredit the Democrats by as- 
sociating them with the Irish-Catholics and with "that abomina- 
tion against common sense called the Catholic religion."^ During 
the campaign of 1872, Harper's Weekly asserted that the Catholic 
Church in America was "loud in its denunciation of American 
civilization," that it furnished "three-fourths of the criminals and 
paupers who prey upon the Protestant community," that it never 
ceased its "attacks upon the principles of freedom," and that 
"its great mass of ignorant voters have been the chief source 
of our political ills."^ This influential Republican journal de- 
clared that "Romish priests" and "Romish bishops" had become 
the partisans of Horace Greeley, "the candidate of disunion and 
religious bigotry," and the charge was made that the election of 
Greeley would be fatal in its results because he was "a noted 
opponent of the Bible and a firm friend of Rome."^ Furthermore, 
Harper's Weekly pictured Greeley as the accomplice of the "Jesuit 
faction" which "would rejoice to tear the vitals of American 
freedom, and rend the breast that has offered it a shelter."^ 
It charged that the Jesuits had allied themselves with the Ku 
Klux Klan and Tammany Hall, and it called upon "every sincere 
Protestant to labor ceaselessly to defeat the schemes of the 
Jesuits, and drive their candidate back to a merited obscurity."^ 

During the same campaign Thomas Nast, in a very famous 
cartoon, had Uncle Sam attempting to cut the ties between an 

1 Charles H. Coleman, The Election of 1868, New York, 1933, 99, 302- 

2 Harper's Weekly, September 14, 1872, quoted from J. R. G. Has- 
sard, "American Catholics and Partisan Newspapers," Catholic World, 
XVI (March, 1873), 760. 

3 Ibid., 761, for first quotation; Leon B. Richardson, William E. 
Chandler, Republican, New York, 1940, 149 for second quotation. 

4 Harper's Weekly, October 12, 1872 quoted from Hassard in Catholic 
World, XVI, 762. 

5 Harper's Weekly, October 26, 1872 quoted from Hassard in Catholic 
World, XVI, 764. 


American Bishop and the Pope by holding a naturahzation paper 
inscribed, "This ends the foreign alliance." The Bishop had his 
arms full of papers with such items as "Vote for Horace Greeley 
because he does not want the Bible in public schools," "Vote 
as Roman Catholics. Destroy the Public Schools," "Orders from 
the Pope of Rome to the Catholics of America." Close by the side 
of the Bishop stood the Pope in a menacing and cunning fashion 
with his arms also full of papers that read, "Orders to all state 
officials that are Roman Catholics," "Down with the American 
public schools," and "I am Infallible. Therefore I must rule 
Church and State. "^ 

By the mid-seventies the school question had stimulated such 
public interest that many Republican politicians began to talk 
about schools and religious issues. The New York Republican 
platform of 1875 denounced the use of any public funds for sec- 
tarian institutions "as a crime against liberty," and similar state- 
ments came from the Republican party in Connecticut, Ohio, 
Wisconsin, Missouri, and California.'^ In Indiana the Republican 
state platform asserted that it was "incompatible with American 
citizenship to pay allegiance to any foreign power, civil or ec- 
clesiastical."^ In most places the Republicans charged that the 
large number of Catholics in the Democratic party and its oc- 
casional support of state aid for their schools and religious 
equality in the public schools proved that a Democratic-clerical 
alliance had been formed to bring about a union of Church and 
State. President Grant, speaking at Des Moines, Iowa, in the 
fall of 1875 by implication condemned the Catholic Church and 
praised the public schools, and in his annual message to Congress, 
a few months later, recommended the adoption of a constitutional 
amendment that would have obligated the states to maintain a 
free public educational system, and that would have prohibited 
religious training in the schools and public aid to sectarian schools.^ 
In the same month James G. Blaine, one of the most prominent 
Republican leaders in the country, introduced in Congress an amend- 
ment to the federal Constitution that would have prohibited any 

6 Harper's Weekly, XVI (October 19, 1872), 788. 

7 Alvin P. Stauffer, "Anti-Catholicism in American Politics, 1865- 
1900," Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Harvard University (1933), 65, 

8 Catholic Record, X (April, 1876), 325. 

9 New York Tribune, October 1, 1875; James D. Richardson, A 
Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 1789-1897, 
Washington, 1899, VII, 334, 356. 


State from appropriating public funds for sectarian schools>° The 
New York Tribune felt that Blaine was attempting to make what- 
ever capital there was out of this issue, for as it observed, "Every 
politician knows that there is no subject on which the average 
well-to-do citizen in the country districts is so sensitive as upon 
the possibility of Roman Catholic aggression, particularly with 
reference to the schools. "-^^ 

In their national platform of 1876 the Republicans came out 
for a constitutional amendment forbidding the use of public funds 
for sectarian schools, and the Democrats, alarmed by the charge 
that they had joined an alliance with "the emissaries of the Pope" 
restated their loyalty to the public schools and their opposition to 
a division of the public school fund with denominational insti- 
tutions. ■'•" The Republicans attempted to exploit the alleged Demo- 
cratic — Catholic alliance by issuing several pamphlets which charged 
the Catholic Church in America with forcing her communicants 
to vote Democratic in order to make way for a change in our form 
of government. The pamphlets warned that the United States 
would be in danger "if the Ultramontane element of the Church, 
through the success of the Democracy, should obtain control of 
our national affairs."^^ Several Republican papers and journals 
like the Washington Chronicle and Harper's Weekly published 
alleged exposures of clerical threats to excommunicate Catholics 
who voted for Rutherford B. Hayes, the Republican nominee.^'* 

Harper's Weekly continued its assault upon Catholics when 
it asserted that of all religious groups only the Catholics pro- 
claimed their 

hostility to American institutions and laws . . . All the Roman Catholic 
press unites in the assault upon American education . . . The Roman Catholic 
priesthood holds in abject discipline the whole body of our Democratic 
voters . . . There is no room for dissent in this remarkable political or- 
ganization. From the pulpit, the confessional, the church door, the lec- 
ture room, Roman Catholics are directed to obey the suggestions of their 
oracle at the Vatican . . . The Vatican directs the policy of the ruling sec- 
tion of the Democratic party, i^ 

Harper's Weekly felt that in the centennial year of our nation "we 

10 Congressional Record, 44 Cong., I Sess., p. 205. 

11 New York Tribune, December 1, 1875. 

12 Kirk Porter, National Party Platforms, New York, 1924, 89, 96. 

13 Stauffer, "Anti-Catholicism in American Politics," 76-77. 

14 Washington, Chronicle, October 15, 28, 1876; Harper's Weekly, XX 
(October 21, 1876), 854. 

15 Harper's Weekly, XX (July 29, 1876), 615. 


are threatened with the complete reversal of the principles of 
Jefferson and Adams," and it asked, "Will not the people rise, 
from Maine to Texas, to defeat by an utter overthrow the plans 
of our foreign foe?"^^ 

The support that Hayes received from the surviving Know- 
Nothing societies along with the anti Catholic sentiments of some 
of the Republican campaign literature naturally alienated Catholics, 
and a number of their journals spoke out against Hayes. The 
Boston Pilot on August 15, 1876, stated that Hayes was "supported 
by every anti-foreign, Know-Nothing clique that disgraces the 
country," and on September 2 declared that the Republican party 
would make the foreigner "a political helot without voice or vote." 
Earlier John Gilmary Shea in the American Catholic Quarterly Re- 
view had written that up until the time of Grant, the religion of a 
President was of no importance. But with Grant it had become 
different. Shea wrote: 

That he is a Methodist is kept constantly before the public mind. He is 
actually priest-ridden. The bishops and ministers of his creed exercise an 
influence that the Presbyterians never dreamed of coveting, while Jackson 
or Polk were in power; or Episcopalians under Washington, Madison or 
Monroe. 1'^ 

Because Catholics were unhappy about Hayes, the Democrats 
made an effort to win their votes for Tilden by publishing a 
number of documents aimed at proving that Hayes was anti-Catho- 
lic. But Hayes seemed to be bothered more by the charge of 
nativism than by that of religious bigotry. He told a close per- 
sonal friend in a private letter that "the Know-Nothing charges 
are more than met (not by denial or explanation) but by charging 
the Democrats with their Catholic alliance," and in a letter to the 
Secretary of the Republican National Committee, Hayes said that 
he did "not favor the exclusion of foreigners from the ballot or 
from office," but that he did "oppose Catholic interference and 
all sectarian interference with political affairs, and especially with 
the schools."-^^ When the returns of the 1876 election were in 
and James A. Garfield thought that the Democrats had won he 
wrote privately that the Republicans had been defeated by "the 
combined power of rebellion, Catholicism, and whiskey."^^ 

16 Ihid. 

17 Volume I (January, 1876), 168. 

18 Charles E. Williams, ed., Diary and Letters of Rutherford Bur- 
chard Hayes, Columbus, Ohio, 1929, III, 358, 366. 

19 Allan Nevins, Grover Cleveland, A Study in Courage, New York, 
1934, 182. 


Catholicism was hardly discussed in the 1880 campaign, al- 
though the Neu> York Herald proclaimed this was a Protestant 
country and we were a Protestant people, and the San Francisco 
Argonaut m.aintained that "Where the Protestant Church and the 
non-sectarian schoolhouse cast their shadows, wherever temperance, 
intelligence, and patriotism exist, there the Republican party has 
triumphed. "^° Garfield's margin of victory was less than 10,000 
votes, and interestingly enough, John Gilmary Shea felt that the 
narrow Democratic defeat had been "brought about by the intro- 
duction of the Catholic question into politics, not by Catholics who 
did nothing, said nothing, asked nothing, but by schemers who 
used an old bugbear, and found fools enough to think them honest 
men.""^ But the Catholic issue played no role at all, let alone 
the decisive one, in the outcome of the 1880 election, and Shea 
was probably misled by the undue importance he attached to some 
of the anti-Catholic sentiments that appeared occasionally in the 

While Catholicism was a side issue in the national campaign 
of 1880, this did not appear to be the case in New York City. 
Here William R. Grace, an Irish-American and anti-Tammany 
Democrat, became the first Catholic to be named by either party 
for the office of Mayor. The Republicans emphasized his religion 
as a major obstacle to his election. Elihu Root stated that Grace's 
nomination meant that it was proposed to deliver control of the 
city government "to one sect to the exclusion of all others."-- A 
Protestant minister declared that Leo XIII contemplated the de- 
struction of all Protestant institutions in the city if the Democrats 
won,-^ and the New York Times predicted that the election of a 
Catholic Mayor would mean that the public schools would be 
"Romanized" by the introduction of Catholic teachers and text- 
books.^"* The religious issue probably cost Grace the vote of 
thousands of Protestant Democrats, for while he won, his plurality 
of 3,000 votes fell far below Hancock's 40,000 in the presidential 

An incident occurred in 1884 which seemed to demonstrate 
how diffiailt it would have been to nominate a candidate for 

20 John Gilmaiy Shea, "The Anti-Catholic Issue in the Late Elec- 
tion," American Catholic Quarterly Review, VI (January, 1881), 40. 

21 Ibid., 37-38. 

22 Nexv York Times, Octobei' 30, 1880. 

23 Ibid. 

24 Ibid., October 31, 1880. 


President who had Catholic relatives, let alone a Catholic him- 
self. A few of the Republican reformers like George Frisbie Hoar 
and George William Curtis opposed the nomination of either Blaine 
or President Arthur and decided to back General William T. Sher- 
man who, next to Grant, was the most popular war hero in the 
North. But opposition to Sherman arose from the New York and 
Massachusetts delegations, because his wife was a Catholic, and 
Hoar's own group told him, "Our people do not want a Father 
Confessor in the White House. "^^ But we must not read too much 
into this, for this does not prove the point that Sherman lost be- 
cause of his Catholic connections. He was never a serious conten- 
der in 1884, and any candidate endorsed by the reform element 
would have found little support at the Republican national conven- 
tion that year. 

Catholicism also plagued Grover Cleveland in his bid for the 
nomination on the Democratic ticket although for reasons quite 
opposite from those that seemed to handicap Sherman. Before 
convention time Tammany opponents of Cleveland spread the word 
that he was a Know-Nothing, a "Presbyterian bigot," and "bit- 
terly hostile to anything relating to Catholicity."^^ Tammany 
played up the fact that Cleveland, as governor of New York, had 
vetoed a bill appropriating state money for the Catholic Protec- 
tory in New York City. When Cleveland's managers arrived at 
Chicago they found many worried supporters, "for all Chicago was 
talking about Cleveland's anti-Catholicism."^^ But officials of the 
Catholic Protectory repudiated the charge of bigotry made against 
Cleveland, and several of his prominent Catholic appointees has- 
tened to the Democratic convention to counter the rumors that he 
was anti-Catholic.^^ 

When Tammany continued to circulate the anti-Catholic charges 
against Cleveland during the campaign, some Catholics spoke out 
against these tactics. A group of them met in New York to pro- 
test against the attempt of Patrick J. Hickey, editor of the Catholic 
Review, to make it appear that their organization, the Catholic 
Union, opposed Cleveland and favored Blaine.^^ Father Edward 
McGlynn also came out publicly to the rescue of Cleveland. 

25 George F. Hoar, Autobiography of Seventy Years, New York, 1903, 
I, 407-^08. 

26 Denis Tilden Lynch, Grover Cleveland, A Man Foiir-Square, New 
York, 1932, 180. 

27 Ibid., 171. 

28 Ibid., p. 172; H. C. Thomas, The Return of the Democratic Party 
to Power, New York, 1919, 179. 

29 Lynch, Cleveland, 262. 


I am disgusted at the talk about alleged Irish defection and the Catholic 
vote for Blaine, and at the cost of several journals of supposed Irish and 
Catholic leanings, which had procured them the distinction (not without 
the profits) of being scattered broadcast as Blaine literature. The attempt 
to excite Catholic prejudice against Grover Cleveland is due almost en- 
tirely to conscienceless politicians . . . conscienceless scamps. 30 

Cleveland seemed to be undisturbed about the religious allegations 
made about him and even felt that they would prove to be advan- 
tageous to him. "The Catholic question is being treated," he wrote 
in a letter, "and so well treated in so many different ways that I 
should not be at all surprised if what has been done by the enemy 
should turn to our ad vantage. "^•'■ 

Blaine was also caught up in the Catholic issue. Born of a 
Presbyterian father and a Catholic mother and raised as a Catholic, 
he had become a Presbyterian in his adult life. Thus Catholicism 
affected Blaine's candidacy in several different ways. In spite of 
his switch in faiths he was charged by some with being in reality 
a Catholic because he had sent one of his daughters to Paris to be 
educated in a "Romish" convent, and because another of his daugh- 
ters had been married by a "Romish priest" to a former officer 
of the Papal Guards.^" To counter these allegations some of 
Blaine's friends made public a letter he had written in 1876 in 
which he asserted that the charge of Catholicism was a plot of 
his enemies, that his ancestors on his father's side were Presby- 
terians, that he abhorred religious tests in a republic where free- 
dom of conscience was the birthright of every citizen, that he would 
not speak disrespectfully of his mother's faith, and that he would 
not be drawn into any avowal of hostility or unfriendliness to 
Catholics, though he had never received, nor did he expect, any 
political support from them.^^ The American Protestant Association 
issued a circular which stated that Blaine "was not a Papist," but 
"a straightout New England, orthodox Congregationalist."^* Prot- 
estants pointed out that whatever Catholicism Blaine had had as 
a youth surely would not injure him in his later life, and one of 
them declared, "If, as a little child, he took his mother's hand and 
walked with her to church, why there is a good Protestant day of 

30 Ihid., 269. 

31 Nevins, Cleveland, 170. 

32 The Republic, June 4, 1884. 

33 Gustavus Myers, History of Bigoti-y in the United States, New 
York, 1943, 220-221. 

34 Lynch, Cleveland, 230. 


judgement coming which will, no doubt purify, as by fire, the 
touch of that mother's hand."^^ In contrast with these appeals 
the Democrats attempted to win the votes of Catholics by accusing 
Blaine of being a former Know-Nothing and "a renegade to his 
mother's faith," and by recalling his sponsorship of the constitu- 
tional amendment to prohibit state aid.^^ 

Much has been made about the Burchard episode playing a 
prominent part in Blaine's defeat in 1884. According to many 
contemporaries and historians, Blaine's failure to repudiate Bur- 
chard's slur of "Rum, Romanism, and Rebellion" made against the 
Democratic party alienated so many Irish-Catholic voters in New 
York City that the Republicans lost New York, a key state, by 
less than 1,200 votes. If this were the case, then Catholicism 
might be regarded as playing a determining role in the outcome 
of this election. But the importance of this incident in causing 
Blaine's defeat has been exaggerated. A number of factors ex- 
plain Blaine's loss in New York, which both sides regarded as a 
doubtful state to begin with, and in a victory parade the Democrats 
carried a banner that summed up some of these. ^'^ 

The World Says the 


Did It 

The Tribune Says the 


Did It 

The Sun Says 


Did It 

Blaine Says 

St. John 

Did It 

Theodore Roosevelt Says it was the Soft Soap Dinner 
We say Blaine's character Did It 
But We Don't Care What Did It 
It's Done. 

But the temptation to regard Burchard's statement as swinging the 
Irish-Catholics in New York City away from Blaine in sufficient 
numbers to cause his defeat has persisted. 

In the late eighties and early nineties there was another revival 
of the doctrines of Know-Nothingism, and such groups as the 
United Order of Deputies and the Patriotic Order Sons of America 
sprang up whose membership took an oath "not to help in electing 
or appointing a Catholic or a Catholic sympathizer to off ice, "^^ 
and periodicals like the Loyal American appeared which had edi- 

35 E. P. Oberholtzer, A History of the United States Since the Civil 
War, IV (1931), 205. 

36 Stauffer, "Anti-Catholicism in American Politics," 119-120. 

37 Henry L. Stoddard, As I Knew Them, Presidents and Politics from 
Grant to Coolidge, New York, 1927, 138. 

38 George Potier, The American League, Chicago, 1890, 20. 


torials that declared, "The modern 'holy alliance:' Rum, Rome, 
the saloon and the priest. All they ask for is a fair divey betv/een 
them of the boodle of American citizens."^^ The most important 
of these groups was the American Protective Association which 
was formed in Iowa in 1887 and which soon spread into other parts 
of the country. The story of the A.P.A. is a very familiar one, 
and need not detain us here except to recall a few pertinent facts. 
There is no doubt about this organization being extremely anti- 
Catholic and its seeking to exploit Protestant fears about Cathol- 
icism. Every A.P.A. member had to take an oath in which he 
denounced Catholicism and in which he swore that he would not 
"knowingly vote for, recommend for nor appoint, nor assist in 
electing or appointing a Roman Catholic nor any one sympathizing 
with Roman Catholicism to any political position whatever. "^° 

The A.P.A. put out inflammatory pamphlets. It published 
fabricated pastoral letters from the American hierarchy to American 
Catholics calling upon them to form a "Papal Party," to "plot 
and labor for the absolute supremacy" of the Pope, to serve "the 
interests of Catholicism" in "their political work," and to fill all 
the political offices "with men selected by the bishop of the diocese." 
It printed and widely circulated forged papal encyclicals such as 
the one from Leo XIII which represented the Pope as declaring 
that since the Catholic Columbus had discovered America, this con- 
tinent belonged to the Pope, and the time had come to take forcible 
possession. It spread stories that Catholics had stored arms and 
ammunition in cathedrals, convents, churches, and parochial schools 
for use against Protestants.'*^ That these fabrications had their 
effect, especially in the rural areas, is illustrated by a letter from a 
physician in a small town in Ohio. 

We have been, and still are, having an excitement in our usually quiet 
town, in regard to the Catholic question. There is not a Catholic in the 
entire township; but a large number of our people are intensely stirred 
up, some almost prostrated with fear, afraid that the Catholics are about 
making a wholesale attack upon Protestants, killing and plundering, and 
destroying our schools and churches. Of course it obtains the strongest 
foothold among the ignorant and unthinking, yet it seems to cause great 
uneasiness and fear among many of the more intelligent.42 

39 Stauffer, "Anti-Catholicism in American Politics," 170. 

40 Ibid., 176. 

41 Ihid., 225^226, 300-301; Oberholtzer, History of the United States, 
V, 428. 

42 Washington Gladden, "The Anti-Catholic Crusade, The Century, 
XL VII (March, 1894), 792-793. 


Now all this would seem to indicate that the A. P. A. had stirred 
up a national excitement about the participation of Catholics in 
American public life, but we must be careful not to exaggerate 
the importance of this organization and its propaganda in national 
politics. Cecil Spring Rice described it as a group which sought 
"to prevent Catholics, especially Irishmen, from being Republican 
office holders,"'*^ and it is true that in just about every case it 
worked with the Republican party. But where the A.P.A. in- 
fluenced elections most was in local areas and especially in the 
Mid-West. In a number of communities in Nebraska, Iowa, 
Illinois, Michigan, and Ohio, the A.P.A. won control of the Re- 
publican party and carried many local elections, and in these areas 
politicians appeared to be reluctant to nominate Catholics for of- 
fice for fear the religious issue would defeat them. In 1894 when 
the A.P.A. claimed a membership of two million and boasted that 
it was "travelling at the rate of a cyclone," it was asserted that it 
ruled a number of leading cities including New York, Brooklyn, 
Boston, Chicago, New Orleans, San Francisco, Pittsburgh, St, 
Louis and Kansas City.'*'^ However, such claims by the A.P.A. 
along with the one in 1896 of controlling four million votes in the 
United States have to be accepted as more propaganda than fact. 
Politicians and parties did not succumb so easily, as it has been 
assumed, to A.P.A. demands, even on the local and state level 
where the organization wielded its greatest power. For example, 
Henry Cabot Lodge, a young rising Republican politician then, 
never had anything to do with the A.P.A. and resisted its demands. 
Writing to Theodore Roosevelt in 1894 about the Massachusetts 
Republican platform of that year. Lodge said, "It meets the A.P.A. 
squarely, denouncing any attempt to discriminate on account of 
religion, which was bold and wise." Himself a rising and am- 
bitious politician, Roosevelt told Lodge, "I think that no good can 
be done with such a movement as the A.P.A.," and he further 
predicted that "The A.P.As. won't cut any figure at all."^^ 

What excitement the A.P.A. might have been able to stir up if 
a Catholic had been running for President we shall never know, 
and to speculate about it with personal opinions is not the task 
of the historian. Catholicism received practically no attention in 

43 John A. Garraty, Henry Cabot Lodge, New York, 1953, 141. 

44 Oberholtzer, History a the United States, V, 427-428. 

45 Garraty, Lodge, 141-142; Elting E. Morison, ed., The Letters of 
Theodore Roosevelt, Cambridge, Mass., 1951, I, 400-401. 


the 1888 campaign, but in that of 1892, the A.P.A. tried to arouse 
voters about the Catholic issue in several different ways. The 
A.P.A. pointed to the maladministration of New York City under 
Tammany Hall as an example of the evil effects of the alleged 
alliance between a corrupt political machine and "Romish emis- 
saries." It acaised Cleveland of installing a direct telephone con- 
nection from the White House to the residence of Cardinal Gib- 
bons to secure the latter's approval of everything the President 
did. Cleveland was also charged with putting a Catholic at the 
head of every division of the federal employees and with having 
issued orders that every government clerk contribute to the Sisters 
of Charity. Blaine was accused of currying favors with the Catho- 
lics by sending his children to Catholic schools and by holding con- 
ferences with the hierarchy, and the selection of Catholics to head 
both national committees was attacked as a bid for papal control."*^ 
But while these matters were played up they were really side is- 
sues and diversions, and they had no effect upon the outcome one 
way or the other. 

Catholics even received the blame for bringing on the Panic 
of 1893. The charge was made that servant girls and workers 
in the Mid- West, prodded by the Catholic clergy had started runs 
on the banks and that everywhere Catholic merchants had refused 
to purchase and Catholic manufacturers had closed their plants 
as part of a Catholic plot to disrupt our economic life so as to 
seize control of the country. ^^ At their national convention in 
1896 the Republicans, not wanting to offend the A.P.A. by using 
a Catholic and not wishing to affront Catholics by employing a 
Protestant, asked a Jewish Rabbi to open the proceedings with a 
prayer.'*^ But by this time whatever political influence the A.P.A. 
had had on a national level had begun to disappear. The Repub- 
licans, who had adopted a plank declaring against appropriations 
for sectarian institutions in every one of their platforms since 1876, 
refused to take a similar stand in 1896. This was humiliating 
enough for the A.P.A., but what was even more humiliating, and 
which dramatically underscored its weakness in national politics, 
was the fact that the Committee on Resolutions had at first accepted 
the plank, then reconsidered and defeated it when Archbishop John 
Ireland sent a telegram to the national chairman asking the Repub- 

46 Stauffer, "Anti-Catholicism in American Politics," 309-310. 

47 Ibid., 326. 

48 Oberholtzer, History of the United States, V, 429. 


lican party not to "lower itself to recognize, directly or indirectly, 
the A.P.A."*^ While some efforts were made during the campaign 
to list both McKinley and Hanna as Catholics, the economic issues 
in 1896 crowded everything else out. 

Thus Catholicism had no real significance in any one of the 
presidential elections of the post-Civil War generation. As an 
issue, and even as a propaganda device, it was always overshadowed 
by other matters. Whether Catholicism would have become an 
important factor if a Catholic had run for President we shall 
never know, for neither one of the major parties seriously con- 
sidered a Catholic as a candidate for the presidency. From this 
it might appear that they were unwilling to take the risk of running 
a Catholic for President, and that this reluctance excluded presi- 
dential possibilities who, had they not been Catholics, might have 
otherwise been considered or named. But such a conclusion rests 
more upon emotionalism than it does upon historical evidence. 
No doubt there would have been sturdy obstacles in the way of 
running a Catholic for the presidency, but how much of a risk or 
liability such a nomination would have been to a party in these 
years will never be known. There is no evidence to warrant the 
conclusion that the major parties held back from naming a Catho- 
lic because of the risk element involved. More to the point is 
the fact that there were no Catholics prominent, popular, or at- 
tractive enough for the parties to consider. We do know, though, 
that Catholicism did provoke bitter political fights in local and 
state contests in these years, but even in these situations, the religious 
factor did not prevent Catholics from being elected to office. 

Vincent P. De Santis 
University of Notre Dame 

49 Humphrey J. Desmond, The A.P.A. Movement, Washington, 1912, 

The Philippines and the Royal 
Philippine Company 

The Royal Philippine Company, created in 1785 by decree of 
Charles III of Spain, passed through various stages of fortune, and 
dissolved in 1834 amid the internal difficulties that racked Spain 
and the international imbroglios in Europe. Spain's Asian ven- 
ture in imperialism is significant in relation to the status of inter- 
national trade at the time of the Company's inception. The exis- 
tence of the Royal Philippine Company could not but be regarded 
by Holland and England as a frontal attack upon their interests 
in the Orient because the success of the Company would not simply 
have eliminated the Spanish peninsula as a market for Asian 
goods carried by these two great mercantile powers, but would have 
seriously afflicted their illegal trade in such materials with the ports 
of Central and South America. Indeed, the success of the Spanish 
endeavor would have been a major step toward sealing off the 
Spanish empire from the commercial nations of Europe, an ob- 
jective long sought by the Spanish kings. Within the framework 
of the Spanish empire, the Royal Philippine Company could have 
served as a unifying factor, a factor sorely needed in view of the 
dismemberment of the empire that occurred in the nineteenth cen- 

The historical importance of the Royal Philippine Company is 
inseparable from the royal intention in its formation. In the Com- 
pany's founding cedula, Charles III specifically states that the 
Company's "principal purpose must remain the union of American 
and Oriental commerce. . . ."^ Eduardo Malo de Luque, writing 
in Spain at the end of the first five years of Company existence, 
concurs with the cedula in his statement of the Company's major 
objective.^ In 1810, Tomas de Comyn, a Company agent in the 
Philippines, reiterates the view of Malo de Luque and the clear 
wording of the royal cedula.^ Comyn' s statement was made in 

1 Real cedula de la Compania de Filipinas de 10 de Marzo de 1785, 
Articulo xxvi, in Eduardo Malo de Luque, Historia politica de los esta- 
blecimientos ultramarinos de las naciones europeas, V, Madrid, 1790, 
piezas anexas 2, 11-94. 

2 Ibid., V, 344. 

3 Tomas de Comyn, Estado de las Islas Filipi7ias en 1810, Manila, 
1820, 68-69. 



defense of the Company against those who considered the develop- 
ment of the Phihppine Islands to be the sole purpose for the 
existence of the Company. Curiously, existing writings on the 
Royal Philippine Company, while drawing heavily upon both Malo 
de Luque and Comyn, have adopted the view which both writers 
opposed. This tendency to regard the Company only in its Oriental 
context with emphasis on the Philippines pervades the entire pub- 
lished bibliography of the Company. Unfortunately, this Philip- 
pine-centric interpretation of Company history has achieved so 
general an acceptance that an accurate assessment of the place of 
the Company in Spanish history must be corroborated by a re- 
appraisal of the role of the Philippines in Company history. A 
chronological survey of pertinent materials will help to explain the 
inaccuracy of the Philippine-centric interpretation. 

The introduction of the Philippine Islands into Company litera- 
ture begins in 1765, with the "Demonstracion" of Francisco Leandro 
de Viana.'* This document is a plea to the king of Spain for re- 
newed efforts in the development of the Philippines. Viana's 
view of possible royal profit in the Philippines is optimistic, al- 
though as a royal official he well knew that to his time the Islands 
constituted a drain on the Spanish treasury and had never been 
profitable to their Spanish majesties.^ The plea of the "De- 
monstracion," then, was in the nature of a promise to the crown. 
Viana's demand for an increase in the quality, discipline, and num- 
ber of Spanish troops in the Islands points up a serious obstacle 
in the path of any proposed plan for the improvement of the 
Philippines.^ The southern Islands were under continual Moro 
attack and the success of either cash-crop agriculture or regular 
coast-wise traffic among the islands would have had to depend 
upon the unquestioned power of Spain throughout the archipelago. 
The Philippine historian Jose Montero y Vidal adequately under- 
scores the failure of Spain to rectify this debility within the Com- 
pany's time.'^ Moreover, the Company, as constituted under Spanish 
law, was in no way able to inaugurate measures in this direction 
as were its English and Dutch counterparts in their respective 

4 Francisco Leandro de Viana Zavala Vehena Saenz de Villaverde, 
"Demonstracion del misero deplorable estado de las Islas Philipinas. . . , 
Febrero, 1765"; Newberry Library, Chicago, Ayer Collection, cited here- 
inafter as Ayer Collection. 

5 William Lytle Schurz, The Manila Galleon, New York, 1939, 182. 

6 Viana, "Demonstracion," Parte I, capitulos 1-2. 

7 Jose Montero y Vidal, Historia de la Pirateria Malayo-Mohametana 
en Mindanao Jolo y Bot-neo, II, Madrid, 1888. 


Spheres. The language of the king was most explicit. The Com- 
pany was defined as "solely mercantile" and was forbidden to 
employ any of its facilities or personnel in political activities.^ 

The writing of Nicholas Norton y Nichols preceded Viana's 
"Demonstracion" by a few years, and contributed to the support 
of Viana's contentions and perhaps to the formulation of his ideas. 
Norton, a naturalized Spaniard of English origin, accused Spain, the 
world's greatest consumer of cinnamon, of supporting the Dutch 
establishments in Ceylon by neglecting to develop cinnamon in 
the Philippines.'^ Viana, with access to the royal ear, included 
Norton's charge in the "Demonstracion" with a mention of the 
"benefit of cinnamon" cultivation.^*^ The preoccupation of both 
Viana and Norton with the production of spices stems, of course, 
from their knowledge of the Dutch success in the Spice Islands. The 
area of the Philippines suited to the cultivation of cinnamon, how- 
ever, was well within the striking range of the Sultan of Jolo. The 
dream of spice traffic formed the foundation of these and subse- 
quent demands for agricultural development of the Philippines. 

In 1790, the sixth year of the Company's life, there was 
published in Madrid the fifth volume of Eduardo Malo de Luque's 
Historia politka. This author is identified from various sources 
as the Duke of Almodovar.^^ His volumes are generally regarded 
as a Spanish version of Raynal's Histoire Philosophique}'^ The 

8 Real cedula . . . de 10 de Marzo de 1785, Articulo xxxiii. The royal 
injunction reads as follows: "Declaro que esta Compania ha de ser sola- 
mente mercantil, sujeta a las leyes de la Monarquia, como qualquiera otro 
comerciante particular; a excepcion de la gracias, privilegios y exenciones 
que le concedo para su fomento, sin que por ningun motivo ni pretexto 
puede mezclarse ni introducirse en materias politicas, alianzas ni otros 
negocios de esta naturaleza, a menos de tener expresa orden 6 comision 
mia; y si alguno de sus empleados 6 Subalternos contraviniese a esta 
prohibicion, y usase de los buques y facultades de la Compaiiia en otras 
empresas que las de comercio se castigara severamente como reo de 

9 Nicholas Norton y Nicols, "Commercio de las Islas Philipinas. . . , 
Manila, [1759]," Ayer Collection. 

10 Viana, "Deinonstracion," Parte II, capitulo 3. 

11 Eduardo Malo de Luque is so identified by W. E. Retana, the 
Philippine collector and bibliographer in his Aparato, II, Madrid, 1906, 
581; Tomas de Comyn quotes from the fifth volume of Malo de Luque 
and attributes the quotation to the Duke of Almodovar, Estado, 71 ; An- 
tonio Palau y Dulcet says of the Historia politica, "Su autor es Pedro 
Francisco Luxan y Suarez de Gongora, Duque de Almodovar, quien se 
escudo bajo el anagrama de su titulo nobilario," in Manual del lihrero 
Hispano- Americano, V, Barcelona and London, 1926, 22. 

12 Roland Dennis Hussey, The Caracas Company, 1728-178^, a Stiidy 
in the History of Spanish Monopolistic Trade, Cambridge, 1934, 342. 
Professor Hussey calls it "A revision, satisfactoi-y to the Spanish censor, 
of Abbe Raynal's Histoire PJiilosophique." 


introduction to the fifth volume is prefaced by the statement that 
pubHcation was delayed to allow for the securing of Company 
documents; Malo de Luque, then, presumably concludes his fifth 
volume with original material on the Company. In his text, the 
author cites two documents, a report of the Manila directors to 
the Captain-General of the Philippines, dated November 18, 1788, 
and a report of the Manila directors to the Madrid directors, dated 
July 10, 1789. The same volume of the Historia politica contains 
appended documents including the Company's founding cedula and 
a Plan general. The latter document is a concise report of the 
Company's commercial achievement to September 30, 1789. 

The Plan general makes the fifth volume of the Historia 
politica the most valuable work published to date on the Royal 
Philippines Company, because it completes and places in world 
context the narrower considerations of Malo de Luque' s narrative. 
The sixty pages of text which the author devotes to the Company 
are concerned almost wholly with Company efforts in Island 
development, such as investments in agriculture, expenditures on 
installations for external and internal trade, and the blind opposition 
of the Manilans to the venture. Taken alone, these pages are the 
foundation of the Philippine-centric interpretation of Company his- 
tory.' The following examination of writings on the Company will 
show that through a process of incremental distortion, the textual 
portion of the Historia politica has served as the nucleus for a 
series of commentaries and histories that accept the Company as 
an almost purely Philippine venture. 

Within the lifetime of the Company, another writer contrib- 
uted his observations to the bibliography of the Royal Philippine 
Company. In 1810, Tomas de Comyn, a Company factor in the 
Islands, published his Estado, an analysis of the economic state of 
the Philippine Islands in 1810. One chapter of the Estado is devoted 
to the Company and even this is in the nature of a post mortem. 
Comyn, in the employ of the Company in the Islands, was predis- 
posed to regard Company abandonment of the Philippines as gravely 
significant; his account of the Company's failure in the Islands 
carries with it an impression of global failure. He explicitly states, 
however, that the development of the Philippine Islands was not 
the primary objective of Company commerce. He cites Malo de 
Luque in his contention that the primary purpose of the organiza- 
tion was to unite Asian, American, and European trade.^^ A more 

13 Comyn, Estado, 68-69, citing Malo de Luque, V, 344. 


precise delineation of this primary objective is lacking in the work 
of either man. Presumably, the royal intent encompassed a scheme 
of traffic among Spanish dominions routed through Spain for the 
benefit of Spain, but neither Comyn nor Malo de Luque regarded 
Philippine development as the Company's cardinal goal. Later 
writers, however, were to mate the Philippine emphasis of Malo 
de Luque's text with Comyn's concern for the Islands and produce 
the Philippine-centric interpretation of Company history. 

Ivlalo de Luque details the Company's attempts to improve the 
Islands. Comyn qualifies Malo de Luque's sanguine exposition 
by reference to "[t]wenty-four years of impotent and gratuitous 
efforts," and so predicates failure as the sequel to great effort. 
Comyn continues in this pessimistic vein telling of a more than 
80 per cent increase in the purchase price of Asian goods caused 
by the compulsory routing of traffic through Manila. He states 
that this "mal extendida sistema" prevailed for ten or twelve 
years, and detracted consistently from the Company's security. What 
remains as Comyn's most damaging criticism of the Company's 
organizational pattern was his characterization of the entire Company 
approach to Philippine development as mistaken. He believed 
that the Company had set an impossible task for itself in assuming 
the triple role of investor, producer, and carrier of Philippine 
agricultural and manufactured produce.^'* The backward economic 
state of the Philippines at the time of the Company's arrival un- 
questionably forced the Manila directorate to take this manifold 
action. Comyn's criticism, however, implies unrestrained zeal on 
the part of Company officials whereas later Philippine writers 
infer, simply, stupidity. The importance of both Comyn and Malo 
de Luque to the Philippine-centric view is not in what they wrote, 
but in how their writings were used in the course of the nineteenth 

The first step in the development of the Philippine-centric 
interpretation was taken by Sinibaldo de Mas y Sans nine years 
after the Company's official demise. In 1843, Mas had published 
at Madrid his Infomie sobre el estado de las islas FHipinas en 1842. 
A point by point comparison shows that he takes almost all his 
information from Malo de Luque. W. E. Retana says that Mas 
"in the historical section [of the Infon?ie'] drank the blood of the 
Duke of Almodovar. . . ."-^^ In copying Malo de Luque without 

14 Ibid., 62-71. 

15 Aparato, II, 581. 


citation, Mas devoted more attention to rephrasing than did those 
who, in their turn, were to copy him. Maio de Luque had originally 
attributed the difficulties between the Company and the Manila 
merchants to the blindness and ill-considered action of the latter, 
resulting in the maintenance of '\ . . la mas ahsoluta separ acton de 
tntereses, y abrigando un junesto espiritu de division. '^^'^ Mas, 
writing in the Philippines, might have been expected to seek out 
better causes for this resentment, but contents himself with ascrib- 
ing Manilan reluctance to '\ . . un junesto espiritu de separacion 
de intereses. . . ."'^^ Malo de Luque lists the following Company 
expenditures in the Islands: Philippine produce, 3,127,712 r.v.; real 
estate, 5,168,247 r.v.; Asian produce purchased from Manilans, 
8,779,876 r.v.; totaling to 17,024,836 r.v.'^^ With arithmetic fas- 
tidiousness, Mas presents the same information — correcting a one 
real error in Malo de Luque's addition. -"^^ The importance of this 
particular instance of copying is that in the original, Malo de Luque 
is emphasizing the success of the Company in off-setting the loss 
to Manila of the Acapulco galleon of the previous year while 
Mas is presenting an account of the tremendous waste of capital 
by the Royal Philippines Company. 

Mas draws from Tomas de Comyn after fully utilizing Malo 
de Luque's record of the first five years. The Informe tells us 
of an 80 to 100 per cent increase in the cost to the Company of 
Asian goods purchased at Manila, the establishment of agencies 
in China and India, and the ten or twelve years of the compulsory 
Manila call.^° All of this is from Comyn's Estado.^'^ The only 
significant change interpolated by Mas is where Comyn speaks of 
an increase in excess of 80 per cent in the cost to the Company 

16 Histdria Politica, V, 319, 345-346. 

17 InfoTTne, I, Parte Segunda, 33. 

18 Malo de Luque, V, 362-363, citing a report of the Manila directors 
to the Captain-General of the Philippines, November 18, 1788. 

19 The reliability of Malo de Luque's arithmetic is certainly open to 
question. Another instance of his inaccuracy is his statement, Ibid., V, 
349, that the Company exported from the Philippines 14,350 libras of 
indigo in 1786, at which figure he may have arrived through some calcula- 
tion involving the price of indigo; whereas an official Company document 
lists the figure at exactly half that amount. The document: Exposicion 
de la compania de Filipinas, relativa a su establecimiento, y d su impor- 
tancia politico-mercantil: a los medios que ha empleado para llenar los 
fines de su instituto; y a la justicia y necesidad de su conservacion para 
utilidad general del Estado, dirigida por su Junta de gobierno a las Cortes 
generates y extraordinarias de la Nacion, Cadiz, 1813, 361 ; hereinafter 
cited as Exposicion, 1813. 

20 Informe, I, Parte Segunda, 48. 

21 Estado, 65. 


of Asian goods purchased at Manila, Mas categorizes the increase 
as an 80 to 100 per cent loss of investment. Mas continues the 
emphasis on Company efforts in agriculture with the adoption of 
Comyn's regret, but in a more modest presentation. "El sistema 
de derramar dinero para transformar el estado agrkola y fabril 
de las is las fue segurdo por 20 anos. . , ,"^^ Mas concludes with the 
comment that Island development "diminished frightfully" the 
capital of the Company. He attributes the failure of Oriental 
commerce to the "political convulsions of the epoch. "^^ This esti- 
mate of the effect of the war on Company commerce can probably 
be justified. In short, Mas' Company history is taken from Malo 
de Luque and Comyn; the first five years are a repetition of the 
Historia politica and later years are covered with information from 
the Estado. With minor exceptions and what appears to be a 
single error in copying, Mas' dependence upon these two works 
is complete.^'* His contribution to the Philippine-centric inter- 
pretation of Company history is the result of his distortion of the 
sources which he employed. 

In December, 1842, J. Mallat, a French author, returned to 
Paris from his world travels to write his two volume work on 
the Philippines.^^ His arrival was well timed with the January, 
1843, publication of Mas' Informe in Madrid. Where Mas takes 
from Malo de Luque with attention to rephrasing, Mallat takes 
from Mas and shields the theft by escape into another language. 
Mallat's dependence upon Mas can best be described by comparative 
statements from their works. 

On the foundation of the Company: 

En 1784 la compania de Caracas, En 1784, la compagnie des Caraques 

que por la cesacion de su privilegio vit expirer son privilege ; eprouvant 

esclusivo buscaba objeto ocupar sus quelque embarras a trouver un em- 

cuantiosos fondos. . . .^6 ploi avantageux pour ses grands 

capitaux. . . .27 

22 Informe, I, Parte Segunda, 48; Comyn tells of "twenty-four years 
of impotent and gratuitous effort," Estado, 62-71. 

23 Informe, I, Parte Segunda, 49. 

24 Mas dates the Real cedula . . . de 10 de Marzo de 1785, 1784, In- 
forme, Parte Segunda, 31, while Malo de Luque, Historia politica, V, 342, 
gives the correct date. 

25 Les Philippines, Histoire, Geographic, Moeurs, Agriculture, In- 
diistrie et Commerce, des Colonies Espagnoles dans L'oceanie, 2 vols., Paris, 

26 Mas, Informe, Parte Segunda, 31. 

27 Mallat, Les Philippines, II, 292. 



On the royal requirement of Philippine development: 

Un 4 por 100 de los beneficios 
debia emplearse en el fomento de 
la agricultura e industria del pais: 
la compania tenia que comprar 
todos los efectos de China e India 
en Manila, ya fuese de sus vecinos 
ya de especuladores de aquellos 
paises por medios de contratas a 
entregar en Manila. . . .28 

Quatre pour 100 de benefice devai- 
ent etre employes a I'encourage- 
ment de I'agriculture et de I'in- 
dustrie du pays. La compagnie 
etait obligee d'acheter a Manilla 
toutes les merchandises de la Chine 
ou de rinde, soit des habitants, 
soit des speculateurs venus ces 


The foregoing information concerning the purchase of Oriental 
goods at Manila was taken by Mas from Comyn.^^ The story of 
the foundation of the Company and the expiration of the privileges 
of the Caracas Company was drawn from Malo de Luque.^^ Mallat, 
of course, simply translated Mas. In the following quotations, the 
data on the comparative price of Sumatran pepper and the estimate 
of total Philippine pepper production are of unknown origin.^" 
The data on the price offered by the Company for Philippine 
pepper and the optimistic estimate of annual pepper production 
by the Manila directors are taken from Malo de Luque.^^ 

On the Company attempts in agriculture: 

Concibio la erronea idea de crear 
en las islas los articulos de que 
necesitaba vastos acopios para sus 
operaciones, la seda, el anil, la 
canela, el algodon, la pimienta; 
establecio factorias subalternas, 
compro tierras, repartio semillas, 
aperos de labranza y premios, hizo 
adelantos de dinero y consiguio el 
que algunos pueblos contratasen 
entregar a una convenida epoca 
cierta cantidad de dichos produc- 
tos a precios muy subidos: la 
pimienta se estipulo al de 13 de 
medio pesos fuertes el pico de 

[M]alheureusement, elle concut la 
fausse idee de cultiver, dans 
I'archipel meme, des productions 
dont il lui fallait, pour ses opera- 
tions, de grands approvisionne- 
ments, telles que la soie, 1' indigo, 
la canelle, le coton, le poivre; elle 
etablit des comptoirs, elle acheta 
des terres, elle distribua des graines, 
des instruments et donna des 
primes; elle fit des avances de 
fonds et engagea certains pueblos a 
des epoques convenues, certaines 
quantites des ces produits a des 
prix tres-eleves; ainsi, par exemple. 

28 Mas, Informe, Parte Segunda, 31. 

29 Mallat, Les Philippines, II, 292. 

30 Comyn, Estado, 65, 

31 Malo de Luque, Historia politica, V, 341-342. 

32 This figure of unknown origin, 64,000 libras, is far short of the 
Company tally of pepper production to 1802. The official figure is 
272,446 libras, 13 onzas, Exposicion, 1813, 48-54. 

33 Historia politica, V, 368, citing a report of the Manila directors to 
the Madrid directors, July 10, 1789. 



ellc of frit de payer le poivre l^Vz 
piastres le picol de 137 livres, 
tandis qu'a Sumatra en pouvait 
I'acheter pour 3 ou 4 piastres. 
L' illusion fut poussee si loin a cet 
egard, qu'en 1789 I'agent de la 
compagnie a Manille ecrivit a la 
direction generale, a Madrid, qu'il 
esperait, au bout de trois ans, pou- 
voir expedier, 9600 picols, et que, 
plus tard, el fournait seul aux be- 
soins de I'Espagne et d'une grand 
partie de I'Europe. Le fait est 
qu'il ne put jamais se procurer plus 
de 64,000 livres par an, sur les- 
quelles encore la compagnie eprouva 
des pertes considerables. 35 

Manuel Azcarraga y Palermo wrote La libertad de comercw 
en las islas Filipinas which was published in Madrid in 1871. 
Azcarraga employed Malo de Luque, Comyn, and Mas in his thirty- 
four page presentation of Company history. Only Mas is cited. 
Azcarraga's reliance upon Malo de Luque may be partially illus- 
trated by comparative statements of the two authors on the founda- 
tion of the original Philippines Company in 1733. 

137 libras, mientras que en Sumatra 
se puede comprar a 3 6 4. El 
factor de Manila se hallaba en 
1789 tan alucinado acerca de este 
punto que en un informe a la 
superior direccion de Madrid, cal- 
culaba que de alii a tres aiios es- 
portaria la compania 9600 picos y 
en los sucesivos se podria abastecer 
a la Espana, America y buena parte 
de Europa. Sin embargo, nunca se 
llegaron a recoger mas de 64,000 
libras a costa de grandes perdidas.24 

. . . por cedula de 29 de Marzo 
de 1733: por ella se le concedian 
varios privilegios, no del agrado de 
nuestros comerciantes de Manila, los 
cuales protestaron y reclamaron por 
medios de diputados en la Corte 
contra la creacion de aquella socie- 
dad; y por desgracia para las islas, 
no llego esta a consolidarse ni a 
despachar espedicion alguna.36 

. . . Real Cedula de 29 de Marzo 
de 1733, en que se le erigio con- 
cediendola varios privilegios que 
enormemente perjudicaban las ideas 
del comercio de Manila. Protes- 
taron sus Diputados contra la es- 
presada ereccion y sus condiciones. 
Estas y otras inoportunas curcun- 
stancias de aquel tiempo, embarazon 
que llegase a consolidarse la citada 
compaiiia, ni a emprehender ex- 
pedicion alguna.37 

Azcarraga follows the crop by crop coverage of agricultural 
endeavor exactly as in Malo de Luque. La liberatad adheres so 
closely to Malo de Luque that 27 of the 34 pages which Azcarraga 
devotes to the Company deal with the first 5 years of Company 

34 Mas, Informe, I, Parte Segunda, 33-34. 

35 Mallat, Les Philippines, II, 293-294. 

36 Azcarraga, La libertad, 114-115. 

37 Malo de Luque, Historia politica, V, 233-234. 


history. The remaining 44 years are covered in 7 pages. Azcarraga 
like Mas is dependent upon Comyn for the period after 1790. He 
tells of European goods smuggled into Manila by foreign European 
carriers after the Spanish king opened that port in 1789 to Euro- 
pean ships bringing Asian produce. ^^ Possibly Azarraga draws 
this information from Mas, but it is clearly traceable to Comyn. ^^ 
Also traceable to Comyn through Mas is Azcarraga's account of the 
establishment of agencies in China and India. ^° La Ithertad speaks 
of the continuance of the Manila call after 1803,^^ and indeed, 
an official Company document also makes this claim.'*" Neverthe- 
less, the continuance of the Manila call should not be interpreted 
as a spirited Company effort to continue Philippine development. 
This call would not be for the purpose of procuring Philippine 
produce, nor would the transmission of merchandise by way of 
Manila fatten the Manila customs since duties would only have 
been imposed on goods sold in the Philippines.'*^ Goods sold in 
the Philippines, by admission of Company officials, constituted 
only a negligible trade.^'* Azcarraga takes up the Nueva real cedula 
of 1803, and describes some of its provisions, but because his 
presentation is at variance with the data in the document, it is 
doubtful that the cedula itself was available to him.^^ He continues: 

Los calculos equivocados de los directores sobre los precios en que habrian 
de poder realizar los productos del pais, que a tanto costo habian con- 
tratado, les ocasionaron grandes perdidas principalamente en la pimienta.46 

This is an obvious reference to the comparison between Sumatram 
and Philippine prices provided by Mas and copied by Mallat. By 
Azcarraga's time, the failure of the essay of the Manila directors 

38 Azcarraga, La libertad, 142-143. 

39 Comyn, Estado, 70. 

40 See above p. 85. 

41 Azcarraga, La libertad, 142. 

42 Exposicion, 1813, 102. 

43 Nueva real cedula de la compania de Filipinas de 12 de Julio de 
1803, Titulo IV, Articulo lix. 

44 Se. un tratado de Comercio y navegacion entre Las Compas. Ingle- 
sas y Espanol, ca. 1796, Ayer Collection, 9. 

45 La libertad dates the cedula 1805 while the actual date was 1803. 
Further, Azcarraga says that the war time permission to ship goods from 
Manila to Peru was extended by the king in the amount of 300,000 pesos 
annually, La libertad 142-143. This information could not have been 
drawn from Comyn who correctly states the value of war time shipment 
at 500,000 pesos annually, Estado, 69. It is possible, however, that per- 
mission was extended before 1803, in a lesser amount than reaffirmed 
and raised in the Nueva real cedula... de 1803. 

46 Azcarraga, La libertad, 145. 


in pepper production had attained legendary stature. In immediate 
sequence, he takes up the native attitude toward the Company's 

los labradores parece tambien que se aprovecharon de los errores y larguezas 
de la Compania y hubo el caso de una indigena que quedo mudo 6 fingio 
estarlo, para no dar cuenta de un capital de ochenta mil duros, que por 
sus manos paso para las de los cosecheros; nuestra misma legislacion, que 
declaraba nula toda obligacion consistente en anticipos hechos a los indi- 
genas que escediera de cinco pesos, era un gran obstaculo que imposibili- 
tando a la Sociedad de enjuiciar a sus acreedores, le daba las mas veces 
un resulatado contrario al que se proponia en aquellos anticipos, y todos 
estos quebrantos no le permitieron repartir mas que cuatro dividendos 
activos en veinticinco anos.*^ 

In the foregoing, the preoccupation of the Philippine-centric 
interpreters with the supposed importance of Philippine agricul- 
ture and internal development to the Company's general welfare 
is carried almost to the ultimate. The central thesis of the Philip- 
pine-centric view is that Company global success was somehow 
dependent upon the Company's rather limited effort within the 
Philippine Islands. With Azcarraga, the formation of this mis- 
interpretation is proceeding apace — developed almost wholly from 
Malo de Luque's brief account of the early years and Comyn's 
truthful, if not objective, lament of Company failure ivithin the 
Islands. Malo de Luque emphasizes Company efforts in Philippine 
agriculture as a Company contribution to Island welfare; Comyn 
bitterly regrets the Company's failure to make the Philippine 
venture pay; Mas attributes great loss of capital to the Company's 
pursuit of Philippine agriculture; Mallat copies; Azcarraga ascribes 
a diminution of dividends to Philippine agriculture. The fallacy 
of this line of development can be at least partially discerned in 
an examination of the founding cedula. Article L of that docu- 
ment requires the Company to invest 4 per cent of its profits in 
Philippine development; this investment was to depend upon es- 
timated or realized profit, not vice versa as assumed by Azcarraga.'*^ 
It is only a small step from Azcarraga's contention to the conclu- 
sion that the entire Company capital was swallowed up in the 

In 1878, seven years after the publication of Azcarraga's La 
Uhertad, Jose Felipe del Pan had published in Manila his Las Islas 

47 Ibid. 

48 See footnote 67. 


Filipmas. Progresos en 70 ahos. Pan, the editor of La revista de 
Filipinas and a man intensely interested in Philippine development, 
republished Comyn's Estado as the first part of this work. The 
second part, by Pan, follows the categories imposed by Comyn 
and re-presents them in terms of the changes of seventy years. Pan 
is hostile to the theories of commerce held by Comyn and at times 
seems over- anxious to derrogate Comyn's position as spokesman 
for the economic condition of the Islands. His treatment of the 
Company is harsh and his criticisms pointed, although he accepts 
previous interpretations uncritically. Yet, among the writers ex- 
amined herein, Pan is the first to relate what appears to be first 
hand knowledge of Philippine agriculture to the problem of Com- 
pany failure in that field. 

Pan begins his commentary on the Royal Philippines Company 
by taking his final step in the development of the Philippine- 
centric theory. He boldly assumes that the Company's sole objec- 
tive was the promotion of the Philippine economy, and naively 
but truculently states that the entire capitalization of the Company 
was wastefuUy and uselessly plowed into the Islands. ^^ Pan fol- 
lows with a brief analysis of the reasons for this supposed waste 
of capital. He emphasizes bad management in agriculture and, 
as a case in point, ridicules Company officials who invested money 
in an attempt to raise pepper in the Islands; Pan points out that 
the climate of the Philippines is not suited to pepper cultivation.^^ 
This fact seems to have escaped other commentators. 

Pan's arguments are of conclusive importance to the develop- 
ment of the Philippine-centric approach to Company history. With 
the publication of Pan's Progresos, this misinterpretation has 
achieved an impressive list of backers — each contributing his portion 
and each making easier the path of future adherents. Such a list 

49 Pan, pp. 252-253. The exact statement is as follows: "Concediendo, 
en primer lugar, que los juicios d posteriori son faciles, porque en apoyo 
de los argumentos aparece la suprema razon del exito conocido; aun con 
esta salvedad, no podemos dispensarnos de presentar con todo desembarazo 
algunas reflexiones acerca de la marcha de los negocios de La Covipajiia 
de Filipinas que disponia de un capital de doce milliones de pesos. Aten- 
didas diferencias entre precios de jornales de entonces y ahora, asi como 
de todas las cosas mas necesarias a la vida, aquel enorme capital equivalia 
a treinta milliones de pesos hoy. iQue palanca tan poderosa de adelantos 
materiales! Asombra lo que, actualmente, con treinta milliones de pesos, 
y a fines del pasado siglo con doce, se podria hacer bajo un plan meditado 
y direccion energica e inteligente, para la transformacion economica de 
este pais. 

Pues bien: de La Compania de Filipinas, que aqui gasto en para 
perdida tan crecidos capitales, apenas queda huella por parte alguna." 


was almost bound to impress an historian attempting to present 
a brief summary of the Royal Philippines Company in a broad 
survey of Philippine history. Such a writer was Jose Montero y 

In 1895, Montero published his Historia general.^'^ This brief 
account concentrates on Company organization, taken mostly from 
the founding cedula.^" This treatment is largely a paraphrasing 
of Azcarraga. On the period after 1790, Montero is less infor- 
mative, and, in keeping with his predecessors, leaned heavily upon 
Tomas de Comyn. Azcarraga was not slighted: whole sentences 
were lifted, without direct citation, from La lihertad, including 
that most respectful gesture of the plagiarist, the carefully copied 
mistake.^'^ Montero's conclusions are a re-presentation of Pan with 
the scorn extracted.^* In short, Montero drew together all con- 
tributors to the Philippine-centric interpretation. His footnotes are 
the roster of those treated in the foregoing; Malo de Luque, Comyn, 
Mallat, and Pan. Curiously, Azcarraga and Mas are not mentioned. 

The latest published work of the Royal Philippines is that of 
Professor William Lytle Schurz.^^ Schurz begins his article with 
a documented narration of the first Spanish attempts at direct 
trade with Manila. Four pages are devoted to these preliminary 
attempts, then the author proceeds into an examination of Viana's 
Memorial. Three pages are devoted to Viana's charges and recom- 
mendations. In evaluating Viana's plea, Schurz states "we see 
that it was fortunate for Spain's hold on the islands that before 
the Mexican War of Independence they had been made immediately 
dependent on the government in the peninsula, and that direct 
communications had been established with them."''^ This is a 
part of the Philippine-centric view in that it broadly states that 
Company operations in the Philippines were of sufficient magni- 

50 Ihid., 253. 

51 Historia general de Filipinas desde el descuhnmiento de dichas 
islas hasta nuestros dias, II, Madrid, 1895. 

52 Ibid., 297-301. 

53 Montero uses Azcarraga's incorrect date for the Nueva real cedilla 1803, Ibid., 304. See above footnote 45. 

54 Ibid., 305-307. 

55 William Lytle Schurz, The Manila Galleon, New York, 1939; "The 
Eoyal Philippine Company," Hispanic American Historical Revieiv, Novem- 
ber, 1920, 491-508. The original article was abbreviated and appended 
to The Manila Galleon without the citations contained in the original. 
Nothing was added. 

56 Schurz, "The Royal Philippine Company," HAHR, November, 1920, 


tude to overcome an established economic dependence on New 
Spain that had been nurtured over a period of two hundred years 
by annual galleons between Acapulco and Manila. The conclud- 
ing remarks of Schurz' article lend further support to the Philip- 
pine-centric theory. 

The islands henceforth looked toward Spain and not toward Mexico, and 
this reorientation of the colony was in a large part the work of the Com- 
pany. It marked the end of the long era which began with the expedition 
of Villalobos, and the beginning of the final epoch in the Spanish history 
of the islands. 57 

Schurz passes from an examination of Viana to a narration of 
the early royal efforts at direct trade with the Islands. Azcarraga 
is cited as the source for information on the arrival at Manila of 
a royal vessel, the Buen Cons e jo, prior to the formation of the 
Company.^ ^ In amplification of Manilan opposition to the Com- 
pany, the author tells of the unwillingness of the city's merchants 
to participate in any new venture; Montero is cited.^^ The article 
continues for four pages with the establishment of the Company 
and a description of its composition taken mostly from the founding 
cedula. Immediately thereafter, Schurz returns to the problem 
of Manilan opposition to the Company. ^° Schurz evidences a 
strong reliance on Mallat by including a quotation from the latter 
in his verifying footnote. Schurz concludes his treatment of Manilan 
resentment against the Company with the statement that the Com- 
pany promoters were conscious of the "... little chance of success 
the company would have in the face of this opposition. "^^ A 
page and a half is then devoted to the provisions of the founding 
cedula which were composed with an eye to Manilan objections. 
The implication is clear. Company success was dependent upon 
Company achievement within the Islands. In logical order, Schurz 
next takes up the Company failure in Philippine agriculture. He 
presents the opinion of Fedor Jagor that this failing was due to 
lack of royal provision for impressed native labor, ^^ J^gor, like 
Mallat, was a traveller who visited the Philippines, read Comyn 

57 Ibid., 508. 

58 Ibid., 497. 

59 Ibid. 

60 Ibid., 501, citing Pedro Calderon Enriquez to Arriaga, A de I, 108- 
3-18 and Mallat, Les Philippines, II, 293. 

61 Ibid., 501. 

62 Ibid., 503, citing Fedor Jagor, Viaje por Filipinas, translated from 
the German, Madrid, 1875, 13. 


and perhaps Malo de Luque, and returned home to write. Jagor's 
judgment was neither new nor carefully considered; it was drawn 
from Comyn's Est ado. ^^ 

The material presented in "The Royal Philippine Company" 
concerning the Company's duties in Island development is taken 
largely from the founding cedula with additional information from 
the Exposicion of 1813.*''* Schurz begins his treatment of Com- 
pany commerce on the fourteenth page of his article, concludes in 
two paragraphs, and then devotes three pages to the reasons for 
the Company's passing.^^ Overall, the article assumes a familiar 
aspect. Of the eighteen pages of the paper, only four deal with 
the period after 1790, and of these, three are taken up with the 
Company's decline. With the exceptions of Comyn's brief, insular 
comments and Schurz' information on Company operations in 
Mexico, the history of the Royal Philippine Company remains 
as Eduardo Malo de Luque left it with the publication of the fifth 
volume of his Hhtoria polHica in 1790. 

Although mistaken, this Philippine-centric view of the Company 
has a ready appearance of proportioned judgement. At first it 
would appear no less than logical that a trade organization bearing 
the name "Philippines," and seemingly designed to unite the Philip- 
pine Islands with Spain would feature the same Islands as its 
focus of activity. A perusal of documents and published works in 
the Ayer Collection of the Newberry Library reveals the Philippine- 
centric theory to be a non sequitur. 

Because of Malo de Luque's pre-eminent position in the writ- 
ing of Company history, any re-examination of the Company must 
begin with him. This author's textual neglect of extra-Philippine 
aspects of Company commerce may be explained in two ways. 
First, the Royal Philippines Company was heralded in Spain as a 
new Oriental venture.^^ Consequently, Malo de Luque's readers 

63 Comyn, Estado, 12. Speaking of early success in silk production, 
Comyn laments the lack of enforced labor. ". . . y son incalculables los 
felices resultados que se habrian seguido de plan tan vasto, y principiado 
con tanto vigor, si hubiese podido continuarse con igual teson por su sucesor, 
y no hubiese sido de una vez destruida la obra por equivocada humanidad 
con que se procedio poco despues de la partida del seiior Basco, ex- 
honerandose al indio de ser aplicado a cultivo alguno que no fuese 
plenamente espontaneo, en conformidad, segun se pretendia, con el espiritu 
general de nuestra legislacion indiana." 

64 Exposicion, 1813, 

65 Schurz, "The Royal Philippine Company," HAHR, November, 1920, 

66 Valentin de Foronda, "Disertacion Sobre la nueva Compania," in 
Miscelanea, Madrid, 1787. 


would have been interested in a presentation of Oriental affairs — 
viewing operations in other quarters as uninterestingly ordinary. 
Second, Malo de Luque, the Duke of Almodovar, may have had 
a financial interest in the Company. If Malo de Luque was an 
investor in the new Company, the wording of the founding cedula 
makes the reason for his emphasis on Island development readily 
apparent. All privileges and exemptions granted by the king to the 
Company were dependent upon a Company investment of 4 per 
cent of its annual net profit in Philippine internal development.^'^ 
The initial desire of the king was, therefore, that the Islands 
should prosper with the Company. In the early years of Company 
history, the official Company position was, of course, that the 
Islands were prospering with the Company. Certainly this theme 
is carried out in the Exposicion of 1813, directed to "las Cortes 
generates y extraordinarias de la nacion."^^ Over 35 of the Expo- 
sicion' s 124 pages are devoted to the chronicling of the Philippine 
endeavor. ^^ Not only does this Company document pursue the 
tenor of Malo de Luque, but frequently quotes the latter in defense 
of Company privilege. '^*^ Again there arises the question as to the 
relationship of Malo de Luque to the Company. 

^T.Real cedula... de 10 de Marzo, de 1785, Articulo L states: "Todas 
estas gracias, privilegios y extenciones tan ventajosas a la Compania, y 
el crecido interes que he tornado en sus acciones, han tenido en me Real 
animo el preferente objeto del bien general de mis amados vasallos, y 
que se fomenten la agricultura e industria de las Islas Filipinas. Y como 
su prosperidad refluye en beneficio de las operaciones de este comercio, 
y que sus progresos tienen intimo enlace con los de la Compania, cuya 
utilidad sera mayor, quanto mas se aumenten los frutos y las artes en 
aquellos dominios: declare que la he concedido, y debe gozar de las 
franquicas contenidas en los articulos anteriores, con la precisa calidad 
de aplicar un quatro por ciento del producto libre de sus ganancias anuales, 
para destinarlo con su misma intervencion al fomento de las Filipinas en 
los dos ramos de agricultura, e industria, y que a este fin la Junta de 
gobierno, que se formara en Manila, propondra todo lo que tenga por 
conveniente a la de esta corte, para que examinado con el zelo, madurez 
y pulso que exige un asunto de tanto importancia, resuelva lo que le parezca 
mas conducente al adelantamiento de dichas ramos, y me de cuenta de 
sus acuerdos, para que se observen con mi Soberana aprobacion." 

68 Exposicion, 1813. The governing body of the Company was ap- 
pealing to a hostile Cortes, an assembly opposed to privilege and monopoly, 
for an extension of the Company's special graces. With the monarchy 
in temporary eclipse, royal favor was of no avail. This Exposicion is a 
recitation of Company services to the state with emphasis on the aid 
to the Philippines required in the founding cedula. This aid had, by 
1813, been long a dead issue, but, in an effort to present the Company's 
record to the Cortes in the best possible light, the discontinuance of 
Philippine investment is not denied, but dliberately obscured. 

69 Ibid., 36-75. 

70 Ibid., 57-75. 


The Expo ski on of 1813, then, is a defense of Company privilege 
and monopoly characterized by a zealous description of the areas 
wherein the Company had complied with royal demands. Professor 
Hussey's generalization applies particularly to the Royal Philippines 
Company. "The practice of monopoly always faced the need of 
itself granting privilege and laboring outside its chosen field, in 
order to retain ministerial favor. '"^^ The portion of the Exposkion 
of 1813 devoted to Philippine trade and agriculture was an attempt 
on the part of the Company to convince the government that no 
stone had been left unturned in the quest for Island prosperity. 
Thus is evidenced the natural corollary to the duties of monopoly — 
the necessity to inform the government of every minute compliance 
with ministerial wishes. The total expenditure in Philippine agri- 
culture to 1802, is listed at 2,300,473 reales de vellon, 25 maravedis 
in the Exposkion of 1813.^" This figure assumes considerable 
importance in its relationship to the investment in Philippine de- 
velopment demanded by the founding cedula. The Exposkion 
of 1813 mentions declared dividends of twenty-seven per cent.'^^ 
Converting this percentage into reales de vellon reveals that the 
investment in Philippine agriculture exceeded the required four 
per cent of profit, a fact which, no doubt, the Company officials 
wished to make abundantly clear to the government auditors. Ulti- 
mately, this listed investment denotes irrecoverable capital, i.e., 
losses to the Royal Philippines Company in Philippine agriculture. 
Actual expenditures in the Islands, of course, far exceeded this 
amount. Malo de Luque reports that in the first five years, the 
Company disbursed in the Philippines an amount in excess of 
seventeen million reales de vellon, over three million of which were 
involved in agricultural purchases.''''* These expenditures, large 
even in relation to the total capitalization of the Company, do not 
represent a loss. 

The foregoing material from the Exposicion of 1813 is not 
found in the writings of Mas, Mallat, Azcarraga, Pan, or Montero, 
and it may be assumed that the Exposicion was either not available 
in the Islands or were overlooked by these authors. Only Schurz, 
of the writers contributing to the Company bibliography, cites it 
and he does not employ its statement of total Philippine investment 

71 Hussey, Caracas Company, 300. 

72 Exposicion 1813, 56. 

73 Ibid., 85. 

74 Malo de Luque, V, 362-363, citing Manila directors to the Captain- 
General, November 18, 1788. 


in his estimate of Company losses in the Islands. Moreover, the 
investment did not increase in the years following 1802. An 
Exposicion directed to the Cortes by the Company's Madrid Junta 
in 1821, lists the same investment or loss in the Philippines.'^^ The 
true position of the Philippine Islands in Company commerce at 
the conclusion of five years is found in the Plan general of Malo 
de Luque. Historians who have cited him but continued in the 
Philippine-centric interpretation, have either failed in their under- 
standng of the Plan general or have neglected it altogether. 

The Plan general is an enclosure bound in with the fifth volume 
of the Hist or ia politica and designated pieza three. '^^ It opens as a 
single sheet approximating the area of six or eight pages of the 
same book. Its totality comprises the most useful and detailed pres- 
entation of Company commerce possible in so small a space. Capi- 
talization is covered in broad categories, including amounts forth- 
coming from various merchant guilds, banks, and individual sub- 
scribers, along with the source and interest rates of borrowed cap- 
ital. All voyages, points of arrival and departure, national origin 
of cargo, value, and taxes were recorded along with the value of 
sales and realized profit on each category of delivered merchan- 
dise. Succinctly, enough information is provided for a broad cost 

While the dependence of the Royal Philippines Company on 
the declining Caracas Company is well known, some details of this 
dependence will be pertinent at this point. The holdings of the 
Caracas Company in the Americas on the eve of the conversion of 
these assets to the new venture exceeded thirty-four million reales 
de vellon?'^ Further, the directorate of the Royal Philippines Com- 

75 Exposicion dirigida a las Cortes por Junta de gobierno de la 
compania de Filipinas, acompanada de la Consulta hecha d varios juri- 
consultos celebres de Espana, Holand e Inglaterra, y de las dictdmenes 
de estos acerca del derecho que tiene las accionistas, con arreglo a la 
Constitucion y a las leyes, para exigir la indemnizacion competente, por 
haber sido anulado, cinco anos antes del plazo convenido, el pacto solemne 
que se contiene en el real Cedula o Patente temporal, que servio de base 
al establecimiento de la Compania, Madrid, 1821. 

76 Plan general que comprehende los capitales con que girado, yet 
comercio que ha hecho la real compania de Filipinas, desde su estableci- 
miento en primer de Julio de 1785, hasta 30 de Septiembre de 1789, con 
expresion de la clase de efectos en que ha negociado, sus DerecJios y 
Gastos, Ventas, Existencias, y resultas que ha producido hasta el misma 
dia, a saber, in Malo de Luque, V, pieza, 3, 95. 

77 Hussey, Caracas Company, 294, citing Resumen general de la 
la liquidacion . . , de la Real Compania, (1787), A. de I., 108^5-7. 


pany was identical with that of the terminating Caracas Company/ ^ 
The transfer to the new company of the incumbent directors along 
with so large a portion of American holdings allows the inference 
that the old trade would not be abandoned — that it might be 
relied upon heavily by men experienced in it and unfamiliar with 
the new tack of the Asian venture. This inference receives cor- 
roboration in the following analysis of the Plan general. 

To begin with, the course or routing of the Company's Oriental 
trade must be fully understood. A ship leaving Spain laden with 
domestic and foreign European manufactured goods and Spanish 
silver, would call at designated ports in South America, discharge 
the major portion of the finished products, take aboard American 
produce, and proceed to Manila with the newly acquired cargo and 
the bulk of the original silver. At Manila, the silver would be 
exchanged for Oriental produce which had arrived in foreign 
bottoms. These goods usually passed through the hands of the 
Manilans, producing prosperity in the city. The fully laden ship 
would then return to Spain by way of the Cape or the Horn with 
no further exchanges. There was to be no direct traffic between 
Asia and the Americas. With the exception of minor quantities 
of American produce disposed of in the Philippines, all goods 
handled by Company ships passed through Spain. Tariff adjust- 
ments and benefits were allowed the Company on trans-shipment 
of Asian goods from Spain to the Americas, but Spain remained 
the center of trade. 

By September 30, 1789, the gross transactions of the Company 
amounted to 469,768,318 reales de vellon. From this is deducted 
the money involved in ships, warehouses, and administrative build- 
ings, leaving the gross figure for current transactions at 429,345,755 
reales de vellon. Also, silver carriage and merchandise carriage 
are undifferentiated; the divisions of trade are examined in terms 
of money value. 

Exports to the Philippines constituted 28 per cent of the total 
commerce and produced 1 per cent of the gross profit. Imports 
from the Orient made up 29 per cent of the gross transactions and 
provided 21 per cent of the gross profit. The low profit on the 
outbound segment of the Asian trade was due to the fact that it 
was, for the most part, a one way carriage of Spanish silver. The 
Oriental branch of Company commerce, therefore, accounted for 

78 Ihid., 297-298, citing Extracto de los Acuerdos de la Junta General 
... 22 de Marzo de 1785, A. de I., 108-5-7. 


57 per cent of the gross transactions by value and yielded 22 per 
cent of the gross profit. The fact that the Oriental branch of 
trade consumed the greater portion of the investment is, of course, 
in complete accord with the royal intent to develop Asian trade. 
An examination of the Company's American trade, however, re- 
veals that the directors had not lost their skill in familiar fields. 

Exports to the Americas, to 1789, made up 31 per cent of the 
gross transactions and produced 63 per cent of the gross profits. 
Asian merchandise in this outgoing leg of American trade con- 
stituted less than 2 per cent of cargo value. Consequently, this 
tremendous profit was not in any way dependent upon the influx 
of goods from the Pacific. Imports from the Americas accounted 
for only 12 per cent of the gross transactions and supplied 15 
per cent of the gross profit. The most important facet of this 
analysis is that the known and established American trade was 
producing more than three quarters of the Company's profit while 
consuming less than half of the investment. The Oriental ven- 
ture, on the other hand, produced less than half as much profit 
while requiring slightly larger investment. The Company directors 
were not, as assumed by adherents to the Philippine-centric inter- 
pretation, pouring money into the Philippines without a buffer in 
a more profitable area. Further, of the 29 voyages completed to 
1789, 20 were solely in the American trade, and of the out-bound 
voyage. ^^ The low profits in the import branch of Oriental trade 
was probably due to the novelty of the venture along with Comyn's 
''mal extendido sistema." The latter, that is the acquisition of all 
Oriental goods at Manila, exposed the Company to the rapacity 
of foreign carriers and Manilan middle-men, increasing the cost of 
goods 80 per cent, according to Comyn.^° As previously stated, 
Comyn is lamenting a loss of profit while Mas and others in the 

79 These findings, drawn and deduced from the Plan general, are 
not obvious and cannot be discerned at a glance. Perhaps this is an 
additional reason why other writers have shunned it. A case in point is 
the number of voyages initiated and completed to 1789. Under "deliveries" 
{envios), the Plan general lists forty voyages initiated: 21 to Caracas, 
Maracaybo, and Nueva Espaha; 9 to Lima and Buenos Aires; 10 to 
Manila. Under "returns" (retornos) , however, the Plan general lists 29 
completed voyages: 9 from Manila; 20 from Caracas and Maracaybo. 
These figures indicate that 9 round voyages had been made to Manila 
from Spain with 9 calls at Buenos Aires or Lima. The tenth vessel, 
dispatched in 1789, had not yet completed its trip. Therefore, the 9 
voyages to Lima and Buenos Aires are actually part of the 10 voyages 
to Manila. Whatever the cost accounting value of listing 40 voyages in 
the Plan general, the actual voyages initiated to 1789 did not exceed 30. 

80 Comyn, Estado, 65. 


Philippine-centric lineage assume a loss of capital. The Exposicion 
of 1813 states that in Spain, 24 per cent of the sale price of Chinese 
goods and 44 per cent of the sale price of Indian goods were due 
to the Manila routing.^^ While the Manila routing, then, was 
occasioning no loss, the inroads on profit could scarcely have been 
countenanced by an alert directorate. Given such circumstances, 
it would have been indeed unusual if the Company directors had 
not taken steps to eliminate Manila from the Company itinerary. 
Unfortunately for those who relied upon Malo de Luque and 
Comyn for their narration of Company history, the former wrote 
too early to be aware of the abandonment of Manila by Company 
shipping and the latter obscures the actual train of events in treat- 
ing the establishment of Company agencies in China and India. 
The Exposicion of 1813, with its emphasis on the performance of 
Company duties to the crown, assumes the new routing without 
mentioning a specific date.^^ With more precision, an extract of 
the first meeting of shareholders in the Royal Philippines Company 
dated 1793, reveals that many abrogrations of the founding cedula 
were granted in the early years. ^^ This "Extracto de la primera 
Junta General" lists among these special amendments the permis- 
sion to by-pass Manila in Oriental trade and the permission to dis- 
continue the investment of 4 per cent of profit in Philippine in- 
ternal development. Not only had the Madrid directors secured 
royal permission to remove Manila from their trade routes, but 
permission to remove the Philippines from their expense accounts 
as well. The abandonment of Manila occurred before the Na- 
poleonic conflicts deprived Spain of access to her overseas dominions, 
and the failure of the Company to maintain direct relations between 
Spain and the Philippines cannot be directly attributed to those 
wars. Without question, these wars did affect the later shaping 
of Company commerce, but the initial abandonment of Manila as 
the Oriental terminus of trade stemmed from the fact that routing 
goods through Manila resulted in a loss of profit to the Company. 
Of course, the official position of the Company in its correspondence 
with the government was to overlook the abandonment and cling 
to the fiction that Manila was still served.^* 

81 Exposicion 1813, 80. 

82 Ibid., 97-98, 102. 

83 Extracto de a primera Junta General de la Real Compania de 
Filipinas celebrada en los dias 9 de Septiembre de 1791, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, y 
20 de Marzo de 92, 16 de Julio de 93, Madrid, 1793; Ayer Collection. 

84 Exposicidn, 1813, 102. 


Prior to 1790, the Company dispatched 12 ships to Manila.^^ 
Between 1790 and 1813, only 20 additional voyages were made to 
the Orient, and of this number, not all called at Manila. ^^ Only 
20 ships according to a Philippine observer, came to Manila directly 
from Spain in the 40 years preceding 1820.^'^ If we deduct from 
this figure the 12 Company ships that arrived prior to 1790, the 
last of the royal voyages in direct trade made by the Asuncion in 
1783 and 1784, the 1780 and 1782 expeditions carried out by the 
Five Major Merchant Guilds of Madrid, and the voyage sponsored 
by an independent house in the same period, we are left with a 
total of 4 direct voyages from Spain to Manila between the date 
of permission to by-pass it and 1820.®^ Thus, with the 12 voyages 
known and the 4 deduced, we have a tentative total of 16 direct 
voyages made by Company vessels in the years between 1785 and 
1820. These voyages could hardly have affected a "reorientation 
of the colony" toward Spain and away from Mexico, as concluded 
Professor Schurz. This becomes particularly apparent when we 
realize the overall reduction of the Company effort within the 
Islands after the initial years. In 1803, the Manila Junta or ad- 
ministrative board was discontinued and the duties of the Company 
agents in the Islands reduced to preparing war time shipments to 
Peru, ' shipment of money to Oriental agencies, and the collection 
of Island produce for domestic sale.^^ 

As previously stated, the final figure for Company loss in the 
Philippines was 2,300,473 redes, 25 maravedis.^^ The Exposiciones 
of 1813 and 1821, directed to the Spanish government by the 
Madrid Junta in defense of Company privilege, attempt to paint a 
picture of faithful and arduous service in the national interest, but 
the permission to cease investment severely injures the sincerity of 
these Company complaints. The exact date that the Company 
ceased to invest money in Philippine internal development is dif- 
ficult to determine, but a loosely defined figure set against esti- 
mated profits in the Plan general opens the possibility that the 

85 Plan general; Exposicion, 1813, 18. 

86 Exposicion, 1813, 19. 

87 Manuel Bernaldez Pizarro, Dictamen sobre las causas que se 
oponen a la seguridad y Fomento de las Yslas Filipinas, [Manila], 1821; 
Ayer Collection. 

88 The respective citations for these voyages are as follows: Ex- 
posicion, 1813, 83; Malo de Luque, V, 318; Exposicion, 1813, 4-5. 

89 Nueva real cedula de la compania . . . 1803, Titulo III, Articulo 

90 Exposicion, 1813, 56; Exposicion dirigida a las Cortes. .. ,1821, 14. 


major portion of the investment had been made prior to December, 

Examination of the Plan general reveals that ail expenses of 
overhead, official salaries, maintainance, etc., are charged directly 
to the expense of expeditions, apparently through the ordinary 
method of pro-rating employed by present day businesses. Only 
two exceptions are made to this presentation of expenses: a loss 
involved in the supply of slaves to the Americas and 2,190,583 reales, 
18 maravedis in expenditures of "undetermined application." The 
latter bears a close numerical resemblance to the knovv^n total loss 
in the Islands. The significance of this expenditure of "undeter- 
mined application" lies in its listing with an enterprise initiated at 
royal command, that is, slave traffic. Philippine investment, an- 
other royal command, could not logically have been pro-rated over 
the expenses of Oriental voyages because to do so would obscure 
the amount invested, a procedure that would almost certainly meet 
with the king's disapproval.^^ Therefore, the separate listing of 
this expense and its separate deduction from estimated profits lead 
well to the tentative conclusion that 2,190,583 reales, 18 maravedis 
constituted the then to-date investment in Philippine internal devel- 
opment. This would mean that by December, 1788, less than 
100,000 reales, the difference between the figure of "undetermined 
application" and the figure for final loss in the Islands, remained 
to be spent in Philippine internal development.^^ The royal per- 
mission to discontinue Philippine development prior to 1793, to- 
gether with the expense of "undetermined application" indicate 
that the Company's Philippine investments ceased betvv^een the 
fourth and eighth year of Company existence. ^^ The permission to 
cease and the probable cessation of investment preceded the declara- 
tion of the first dividends in 1793.^* The removal of Manila from 
the Company's routes would also have come before 1793. The 
Company investments in internal development and Philippine trade. 

91 Real cedilla ... de 10 de Marzo de 1785, Articulo VI reveals the 
kings mistrust of certain accounting abuses by enjoining clarity in book- 
keeping. Further, Articulo L, see footnote 67, would, by its provisions 
for determining the exact amount of Philippine investment, presumably 
make prorating or any other type of apportioning illegal. 

92 The Plan general limits its presentation of Philippine information 
to December, 1788. 

93 It is doubtful that the re-imposition of the 4 per cent requirement 
in 1803 (Nueva real cedilla ... de 1803, Titulo III, Articulo xlii) would 
have had any effect on the Company or the Philippines, inasmuch as 
only one dividend was declared after that date; Exposicion 1813, 85. 

94 Extracto de la primera Junta General . . . 1793, Ayer Collection. 


therefore, hardly exceeded the moderate demands of the king or 
financial self-interest. The inevitable conclusions are that the 
Company was not destroyed in the Philippines and that the Philip- 
pines were, in fact, abandoned by the Company. It is in their 
failure to understand this that Philippine-centric interpretors of 
Company history have made their error. 

The narrow and parochial confines to which former writers 
have relegated the Royal Philippine Company do violence to the 
ecumenical character of the organization. The Philippines consti- 
tuted a diminutive portion of the Company's scope, and concentra- 
tion on this particular area neglects the carriage of slaves from 
Africa to South America, fabrication of metal containers for the 
Mexican mines, manufacture of moslem caps for Near Eastern 
trade, procurement of v/eapons for the Spanish army, and, most 
important of all, a vigorous American trade which produced the 
major share of Company profit.^^ The directors of the Company 
were merchants engaged in a world wide search for profit, not 
messiahs with a Philippine fixation. The new context for the Com- 
pany, then, is the world and with the next context come additional 
areas for scholarly investigation. 

Certainly, the microcosm, the Philippines, deserves a better his- 
tory than it has so far achieved. Numerous questions remain un- 
answered. What was at the root of Manilan opposition to the 
Company.? Certainly not Malo de Luque's one sided appraisal of 
colonial ignorance that echoes and re-echoes through the v/ritings 
surveyed in this paper. What of the Company efforts in Philip- 
pine provinces.-^ What of the "silent war" which Pan says the 
alcaldes waged against the Company.? Examination of pertinent 
materials in the Ayer Collection leaves this writer with the im- 
pression that administrative affairs in agriculture were left to men 
more suited to account keeping than exploitation of the soil. This 
inference is tentative and is merely suggested as a line of inquiry. 
It is possible that archival records in Manila could answer these 

The broader facet of world trade demands a major share of 
attention. Five decades of voyages strung across two hemispheres 
cannot be telescoped into several paragraphs without distortion. 
Further, the important question of Company purpose remains un- 
answered. What is meant by "the union of American and Oriental 

95 Exposicion, 1813, 32-33. 


commerce" as set forth in the founding cedula? A cost analysis 
of the Plan general leaves strong indications that the Company was 
predicated on a mercantilistic premise almost passe even in Spain. 
Solid documentation is, how^ever, preferable to the extrapolations 
of cost accounting, and so any generalizations in this vein must 
await further research. 

On the penninsula, greater knowledge of the opposition of 
merchants and industrial interests to certain of the Company's 
retailing and import privileges would undoubtedly shed much light 
on the welfare of the Company during the rule of the Cortes. 
The Archivo General de la Nacion at Caracas, Venezuela would 
certainly provide information on the American aspect of the Com- 
pany traffic, particularly with regard to that trade which the Com- 
pany inherited from the Caracas Company. In brief, the history of 
the Company is not yet written. The re-orientation attempted in 
this paper barely scratches the surface of the subject. Within the 
United States, there is little documentary material available. Thirty- 
five pages of manuscript, unexamined by this writer, pertaining to 
the Company are in the Library of Congress, and would undoubtedly 
assist in the general problem of Company history. Elsewhere, 
Roland Dennis Hussey, author of the Caracas Company, has stated 
privately that he has in his possession some documentation on the 
Company. Ultimately, the completion of the writing of the his- 
tory of the Company will depend upon the records in the Archivo 
General de Indias in Seville, Spain. 

James F. Cloghessy 

Purdue University 

The Making of an Insurgent 

The Congressional career of George W. Norris substantiates 
the premise that some liberals are gradually molded by political 
circumstances. To develop adequately this theme would take far 
more space than is available, therefore I have chosen to discuss a 
segment of it: Norris' relations with Speaker Joseph G. Cannon up 
to the insurgency revolt in March, 1910, when the Speaker's power 
was curtailed by his removal from membership on the Rules Com- 
mittee. The term "insurgent," as I use it, connotes a Member of 
the House of Representatives who opposed the tremendous power 
granted Speaker Cannon by the rules. Many insurgents later be- 
came known as progressives, a term which did not come into wide- 
spread use until late 1910 or early 1911; other insurgents never 
were identified with the progressive cause. In short, insurgency 
referred to the procedural matter of revising the rules of the House, 
and the Republican members of Congress who desired this reform 
favored it for a variety of reasons, some of which will be com- 
mented upon in the course of this paper. 

When Norris was elected to Congress in 1902 regular Repub- 
licans' throughout Nebraska had reason to rejoice. He had re- 
deemed the Fifth Congressional District, encompassing eighteen 
counties in south-western Nebraska, from Populist-Democratic con- 
trol. Republican politicans and officials of the Burlington rail- 
road, whose main line ran through the district, congratulated Nor- 
ris, who had been able to call upon both groups for help during 
the campaign. 

Defeating his opponent by less than two hundred votes, Norris 
realized the necessity of hard work, if the district were to remain 
in the Republican fold. Eager to succeed in his new position, he 
willingly accepted the advice of Senator Charles H. Dietrich, who 
had taken him "under his wing" during the campaign. It was 
Dietrich who suggested that Norris seek membership on the Com- 
mittee on Public Buildings and Grounds in the 58th Congress. 
The Senator thought that a Nebraskan on this committee would make 
the state's delegation one of the most powerful with members 
strategically located on key committees. •'^ Norris, for his part, 

1 C. H. Dietrich to G. W. Noms, December 4, 1902. George W. 
Norris Papers, Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress. All manu- 
script citations are from this collection. 



understood that membership on the Committee on Public Buildings 
and Grounds might insure his continued service in Congress. 
Through "log-rolling" he could make certain that Nebraska and his 
congressional district in particular would be included in every bill 
the committee approved for the construction of post-offices, court- 
houses and other federal buildings. He eagerly sought this assign- 
ment and considered himself fortunate when the newly chosen 
Speaker of the House placed him on the committee.^ 

Shortly after his election Norris wrote to Cannon and then in 
February, 1903, he had made his first trip to Washington to ask 
Cannon for this committee assignment. Cannon was polite and 
even cordial to Norris but refused to commit himself. He claimed 
that until the 58th Congress convened he was merely a member and 
not Speaker of the House.^ When Cannon finally acceded to his 
request, Norris v/as delighted. He assumed, along with many of 
his friends in Nebraska, that he was in the Speaker's good graces. 
Indeed, throughout most of the Roosevelt years Norris would pro- 
claim his support of both Theodore Roosevelt and Joseph G. Cannon 
and see nothing incongruous in that position. 

Actually, it is only with the benefit of hindsight that Norris' 
position might appear incongruous. Roosevelt and Cannon, though 
not cast in the same political mold, had a begrudging respect for 
one another, and owing to the President's efforts they worked ex- 
ceedingly well together most of the time. Cannon's advice and 
opinions were sought by the President and taken into consideration ; 
on the other hand, Roosevelt's legislative program, until the very 
end of his presidency, rarely ran into difficulty in the House of 
Representatives. Important measures received the approval of the 
lower chamber with the precision of a well-oiled machine; the 
controversial Railroad Rate Bill, for example, passed the House 
with less than a dozen votes cast against it. The developing breach 
in the Republican party was not nearly so evident in the lower 
chamber as it was in the Senate where administrative measures fre- 
quently met powerful opposition. To George W. Norris, a very 
minor member of Congress and a devoted follower of Theodore 
Roosevelt, both the Speaker and the President seemed to function 

2 Norris to E. J. Burkett, December 9, 1902; Norris to Charles F. 
Manderson, December 9, 1902; Norris to Joseph G. Cannon, September 
15, 1903. 

3 Norris to Joseph G. Cannon, September 15, 1903. 


as members of a well-disciplined team and he was proud of his 
connection with it. 

Furthermore, during his early years in Congress Norris had 
an additional reason to be grateful for his growing friendship with 
"Uncle Joe." In the 1904 campaign Cannon spoke on Norris' be- 
half in the Fifth Congresstional District. Easily re-elected, Norris 
expressed his appreciation to the Speaker: 

Your position is the second one in the nation, and the confidence that all 
have in you has made many votes for the Republican ticket all over our 
country, because it has been recognized that Republican success meant the 
retention of yourself in that high and honorable position. ^ 

There is no evidence to indicate at this time that he considered the 
Speaker's great power a threat to representative government. If 
the rules of the House were arbitrary and not entirely to his liking, 
the fault, Norris felt, lay in the large and unwieldly size of the 
membership and not in the power of the Speaker. Limitations in 
debate he considered necessary and he also accepted without reser- 
vation the seniority system which accentuated his insignificance in 
legislative matters.^ 

Meanwhile, Norris was winning recognition as an able and ris- 
ing member of the House. Though a partisan Republican, his 
partisanship was neither emotional nor extreme. On occasion he 
spoke and voted against party measures which he felt were opposed 
to the interests of his constituents. These deviations from the Re- 
publican party line did not noticeably damage his standing with the 
Speaker or the party organization. Indeed, at the outset of the 59th 
Congress, Cannon placed him on an additional committee. Labor, 
and Norris continued to serve on it throughout the 60th Congress. 
Yet it was during the 60th Congress (March, 1907, to March, 1909) 
that Norris began to give serious attention to the rules and pro- 
cedures by which Cannon exercised his authority. Before the ses- 
sion was concluded he was to present a resolution designed to 
deprive the Speaker of some of his power. 

In October, 1907, in response to an inquiry from Congressman 
E. A. Hayes of California, Norris for the first time committed him- 
self to favoring a change in the House rules. Possibly influenced 
by the example of the President in pursuing more liberal policies, 
Norris did this at a time when his standing in the Republican party 

4 Norris to Joseph G. Cannon, November 14, 1904. 

5 Norris to Eugene Allen, June 5, 1906. 


both in Nebraska and in Congress was secure and unchallenged. 
The Committee on Rules, he explained, should be expanded and 
elected by the House instead of being appointed by the Speaker, 
though Norris doubted whether such a change could ever be ef- 
fected. The rules could best be changed at the initial party caucus 
of a new Congress. At this caucus, Norris observed, the new mem- 
bers would most likely follow the leadership of those in positions 
of party power. Thus any change not favored by these men would 
probably fail. It was the caucus system that was at the basis of 
the Speaker's power.^ Though Norris later was instrumental in de- 
priving the Speaker of his authority to choose the Rules Committee, 
he knew that this reform to be meaningful would have to be fol- 
lowed by the destruction of the party caucus. 

Despite having committed himself against the power of the 
Speaker, Norris and other insurgents conducted no prolonged battle 
during the first session of the 60th Congress. The Panic of 1907 
and the forthcoming national election precluded any open party 
strife. However, Norris courageously let it be known what he in- 
tended to do, if the opportunity ever arose. On May 16, 1908, he 
introduced a resolution providing that all standing committees be 
appointed by the Committee on Rules."^ A new committee, con- 
sisting of 15 members selected by the House from different geo- 
graphical groups, would replace the existing one. The resolution 
was sent to the Committee on Rules to be disposed of by its chair- 
man, Joseph G. Cannon. It was the identical resolution that Norris 
presented in March, 1910, when he precipitated the historic struggle 
which deprived the Speaker of his membership on this Commit- 
tee. Norris, in effect, on May 16, 1908, warned the Speaker to 
be on his guard lest he be outmanoeuvred. 

Since Roosevelt would soon leave the White House and since 
Cannon nourished presidential ambitions, the Speaker emerged dur- 
ing this session as a leading conservative critic of the President's 
program. Members who supported Roosevelt policies now saw 
Speaker Cannon in another light. With the aid of critical journa- 
lists, jovial, cigar-smoking "Uncle Joe" soon emerged as the "Ty- 
rant from Illinois" and the "Arch-foe of Insurgency."^ Norris, in 
the Insurgent camp, had good reason to hope that his constituents, 

6 Norris to E, A. Hayes, October 9, 1907. 

7 Congressional Record: Sixtieth Congress, First Session, 6440. 

8 Quotes are titles of two recent studies of Cannon: Blair Bolles, 
Tyrayit from Illinois, New York, 1951, William R. Gwinn, Uncle Joe 
Cannon: Archfoe of Insurgency, New York, 1957. 


who recently had endorsed a comprehensive state-wide program of 
administrative reform, would approve his action.^ He entered the 
19O8 campaign, one of the most difficult of his entire career, 
committed to a position from which there was no turning back — at 
least as long as Cannon was Speaker. 

As Norris well understood, his resolution exposed him to the 
displeasure of the Speaker and most of the party leaders in Con- 
gress. It put him "out of the shadow of their approval" and 
promised to make his life and work in Washington most disagree- 
able. It meant too that almost all of the "favors and courtesies" 
extended to other Congressmen would be denied him}^ Hereafter 
Norris would have to place principle above party. And his con- 
tinuance in public life depended upon the ability of his constituents 
to understand this situation. 

Though Norris was aware of the long-range implications of his 
position, his constituents in 1908 seemingly were satisfied. During 
the campaign it was widely endorsed; indeed, he had to explain 
why he had been friendly to the Speaker and had not opposed him 
earlier. He stressed that the rules and not the men were basically 
at fault. 

The 19O8 campaign, which saw Bryan and the Democrats sweep 
Nebraska if not the nation, was one of the meanest and most mali- 
cious in which he had ever participated. His opponent, supplied with 
a seemingly inexhaustible checking account, often disregarded the 
truth. Furthermore, the Republican organization was more of a 
hindrance than a help. Among other things, necessary funds were 
withheld until late in the campaign. Throughout September and 
early October Norris had remained at home subject to the call of 
the state organization to speak throughout Nebraska. But the 
call never came and much precious time was lost. Five days after 
the election, he finally obtained figures that revealed his reelec- 
tion to Congress for a fourth term by a margin of twenty-two 

9 The Thirtieth session of the Nebraska legislature had enacted among 
other items a primary law, a child labor act, an anti-free pass law and 
other railroad regulatory measures. The state now emerged as one of 
the few that had taken measures, as an editorial in the Omaha Bee, 
April 7, 1907, stated, "to supplement the work of Congress under the 
direction of President Roosevelt to the end of relieving the people of 
Nebraska of railroad domination in politics." 

10 Norris to E. F. Baldwin, May 28, 1908; Norris to George Allen, 
June 22, 1908. 

11 Norris had 20,649 votes to 20,627 for Fred W. Ashton, his opponent. 


There is no doubt that the 1908 campaign played an important 
role in the development of his insurgenq^ and political independ- 
ence. While Norris was manifesting his independence of party 
machinery in the House of Representatives, his experience in 1908 
convinced him of the wisdom of conducting campaigns with a mini- 
mum of coordination with the Republican organization. It is also 
clear that his insurgency developed gradually and that there was 
no single incident that was responsible for it, though Norris and his 
biographers cite specific instances to the contrary. -^^ In the course 
of my research in the Record and the Norris papers I have not 
been able to corroborate their examples, which are based largely 
on magazine articles written by Norris in the 1920's.-^^ The fact 
that he represented a political "burnt-over" district which since his 
arrival in Nebraska in the late 1880's had suppoted all shades of 
opinion from respectable Republicanism to belligerent Bryanism, 
possibly made his position easier. But basic to the success of the 
role he was to enact was the personality, courage and integrity of 
the man himself. Unassuming, modest but straightforward, pres- 
enting facts and discussing issues sometimes for hours on end, rely- 
ing on the friendship of a small band of faithful followers and 
without a political machine to aid him, Norris was able over a 
period of years to gain and hold the respect of the voters. While 
other candidates might indulge in personalities and add emotional 
fervor to the issues they raised, Norris presented reason and logic 
with the probity of a country judge. 

Following his reelection Norris prepared to attack the rules once 
the second session of the 60th Congress convened on December 7, 
1908. But the sudden illness of one of his daughters prevented 
his presence on December 11, when the insurgents, whose mem- 
bership at this time fluctuated between 25 and 30, gathered in the 
Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee Room at the call of 
William Peters Hepburn of Iowa, who after twenty-two years of 
distinguished service, had just been defeated for reelection. Hep- 
burn performed a service similar to that of Robert M. LaFoUette 
in the Senate: organizing the dissident Republican members to 
challenge the power of the party hierarchy. 

12 G. W. Norris, Fighting Liberal, New York, 1945, 93-97; Alfred 
Lief, Democracy's Norris, New York, 1939, 68, 71-72; Richard L. Neu- 
berger and Stephen B. Kahn, Integrity: The Life of George W. Norris, 
New York, 1937, 31-33. 

13 Collier's Weekly, June 21, 1924; Saturday Evening Post, August 7, 


Norris was present, however, when Congress reconvened after 
the Christmas recess. His plan to amend the rules was accepted by 
the group as the best way to make the House truly representative. 
Most of the insurgents at this time agreed that a change of speakers 
or a change of parties would not lessen the power of the Speaker, 
while a change in the rules would remove the source of his power 
and more nearly solve the problem. Norris explained: "the rule 
that gives the Speaker power to appoint all the standing com- 
mittees of the House, which [in turn] practically control all of 
the legislation of the House," was the rule that was most obnoxious 
to those who believed that the Speaker had too much authority.-^'* 

Though the insurgents challenged the rules throughout this 
short session, they realized that any resolution to change them 
would be referred to the Committee on Rules, of which the Speaker 
was chairman and dominant member. Once the members at the 
beginning of a Congress approved the rules, the only way to amend 
or change them was to obtain the Speaker's consent, which the in- 
surgents knew would not be forthcoming. Congressman Hepburn 
summed up this dilemma nicely when he said: "Oh, it is easy to 
get into the Committee on Rules, but by what hoist and by what 
petard would we get out of the Committee on Rules ?"-^^ This 
session also revealed the possibility that the insurgents, by join- 
ing with the Democrats, might swing the balance of power away 
from the Republican party. By threatening the Speaker in this way 
the insurgents hoped that they might wrest some concessions. 

Cannon, aware of this possibility, hoped to split the insurgent 
ranks by allowing a minor amendment to the rules, which was 
quickly adopted as the session drew to a close. It created a "calen- 
dar Wednesday" where no business but the calling of committees 
would be in order. Norris denounced this as "a sop" which did 
not solve the problem of making the House a really "representa- 
tive body instead of a one-man machine. "-^^ 

Thus as the administration of Theodore Roosevelt came to an 
end, insurgency appeared as an orgnized movement which was gain- 
ing strength and national recognition. Speaker Cannon, colorful 
and gruff, had become in many newspapers, magazines and in the 
public mind, the "Iron Duke" who tyrannized the House of Repre- 
sentatives. While most of the insurgents criticized the rules, many 

14 Congressional Record: Sixtieth Congress, Second Session, 817. 

15 Ibid., 2655. 

16 Ibid., 3570. 


of the journalists attacked the man. By the end of 1908 they 
helped to make the Speaker a subject of national attention, and 
"Cannonism" a system that reformers sought to eradicate. •^'^ Though 
Norris continued to respect Cannon, the Speaker, pressed and 
harassed on all sides, by members of his own party, by the Demo- 
cratic opposition, by the press and by increasing public clamor, 
began to utilize fully the tremendous power at his disposal. 

When President Taft, as one of his first official acts, called 
Congress into special session less than two weeks after the previous 
one had adjourned, the fight to reform the rules promised to be- 
come a focus of national attention. Norris was determined to push 
for reform, though it would probably cost him all the standing his 
seniority had accumulated. Even before the special session started, 
parlimentary manoeuvring began over the question of adopting the 
rules of the previous session. Once these rules were adopted vir- 
tually all hope of modifying them during the 61 st Congress would 
be ended. Now that Hepburn had retired to his Clarinda, Iowa, 
law office, insurgent strategy during this fight was determined by 
A. P. Gardner of Massachusetts, John M. Nelson of Wisconsin, 
and E. H. Madison of Kansas. But Norris led the floor fight. 
He claimed that the real authority in government was being ex- 
erted by the "Iron Duke" who, "crowned with the power given 
him by the rules, reaches out his mighty hand and forces even the 
Chief Executive to do his bidding." He concluded his attack with 
the statement, "We insurgents may have the life crushed ou-t of us 
by the machine, but the cause is right, and in the end it must 
prevail. "^^ 

Norris was correct in his prediction. Nevertheless the insur- 
gents were responsible for further concessions from Cannon, because 
they revealed that an effective Insurgent-Democratic alliance could 
now challenge the Speaker's power. The previous rules were 
amended to improve the functioning of the House. Hampering 
neither the Speaker's control of the Committee on rules nor his 
power to appoint standing committees, the modification came about 
through an arrangement by Cannon with Representative John J. 

17 Charles R, Atkinson, The Committee on Rides and the Overthrow 
of Speaker Cannon, New York, 1911. Chapter VI entitled "The Develop- 
ment of Public Sentiment Against the Speaker" presents a survey of 
growing press and periodical hostility. LaFollette's Magazine between 
February and the end of April, 1909, contained six articles attacking the 
power of the Speaker. 

18 Congressional Record: Sixty-First Congress, First Session, 32. 


Fitzgerald and Tammany leaders in New York who presumably 
were representing the Standard Oil Company and other high tariff 
interests. According to Kenneth Hechler, the only scholar who has 
seriously tried to explain this incident, the Speaker promised to 
support a higher duty on petroleum and other items in the pending 
tariff bill in return for enough Democratic votes to prevent the in- 
surgents in alliance v/ith Champ Clark, the Democratic leader, from 
further amending the rules. -^^ 

After the rules fight, the House settled down to the urgent busi- 
ness of preparing a new tariff law. In the struggle over the Payne- 
Aldrich tariff Norris again tangled with Cannon and this time he 
out-manoeuvred him. He offered an amendment which reduced 
the duty on petroleum and its products from 25 per cent to a nom- 
inal one per cent. The amendment prevailed and then by unani- 
mous consent petroleum and its products were placed on the free 
list.^*^ Cannon, in committee as well as on the floor, had insisted 
on the 25 per cent rate, and if Kenneth Hechler's analysis is cor- 
rect, Norris was responsible for Cannon's inability to keep his 
pledge to Fitzgerald and the twenty-two other Democrats whose 
votes had saved him from defeat at the outset of the Special Ses- 
sion. Though successful on this one point, Norris and the insur- 
gents 'were able to do little more than complain of Cannon's mas- 
terful direction of the controversial tariff bill through the House. 
And at the end of the special session in August, 1909, the insur- 
gents felt the power and anger of the Speaker when, without 
exception, they were downgraded to committees which Norris 
claimed were "dead and committees in name only.""^ 

Actually, at this time the position of Norris and his fellow 
insurgents had not yet been clarified because no one knew whether 
William Howard Taft intended to continue the Roosevelt policies. 
Taft's position was clearly revealed to the insurgents when he fired 
Louis R. Glavis, in September, 1909, and Clifford Pinchot in Janu- 
ary, 1910, thereby exonerating his Secretary of the Interior, Richard 
Ballinger. In the furor that followed Norris again tangled with 
and bested Cannon in a way that must have grated. In January, 
1910, Norris presented an amendment providing that House mem- 
bers of the joint-committee to investigate the Ballinger-Pinchot con- 
troversy "ought to be elected by the House of Representatives and 

19 Kenneth W. Hechler, Insurgency, New York, 1940, 54-59. 

20 Norris, Fighting Liberal, 102; Hechler, Insurgency, 60-63. 

21 Norris to Adam Breede, September 4, 1909. 


not appointed by the Speaker. "^^ By combining forces, Democrats 
and insurgents carried the resolution by three votes, thereby in- 
suring a fuller and fairer hearing than otherwise would have been 
possible. At the same time Cannon was administered a stinging 
rebuff, his first clear defeat in the battle against the insurgents. 
If Cannon had not previously been aware, he now must have 
recognized George W. Norris as a foe whose understanding of 
parliamentary procedure and manoeuvuring rivaled his own. Since 
the Insurgent-Democratic coalition could outvote the regular Re- 
publican members. Cannon undoubtedly realized from this defeat 
that eternal vigilance was demanded lest he give the insurgents 
the opportunity to revise the rules. 

In the eyes of the insurgents. President Taft had allied himself 
with the Speaker against the cause they had been fighting. They 
felt that Cannon, a long-time and bitter foe of conservation, had 
won the administration to his point of view. The President, they 
were convinced, was a traitor to the Roosevelt policies and another 
bulwark of the system of privilege they were attacking. Indeed, 
Taft's treatment of them at this time assured Norris that the in- 
surgents were correct in their evaluation. 

As the Ballinger-Pinchot controversy swirled about him, the 
President decided to use the patronage weapon against insurgent 
Republicans on the ground that they were helping to bring the 
Democratic party into power. -^ Taft apparently took this position 
upon the insistence of Cannon and other Republican leaders, and 
Norris was one of the first victims. 

Thus by the end of January, 1910, the stage was set for the 
dramatic and historic battle that climaxed the insurgency revolt. 
Norris and his fellow insurgents, deprived of their patronage and 
committee standing, ignored by many of their colleagues, branded 
as disloyal Republicans and avowed enemies of the administration, 
had everything to gain and nothing to lose if only they could find 
a legislative lever to open a wedge in the House rules. By this 
time, Norris had emerged as their outstanding leader and most 
skillful parliamentarian. Though he found his position in Congress 
and his life in Washington unpleasant, under no circumstances did 
he intend to deviate from the path he was pursuing. Correspon- 
dence approving his actions assured him that popular support at 

22 Congressional Record: Sixty-First Congress, Second Session, 390. 

23 Norris to William Howard Taft, January 6, 1910; Hechler, In- 
surgency, 216. 


the next election would not be withdrawn even if his patronage 

With patience and fortitude Norris awaited the opportunity to 
wage war against the powers that Cannon and his chief lieuten- 
ants were ruthlessly exercising. He hoped this occasion would come 
soon. If not, he claimed he would still be satisfied with the 
knowledge that he had helped to sow the seeds that eventually 
would allow others to "reap an effective harvest for free and 
untrammelled representation in the House."^^ As it turned out, 
Norris had but a short time to wait. In March, 1910, Cannon 
made a parliamentary blunder that gave Norris the opportunity 
to introduce again his May, 1908, resolution — this time to precipi- 
tate the revolution that curtailed the power of the Speaker. 

On the eve of the historic rules fight in March, 1910, Cannon 
and Norris symbolized the past and the future of the Republican 
party — one group seeking to consolidate its entrenched position 
and the other vying for control. Born before the Civil War Can- 
non had grown to maturity in the political environment of Half- 
Breeds and Stalwarts and had accepted Grantism, while Norris 
represented an important segment of the oncoming generation of 
national leaders. Born during or after the Civil War this gener- 
ation 'came to political maturity when indignant criticism was be- 
ing leveled against their party and when ephemeral third parties, 
and by 1896 even the Democrats, were demanding social change. 
The older generation which had first helped to preserve the Union, 
in the post-war period with the aid of the soldier-vote cemented 
the Republican alliance between business and politics. Their mem- 
bers were largely desirous of continuing in these established grooves, 
and from their ranks came the stand-patters and many of the op- 
ponents of national expansion. On the other hand, the younger 
generation of Republican leaders, like most of the reformers did not 
question the accumulation of wealth. They were more concerned 
with its concentration and inequitable distribution. From their 
ranks came the insurgents as well as a large majority of the pro- 
gressives and imperialists, though it does not always follow that 
an individual stand-patter or progressive was a friend or foe of 

Richard Lowitt 
Connecticut College 
New London 

24 Norris to C. L. Fahnestock, January 11, 1910. 

Roger Barlow: First English 
Traveler in the Pampas 

The first eye-witness account in English of the New World 
was written around 1540 by an English merchant named Roger 
Barlow.^ Ignored for nearly four centuries, Barlow's A Brief 
Summe of Geographie'^ describes the experiences of perhaps the 
first Englishman ever to set foot on the vast Pampas of the River 
Plate regions. 

In 1526, Roger Barlow was already a well-established, pros- 
perous merchant in Seville, Spain. Another English merchant in 
the same city and a good friend of Barlow's was Robert Thorne, 
of the famous trading family of Bristol. Allured by the possi- 
bility of reaching the Spice Islands by a shorter route than Magel- 
lan's, a number of Sevillan merchants formed a company for the 
purpose of making a voyage to those fabulous islands, under the 
command of Sebastian Cabot. Among the backers of this proposed 
expedition were Robert Thorne, and Roger Barlow.^ Thome's 
interest in this expedition was two-fold: first, he was, of course, 
interested in compounding his investment, but, second, and more 
important to him, he wanted certain information regarding a pos- 
sible passage to the Pacific by way of the polar regions. Since, ac- 
cording to his calculations, that was the shortest distance between 
western Europe and the Spiceries, it was first necessary to ascer- 
tain whether the Pacific Ocean lay continuously open in that direc- 

The man chosen by Thorne to carry out his plans of discovery 
was Roger Barlow. It was arranged that Barlow and anotlier Eng- 
lishman, Henry Latimer, a competent pilot, should sail with Se- 
bastian Cabot as super-cargoes, for the purpose of learning all that 

1 E. G. R. Taylor, Introduction to Roger Barlow, A Brief Summe of 
Geographie, The Hakluyt Society, 2nd Ser., No. LXIX, London, 1932, 
xxviii. The date 1540 is confirmed by the watermarks on the manu- 

2 The original manuscript, which has no title, is docketed, Geographia 
Barlotv in the Royal Library of the British Museum. The title here in- 
dicated was supplied by Taylor from a phrase employed by Barlow. 
Taylor, Tudor Geography, 1A85-1583 London, 1930, 45. 

3 Henry Harrisse, John Cabot the Discoverer of North America, and 
Sebastian Cabot his Son. A Chapter of the Maritime History of England 
under the Tudors, 1^96-1557, London, 1896, 183-184. 



the voyage could teach them. Young, serious-minded, well-educated, 
accustomed to seamen and the sea, and above all, a loyal English- 
man, he was just the man to make a suitable leader for an Eng- 
lish overseas discovery. On April 3, 1526, a Spanish fleet com- 
posed of three caravels and a brigantine left Seville for the Spice 
Islands. Barlow, himself, sailed on Cabot's flag-ship, and appears 
to have acted as assistant to Hernando Calderon, treasurer of the 

The expedition, however, never reached its objective, due to 
disaster. While rounding Santa Catalina, off the present-day Rio 
de la Plata (then called Rio de Solis) the flag-ship was lost. On 
Santa Catalina Island, Cabot found a survivor of de Soils' expedi- 
tion, one Henrique Montes, who claimed to have heard from the 
Indians that gold and silver were to be had by sailing up the 
Parana River, for the river allegedly had its source in a sierra rich 
in precious metals. In February, 1527, leaving the sick and one of 
the larger ships at the mouth of the Uruguay, Cabot changed his 
objective, and with the remainder of his party sailed up the Plata 
and the Parana in search of treasure.^ 

Barlow's first-hand account of what he saw on the shores of 
the Plata is the first of its kind in the English language. In his 
description of the Rio de la Plata, this early traveler mentions the 
multitude of seals and the numerous shoals which made navigation 
of the estuary both difficult and hazardous. He gives a very full 
description of the country, its vegetation, its birds and beasts, and 
its people. 

As the expedition progressed up the muddy Parana, Barlow was 
impressed by the luxuriant vegetation, and he describes in detail the 
strange fauna and flora on the river's edge: 

This river of parana is a marvelaus goodlie rever and a grete, for of iij 
hundreth leges and above that we went up in it, the narrowest place from 
one shore to an other was above ij or iij leges brode. This river is full 
of goodlie ilondes and plesant, for thei be full of trees of divers sortes 
and the levis of them alwais grene, and the bowis hange downe into the 
water and many straunge birdes brede in them. In one iland that we 
came to there were no maner of birdes in it but onlie white hemes, where 

4 The presence of an Englishman aboard the flagship does not seem 
to have elicited undue comment among the Spanish crew. According to 
Jose Toribio Medina, El veneciano Sebastian Caboto al servicio de Espana, 
Santiago de Chile, 1908, tomo I, 226 : "His companions had Hispanicised his 
name and they called him Rodrigo del Barco, and more commonly, Roger 
Carlo or Barlo." 

5 Taylor, Tudor Geogi-aphy, 56. 


we went alande, and in less time than ij houres we killed with staves and 
bowes above a thousande. . . . And by other ilandes we passed wherein 
was none other birdes as we coude perceave but popyngayes and turtil 
doves and an other sort of smal byrdes which be no bigger of bodie then 
the toppe of mans thombe but they have the goodliest colored fethers 
that ever man might se, the colours wold chatinge in moving of them as 
it were chaungeable silke.6 

At least two voyages were made up the Parana, and the ex- 
treme nothern point reached by the expedition was probably not 
far from the site of the present-day city of Asuncion, on the Para- 
guay River. Barlow, always a very keen observer, describes, in 
one instance, the method employed by the Indians to hunt deer: 

Along the river of parana is a goodlie plaine contreie, and goodlie wood 
of divers kynds of trees that be alwais grene wynter and somer. Ther 
be many wylde beastes and a straunge facion of shepe, oystriges, and red 
dere, wch the indies do hunte by divers waies, but not with dogges for 
ther be none in the contreie but certain mastifes that we brought with us 
out of spayne. One maner of ther huntyng is this. They wil go together 
iij or iiij hundred indies wheras thei se thes beastes feding in the playn, 
and wil go betwen them and the mountaines and compasse them about 
saving one waie toward the river, and then every man setteth fier in the 
drie gras and when thes bestes se the fier and smoke behinde them thei 
leve the covert and renne toward the ryver, and the indies folowe them 
til thei come almost to the revers side and then thei presse upon them 
with ther bowes and arowes and force them to take the water, for backe 
ageyne thei shel have moche adoo to skape, and whem thei be in the water 
ther be indies redy with ther canoos and so chase them up and downe in 
the river and kyll them wt ther bowes and arowes.'^ 

It is evident from Barlow's account, that the expedition en- 
countered friendly, peaceful Indians, as well as the warlike Guaranis, 
who, he claims, practiced cannibalism: 

Upon the cost of santa marie toward santsalvadore be certyne generations 
of indies called biguais and charnais which liveth by fyshing and huntying, 
and these do not ete one another. But from sent Salvador up the river 
parana be a grete generation of indies called guaranies which be verie yll 
people and contynuallie make warre upon ther bordres and one ete another, 
and if they take ther enemie alife thei bryng him home, and if ther 
prisoner be not fatte he will kepe him till suche tyme as he be in good 
plight, and in this meane tyme thei wyl cherishe and fede him with the 

6 Barlow, Brief Summe, 160. The original spelling is maintained in 
the quotations of Barlow. It is interesting to note the inconsistencies in 
the spelling. 

7 Ibid. 


best meates that he can get and one of his wifes shal have keping of 
him, and at all times that he lysteth he shal take his pleasure of her, but 
every night he shalbe tyed and watched for steling awaie. And every daie 
she wil paint him and dresse as though he ware her owne husbond and 
wil lede him with a corde made of coton tied about his necke from place 
to place, accompanied with many daunsyng and syngyng, and making as 
moche pleasure as thei can, and he likewise wt them, till suche tyme 
that thei do entende to kyll him.^ 

In March, 1528, the expedition encountered Diego Garcia, who 
had been sent there by the Spanish crown, with the express purpose 
of exploring the Rio de Solis. Thereupon, Cabot determined to 
establish his own priority by sending back an immediate report to 
Spain, requesting permission to continue his explorations, and also 
supplies to make it possible. The Englishman, Roger Barlow, and 
the treasurer, Hernando Calderon, were dispatched on this impor- 
tant mission to Charles V. Unfortunately, however, just as they 
were about to conclude the negotiations for supplies, Francisco 
Pizarro arrived with the news of his Peruvian discoveries, bring- 
ing with him many rich specimens of gold and silver to sub- 
stantiate his claims. In view of this new development, Charles V 
lost interest in the Rio de Solis expedition, and Sebastian Cabot 
received no supplies.^ 

Barlow spent the next decade in his homeland, engaged in the 
busy life of a prosperous merchant. The death of his friend and 
business associate, Robert Thorne, and the preoccupation of King 
Henry VIII with other matters, compelled Barlow to put aside his 
dreams of a passage to the Pacific. However, in 1540-1541, Bar- 
low once more took up his project. In order to strengthen his 
proposal to King Henry VIII for the establishment of an all-Eng- 
lish trade route to the Spice Islands, Barlow accompanied his docu- 
ments with the treatise, Brief Summe of Geographie}^ Actually, 
his treatise was almost a word for word translation of an earlier 
Spanish work by Martin Fernandez de Enciso, entitled, Suma de 
Geographia (1518). A comparison of Barlow's work with that 
of Enciso, however, reveals that the Englishman added a lengthy 
account of what he, personally, had seen in the Plata basin. Since 
Enciso' s knowledge of South America did not extend beyond Cape 

8 Ibid., 156-157. 

9 Richard Biddle, A Memoir of Sebastian Cabot; With a Review of the 
History of Maritime Discovery, Philadelphia, 1831, 156. 

10 Royal MSS. 18 B. XXVIII, British Museum. 


Santa Maria, the authenticity of this part of the work is established.^^ 
A further check on the validity of the addition made by Barlow is 
the extant letter, dated July 10, 1528, and written by one, Luis 
Ramirez, a crew-member of the same expedition, in which Ramirez 
describes essentially the same things as does Barlow. ^^ 

Due to the death of Henry VIII in 1547, plus the change in 
cosmographical thinking that had evolved during the previous 
twenty-five years, the plans of Thorne and Barlow were never 
executed. Barlow died in 1554, a disappointed man, little dream- 
ing that he would still be remembered four hundred years later 
as the first English travel writer on South America. 

S. Samuel Trifilo 
Marquette University 

11 Tayloi", Introduction, Brief Simime of Geographic, xi. Writes Tay- 
lor: "It is typical of the lag of English knowledge behind that of the Con- 
tinent, that Eoger Barlow did not feel the necessity of adding a single 
line to Enciso's description of Central and North America and the West 
Indies written in 1518." Ibid., 1. 

12 Ibid., xxiv. According to Harrisse, John Cabot, 201, Ramirez's 
letter has been published in the original Spanish by Adolfo de Varnhagen, 
in the Revista de Instituto Historico e Geogrdfico do Brazil Trimesal, Rio 
de Janeiro, XV (1852), 14-41. In 1843, Ramirez's letter was translated 
into French, and appeared in Ternaux-Compans, Nouvelles Antiales de 
Voyage, III (1843). This French translation, undoubtedly, led Taylor 
to assume that Ramirez was a Frenchman. 

Book Reviews 

Emanuel L. Philipp — W^/scons/n Stahvart. By Robert S. Maxwell. Madi- 
son, Wisconsin, The State Historical Society of Wisconsin. Pp. xvi, 
272. $6.50. 

The comment of the Detroit Free Press in 1862 regarding the anti- 
slavery movement — "One millstone will not crush the grain; two are 
always necessary"- — is applicable to the contest between progressives and 
stalwarts not only in Wisconsin but throughout the nation. The author 
of this fascinating biography of Governor Philipp has written an account 
of Wisconsin's most intelligent stalwart as a fitting sequel to his earlier 
life of LaFoIIette. Professor Maxwell has had access to a rich store of 
material dealing with the life of an industrialist-politician who might very 
well be called the William Howard Taft of Wisconsin. The author has 
made an excellent use of his materials; his knowledge of the Wisconsin 
scene is comprehensive; and he relates the story to the trend of national 
affairs. It is hard to see how he could have packed more information 
into a relatively small volume. The author's fairness and objectivity is 
outstanding and in no way influenced by the fact that Cyrus L. Philipp, 
the son of Governor Philipp cooperated "in all phases of the project." 

Emanuel L. Philipp was largely a self-made man in the tradition of 
Andrew Carnegie. His early life was one of hardship, but left no trace 
of bitterness. Philipp was quick to recognize and seize a business op- 
portunity; a pioneer in the development of the independent refrigerator 
car business, he was also associated with the Milwaukee brewery interests. 

In 1900, Philipp, and other stalwarts, attempted cooperation with La- 
FoIIette; the alliance was short-lived. Philipp came to resent the intem- 
perate charges against business interests generally. He was accused of 
indulging in the common practice of rebating in violation of the Elkins 
Act. However, by a personal Appeal to the Attorney General of the 
United States, William H. Moody, he did obtain a clarification of the 
rebate provisions of the law. 

An especially interesting episode is Philipp's clash with Ray Stannard 
Baker and S. S. McQure. Philipp resented their accusations and won a 
verdict in a libel suit in U.S. Circuit Court which cost McClure $15,000 
plus. Whether this verdict was an important factor in the decline of 
muckraking is a question, as this type of journalism was already on the 

Philipp's role in Wisconsin politics is clearly established; he rallied 
the fragments of stalwart wreckage and gave to those who disliked too 
much progressive leadership a program which, at least to an extent, re- 
sulted in a better balance between contending forces in Wisconsin politics. 

Elected governor in 1914, Philipp served (ably) through three 2 -year 
terms. Though originally hostile to the State University and to the Legis- 



lative Reference Library (like Governor Heil at a later date), Philipp was 
flexible and a good listener. From the standpoint of the present, possible 
Chapter Eleven — "Defender of Civil Rights" — stands out as a reminder 
that in times of stress excessive zeal can crush civil rights. Philipp was 
an efficient and courageous war-time governor, a champion of tolerance 
and civil rights. Any reader with an interest in the history of the pro- 
gressive movement will certainly need to read this attractive volume. 

William A. Pitkin 
Southern Illinois University 

The Civil War, A Narrative. Vol. I, Fort Sumter to Perryville. By Shelby 
Foote. New York, Random House, 1958. Pp. 840. $10. 

The novelist, Shelby Foote, has fallen in with the parade of writers 
who are capitalizing on the rising market provided by the approach of 
the American Civil War centennial. Most of those marching in this parade 
will remain as faceless as soldiers in any large formation, but not Mr. 
Foote. This is not just another of many volumes, but a freshly-written, 
lucid prose synthesis of the works of others before him. 

The author is well aware that the novelist in history is always suspect. 
"In all respects," Mr. Foote explains, "the book is as accurate as care 
and hard work could make it ... in writing a history I would no more 
be false to a fact dug out of a valid document than I would be false to 
a 'fact' dug out of my head in writing a novel. . . . Wherever the choice 
lay between soundness and "color,' soundness had it every time." 

The narrative opens with quick, almost hasty sketches of Jefferson 
Davis and Abraham Lincoln, and leads from there smoothly into the im- 
mediate background of the war. From there, Foote dextrously leads the 
reader from the fighting in the East to the war in the West, and back 
again, closing with Lincoln's message to Congress in December, 1862. 
His indebtedness to secondary works is quite apparent at times, and con- 
sciously or not, little bits of Bruce Catton, K.P. and T.H. Williams, 
Freeman, Wiley, Leech and others peer through Mr. Foote' s fine prose. 
But he has not done his fellow authors a disservice, xmless by not 
footnoting them, because the synthesis is a skillful one. Mr. Foote notes 
that he found the secondary works "invaluable," but the frame of the 
Official Records holds his colorful canvas taut. Even so, I believe still 
more use might have been made of original sources. 

Shelby Foote tells us he accepted "the historian's standards without 
his paraphernalia," which apparently means the book was written as 
popular history, not as historian's history. It also means that Mr. Foote 
does not intend to document the work, and this is the chief lament. 
Footnotes might seem burdensome for a popular history, but either they 
or chapter notes should have been used to give credit where credit is due. 


A bibliography of two pages is scarcely adequate for an 800 page, fact- 
filled account, even though there is the promise that the last volume of the 
projected triology will contain "a complete bibliography." 

As it progresses, it becomes apparent this is a military history, and a 
well done one at that. Battle writing is clear and easily understandable, a 
fact which in itself makes the volume valuable. It is refreshing to find 
such an artistic blend of description and characterization sifted from the 
mass of fact. Occasionally an error stands out, such as those jotted down 
by Professor Frank E. Vandiver in his New York Times review. An il- 
lustration of this is Foote's statement that General John Pope defeated 
Little Crow, leader of the Sioux uprising in 1862, when the credit really 
belongs to Minnesota's Henry H. Sibley. The mistakes are few, however, 
and in general Mr. Foote lived up to his goal of accuracy. Since this is 
a military history, it would be unusual to find detailed consideration of other 
facets of the war, such as politics or finance. It is disappointing to find 
so little notice taken of logistics, for the best general or the most deter- 
mined men could not long succeed without attention to that science. Also, 
Mr. Foote has neglected the war on the water, so far. 

Outstanding characteristics of the book are the rhetoric and the at- 
tention to the fighting in the West. In spite of the shortcomings, the 
book will find a prominent place on any shelf of Civil War literature. 

Robert Huhn Jones 

Kent State University 

Crosier on the Frontier, A Life of John Martin Henni, Archbishop of 
Milwaukee. By Rt. Rev. Msgr. Peter Leo Johnson. The State His- 
torical Society of Wisconsin, Madison, 1959. Pp. XV-240. Illustrated, 
Paper. $3.95. 

Monsignor Johnson may be said to have commenced preparation for 
this biography as professor of church history at St. Francis Seminary, Mil- 
waukee, before World War I. That crisis drew him away briefly. Dur- 
ing it, he served as chaplain in the armed services, but returned to his 
professorship shortly after peace was proclaimed. The Salesianum, a quar- 
terly made possible by the priest alumni of the Seminary, preserves some 
record of the author's preparatory work. As editor of this periodical for 
more than a quarter of a century he has published many documents per- 
tinent to Henni. However, the twenty-seven pages of citations and bibli- 
ography on which the text is built are proof that Monsignor Johnson has 
explored far beyond the manuscript correspondence of his biographee and 
his friends. Periodical literature of the pioneer era together with pri- 
mary and secondary works have been drawn upon. The result is, above 
all, a scholarly work. 

The story of Archbishop Henni's life is deeply significant and full 
of interest. He was a great ecclesiastical figure thrown into the turmoil of 


events which boiled on the frontier. The problems of vanishing Indians, 
of cultural conflicts between immigrants, of nativistic Americans reviling 
all Europeans, of religious bigots striking blindly at the Church succes- 
sively came to the surface round about the prelate. Progress and expan- 
sion, poverty and riches, venality and heroism were likewise round about 
him. Monsignor Johnson depicts the man of great sympathy and under- 
standing of people who was able to mold a great Catholic diocese from 
this amalgam. 

It is impossible even to touch upon the chapters which record how 
Henni accomplished what he did. However, the author's treatment of 
the Archbishop's influence on the German immigrant question must be 
singled out for commendation. It is required reading for anyone con- 
cerned with this interesting episode of American history. 

The State Historical Society of Wisconsin has done a nice job of 
publishing and is to be commended on keeping the price low. Librarians 
may grumble over the fact that the paper-back binding will make addi- 
tional processing necessary before the book may be put on their shelves. 
Nevertheless, many individuals who will want their private copies will 

Raphael N. Hamilton 
Marquette University 

Embarcadero, Being a Chronicle of True Sea Adventures from the Port of 
San Francisco. By Richard H. Dillon. Coward-McCann, New York, 
1959. Pp. 313. $4.75. 

Denizens of ocean-front cities, youths and elders who cast fond glances 
out over the seaways that brought their fathers and took away their friends, 
in short, people for whom the maritime atmosphere means both romance 
and subsistence, will find this book a delightful companion after sundown 
obscures the outer world and leaves them to their dreams. It is a string 
of yarns, unadorned by a genius such as Conrad, lacking even a central 
theme beyond common acquaintance with San Francisco Bay as starting 
point for most of the adventures. From a scholarly point of view it ar- 
rives without an index, a bibliography, or a single footnote citation. 
Several times the grammar is quite careless, particularly when that trouble- 
some objective "whom" suddenly becomes the subject of a finite verb. 
Nevertheless, though they may label Embarcadero as "no contribution," 
few historians will put down the book before reading to the last page. 

What it has is integrity. It portrays the man of the sea, especially the 
pacific sea from Dutch Harbor to Tahiti, though the record runs round 
the Horn extend the geographic rotundity. There are the bad men and 
the brave men, predecessors of our beatniks, and the man sailing an 18- 
footer from Fisherman's Wharf to New Caledonia and Melbourne, the 
fabulous Bernard Gilboy. Old clippers breeze through the pages like bees. 


Mutinies, kidnappings, piracy and barratry recall an earlier "freedom of 
the seas." Omnipotent captains rule with a marlin spike. Canvas and 
ropes spell out their authentic functions, and hurricanes tear hulls to 
skeletons. Mr. Dillon restores the flavor of the old Bay of San Fran- 

W. Eugene Shiels 
Xavier University, Ohio 

Money, Class, and Party: An Economic Study of Civil War and Recon- 
struction. By Robert P. Sharkey. The John Hopkins University Studies 
in Historical and Political Science. Seventy-seventh Series, Number 
Two. Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1959- Pp. 346. $5.50. 

In this volume, Robert P. Sharkey carries forward the process of re- 
examining the evidence on which the prevailing interpretation of the 
Civil War and Reconstruction period is based. Professor Sharkey, like 
his mentor, C. Vann Woodward, is unimpressed by the historical cliches 
that bedevil that epoch of our history. He has not been awed by his 
august predecessors in the field, most of whom disagree with some, or all, 
of his conclusions. 

Professor Sharkey has demolished the impression, fostered by the con- 
troversial historiography of Reconstruction, that the Radical Republicans 
subscribed to a single, consistent, economic program. On the contrary, 
he has convincingly shown that there were at least three distinct categories 
of Radical opinion on fiscal questions. In the first class may be found 
the extreme Radicals of the Thaddeus Stevens, Ben Wade, Ben Butler 
stripe, who supported the greenback issues, opposed currency contraction, 
and advocated a high protective tariff. Their adversaries in the financial 
controversies were more moderate in their attitude toward the South and 
argued strongly for a hard-money policy of contraction. This group 
numbered among its leading spokesmen James G. Blaine, William P. 
Fessenden, Justin S. Morrill, and James A. Garfield. A third faction, 
which held the balance of power between the contending fiscal extremes, 
included George W. Julian, John A. Logan, John Sherman, and George 
S. Boutwell. These men were less concerned with economic principles 
than with political expediency. During the war and early post-war years, 
this latter group aided the soft-money element while it was popular to 
oppose the contraction policy of Johnson's Secretary of the Treasury. The 
return of prosperity and the election of Grant on a hard-money platform 
in 1868, swung them into the hard -money camp. Only after that date, 
Mr. Sharkey contends, could the Republicans accurately be characterized 
as the sound money party. 

Just as his analysis of the principles of the Radicals has destroyed the 
monolithic conception of that faction, the author's treatment of the capi- 
talists' role in these years reveals gaping discrepancies in a hitherto largely 


unchallenged solid front. The variations among the attitudes of the 
bankers toward Secretary McCulIoch's contraction policy are particularly 
striking. The author identifies and explains the differences among the 
interests of the metropolitan bankers of the East, the urban bankers of 
the West, the rural bankers, and the private bankers of the eastern cities. 

A major thesis of Mr. Sharkey's book is his contention that the green- 
back issues of the war period were necessary, as the sponsors of the pro- 
gram contended. This provocative view is most cogently argued. The 
author holds that neither a heavier tax program nor the sale of govern- 
ment securities for gold at prices substantially below par would have driven 
or tempted sufficient amounts out of the hoards to supply the currency 
needs of the government and the economy. Reliance on state bank notes, 
he reasons, would have been even more inflationary than the "necessary" 
expedient, issues of fiat money. 

Through these and other provocative observations, Robert P. Sharkey's 
book has made an important contribution, broadening and deepening our 
understanding of a difficult and significant period in our history. 

Robert W. McCluggage 
Loyola University, Chicago 

Notes and Comments 

The University of Wisconsin Press has done a noteworthy 
service to historians by reprinting this past March Carl Lotus 
Becker, The History of Political Parties in the Province of New 
York, 1760-1776, a scholarly gem of the first decade of this cen- 
tury. Moreover, the new book is in two forms, with the paper 
cover volume listed at one dollar and ninety-five cents, easily avail- 
able to the short wallets of students, and the cloth cover listed 
at six dollars and fifty cents. In the Foreword, Arthur M. Schles- 
inger, points out the place of this earliest of Becker's books in his 
scholarly growth and the place of Becker in the development of 
objective historical scholarship. Professor Schlesinger terms the 
work, first published in 1909, "a minor classic of historical litera- 
ture," and he considers it fundamental in the historiography of the 
American Revolution. 

Coming from the same Press is a work which all Wisconsin 
alumni will be pleased to read and which many educators over 
the country will notice. This is Some Ferments at Wisconsin, 1 901 - 
1947 1 Memories and Reflections, by G. C. Sellery, Dean of the 
College of Letters and Science at the University of Wisconsin, 
1919-1942. Canadian-born George Clark Sellery was prominent 
in the History Department at Madison from 1901, and after World 
War I gained renown for his administrative abilities as Dean. 
Now in i960, looking back over his 87 years, he presents his 
memories of the important events in which he participated and his 
reflections upon the many controversies — the Van Hise and Frank 
philosophies of education, "the Round Robin against La FoUette," 
the Experimental College, academic freedom, and intercollegiate 
athletics, to mention a few. The book in 124 pages is lithoprinted 
and is listed at two dollars and fifty cents. 

A warm welcome has been given to Arizona and the West, a 
Quarterly Journal of History, published by the University of Ari- 
zona, and edited by John Alexander Carroll. The first number 
appeared in the Spring of 1959, in excellent format, carrying 
illustrations and pen sketches. The number elicited numerous 
comments and suggestions. These are reviewed in scintillating 



editorial remarks in the Summer issue under the heading "Orchids, 
Cacti, and Candor." After these explanations to readers of the 
Journal's scope and intent, Professor Carroll dedicates the number 
to the memory of Herbert Eugene Bolton in an essay to which all 
who knew the "giant among historians" will say "Amen." Since 
there is some dispute about the territorial boundaries of "the West," 
Professor Burl Noggle in a long article starts with a definition of 
the limits of "the Southwest," which, he says, "almost defies defi- 
nition." The article, "Anglo Observers of the Southwest Border- 
lands, 1825-1890: The Rise of a Concept," is the vehicle for the 
comprehensive bibliography on the "Southwest" section of the 
"West." Four other articles are followed by an all- West book 
review section in a novel and pleasing typesetting job and by an 
equally attractive section "A Roundup of Western Reading," by 
The Old Bookaroos, B. W. AUred, J. C. Dykes, and F. G. Ren- 
ner. Arizona and the West is well-launched on what we hope will 
be a long and profitable voyage. The annual subscription is five 


* * * * 

Two books on the history of banking have recently come from 
Public Affairs Press, Washington, D.C. The American Bankers 
Association, Its Vast and Present, by Wilbert M. Schneider, Pro- 
fessor of Economics and Business Administration and currently 
Academic Dean of Emmanuel Missionary College. Herein is traced 
a general history of banking in the United States and the prominent 
part played by the Association from its constitution in 1873. 
Three periods of growth and development of the Association are 
particularly marked, each covering twenty-five years: 1875-1900, 
1900-1925, 1925-1950. After setting the record forth chrono- 
logically, the author gives a comprehensive account of the structure 
of the ABA, its objectives, its policies with respect to public finance, 
government in banking, its legal and legislative activities, its war- 
time and peacetime services. The book will appeal to men of 
finance and will be useful to historians. It has 275 pages with an 
index and sells for |5.00. 

The second book. Women in Banking, a History of the National 
Association of Bank Women, by Geniveve N. Gildersleeve, is pre- 
cisely what the title states. The origin, purpose, development, and 
achievements of the Association, with sketches of the officers are 
presented in a factual account based upon the minutes and records 
of the Association. The book is in 115 pages and is listed at 3.25. 


An Historical Revie^v 


An Historical Review 

JULY I960 




LINCOLN, 1860-1865 



CIVIL WAR, 1936-1939 . . . 

Robert H. Zoelhier 131 

Eugene H. Korth, S.J. 151 




OCCUPATION, 1861-1865 . . . Elisabeth Joan Doyle, 185 




Published quarterly by Loyola University (The Institute of Jesuit History) 
at 50 cents a copy. Annual subscription, $2.00; in foreign countries, $2.50. 

Entered as second class matter, August 7, 1929, at the post office at 
Chicago, Illinois, under the Act of March 3, 1879. Additional entry as 
second class matter at the post office at Effingham, Illinois. Printed in 
the United States. 

Subscription and change of address notices and all communications should 
be addressed to the Managing Editor at the publication and editorial 
offices at Loyola University, 6525 Sheridan Road, Chicago 26, Illinois. 


An Historical Review 

JULY I960 


Negro Colonization: The Climate of 
Opinion Surrounding Lincoln, 1860-65 

The actual efforts toward colonization of the Negroes, both 
slave and free, during Lincoln's administration, and particularly the 
abortive experiments in the Hispanic area (notably the short-lived 
colonies projected in Haiti and Chiriqui), have been adequately 
examined. -"^ Less attention has been directed to what might be 
called the general atmosphere or climate of opinion in which these 
specific colonization attempts were made. Likewise, Lincoln's 
public pronouncements on the colonization issue have been sub- 
jected to close scrutiny. But public pronouncements by public 
figures, deliberately conceived and carefully phrased, often serve 
only as a veil for motives and interests which, if baldly stated, 
would conflict with the demands of political expediency- There 
may be some value then, in attempting to fill in and highlight the 
background that surrounds those rather meager comments on col- 
onization which Lincoln made public. This can perhaps best be 
done by examining those currents of opinion which were part of 
the political atmosphere of Washington during his administration. 

Lincoln's personal, expressed attitudes toward the colonization 
issue are so well known as to require only the briefest review. As 

1 In particular, see Warren A. Beck, "Lincoln and Negro Colonization 
in Central America," Abraham Lincoln Quarterly, VI (September, 1950), 
162-183; N. Andrew N. Cleven, "Some Plans for Colonizing Liberated 
Slaves in Hispanic America," Journal of Negro History, XI (January, 
1926), 35-50; Walter F. Fleming, "Deportation and Colonization: An At- 
tempted Solution to the Race Problem," Studies in Southern History and 
Politics, New York, 1914; Paul J. Scheips, "Lincoln and the Chiriqui 
Colonization Project," Journal of Negro History, XXXVII (October, 1952), 
418-453; Charles Harris Wesley, "Lincoln's Plan for Colonizing the 
Emancipated Negroes," Journal of Negro History, IV (January, 1919), 



early as July 16, 1852, in a speech at Springfield, Illinois, Lincoln 
favorably quoted Henry Clay's dictum that "There is a moral fit- 
ness in the idea of returning to Africa her children, whose ances- 
tors have been torn from her by the ruthless hand of fraud and 
violence."" But by October, 1854, the future President had come 
to realize that a simple sense of "moral fitness" would not solve 
the Negro problem. In a speech at Peoria, Illinois, during this 
month he confessed that his "first impulse would be to free all 
the slaves, and send them to Liberia, to their own native land." 
But he admitted that the logistics of such an undertaking presented 
insuperable difficulties. And yet, he continued, neither can we 
keep them in the United States as "underlings." "What next? 
Free them, and make them politically and socially our equals ? My 
own feelings will not admit of this, and if mine would, we know 
that those of the great mass of whites will not. ... A universal 
feeling [of racial antipathy], whether well or ill founded, cannot 
safely be ignored. We cannot make them equals."^ The only 
solution, he feels, is "gradual emancipation." 

But by June, 1857, he had come to see that emancipation, even 
if gradual, would bring inevitably in its train the dread problem of 
racial "amalgamation," an eventuality which must be avoided at 
all costs. Clearly, the only solution to the problem is coloniza- 
tion — if not to Africa, then to someplace else. "The separation 
of the races," he reasoned, "is the only perfect preventive of 
amalgamation. . . . Such separation, if ever effected at all, must be 
effected by colonization.""* This conviction of the utter and eternal 
social incompatibility of black and v/hite was still deep in Lincoln's 
consciousness in August, 1862, when he addressed a delegation 
of free Negroes at the White House. He called his audience's 
attention to a "broader [physical} difference than exists between 
almost any other two races." As a result, he continued, "not a 
single man of your race is made the equal of a single man of 
ours." He went on to say that the colored race was the "basis" 
for the whole tragedy of the war, and concluded that "It is bet- 
ter for us both, therefore, to be separated."^ 

" From Clay's speech before the American Colonization Society, 1827; 
in Lincoln's "Eulogy on Henry Clay Delivered in the State House at 
Springfield, Illinois, July 16, 1852," John G. Nicolay and John Hay (eds.), 
Abrahavi Lincoln: Complete Works, Comprising His Speeches, Letters, 
Papers, and Miscellaneous Writings, 12 vols., New York, 1894, II, 176. 

3 Ibid., II, 206-207. 

4 Ibid., II, 337-338. 

5 Ibid., VIII, 2-9. 


Now, what influences stand behind these public pronounce- 
ments by Lincoln on the subject of colonization? They are of 
course partially understandable, in the most general terms, as prod- 
ucts of his frontier and Border-State inheritance. More specif- 
ically, when he came to the Presidency, he found himself sur- 
rounded by men, many of whom can be safely described as col- 
onizationists. Lincoln's Postmaster General was Montgomery Blair, 
who had not only been counsel for Dred Scott, but had also been 
instrumental in finding a lawyer to defend John Brown. Blair 
was, moreover, the brother of Francis Preston Blair, possibly the 
most outspoken promoter of Negro colonization in Washington. 
Caleb Smith, Lincoln's Secretary of the Interior, was an enthusiastic 
colonizationist, as also was Edward Jordan, Solicitor of the Treas- 
ury. A little later, Lincoln seems to have lent an attentive ear, 
at least for a while, to the persuasive voice of the Reverend James 
Mitchell, Commissioner of Emigration. Gideon Welles, himself 
opposed to most of the colonization projects undertaken, noted in 
his Diary for September 26, 1862, that "for months, almost from 
the commencement of this administration, [colonization] has been 
at times considered."^ 

Still, an enumeration of these specific influences, which may 
have had a hand in shaping Lincoln's ultimate colonization policies, 
gives us only a relatively superficial view of the problem, takes 
into account, so to speak, only the facade. What motives, if any, 
lay beneath and behind those terms, usually altruistic and hu- 
manitarian in tenor, in which Lincoln couched his colonization 
proposals.-^ To what extent did he absorb, consciously or perhaps 
unconsciously, the attitudes toward colonization which were part 
of the air of the war-torn capitol.'* To attempt an answer to such 
questions, insofar as they may be answered, we must turn to the 
utterances concerning colonization of those politicians who, being 
less in the public eye than the President, could afford to be less 
altruistic, more narrowly partisan, and, particularly, more frank 
in the elucidation of their motives. 

The deep-rooted fear of "amalgamation" which Lincoln be- 
trays is echoed clearly, for example, in the House Report on Eman- 
cipation and Colonization. The committee observed that "Much 
of the objection to emancipation arises from the opposition of a 

6 Carl Sandburg, Abraham Lincoln: The War Years, 4 vols., New 
York, 1939, I, 151-153; The Diary of Gideon Welles, 3 vols., Boston, 1911, 
I, 150-151. 


large portion of our people to the intermixture .of the races, '^ and 
from the association of white with black labor." The committee 
called attention to the "antipathy which nature has ordained," and 
insisted that the Negro "cannot, and ought not to, be admitted 
to our social and political privileges." They concluded with a 
statement of belief apparently as common in the North as South: 
"The Committee conclude that the highest interests of the white 
race, whether Anglo-Saxon, Celt, or Scandanavian, require that the 
whole country should be held and occupied by these races alone." 
Later in the Report they are even more explicit: "The Anglo- 
American looks upon every acre of our present domain as intended 
for him and not for the negro. "^ 

To bolster this belief that the territories of the United States 
were meant from the beginning as an exclusive preserve of the 
blonde Nordic, appeals were made to the authority of the Found- 
ing Fathers and the early history of the country. On June 2, 1862, 
the subject of recognizing the republics of Haiti and Liberia, and 
of accepting black representatives from these states, was under 
discussion on the Senate floor. Senator S. S. Cox of Ohio was 
asked what objection he could have to a black man as official 
representative to our government. "Objection.^ Gracious heavens! 
what innocency!" was his immediate retort. 

Objection to receiving a black man on an equality with a white man In this 
country.'* Every objection which instinct, race, prejudice, and institutions 
make. I have been taught . . . that these Commonwealths and this Union 
were made for white men; that this Government is a Government of white 
men; that the men who made it never intended, by anything they did, to 
place the black race upon an equality with the white. The reasons for 
these wise precautions . . . are climatic, ethnological, economical, and social. ^ 

The House committee concurred with Senator Cox, observing that 
"There is no instance afforded us in history where liberated slaves, 
even of the same race, have lived any considerable period in har- 
mony with their former masters when denied equality with them." 
Thus did history, and American history in particular, seem to point 
up the wisdom of mass colonization. With a vivid consciousness 
of the hard realities of the situation, and with an accuracy ap- 
proaching clairvoyance, the House committee prophesied: 

7 Italics mine. 

S House Report on Emancipation and Colonization, 37 Cong., 2 Sess., 
House Exec. Doc. No. 148, 13-14, 16 (July 16, 1862). 

9 Cong. Globe, 37 Cong., 2 Sess., 2502 (June 2, 1862). 


It matters not how wealthy, how intelligent, or how morally meritorious 
the Negro may become, so long as he remains among us the recollection of 
the former relation of master and slave will be perpetuated by the change- 
less color of the Ethiop's skin, and that color will alike be perpetuated by 
the degrading tradition of his former bondage. lo 

All of this makes it dear that Lincoln's convictions concern- 
ing the absolute necessity of colonization were not the product of 
an inherent narrowness of viev/, nor indicative of a lack of social 
imagination; they were, indeed, the respectable tenets of substan- 
tial and hard-headed politicians and statesmen of the age. Never- 
theless, such beliefs, held as they were by a majority both North 
and South, made, in the words of Senator Willey of Virginia, 
"the nominal boon of freedom to the Negro in this country, so 
long as he is to remain in this country, ... a mockery and a delu- 
sion. "^^ 

That the racial issue, as such, was foremost in the minds of the 
men in government was made clear by Senator F. P. Blair of Mis- 
souri in his speech of April 11, 1862. He asserted flatly that 

It was the negro question, and not the slavery question which made the 
rebellion. ... If the rebellion was made by two hundred and fifty thousand 
slave-holders, for the sake of perpetuating slavery, then it might be a com- 
plete remedy to extirpate the institution; but if the rebellion has grown 
out of the abhorrence of the non-slaveholders for emancipation and amalga- 
mation, and their dread of "Negro equality,' how will their discontent be 
cured by the very measure [emancipation] the mere apprehension of which 
has driven them into rebellion? 

Emancipation without colonization, he asserted, would merely ag- 
gravate the already existing social tensions. The cure would be 
more pernicious than the disease itself.-^^ If there was popular 
acceptance of Blair's possibly partisan thesis, that it vv^as the "negro 
question," and not slavery, that generated the Civil War, then the 
pressure for colonization as the essential concomitant of emanci- 
pation becomes considerably clearer. 

All of this underscores the fact that not only Lincoln's opinions 
but also the general climate of opinion surrounding him pointed 
to colonization as the only satisfactory solution to the social and 
political problems generated by the inescapable doctrine of eman- 
cipation, be it immediate or gradual. In 1865, James Mitchell, 

10 House Report on Emancipation and Colonization, 15. 

11 Cong. Globe, 37 Cong., 2 Sess., 1606 (April 10, 1862). 

12 Ibid., 1632. 


the Commissioner of Emigration, recalled that during the early 
part of his administration 

Mr. Lincoln thought a world-ivide necessity existed for a combination with 
England on this question, and acted accordingly, believing that a union of 
two powers such as the United States and Great Britain could bring a third 
power into being for the benefit of the colored race. ... I will never for- 
get the fullness and emphasis of [Lincoln's] utterance, . . . when I first 
brought this colonization of the British colonies [Honduras and Guiana} to 
his notice. On asking permission to bring it to the notice of our able 
Secretary of State, he remarked, "Surely! If England wants our Negroes, 
and will do better by them than we can, I say let her have them, and may 
God bless her!' 

Indeed, the Reverend Mitchell's recollection of the strength of 
Lincoln's feelings at this period seems to be confirmed by the 
President's unequivocal stand for colonization in his first Annual 
Message to Congress. "On this whole proposition," he asked, "in- 
cluding the appropriation of money w^ith the acquisition of terri- 
tory, does not the expediency amount to absolute necessity — that 
without which the government cannot be perpetuated.'*"^'' Lin- 
coln clearly felt late in 1861 that the failure of the colonization 
project could well mean the total failure of the Union. 

It should be noted, however, that there were pressures work- 
ing in the opposite direction — against colonization. Many thought- 
ful observers did not share Lincoln's confidence in the moral fit- 
ness and social efficacy of Negro deportation. Professor Flem- 
ing, in discussing the American Colonization Society, suggests that 
its guiding principle was that "the black race was inferior to the 
white and that in American society there was no place for the 
free blacks." As a result, he continues, the colonizationists from 
the very beginning were accused of "encouraging race prejudice 
and thus strengthening the bonds of slavery."^'^ It seems reason- 
able to assume that these unfavorable attitudes would easily attach 

13 James Mitchell, Brief on Emigration and Colonization ayid Report 
in Anstver to a Resolution of the Senate, Washington, 1865, 10; Lincoln's 
Annual Message to Congress, December 3, 1861, in Nicolay and Hay 
(eds.), Lincoln: Works, VH, 51. The Reverend Mitchell's remarks, here 
and elsewhere in this study, should be taken C2im grano sails. He proved 
a very troublesome gadfly to both Seward and Welles, and his Brief, a 
masterful piece of salesmanship, is clearly written with a sharp eye to 
his own self-interest; the post of Commissioner of Emigration was a plum 
he was obviously struggling to keep. 

14 Walter F. Fleming, "Deportation and Colonization: An Attempted 
Solution to the Race Problem," Studies in Southern History atid Politics, 
New York, 1914, 6. 


themselves to Lincoln's public statements on the problem. At 
any rate, Charles Sumner succinctly stated the anti-colonizationist 
attitude in economic, social, and moral terms in a speech before 
the State Committee of Massachusetts during 1861. He placed 
great stress on the "intrinsic and fatal injustice" of any colonization 
plan. Colonization, he continued, "will deprive the country of that 
it needs most, which is labor. ... It is vain to say that this is a 
white man's country. ... It is a country of man. Whoever dis- 
owns any member of the human family as brother disowns God 
as father, and thus becomes impious as well as inhuman. "^^ Fred- 
erick Douglass, too, thought Lincoln's colonization policy a ser- 
ious mistake. "The colored race," he emphasized, "can never be 
respected anywhere till they are respected in America. The true 
policy of the colored American is to make himself, in every way 
open to him, an American citizen, bearing with proscription and 
insult till these things disappear. "^^ 

Some critics of colonization, however, saw no need to fall back 
upon such tenuous moral and philosophical arguments. The en- 
tire colonization proposal, they were sure, was simply impossible 
in any practical terms, and the sooner we gave up such visionary 
schemes the sooner we could deal realistically with the problems 
at hand. Senator J. P. Hale of New Hampshire is representative 
of this hard-headed school. On April 10, 1862, he thundered 
from the Senate floor his conviction that colonization 

is one of the most absurd ideas that ever entered into the head of man or 
woman. . . . Any gentleman that will take the tonnage of our national ves- 
sels, . . . and calculate the number of souls each would carry to Liberia, the 
number of voyages each vessel could make, and the time that would be 
necessary, and cipher it all out, will find that . . . the whole Navy of the 
United States could not carry off the annual increase. No, sir; this is a 
problem we have got to solve. ^'^ 

On June 2, 1862, Senator Biddle of Pennsylvania declared that 
he shared with the representatives of the Border States their appre- 
hension over the consequences of emancipation. He was sure his 
constituents would become properly alarmed over the emancipa- 
tion measures then being agitated, were they not "lulled and put 
to sleep with the word 'colonization.' I say the word," he em- 

15 Charles Sumner, His Complete Works, 20 vols., Boston, 1900, XII, 
section 3, 334. 

16 Sandburg, Lincoln: The War Years, II, 184. 

17 Cong. Globe, 37 Cong., 2 Sess., 1605 (April 10, 1862). 


phasized, "not the thing; for no practicable and adequate scheme 
for it has ever been presented or devised. The word is sung to us 
as a sort of 'lullaby.' " Colonization, he implied, is a merely ver- 
bal edifice erected to conceal the dangers and horrors of "general, 
precipitate emancipation." But the astute Pennsylvania Senator 
refused to be fooled: 

When I see men bent on breaking down the dikes and opening the flood- 
gates that shut out an inundation, I am not tranquillized, because some 
philanthropist stands by with a pint mug, promising to bail it out again. 
Colonization may carry off the leakage and running over; but if you 
suddenly let in the floods, it will prove but a 'pint mug' measure of relief. 

And he concluded with inexorable logic, "If you really meant to 
colonize the Negroes, you should not set them free till you were 
ready to colonize them."^^ 

Yet the sour-heads and the cynical, although they stated their 
suspicion and contempt in terms loud and long, failed utterly to 
deprive the idea of a certain fatal fascination. Moreover, on the 
surface at least, a spirit of altruism with regard to the welfare of 
the Negro seemed to prevail. This spirit was given succinct ex- 
pression by Senator Lyman Trumbull; he said he would be 

glad to see the free Negroes of this country settled where they could as- 
sert all the rights and occupy the place of freemen, without any domineer- 
ing race; where they would not only have civil and political rights, legal 
rights, but where their social rights and privileges would be upon a level 
with all the community with whom they associated. 

The lush tropical country of Central and South America seemed 
just the place to put this altruistic spirit into concrete, practical 
terms. Senator F. P. Blair of Missouri insisted on April 11, 1862, 
that the failure of the Liberian experiment should in no way dis- 
courage men of humanitarian impulses from investigating the pos- 
sibilities of Central and South America. "There is a vast differ- 
ence," he asserted, "... between the idea of being colonized on our 
own continent, under our own flag, and being buried in Africa. 
It is the difference between life and death, home and banishment."^^ 
Many arguments were devised to establish the "moral fitness" 
and general feasibility of colonization in the Hispanic area. Some 
argued that both Nature and the God of Nature were in favor 
of Caribbean or South American colonization. James Mitchell, 

18 Ibid., 2504-2505 (June 2, 1862). 

19 Ibid., 1604 (April 10, 1862); ibid., 1633 (April 11, 1862). 


Commissioner of Emigration, probably expressed a long-held view 
in 1865 when he injected Divine Wisdom into the colonization 
discussion. He pontificated: 

The Tropical Belt of the Old and New World, is a field interdicted by an 
all-wise Providence to our healthful habitation — and in equity to the tropi- 
cal man it should be interdicted to our dominion, and will be when repub- 
lican economy prevails therein, for then it will be ruled by the actual 
occupants of the soil. 20 

Senator James R. Doolittle of Wisconsin called upon the v/ell 
worn but always serviceable argument-from-Nature to reinforce 
the intentions of Divine Providence in this respect. Colonization, 
he remarked, 

is in accordance with the natural laws of climate, in accordance with the 
difference of constitution existing between these two races; a solution to 
v/hich nature itself is pointing; a solution by which the tropics are to be 
given to the man of the tropics, and the temperate zone to the man of 
the temperate zone. 

He concluded that Hispanic colonization was "God's solution," and 
warned that "it is easier to work with Him than to work against 
Him, and wiser, too."^^ 

Senator Blair also found the "natural law" argument too at- 
tractive to be ignored. He went a step farther by bringing sta- 
tistics to the aid of intuition, attempting to establish that Negro 
colonization was clearly and unequivocally within the realm of 
divinely decreed natural lav/. He called attention to the fact 
that "The census shows ... [the Negro population] gravitates to 
the tropics, so that, even under existing conditions, it is but a 
question of time." Moreover, he assured his auditors that this 
peripatetic swarm of black men, moved continually toward the 
Equator through the dictates of an inexorable migratory instinct, 
v/ould even "free itself when it gets there, ... so irresistible is 
natural law." He suggested that President Lincoln, by virtue of 
his activities in the cause of colonization, only proposed "to obey 
this natural and irresistible law and facilitate its operation." Not 
content with this appeal to a somewhat chimerical law of Nature, 
Blair indulged in the old metaphor of bleeding the feverish body: 
"It is the disregard of [natural law] which has created the dis- 
order under which the body politic is now suffering. Can it be 

20 Brief on Emigration and Colonization, 10. 

21 Cong. Globe, 37 Cong., 2 Sess., Appendix, 99 (April 11, 1862). 


doubted that the fever will abate rapidly when [Lincoln's] policy 
is adopted?" Blair was so certain that this law of racial segre- 
gation would operate with Newtonian inevitability, that once Lin- 
coln's colonization plans were put into effect, he envisioned 

an outpouring of this [Negro] population like the outpouring of the Mis- 
sissippi when a crevasse is opened. It is indeed so manifest that this 
population tends by nature to that region, that I could as soon doubt that 
water would seek its level when permitted to flow, as that this race would 
not seek its natural home when at liberty to go there.22 

Besides God — and God's felicitous arrangement of natural law 
— more concrete and visible arguments were behind Lincoln's push 
for colonization. The foreign situation injected itself when the 
American foreign correspondents in Europe, particularly Carl 
Schurz in Madrid and Motley in Vienna, assured the President 
that the European nations would certainly recognize the Confed- 
eracy unless the North brought itself to a clear-cut statement of 
policy with regard to the emancipation of slaves. This intelligence 
no doubt reacted directly upon the colonization issue, since colo- 
nization and emancipation were inextricably bound up together 
in the eyes of Lincoln and his administration. Senator Doolittle 
remarked that "every man, woman, and child who comes from 
these [Southern] States, tells me that it is utterly impossible for 
them to talk of emancipation within any slave State without con- 
necting it with the idea of colonization." Colonization, obviously, 
was to act as a sugar coating for the bitter pill of emancipation: 
"The idea, the hope of colonization, " suggested Doolittle, ". . . will 
aid emancipation in all the Slave States." Just the day previously, 
Senator Willey of Virginia had warned vehemently against "by 
wholesale and at once, throw [ing] upon the community a great 
mass of this ignorant, servile, useless, dangerous, disorganizing 
population." If, he argued, the government perseveres in this policy 
of manumission, then should not "some provision ... be made 
whereby they shall be removed from our midst?" The Virginia 
Senator pointed to the black codes being erected in such states 
as New Jersey, Illinois, Ohio, and Pennsylvania. These codes were 
actually, in his view, "constitutional interdictions against the dif- 
fusion of this population, while at the same time you [addressing 
the representatives of these states] want to manumit our slaves and 
throw them broadcast on our community." Without colonization, 

22 Cong. Globe, 37 Cong., 2 Sess., 1633 (April 11, 1862). 


he threatened, and in the face of the Northern black codes, Vir- 
ginia will inevitably be driven "not only to reenslave those who 
may be manumitted . . . but also to reenslave the sixty thousand 
free Negroes already there."^^ Colonization is the safety valve; 
the only way to keep the lid from blowing off. 

In his second Annual Message to Congress, December 1, 1862, 
Lincoln himself stressed the combination of emancipation and 
colonization as the clear solution to the problem posed by Senators 
Doolittle and WiUey. With an eye to the North's fears of a black 
innundation, he said that the Negroes came North only because 
they were fleeing from "bondage and destitution" in the South. 
"But if gradual emancipation and deportation be adopted, they 
will have neither to flee from." They will be able to remain in 
the South, working for wages under their old masters, "till new 
homes can be found for them in congenial climes and with people 
of their own blood and race."^'* 

Both Lincoln and members of his administration appear to 
have had additional motives for pressing colonization, some clearly 
stated and others rather carefully concealed. Many saw coloni- 
zation as an excellent excuse for the United States to expand her 
territorial dominions, as part of the developing doctrine of Mani- 
fest Destiny. At the same time, Lincoln seems to have regarded 
Negro deportation as one possible solution to the free white labor 
problem. At any rate, he combined the motives of territorial ac- 
quisition and Negro colonization when, in his 1861 Alessage to 
Congress he touched on the problem of acquiring territory for the 
Negro. He remarked that "having practiced the acquisition of 
territory for nearly sixty years, the question of constitutional power 
is no longer an open one with us." Whether by this comment 
Lincoln had in mind ceding the purchased territory to the colo- 
nizers, or whether he intended to establish the Negro territory as 
a protectorate of the United States, is not clear. Either way, terri- 
torial purchase in Haiti or Central America would be jusified since 
"the emigration of colored men leaves additional room for white 
men remaining or coming here." Colonization, as Lincoln saw it, 
would not materially weaken the labor market in the United States. 
Rather, his argument ran. 

23 Sandburg, Lincoln: The War Years, I, 574; Cong. Globe, 37 Cong., 
2 Sess., Appendix, 98 (April 11, 1862) ; ihid., Pt. 2, 1604-1605 (April 10, 

24 James D. Richardson (comp.), A Compilation of the Messages and 
Papers of the Presidents, 10 vols., Washington, 1890-99, VII, 3342. 


With deportation . . . enhanced wages to white labor is [j/V] mathematically 
certain. Labor is like any other commodity in the market — increase the 
demand for it and you increase the price of it. Reduce the supply of 
black labor by colonizing the black laborer out of the country, and by 
precisely so much you increase the demand for and wages of white labor. 25 

Thus, Negro deportation would kill two fat birds with one neat 
stone: the status of the white laboring force in the United States 
would be measurably raised and at the same time we might ac- 
quire a useful addition to our territorial holdings. 

Lincoln's comments on the labor problem, on the socio-eco- 
nomic advantages of colonization, and on territorial acquisition tor 
colonization as a tempting corollary of Manifest Destiny, are, un- 
fortunately, rather fragmentary. But these less-than-aitruistic mo- 
tives, which the President seems to have masked with more or less 
effectiveness, received frank discussion in the halls of Congress. 
The members of the House Committee on Emancipation and Col- 
onization argued that in losing the black labor supply we wouldn't 
be sacrificing anything of great value. The Negro, these gentle- 
men seemed convinced, will generally do one-fifth the work of 
a white man: "Of the four or five millions of colored people 
now in the United States the net of their productive and unen- 
cumbered labor may be reduced, when subjected to the standard 
of numbers, to probably one- fifth of that amount." This loss of 
five-million-workers-divided-by-five would leave a very desirable 
labor-vacuum, the committee felt, which would quickly be filled up 
with immigrants from the over-crowded fields of Europe.-^ 

Now, this was only one of the many advantages which would 
accrue to the United States if Negro colonization were vigorously 
prosecuted. Not only would colonization produce only a negligible 
reduction in the available labor force, but in addition the country 
would actually increase in wealth. Even a superficial observer 
cannot (so the House committee's argument ran) fail to notice the 

25 Lincoln's First Annual Message to Congress, December 3, 1861, in 
Nicolay and Hay (eds.), Lincoln: Works, II, 50-51; The African Reposi- 
tory, XXXVII (December, 1861), 375. That Lincoln was actively pursu- 
ing the goal of territorial acquisition seems clear by implication in a 
letter from Caleb Smith to Lincoln, May 16, 1862. "Tlie constitution 
of New Granada," said Smith, "expressly prohibits the government . . . 
from transferring to any foreign power any part of their territory. ... It 
is not probable that the right of sovereignty can be obtained OA'er any 
of the places in which colonization has been proposed." A Report from 
the Department of the Interior on the Transportation, Settlement, and 
Colonization of Persons of the Afncan Race, 39 Cong., 1 Sess., Sen. 
Exec. Doc. No. 55, 10 (June 15, 1866). 

26 House Report on Eonancipation and Colonization, 16-17. 


differing levels of prosperity in, for instance, Kentucky and Ohio. 
They are adjacent states, both lying in the magnificent and fruit- 
ful Ohio Valley. Moreover, the area of the two states is very 
nearly equal. One would therefore assume that Ohio and Ken- 
tucky would be equally prosperous, equally well populated. But 
the committee emphasized that such was not the case. "Ohio now 
contains 2,339,599 and Kentucky only 1,155,713 [persons}." This 
unfortunate disparity, they concluded, could only be explained by 
the presence of a large Negro population. The committee reas- 

If a similar comparison of the progress of any one of the old free States 
with any one of the old slave States be instituted, as New York with Vir- 
ginia, or Massachusetts with South Carolina, it will be seen that while the 
slave States enjoy a superiority in almost all the natural advantages of soil, 
climate, mineral and forest products, the free States have by their system 
of free labor wrought out for themselves a superiority in almost every- 
thing that can tend to elevate a State or community in the scale of progres- 
sive civilization. 

Even on a more narrow geographical scale this rule held true. The 
committee suggested a comparison between the northern and 
southern counties of Delaware. The northern counties, with their 
negligible slave population, had far outstripped the southern, where 
slave labor was extensively developed. In a word, the whole 
tenor of the House Report suggested that deportation of the Negro 
population might well be the magic panacea for all the economic 
ills of the backward states of the Union. "^ 

The siren song of Manifest Destiny and imperialistic ambition 
runs with a bold frankness through the next argument for colo- 
nization which the House Report presented. The committee noted 
that "The very cornerstone of [British] prosperity consists in her 
colonial system." Now, their argument ran, the vast territories 
of our Southern Hemisphere could be one of the most productive 
areas on the surface of the earth, if they could only be populated 
with an intelligent people adapted to the rigors of the tropics. 
The committee called attention to the fact that the European powers 
had long been conscious of the tremendous economic potential of 
this area as was evident from their many (unsuccessful) attempts 
to colonize it. The great difficulty was that the Anglo-Saxon 
tended to degenerate in equatorial regions — and yet here at our 
very feet lay the golden opportunity to develop a colonial empire 

27 Ibid. 


to exceed even that of the British in wealth and power. Was 
there no way to seize the golden apple so temptingly proffered? 
Perhaps. The House committee merely asked one to 

imagine what would be the result of planting five millions of American 
Negroes, far superior in skill and intelligence to those of Cuba, in a countr)' 
equal to the Queen of the Antilles, protected by our power and directed 
by our intelligence, and stimulated to exertion by those motives which the 
wants of civilization which they have acquired among us, have never failed 
to supply, and which are higher and more efficient than any other which 
can animate men. 

At this point the committee waxed ecstatic at the prospect: 

If we add to this the certain result of extending our power and influence, 
through their instrumentality, over the millions of people who already in- 
habit these regions, we shall be able to form some conception of the 
value to our commerce which the foundation of such a colony would confer. 

Beyond doubt, here was the way to convert black dross to black 
gold! Moreover, in furthering our ambitions the Negro would 
be merely paying off a just debt. The Negro, the committee felt, 
clearly owes what culture he possesses to the white civilization in 
which he has lived: 

They have been instructed in agriculture, and the mechanic arts; they have 
learned our language, our religion, and have become familiarized with our 
customs, which form the body of our law and science of government, by 
long contact with our people. 

Best of all, the Negro freedmen would, as colonizers, be excep- 
tionally amenable to our enlightened direction. The committee 
spoke approvingly of "their natural docility of temper and sub- 
ordination to authority; no one should doubt their capacity to 
maintain a free and independent government under the guidance 
and patronage of our republic. "^^ 

To buttress these arguments, the House Report quoted the New 
York Courier and Inquirer, which delivered the opinion that "this 
negro race must necessarily take possession of the tropical regions 
on this continent and the islands adjacent, to which they may be 
transported. They will," the article continued, "expel the whites 
by the same law of nature which has given the black exclusive 
possession of corresponding latitudes in Africa." The committee 
quoted similar sentiments from the New York Tribune: 

28 Ibid., 21-24. 


Now, it is obvious that in this great body of civilized Negroes, we have, 
if we did but know how to use them, and were willing to do so, a most 
powerful and essential instrument toward extending ourselves, as it were — 
through all the American torrid zone. 

The Tribune, with disarming frankness, went on to urge that we 
make the most of "this great instrumentality toward bringing with- 
in our grasp those vast regions upon which we have fixed such 
covetous elances."^^ 

Senator Doolittle articulated for the benefit of the Senate the 
same idea which had motivated the House Report. He envisioned 
the proposed South American colony as a "support against foreign 
intervention," and assured his colleagues that such a colony would 
"feel bound to us by interest, gratitude, and friendship forever." 
Apparently feeling that we should cede any purchased land to the 
Negro colonizers, he still was sure that the colony, "Although 
not a part of our territorial dominion, . . . will be within our com- 
mercial dominion." The fortitious consequence would be a "prac- 
tical annexation for all commercial purposes to the Government 
of the United States." The advantages of this arrangement were 
obvious: "It is," he said, "as good and better for us than if we 
should ov/n the sovereignty of the territory, and be at the expense 
and trouble of governing it."^° 

The situation during the early years of Lincoln's administration 
might then be summed up in a single sentence: the motives for 
deportation and colonization of the Negro were many and strong. 
As emancipation of some sort became inevitable, so deportation and 
colonization of the Negro began to appear inevitable, necessary, 
and imperative. The most pressing question was, was it finan- 
cially and physically possible to transport four or five millions of 
Negroes out of the country.^ Senator Doolittle, that erstwhile Wis- 
consin advocate of colonization, felt that it was. He called at- 
tention to the tremendous m.igrations from Great Britain and Ire- 
land to the shores of the United States; in the ten year period 
from 1847 to 1856, he reported, 2,800,000 persons had successfully 
crossed the "stormy Atlantic." The obvious conclusion was that 
if they could do it, so could we for the benefit of our Negro 
brethren. With Senator Hale of New Hampshire playing the 
part of Doubting Thomas, Senator Doolittle "ciphered it out" on 
the Senate blackboard. He first produced figures on the annual 

29 Ibid., 27-28. 

30 Cong. Globe, 37 Cong., 2 Sess., Appendix, 99 (April 11, 1862). 


increase in Negro population in the United States, and then at- 
tempted to establish that six steamships of a large class, or "indeed 
one single monster like the Great Eastern, carrying 12,000 passen- 
gers, could carry a number of slaves equal to the annual increase 
in no more than eight trips to Liberia, or seven times the annual 
increase to some nearer point of colonization in the Southern Hem- 
isphere of America." Assuming that wq could deport at the rate 
of 150,000 Negroes a year, a very possible figure, then, Senator 
Doolittle promised, "the last remnant of the slave population would 
be removed by 1907." If, he continued, we should deport 350,000 
slaves annually (a not impossible figure), "the removal would be 
complete by 1877." To make the point theoretically, Doolittle 
established to his own satisfaction (if not that of his auditors), 
that "one single trip of all the vessels of the United States would 
take the whole of this [present Negro] population." He asked 
if the illegal slavers, under the ban of piracy, and "moved by base 
cupidity alone," could smuggle fifty thousand slaves three thousand 
miles every year, "cannot a great nation, in the interests of free- 
dom, humanity, and the glory of all mankind, colonize annually 
forty thousand men in the best and richest countries in the world, 
lying almost at its feet?" The cost might be large, but would 
certainly be worth it. Senator Doolittle estimated $50.00 per head, 
and put himself on record as willing to appropriate $50,000,000 
to get the job done.^^ 

It was in this climate of opinion, then, that Lincoln took con- 
crete steps in the direction of mass Negro colonization. On Au- 
gust 6, 1861, Congress abolished slavery in the District of Colum- 
bia. In his first Annual Message Lincoln urged that numbers of 
these slaves, "thus liberated, are already dependent on the United 
States, and must be provided for in some way." He suggested that 
"steps be taken for colonizing [them] at some place or places con- 

si Ibid., 94-97. Senator Doolittle's estimate is probably fairly ac- 
curate. The African Repository claimed in July, 1866, that they had 
shipped a total of 11,288 slaves to Liberia; during the same period their 
receipts wei-e $2,499,531.96. If we ignoi-e overhead and roughly assume 
that receipts were approximately equal to expenditures, we arrive at an 
average cost of shipment per head of something like $216.00. Since the 
voyage to Haiti or Central America would be substantially shorter than 
that to Africa, Doolittle's figure of $50.00 probably constitutes a realistic 
estimate. Indeed, the United States Marshall for the City of New York 
estimated that the rock-bottom price for shipment to either Haiti or 
Chiriqui would be $25.00 per head, exclusive of medical expenses. 39 
Cong., 1 Sess., Sen. Exec. Doc. No. 55, 9; also see The African Repositoi-y, 
XLII (July, 1866), 222-223. 


genial to them." He thought that free Negroes, "so far as in- 
dividuals may desire," should be included in this plan.^^ 

On April 16, 1862, Congress appropriated $100,000 for com- 
pensated emancipation and colonization from the District. ^^ At 
about this same time, the State Department extended recognition 
to both Liberia and Haiti; this new law, in which both of these 
countries were specifically mentioned, probably motivated this step. 
Difficulties began to loom up on May 9, 1862, when Caleb Smith, 
Secretary of the Interior, reported that Liberia, because of "the 
unhealthiness of the climate, as well as the great distance from 
this country," would probably never develop into a major coloniza- 
tion point. At the same time he warned Lincoln that the Clayton- 
Bulwer Treaty with Great Britain might prevent the United States 
from colonizing "any part of Central America. "^^ 

On July 22, 1862, Lincoln addressed the Border-State repre- 
sentatives, speaking, in spite of unpromising prospects, of "room 
in South America for colonization [which] can be obtained cheaply 
and in abundance.""^ Shortly after this, on July 17, 1862, the Con- 
fiscation Act was signed into law; section twelve made provision 
for colonization of freed slaves in "some tropical country." ^^ To 
facilitate this measure, the day before, on July 16, $500,000 had 
been appropriated, in addition to the $100,000 already set aside, 
to be applied to the "probable passage of a confiscation bill."^'^ 
On August 14, 1862, Lincoln urged a delegation of colored free- 
men to become proselytes among their own people in the cause of 
Hispanic colonization.^^ A little over a month later, he published 
the Proclamation of Emancipation, September 22, 1862. While 
the Proclamation itself makes no reference to colonization, the 
adoption of this expedient as the logical, inevitable, and imperative 
consequence of emancipation seems to have been generally assumed. 
At least James Mitchell so interpreted it three years later, in retro- 
spect. Even if something is discounted because of Mitchell's evi- 
dent personal interest in the matter, it is interesting to note that 

32 Nicolay and Hay (eds.), Lincoln: Works, VII, 49-50. 

33 John G. Nicolay and John Hay, Abraham Lincoln: A History, 10 
vols., New York, 1890, V, 216-217; Report on Colonization and Emancipa- 
tion, Made to the Secretary of the Interior, by the Agent of Emigration, 
Emigration Office of the United States, Washington, 1862, 5. 

34 39 Cong., 1 Sess., Sen. Exec. Doc. No. 55, 78 (June 15, 1866). 

35 Nicolay and Hay (eds.), Lincoln: Works, VII, 272. 

36 Mitchell, Brief on Emigration and Colonization, 1-2. 

37 Nicolay and Hay, Lincoln: A History, VI, 356-357. 

38 Sandburg, Lincoln: The War Years, I, 575; Nicolay and Hay 
(eds.), Lincoln: Works, VIII, 1-9. 


he considered the Proclamation "a colonization document, both as 
to words and intention." Lincoln intended the Proclamation, in- 
sisted Mitchell, to be a "colonization measure of the most solemn 
and binding character, . . . An instrument 'of Providence,' in all its 
words and terms, against which resistance will prove madness and 
folly; the same mind that designed it to be an instrument of 
emancipation designed it equally to be an instrument of colonization 
— it was intended to he so.""^"^ 

On December 1, 1862, in his second Annual Message, Lincoln 
reached the apex of his personal efforts and public utterances on 
the desirability of colonization. He proposed the ultimate step. 
Constitutional amendment, which would permit Congress to "ap- 
propriate money and otherwise provide for colonizing free colored 
persons, with their ov/n consent at any place or places without the 
United States."*" 

Behind this final fruitless attempt to g\st colonization the im- 
pressive sanction of Constitutional law was not only strong Con- 
gressional sentiment, but also a new element: pressure, in the form 
of tempting proposals, from abroad. Senator Mala of Ecuador, for 
example, offered to sell large tracts of land on the western coast 
of South America. Like most of the land speculators and sharpers 
who contacted Lincoln, he described his holdings as a veritable Gar- 
den of Eden. "The fertility of the soil," he assured the President, 
"is as great as that on the banks of the Nile. An acre will pro- 
duce 500 pounds of cotton, . . . [and] one pound of rice will pro- 
duce one hundred pounds." The Netherlands, too, inquired 
whether the "United States government will be disposed to co- 
operate ... in the transportation of free colored laborers ... to the 
Nether land colony of Surinam." Such freedmen would have to 
engage to labor on a plantation for a term, perhaps five years, after 
which they would be granted citizenship and free land of their 
own. Denmark called the attention of the American government 
to the serious labor shortage on the island of St. Croix. The Dan- 
ish terms: "free transport to St. Croix for all those who engage to 
labor on a sugar plantation for a term of three years — the emi- 
grants to . . . receive the same compensation for their labor, as the 
free rural population." No mention was made of eventual rights 

•^9 Mitchell, "Letter to James Harlan, Secretaiy of the Interior," in 
Brief on Emigration and Colonization, 1, 3. 

40 Nicolay and Hay (eds.), Lincoln: Works, VIII, 117. 


or liberties for the freedmen.^^ The Enghsh offered to take 10,000 
slaves per year for British Guiana, on terms of five year inden- 
ture. The slaves, they assured Lincoln, vv^ould be provided with 
"houses and land for gardens, rent free, [and] a hospital and doc- 
tor, under the inspection of the colonial government." They also 
suggested British Honduras, calling particular attention to the fact 
that in Honduras "foreigners can . . . become members of [the] 
colonial legislative body."^^ 

Concerning the quality of these and other colonization proposals, 
James Mitchell complained later that while 

Several persons have at sundry times offered to make contracts . . . [they 
did so} on terms which, to a great extent, ignored the true interest of the 
emigrant. . . . [A]n undue regard to personal emolument . . . and a want 
of true liberality to the man of color, have been so clearly manifested, that 
I thought it best to decline the completion of all such contracts. . . A^ 

In consequence, only two experiments even approached final reali- 
zation: these were, of course, the abortive Chiriqui and Haitian 
projects, whose story has already been adequately told. 

The collapse of the Chiriqui negotiations, and the pitiful fiasco 
in Haiti, spelled the virtual end of Lincoln's attempts to deport the 
Negro. The champions of colonization must have watched with 
deep chagrin as one project after another failed, or was still-born. 

While the disgruntled and half-starved Haiti colonists were be- 
ing shipped back to Washington, one final attempt v/as made to 
prevent, through colonization, the dreaded "amalgamation." Sen- 
ator J. H. Lane of Kansas spoke on the Senate floor February 16, 
1864. His plan: colonize the freedmen in Texas. He suggested 
that all white regiments now on the southwestern frontier be with- 
drawn, and immediately replaced by colored troops. The families 
of these colored soldiers should be transported to Texas with the 
regiments, to form the nucleus of a settlement. If this coloniza- 
tion bill should be passed, said Lane, then "I can tell the man of 
color that the hour of his deliverance from the bondage of Egypt 
has come, and that unless he removes he is doomed to sink into a 
hopeless minority in the older states for all coming time." Lane 
saw no difficulty in financing this Texas venture; the $600,000 

41 Report on Colonization and Emigration, Made to the Secretary 
of the Interior, 9, 16-17, 26. 

42 39 Cong., 1 Sess., Sen. Exec. Doc. No. 55, 8 (June 15, 1866) ; Re- 
port on Colonization and Emigration, Made to the Secretary of the In- 
terior, 18-19. 

43 Mitchell, Brief on Emigration and Colonization, 13. 


already appropriated for tropical colonization should simply be 
diverted to this new plan. The area which he had in mind was 

bounded upon the south by the Gulf of Mexico, on the east by the Colorado 
River, on the west by the Rio Grande, on the north by almost impassable 
mountains, securing [the freedmen} from the inroads of Indians. ... In 
respect to location, no territory on the face of the globe is more desirable 
for the habitation of the black man. 

He concluded with the warning that the Negro could never remain 
in the South and be happy. 

The nation should make a reasonable effort to secure for the millions of 
freed men proper homes in a habitable and desirable country on our south- 
western border, where climate and country will be congenial to the wants 
of our people of color, and where, by acquiring an undisputed title to the 
sod, and an independent local organization, they may enjoy the privileges 
of republican civilization, and there concentrate their whole strength for 
mutual improvement. 4 4 

Senator Lane's eloquence, however, came too late; by this date the 
administration was, apparently, heartily sick of the whole coloniza- 
tion issue. The Texas colony never got beyond the talking stage. 
The climate of opinion had, by 1864, changed materially, and the 
Negro was finding at least a temporary niche in the many work- 
gangs needed for reconstruction and national expansion. 

The motives and interests behind colonization, then, were far 
more complex than Lincoln's scanty utterances on the subject might 
lead us to believe. In many cases, the surface altruism masked a 
pervasive and various self-interest. It would, of course, be pre- 
sumptuous to assign such motives to Lincoln where no proof exists. 
Nonetheless, an objective evaluation of his stand on the coloniza- 
tion issue cannot safely be made without a close scrutiny of the 
background against which he moved to solve, if he could, the 
"Negro problem." 

Robert H. Zoellner 

Colorado State University 
Fort Collins 

44 James Henry Lane, Vindication of the Policy of the Administra- 
tion: Speech of Hoji. J. H. Lane, of Kansas, in the Senate of the United 
States, February 16, 186i, on the Special Order, Being Senate Bill No. 
A5, to Set Apart a Portion of the State of Texas for the Use of Persons 
of African Descent, Washington, 1864, 6, 10, 13, 14-15. 

Economic Aspects of German 

Intervention in the Spanish 

Civil War, 1936-1939 

Some twenty years ago, on March 28, 1939, one of the bloodiest 
civil wars in Spanish history came to an end. Although most of 
the issues raised by the war have long since died out, there are 
still several questions which merit discussion. One of these is the 
problem of German intervention in the struggle. 

Regarding the fact of intervention there is, of course, no dis- 
pute. Nazi participation in the crisis was evident to many obser- 
vers from the very first weeks of the conflict.^ But the reasons for 
this participation were not equally clear. Why, precisely, did Hitler 
decide to intervene on the side of Franco during the war '^ Scholarly 
opinion is still divided on the question, and this very lack of unan- 
imity makes a reappraisal of the evidence all the more important. 
For on the answer to that question depends in large measure an 
accurate understanding of Hispano-German relations during the war 
as well as in the critical period following the outbreak of World 
War II. 

Most historians favor the view that military and political con- 
siderations v/ere primarily responsible for German intervention in 
Spain. A glance at the map of Europe explains why this is so. 
Situated as it is at the gateway to the Mediterranean, with its 
southern extremity pointed towards Africa and its western seaboard 
flanking the Atlantic at four strategic points, Spain was in an ex- 
cellent geographical position to serve as a base of operations for 

1 As early as July 28, 1936, just eleven days after the beginning' of 
hostilities, German planes appeared in Morocco to assist in transporting 
rebel (Nationalist) troops across the Strait of Gibraltar to the mainland. 
Two days later, on July 30, the first of numerous shipments of men and 
materiel left Germany for the Iberian Peninsula. This active military aid, 
which characterized much of the war, clearly indicated that the German 
Government was taking more than a passing interest in the outcome of 
the conflict. Ludwig Lore, "Intervention in Spain," Current History, Vol. 
XLV (November, 1936), 42; A. Ramos Oliveira, Politics, Economics and 
Men of Modern Spain 1808-1946, London, 1946, 588-589; Claude G. Bowers, 
My Mission to Spain, Watching the Rehearsal for World War II, New 
York, 1954, 259, 272. For a refutation of Bowers' charge that Germany 
and Italy were using the war as a means of establishing a Fascist state 
in Spain, see Salvador de Madariaga, Spain, A Modern History, New 
York, 1958, 481-482, and George Orwell, Hotnage to Catalonia, Boston, 
1952, 48. 



Germany in the event of a general European conflagration. Con- 
trol of the Spanish ports of El Ferrol, Vigo, and Corufia in the 
north, of the Canary Islands in the south, and of the Balearic Is- 
lands in the east would enable German sea and air forces to close 
the Mediterranean to enemiy commerce and to sever the important 
lines of communication between England and France and their 
colonial empires in Africa and the Far East. Gibraltar could be 
rendered doubly ineffective through a series of fortifications along 
the coast of Spanish Morocco and in the neighborhood of Alge- 
ciras on the European mainland, while control of the southern ap- 
proaches to the Pyrenees would effect the encirclement of France 
towards which Hitler was striving.^ There was solid reason for 
believing that a Franco victory would make such control a reality. 
A triumphant Nationalist government could hardly refuse to grant 
some concessions in return for the military aid which the rebels 
had received. Moreover, the Spanish battleground provided an 
excellent military laboratory for testing the effectiveness of new 
weapons and battle techniques under actual combat conditions. The 
result of such experimentation would be extremely useful to the 
Nazi High Command in the formulation of future military strategy.^ 

2 Arnold J. Toynbee (ed.), S^irvey of hiternatioyial Affairs 1937, 2 
vols. London, 1938, Vol. II, The International Repercussions of the War in 
Spain {1936-1937), 131-132, hereafter cited as Toynbee, Survey of Inter- 
national Affairs 1937, Vol. II; Sir Robert Hodgson, Spain Resurgent, 
London, 1953, C3 ; William E. Dodd, Jr. and Martha Dodd (eds.), Am- 
bassador Dodd's Diary, 1933-1938, New York, 1940, 363-364; United States 
Department of State, Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918-194-5, 
Series D, 4 vols., Washington, 1950, Vol. Ill, Germany and the Spariish 
Civil War 1936-1939, 762— 7G3, hereafter cited as Doc^iments on German 
Foreign Policy, Ser. D., Vol. III. 

3 While testifying before the International Military Tribunal in March, 
1946, Herman Goring, former Nasi Minister of Air, explained Germany's 
role in Spain as follows: "When the Civil War broke out in Spain, Franco 
sent a call for help to Germany and asked for support, particularly in 
the air. . . . The Fiihrer thought the matter over. I urged him to give 
support under all circumstances, firstly, in order to prevent the further 
spread of Communism in that theatre and, secondly, to test my young 
Luftwaffe at this opportunity in this or that technical respect. With the 
pennission of the Fiihrer, I sent a large part of my transport fleet and a 
number of experimental fighter units, bombers and anti-aircraft guns; 
and in that way I had an opportunity to ascertain, under combat condi- 
tions, whether the material was equal to the task. In order that the per- 
sonnel, too, might gather a certain amount of experience, I saw to it 
that there was a continuous flow, that is, that new people were con- 
stantly being sent and others recalled." International Military Tribunal, 
Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Militari/ Tri- 
bunal, 37 vols., Nuremberg, 1947-1949, Vol. IX, 280-281. For further evi- 
dence on this point see Documents on German Foreign Policy, Ser. D, 
Vol. Ill, 86, and Malcolm Muggeridge (ed.), Ciano's Diplomatic Papers, 
London, 1948, 80-81. 


Furthermore, by aiding Franco, Hitler would be striking a telling 
blow against Communist influence in the West,'' while at the same 
time strengthening the bonds of friendship with Mussolini.^ 

All of these considerations undoubtedly played a part in the 
formation of German policy during the war. But they fail to take 
into account one of the basic reasons for Hitler's support of the 
Nationalist cause, namely, the possibility of securing economic con- 
trol of the Iberian Peninsula by exploiting Franco's need for mili- 
tary aid and equipment. 

To understand the plausibility of the foregoing assertion, it is 
necessary to review briefly the economic situation in Germany on 
the eve of the Spanish Civil War. In 1936 the Third Reich was 
engaged in the development of a formidable military machine that 
was rapidly exhausting the domestic supplies of raw materials and 
threatening to defeat the whole rearmament program as well as the 
Nazi dreams of conquest and empire.^ The attempt at self-suf- 
ficiency through the use of ersatz materials was proving a dismal 
failure instead of the hoped-for success. To add to the gravity 
of the situation, imports of essential French minerals v/ere declining, 
while British competition in the Swedish ore market was increas- 
ing."^ In the face of such developments the economic potentialities 
of the Iberian area took on a new significance. Spain was a country 
rich in strategic resources, notably coal, iron, copper, potash, and 
lead. Valuable deposits of zinc, mercury, sulphur, silver, and 

4 During the diplomatic conversations held in Munich in September, 
1938, Hitler assured Neville Chamberlain, the British Prime Minister, that 
opposition to Communism was the sole reason for Nazi intervention in 
Spain. Dociiinents on Gerinan Foreign Policy, Ser. D, Vol. IV, The After- 
math of Muyiich, October 1938-March 1939, Washington, 1951, 289, 475. 
For a similar statement by Von Ribbentrop to the French Foreign Minis- 
ter, Bonnet, see ibid., 475. 

5 See Hitler's statement to the Italian Foreign Minister, Count Ciano, 
in October, 1936, in Muggeridge, Ciano's Diplomatic Papers, 57. For 
French and Russian opinion regarding Germany's efforts to use the vv^ar 
as a means of strengthening her ties with Italy and of disrupting friendly 
relations between Italy and the Soviet Union see Department of State, 
Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1936, Vol. II, 
Europe, Washington, 1954, 502-503, and Jane Degras (ed.), Soviet 
Documents on Foreign Policy, 3 vols., London, 1953, Vol. Ill, 215. 

6 In a memorandum of March 9, 1936 Hjalmar Schacht, the Reich 
Minister of Economics, advised Hitler that new ways of importing raw 
materials with which to meet the needs of the rapidly expanding German 
army would have to be found. "In particular," Schacht warned, "we 
cannot do without the necessary quantities of metals required by the Wer- 
macht for current procurements." Office of the United States Chief of 
Counsel for the Prosecution of Axis Criminality, Nazi Conspiracy and 
Aggression, 8 vols., Washington, 1946, Vol. Ill, 873. 

7 New York Times, December 25, 1936, 17. 


manganese v/ere also being mined in certain localities, principally 
in Castile, Granada, Catalonia, and Andalusia.^ More important 
still, most of these mining areas were in the hands of the insur- 
gents. The circumstances were thus tailor-made for providing Ger- 
many with an entering wedge into the economic life of the Penin- 
sula. Hitler needed raw materials; Franco needed guns and sup- 
plies. Why not institute a quid pro quo arrangement which would 
be mutually beneficial to both parties.'* Once German business 
had secured a foothold in Spain the process leading to consolida- 
tion and control could gradually be extended. Were Franco to 
object to the expansion of German interests later on, the threat of 
withdrawing the military aid would conceivably serve to keep him 
in line. In this way the Spanish war could function as a stepping 
stone to the attainment of Nazi hegemony in Europe. 

Professional opinion, it must be admitted, is divided on the 
accuracy of this interpretation. Some historians and political ob- 
servers suppport it; others ignore the economic factor altogether 
when treating of the subject, while still others relegate it to a 
secondary position. Thus Frederick L. Schuman stated bluntly: 
"Economic interests were subordinated to the military calculus, as 
in every militaristic regime."^ Carlton J. H. Hayes voiced a simi- 
lar opinion when he observed: "Germany and Italy had no predi- 
lection for Franco, and their primary purpose in helping him was 
to tip the European balance of power in their favor. "-^^ Arnold 
Toynbee, on the other hand, in comparing some of the German 
and Italian motives for participating in the war, noted that "Ger- 
many, being a more highly developed industrial country than Italy, 
had a more lively interest in securing the economic co?nmand over 
Spanish raw materials and Spanish markets."-^-^ Similarly, M. Yvon 
Delbos, the French Foreign Minister in the Blum cabinet of 1936- 
1937, reportedly believed that "Spanish iron, copper, lead and 
manganese, rather than the pursuit of glory or the desire to fos- 
ter a new Fascist State, was the motive behind the German vol- 
unteer enlistments," as well as the reason for Nazi support of the 
Nationalist Government. ^^ 

8 Ibid., July 4, 1937, Section 4, 5. 

9 Frederick L. Schuman, Europe on the Eve, New York, 1939, 266. 
See also Koppel S. Pinson, Modern Germany, New York, 1959, 520. 

10 Carlton J. H. Hayes, The United States and Spaiti: An Interpre- 
tation, New York, 1951, 126. 

11 Toynbee, Survey of International Affairs 1937, Vol. II, 186, italics 
added; Hodgson, Spain Resurgent, 69. 

12 New York Times, December 27, 1936, Section 1, 27. 


Russian opinion seconded that of Delbos. Better than most 
others, the Russians v/ere aware of the true purpose of Germany's 
intervention in the Spanish crisis. It was to gain control of the 
iron and copper ore in which the Peninsula was so rich. The Ver- 
sailles Treaty had deprived Germany of her important mineral 
deposits in Silesia and Lorraine, and without them the Reich's 
gigantic industrial machine was "like an automobile without gaso- 
line. "^^ As Maxim Litvinov, the Soviet Commissar of Foreign 
Affairs, put it when referring to the reasons for Fascist aggression 
in Spain during a speech before the Eighteenth Assembly of the 
League of Nations on September 21, 1937: 

... we then learn, what we could never find in a single encyclopedia, that 
anti-Communism has also a geological meaning and signifies a yearning 
for tin, zinc, mercury, copper, and other minerals. When this explanation, 
too, proves insufficient, anti-Communism is then explained to be a thirst 
for profitable trade. We are told such trade may be lost if Spain becomes 
tinted with red. 14 

Nazi officials themselves admitted Germany's dependence on 
Spanish ores and confessed that the economic prosperity or ruin of 
the Third Reich was contingent upon the victory or defeat of the 
Franco forces. -^^ In a speech delivered at the closing of the Na- 
tional Socialist Congress held in Nuremberg on September 13, 1937, 
Hitler revealed the underlying reasons for German opposition to 
Communism in Spain. After pointing out the effect which Rus- 
sian expansion into western Europe would have on the balance of 
power, Der Fiihrer continued: 

Of no less importance is the circumstance that a shift of power toward 
bolshevism would be identical with an economic development that might 
have catastrophic results in our closely knit European community of States. 
The first visible result of every bolshevist revolution is not an enhancement 
of production but the total destruction of prevailing economic values and 
economic functions in the country affected. ^^ 

The economic fate of Spain under Communist domination might 
fail to worry England, Hitler remarked, because England could 

13 Ibid., March 20, 1937, 11. 

14 Degras, Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy, Vol. Ill, 258. 

15 New York Times, December 27, 1936, Section 1, 27. German im- 
ports of Spanish pig iron, for instance, rose from 310,540 tons in 1937 
to 1,000,000 tons in 1938. Editorial in The Living Age, Vol. CCCLVI 
(April, 1939), 104. 

16 Adolf Hitler, My New Order. Edited with commentary by Raoul 
de Roussy de Sales, New York, 1941, 426. 


easily shift her trade from one nation to another and from one 
continent to another. But for a country hke Germany, which was 
dependent upon inter-European commerce, such a prospect would 
prove disastrous. Were Spain to fall under Russian control, then 
the tidal wave of Communism might easily sweep across the 
Pyrenees and engulf France, Holland, and Belgium. Such a 
development would spell economic ruin for Germany, Hitler argued, 
because the Reich was dependent upon reciprocal trade relations 
with those areas. ^^ The economic welfare of the German State 
was thus a major factor in prompting the German Government to 
intervene actively in Spain. This conclusion is supported by evi- 
dence contained in the official archives of the German Foreign 
Ministry in Berlin. An examination of this evidence shows that 
from the very outset of the war the Hitler Government took ad- 
vantage of the rebels' need of military assistance to gain an eco- 
nomic foothold in the Peninsula. 

Within a few days after the outbreak of the Moroccan revolt. 
General Franco commissioned Johannes Bernhardt, a German busi- 
nessman living in Morocco, and Adolf Langenheim, one of the 
local Nazi officials, to fly to Berlin for the purpose of securing 
military aid.^^ The appeal met with favor and resulted in the 
establishment of a German business house in Seville under the 
title of Hisma, Ltda., a Spanish contraction for Conipan/a Hispatjo- 
Marroqui de Transportes (Spanish-Moroccan Transportation Com- 
pany). By August 2, 1936 Hisnia was already actively engaged in 
providing transportation for Franco's troops from Morocco to the 
mainland, and before long its influence was making itself felt in 
many other channels of Spain's commercial and economic life. A 
companion organization to Hisma was set up in Berlin to take care 
of the German end of transactions. The company bore the im- 
posing name of Rohstoffe-und-Waren-Einkaufsgesellschaft (Com- 
pany for the Purchase of Raw Materials and Supplies) which was 
conveniently abbreviated to Rotvak. The two companies were sup- 
posedly to concentrate on handling raw materials only and not 
to include trade in other commodities. Nor were they to extend 
their activities into Spain's possessions outside of Europe. Both 

17 Ibid., A21. In a speech before the Reichstag on January 30, 1937, 
Hitler said explicitly: "GeiTnany has no interest in Spain but the culti- 
vation of those economic relations which Mr. Eden himself describes as 
so important and profitable" [i.e., the mutual exchange of industrial 
products]. Ibid., 413. 

18 Documents on German Foreign Policy, Ser. D, Vol. Ill, 1. 


Hisma and Rowak enjoyed virtual monopolies in buying and selling. 
All commercial transactions between Germany and Spain had to 
be cleared through them. Private exporters in Germany, for in- 
stance, could not make deliveries directly to buyers in Spain. Ra- 
ther they were forced to sell their goods to Rowak which in turn 
resold them to Hisfiia}^ Both organizations received a commission 
from the firms involved for handling the transfer of goods. In 
this way the Berlin Government was assured of complete control 
of the Spanish trade and could use it to apply pressure on Franco 
as circumstances dictated. 

In the course of the following year, 1937, after the successful 
establishment of several other Nazi firms in Spain, the individual 
German interests were merged into a central holding company, the 
Sociedad Financiera Industrial Ltda. (Financial Industrial Com- 
pany, Ltd.).^° It was through the agency of these three companies 
that Hitler and Goring hoped to obtain economic control of Spain. ^^ 
As Franco was to discover later on, German aid came high. 

On July 29, 1936, Langenheim, the Nazi official in charge of 
the Tetuan area in Spanish Morocco, reported to his superiors: 
"Our view of future German commercial . . . relations with Spain 
conforms fully with General Franco's desires and intentions. "^^ 
Herr Bernhardt, the administrative head of Hisma, summed up 
the essence of this German vievv^ in a confidential report to the Ger- 
man Embassy in Spain. He said in part: 

The objective of our economic interest in Spain must be the deep 
penetration into the main sources of Spanish wealth, namely, agriculture and 
mining. Whereas the products of agriculture fall to the share of the 
German Reich more or less without effort, since the Spaniards are forced 
to find a market, the mining problem is of tremendous importance in 
ever)' respect. 2 3 

In the beginning, however, the Nazis proceeded cautiously with 
putting their plans into effect. Hisrna concerned itself for the time 

19 Secret Minute by Hermann Sabath, an official of the German 
Economic Policy Department, Berlin, October 16, 1936, Documents on Ger- 
man Foreign Policy, Ser. D, Vol. Ill, 113-114; Memorandum by Felix 
Benzler, Deputy Director of the same Department, Berlin, February 23, 
1937, ibid., 245. 

20 Secret Minute by Sabath, Berlin, October 16, 1936, ibid., 113. 

21 As Commissioner of the Four Year Plan Goring had charge of 
foreign as well as domestic economic affairs. 

22 Telegram from the Consulate at Tetuan to the Foreign Ministry, 
Tangier, July 29, 1936, Documents on German Foreign Policy, Ser. D, 
Vol. Ill, 16. 

23 Confidential Memorandum of the German Embassy in Spain, 
Burgos, November 4, 1937, ibid., 501. 


being principally with expediting the flow of military supplies from 
Germany to General Franco's troops. ^^ Special care was taken not 
to arouse the suspicions of the Spaniards as to German intentions 
by avoiding everything that would invest the military aid programx 
with an air of more than ordinary business enterprise. The fol- 
lowing incident is typical of this cautious attitude. In a report 
dated September 8, 1936, Herr Messerschmidt, the German repre- 
sentative in Spain of the Export Cartel for War Materiel, suggested 
to Huene, the German Minister in Portugal, that the moment was 
propitious for taking advantage of the pressure under which Franco 
was laboring to procure "pledges from him with respect to our 
future economic and perhaps even political influence.""'^ Messer- 
schmidt contemplated a treaty between Germany and Spain which 
would guarantee the delivery of certain specified raw materials to 
Germany "for a number of years," and which would also stipu- 
late the amount of manufactured goods which Spain would have 
to buy from the Reich. ^^ Although Messerschmidt was confident 
that Franco would agree to such a treaty, all drafts and copies of 
the report, together with other pertinent papers, were called in by 
the German Intelligence at Berlin and consigned to "an especially 
secret category. "^'^ The report may have had some influence in 
the formulation of later Nazi policy, but there is no evidence that 
it was acted upon at that time. 

In spite of the German Government's desire to avoid publicity 
in regard to its economic machinations in Spain, disturbing rumors 
and reports began to appear relative to Hitler's long-range eco- 
nomic aims in the Civil War. The columns of the Deutsche In- 
jormationem, a weekly news bulletin of the German Social Demo- 
crats in Paris, reflected the growing opinion. According to the 
editors of this service, the German Government planned to reim- 
burse itself for the millions of dollars' worth of military aid which 
it was furnishing General Franco by laying claim to Spain's iron, 
copper, and quicksilver mines. Furthermore, the "trained soldiers 

24 "After the steamships A'amerun and Wigbert [German steamers 
carrying war materiel] arrived in Lisbon, the material was sent on most 
smoothly through the agency of Herr Bernhardt (Hisma)." Secret tele- 
gram from Du Moulin, charge d'affaires in Portugal, to the Foreign Min- 
istry in Berlin, Lisbon, August 22, 1936, ibid., 53. 

25 Messerschmidt to Huene, Lisbon, September 8, 1936, ibid., 88. 

26 Ibid. 

27 Secret communication from the War Ministry to the Foreign Min- 
istry, Berlin, September 21, 1936, ibid., 91; Instructions from the Political 
Division in Berlin to the Minister in Portugal, Berlin, October 3, 1936, 
ibid., 104. 


Germany has sent to Spain are to be employed not merely as 
military instructors . . . but after, as Hitler hopes, they have helped 
Franco to victory, they are to carry out in the technical and economic 
field the plans of German industry, and convert Spain into a Ger- 
man colony."^^ In like manner a correspondent of the London 
Times wrote under date of January 8, 1937: "It has been no secret 
that the Germans were pushing their economic penetration into 
Spanish Morocco behind the smoke screen of the Spanish civil 
war.""^ German experts were actively engaged in reorganizing the 
lead mines near Melilla and the more important iron mines in the 
Riff territory. Most of the production of these mines was allegedly 
going to Germany through arrangements with the Tetuan branch 
of the Hisma corporation.'^*^ Large quantities of hematite ores 
mined in the Melilla sector were also finding their way to the 
factories of the Third Reich. ^^ 

Hitler, however, had no intention of waiting until the end of 
the war before expanding his economic beachhead in the Iberian 
Peninsula. In reviewing the extent of German economic activity 
in Spain since the start of the war. Sir Percival Phillips, a special 
correspondent for the conservative London Daily Telegraph, wrote 
from Gibraltar in February, 1937: "Hisma ... has broadened its 
activities to include all kinds of import and export business which, 
before the revolution, was shared by the European markets."^" The 
coastal shipping trade which had formerly been a virtual monopoly 
of three Spanish companies, the Solanazar Company of Malaga, 
Ybarra and Co. of Seville, and the Transmediterranea of Madrid, 
had already passed over into German hands on the grounds that 
German vessels were less subject to blockade hazards than were 
the Spanish ships. German firms were also profitably engaged in 
trading in other commodities such as olive oil, wood pulp, wool, 
cork, and iron ore, and were thus successfully tightening their grip 
on the Spanish markets. ^^ The work of economic consolidation 
was evidently under way. 

Even though Hisma-Rowak were enjoying "undeniable success" 
in their task of funneling essential raw materials into German chan- 
nels and giMmg the Reich a predominance over all other foreign 

28 Quoted in The Living Age, Vol. CCCLI (January, 1937), 380. 

29 Quoted in the Neiv York Times, January 12, 1937, 4. 

30 Ihid. 

31 Ibid., January 17, 1937, Section 4, 4. 

32 Quoted in The Living Age, Vol. CCCLI (February, 1937), 474. 

33 Ibid., 473-474. 


competitors in the Spanish market,^* the arrangement was not popu- 
lar with either German or Spanish private firms. They protested 
against "excessive commissions," "unjustified claims for commis- 
sions," and the monopolistic position of Hisma-Roivak, and agitated 
for a trade clearing agreement between Germany and Spain which 
would allov/ private interests to carry on normal commercial re- 
lations independently of Hisma-Roivak}^ Government officials 
objected that the opening up of many small avenues of trade with 
Spain would jeopardize the chances of obtaining essential food- 
stuffs and raw materials and consequently would be detrimental 
to the interests of the Reich. The attitude of General Franco and 
of the Nationalist Government subsequently proved to be the de- 
ciding factor in the controversy. Since both the General and the 
members of the Government favored a clearing agreement, the 
Germans were forced to back down on the issue and to adopt a 
limited clearing arrangement.'^^ The limitations, however, appar- 
ently did not deprive His77ia-Rou>ak of their monopoly in the hand- 
ling of essential foods and raw materials.""^ 

In accordance with the Reich's pressing need for raw materials, 
especially minerals, Hisma-Roivak devoted much of their time and 
energy to the problem of obtaining vital mineral concessions from 
the Spanish Nationalist Government.^^ In a secret protocol signed 

•^4 Memorandum by Benzler, Berlin, February 23, 1937, Documents 
on German Foreign Policy, Ser. D, Vol. Ill, 245. 

■^5 Telegram from Ritter, Director of the Economic Policy Depart- 
ment, to the Embassy in Spain, Berlin, May 13, 1937, ibid., 288; Confi- 
dential minutes of an official conference with Goring by Ritter, Berlin, 
March 17, 1937, ibid., 253; Report by Eberhard von Stohrer, German Am- 
bassador to Spain, on Gcmian-Spanish commercial relations, Salamanca, 
November 27, 1937, ibid., 513 ; Memorandum by Benzler, Berlin, February 
23, 1937, ibid., 246. 

36 Telegram from Ritter to the German Embassy in Spain, Berlin, 
May 13, 1937, ibid., 287; Ritter to the same Embassy, Berlin, May 26, 
1937, ibid., 296. 

37 Telegram from Faupel, Ambassador in Spain, to the Foreign Min- 
istry in Berlin, Salamanca, May 21, 1937, ihid., 293 ; Ritter to the Ger- 
man Embassy in Spain, Berlin, May 13, 1937, ihid., 287. 

•"S These efforts were proximately motivated by a change in the of- 
ficial attitude of the British Government vis-a-vis the Spanish situation, a 
change which was in itself the result of economic considerations. Prior 
to the capture of Bilbao by the Nationalists on June 19, 1937, the British 
had enjoyed extensive trading privileges in that region, with imports of 
iron ore from the area averaging as much as 100,000 tons per month. 
The prospect of losing this trade to the Germans caused the London 
Government to assume a softer attitude with respect to Franco and to 
institute proceedings aimed at securing an early armistice in Spain. When 
these negotiations broke down, London announced, in an informal fash- 
ion, its willingness to recognize the Franco regime as a belligerent 
power provided a British consul would be permitted to reside in Bilbao in 


at Burgos on July 16, 1937, the Berlin Government declared that 
it was willing to "cooperate in the economic reconstruction of Spain, 
particularly in opening up and utilizing the mineral resources and 
other raw materials in Spanish sovereign territory, including the 
Spanish protectorate of Morocco," and proposed to supply the 
equipment and technical personnel necessary for such an undertak- 
ing. The Nationalist Government, for its part, agreed to 

facilitate as far as possible the establishment of Spanish companies for the 
opening up and economic utilization of mineral resources and other raw 
materials and for other economic purposes serving the general welfare, under 
participation of German citizens or German firms, as compatible with the 
general stipulation of Spanish law. 3 9 

Although the provisions of the Protocol in no way gave the 
German Government a free hand in extending its control over 
Spanish mines, Hisma seems to have engaged in an all-out effort 
to achieve that end. It initiated a special project called the Montana 
project to coordinate all activities directed towards gaining controll- 
ing interests in the principal Spanish mining companies. '''^ The 
Nationalist Government, however, viewed the proceedings with 
distinct disfavor. By a decree issued from Burgos on October 9, 
1937, Franco suspended all acts involving the disposition of min- 
ing property as well as "the purchase, sale, or transfer of shares 
in mining companies or leases," invalidated all titles to any such 
property which had been acquired since the beginning of the 
war, and dissolved all acts contrary to the provisions of the de- 
cree.^ -^ 

The decree was an abrupt setback for German aspirations, 
and one which the Berlin Government was loath to accept. Hisma 
immediately voiced its dissatisfaction with the Spanish stand on 
the question and insisted on absolute equality for German business 
in the exploitation of the mineral wealth of the country. The 
Spanish Government replied that such equality was impossible in 

order to protect Britain's commercial interests there. Franco responded to 
these overtures by ordering his propagandists not to publish anything 
which was hostile to Great Britain; Faupel to the Foreign Ministry in 
Berlin, Salamanca, May 23, 1937, ibid., 294; Von Neurath to the Ger- 
man Embassy in London, Berlin, July 1, 1937, ibid., 387-389; Faupel to the 
Foreign Ministry in Berlin, Salamanca, July 9, 1937, ibid., 407-408. 

39 Text of the Burgos Protocol of July 16, 1937, ibid., 421-422. 

40 Sabath to the Embassy in Spain, Berlin, November 27, 1937, ibid., 
511-512; Memorandum on the Montana project, Salamanca, January 26, 
1938, ibid., 569-571. 

41 Spanish Decree of October 9, 1937 on Mining Concessions, ibid., 


view of the existing laws which permitted no more than twenty- 
five to thirty percent participation by foreign concerns in the devel- 
opment of Spanish mines. Although General Jordana, the spokes- 
man for the Nationalist Government, assured the representatives 
of His7na that the Franco decree of October 9 had not been directed 
specifically against Germany, he nevertheless insisted that since the 
decree was now in effect its terms would have to be observed in 
all dealings with the Reich. In any event, the matter would have 
to be referred to General Franco himself, Jordana claimed, before 
a decision could be reached. It was clear to the German repre- 
sentatives that the "suspicious-minded" Spaniards v/ere hedging on 
the question and were trying to avoid giving a definite answer 
which would satisfy the German demands.*" 

The seriousness of the situation was emphasized by Herr Bern- 
hardt, the director of Hisma, in a confidential report to the Ger- 
man Embassy in Spain dated November 4, 1937: 

It is clear to us that the Montana project constitutes the whole aim and 
purpose of our assistance in Spain in the economic field. 

Reduced to a clear formula, it may be said that the success or failure 
of our efforts in Spanish mining will determine whether our assistance to 
Spain was successful or misplaced. ^ 3 

Bernhardt accordingly urged that all available pressure — military, 
diplomatic, and cultural — be applied in order to secure a favorable 
solution of the problem, adding that force would have to be used 
in case reasonable measures failed. Since the project was of such 
vital importance to the economic welfare of Germany, the officials 
in Berlin ought to participate actively in the matter, and the ad- 
visability of bringing Italian pressure to bear on Franco should like- 
wise be considered. The Nationalist Government in Spain must 
be made to understand that the Reich was engaged in an economic 
war which necessitated Spanish assistance in return for German 
military aid. Bernhardt suggested that a workable solution might 
be the formation of a separate Montafia-H/j'w<;7 Company under the 
name of "Araelsa & Pasch" which could be administered as a trustee- 
ship and which would function in the same capacity as the original 
Hisma. Equality of rights, however, would have to be guaranteed 

•t" Report of Wilhelm Pasch, an employee of Hisma, on the Montana 
project, Burgos, November 4, 1937, ibid., 496-498. 

4o Extract from the report by Bernhardt on the Montana project 
contained in a confidential memorandum of the German Embassy in 
Spain, Burgos, November 4, 1937, ibid., 501. 


regardless of the particular solution which might ultimately be 

Commissioner Goring' s reaction to the new development was 
typical. Considering that his "unusually great personal assistance 
to General Franco" entitled him to make whatever demands he 
deemed appropriate for ensuring the Reich's "war booty" in 
Spain, Goring bluntly advocated sending Eberhard von Jagwitz, 
Under Secretary of State in the German Economics Ministry, 
to Salamanca immediately to "hold a pistol to General Franco's 
breast."*^ More temperate counsel fortunately prevailed. As von 
Jagwitz pointed out, Franco's improved military position made him 
less dependent upon Germany than formerly, and consequently a 
too vigorous approach might lead to a complete loss of economic 
advantages in Spain. Moreover, since there were indications that 
the Nationalist Government was carrying on economic negotiations 
with the United States, Great Britain, France, and Sv/itzerland pre- 
paratory to the resumption of regular commercial relations with 
the outside world, ^^ it was imperative to move delicately in the 
matter so as not to arouse Franco's hostility. It v/as therefore de- 
cided to approach the Generalisimo once more through the instru- 
mentality of Stohrer, the German ambassador in Spain, in an ef- 
fort to secure from him definite reassurances regarding Germany's 
economic future in that country. A simple denial of rumors con- 
cerning his reported transactions with the British would not, how- 
ever, be sufficient; something more tangible would be expected, 

44 Ibid., 501-503. 

45 Memorandum by Hans Georg Mackensen, State Secretary in the 
German Foreign Ministry, Berlin, November 25, 1937, ibid., 508-510. 

46 This renewed interest in Spain followed from the recognition of 
the Franco regime by the individual countries. As noted previously, Eng- 
land was especially concerned about the Spanish mining industry, much 
of which had been in British hands at the outbreak of the Civil War. 
The Rio Tinto Copper Company was almost exclusively a British con- 
cern. It boasted a capital stock of approximately four million pounds in 
addition to stock issues of about two million pounds and reserves of one 
and a half million. During the war German pressure succeeded in di- 
verting a considerable part of the production of the Rio Tinto mines into 
German channels despite strong British opposition; Neiv York Times, 
September 19, 1937, Section 4, 5; Department of State, Foreign Relations 
of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1937, Vol. I, General, Washing- 
ton, 1955, 227; Documents on German Foreign Policy, Ser. D, Vol. Ill, 
Telegi-am from the Charge d'Affaires in Spain to the German Foreign 
Ministry, Salamanca, January 20, 1937, 230; Memorandum by Ruter, an 
official of the Economic Policy Department, Berlin, February, 4, 1937, 240- 
241; Memorandum by Sabath, Berlin, April 16, 1937, 271-272; Report 
of the Foreign Ministry to the Embassies in Spain and Great Britain and 
to the Economics Ministry, Berlin, July 22, 1937, 426-429. 


namely, the approval of German mining concessions in Spain. *^ In 
case Franco indulged in further delaying tactics, Stohrer was to re- 
mind him of the provisions of the secret protocol of July 16, 1937, 
which specifically provided for German participation in the Span- 
ish mining industry "as far as possible."'*^ 

Both the Nationalist Government and the Generalisimo ex- 
pressed the greatest concern over expediting the matter when 
Stohrer approached them on the question. But they also took pains 
at the same time to emphasize the difficulties that made it neces- 
sary to proceed slowly in arriving at an equitable judgment: the 
problem was too complex to admit of a precipitate solution, the 
Governing Council was really only a provisional government, and 
matters such as this which concerned the welfare of the entire na- 
tion ought rightly to be handled by duly elected officials; more- 
over, the protocol of July 16 had clearly stated that concessions 
had to be compatible with existing Spanish laws. Consequently, 
a complete examination of all claims involved was first necessary 
to make sure that no laws were being violated. The Spanish 
Government regretted the slow pace of the proceedings, but since 
■it lacked sufficient technical experts to study the case quickly noth- 
ing more could be expected.*^ The clever Spaniards were obviously 
giving the Germans the well-known run-around, and the Germans 
found it not to their liking. Franco was evidently trying to get 
off the Nazi hook where military necessity had put him. 

The reasons prompting the German Government to insist on 
an early settlement of the Montaiia difficulty are clear from a con- 
sideration of the official figures on mineral exports from Spain to 
Germany. During December, 1937, a record volume of 260,000 
tons of ore had been shipped to Germany. This included 205,000 
tons of iron ore, approximately 55,000 tons of pyrites, and about 
152 tons of copper, tungsten, bronze, and allied minerals. Total 
exports for the entire year reached 2,584,000 tons, which included 
1,620,000 tons of iron and 956,000 tons of pyrites. ^^ The volume 

47 Letter of Mackensen to von Stohrer, Berlin, December 3, 1937, 
ibid., 523; Memorandum by Stohrer, San Sebastian, December 21, 1937, 
ibid., 535. Some of the concessions involved ownership ranging from forty 
to one hundred percent, ibid., 537. 

48 Instruction from Emil Karl Wiehl, Director of the Economic Policy 
Department of the Foreign Ministry, to Stohrer, Berlin, December 13, 
1937, ibid., 526. 

49 Memorandum by Stohrer, Salamanca, December 16, 1937, ibid., 

50 Secret communication from Bernhardt to the Foreign Ministry in 
Berlin, Salamanca, January 21, 1938, ibid., 565-566. 


of minerals involved played too crucial a part in the development 
of the Reich's war industry to admit of lengthy delays. 

Nevertheless, delay continued to be the order of the day. The 
German representatives kept on reiterating their demands ; the Span- 
iards just as stubbornly continued to insist on the necessity of pro- 
ceeding carefully in matters which concerned legal principles and the 
disposition of the nation's patrimony. Days and weeks passed dur- 
ing which progress was at a standstill. On one occasion Jose 
Antonio de Sangroniz, Chief of Cabinet of the Spanish Nationalist 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, accused the Germans of being respon- 
sible for the stalemate because of their undue eagerness to acquire 
control of Spanish mines. ^^ The Germans replied by arguing that 
they had never intended to exploit the mines without the Spanish 
collaboration envisioned by the protocol of July 16, 1937,^^ but 
their assurances left the Spaniards doubtful. 

Negotiations over the Montana controversy dragged on un- 
changed until March 19, 1938, when Franco suddenly ordered his 
Council of Ministers to settle the problem once and for all. The 
Council thereupon decided to replace the objectionable decree of 
October 9, 1937, with a new law which would provide the legal 
status for economic relations with all foreign powers indiscriminately, 
but which would at the same time leave the door open for special 
concessions to Germany. The Nationalist Government would re- 
serve to itself the specific right of granting or refusing transfers of 
ownership in Spanish mines. Fearful lest the proposed law would 
seriously curtail the opportunities for German interests in Spain, 
Ambassador Stohrer brought renewed verbal pressure to bear in an 
effort to secure a revision of the law more in line with German de- 
sires. As a result of his insistent urgings two important changes 
were introduced into the text of the new decree: foreign concerns 
were to be permitted as much as forty percent participation in min- 
ing companies, and the Spanish Government was empowered to 
increase this share in the case of mines in which it had no official 
interest or which were not being exploited properly. This latter 

51 Memorandum of the Embassy in Spain, Salamanca, January 26, 
1938, ibid., 570. The Spanish Government, reasonably enough, feared a 
repetition of what had occurred in the case of the Rio Tinto mines when, 
in "a combination of circumstances favorable to her," Great Britain had 
practically taken the mines away from Spain. Stohrer to the Foreign 
Ministry in Berlin, Salamanca, February 17, 1938, ibid., 602. 

52 Memorandum of the Embassy in Spain, Salamanca, January 26, 
1938, ibid., 571. 

166 ■ EUGENE H. KORTH, S.J, 

provision was a direct concession to German interests, as General 
Jordana personally admitted.^ ^ 

Except for some minor objections regarding the limitations of 
foreign mining rights, the law met with the approval of both Bern- 
hardt and Stohrer since it apparently offered the Hitler Govern- 
ment the necessary loopholes for gaining legal control of mineral 
resources in the Peninsula. Stohrer noted in a report to the For- 
eign Ministry, dated June 10, 1938: 

But just as it will, of course, not be difficult for us to secure through 
dummies the 11 percent lacking for a majority of the shares whenever 
we have a special interest in a mine and the Government should not be 
inclined to make the exception provided for, so, too, it will be entirely 
possible for us, with reference to the choice of personnel, to insure German 
influence upon the commercial and particularly the technical direction. ^ 4 

In other words, Germany had substantially obtained v/hat she had 
set out to acquire from the very beginning — control of valuable 
mineral deposits in Spain — and she had obtained it with the legal 
approbation of the Franco Government. 

There was still, however, one conceivable obstacle to the com- 
plete attainment of such control. The law allowed foreign capital 
a maximum share of only forty percent in mining enterprises. This 
meant that the controlling interest represented by the remaining 
sixty percent could readily become the property of individual Span- 
ish firms. In order to prevent such a development from taking 
place, Bernhardt suggested to Suances, the Spanish Minister of In- 
dustry and Commerce, that it would be impractical to allow the 
big Spanish banking houses to secure control of the mines because 
they lacked reliable capital. The safer plan would be to permit 
Montafia to make the shares which it already owned available to 
the Government for purchase, and also to allow private Spanish 
interests to buy Montafia shares on the open market. Private par- 
ticipation in the project would have the added advantage of arous- 
ing domestic interest in the various mining companies and would 
keep them in close touch with the public. Suances agreed that the 
plan seemed feasible. Whether or not he suspected that Bern- 
hardt hoped in this way to make it possible for Spanish agents of 
Hh?na to buy up eleven or more percent of shares in the different 
companies and thus insure control of them for Hisma is not in- 

53 Memorandum by Stohrer, San Sebastian, June 6, 1938, ibid., 680. 

54 Stohrer to the Foreign Ministry in Berlin, San Sebastian, June 
10, 1938, ibid., 688. 


dicated. The chances are he did not. However that may be, the 
German authorities were prepared to have recourse to dummy 
buyers if necessary in order to evade the restrictive provisions of the 
new law.^^ 

Hisma moved immediately to take advantage of the new situa- 
tion. Five additional companies were estabhshed under Montana's 
name with the maximum forty percent foreign capital allowed by 
law.^^ Since additional capital control was desirous in four out of 
the five cases, Bernhardt advised trying to persuade the Spanish 
Government to make the necessary exceptions in a special protocol. 
If the Government refused, then the needed majority could be ac- 
quired through dummies.^^ 

Hitler's coup in Czechoslovakia gave a new twist to German- 
Spanish relations which had direct repercussions in the agitation for 
official approval of the new companies. Military aid to Spain was 
temporarily stopped, and Franco was faced with the unpleasant 
possibility of seeing the French take over the whole of Morocco in 
order to strengthen their colonial holdings against the outbreak of 
war in central Europe.^^ An actively hostile France could easily 
spell disaster for the Nationalist cause in Spain. Franco was wor- 
ried, and the Germans knew it. Here was the opportunity they 
needed to press home their demands for increased capital partici- 
pation in the newly-established mining comipanies. Future military 
aid to the Nationalists would be made contingent on Franco's com- 
pliance with German demands. This compliance included approval 
of the recently organized Mauritania S.A. Mining Company in 

55 Memorandum by Stohrer, San Sebastian, August 11, 1938, ibid., 
732. Dummy buyers were a favorite device of the Germans. They had 
used them successfully in Tanganyika and Southwest Africa after World 
War I when Gennan properties which had been in British hands during 
the war were put up for public auction; Neiv York Times, January 8, 
1939, Section 4, 5. 

56 The companies were Aralar S.A., at Tolosa, with a capital stock 
of twenty-five million pesetas; Montahas del Sur S.A., of Seville, capital 
stock of twenty million pesetas; Montes de Galicia, in Orense, capital 
stock of sixteen million pesetas; Cia. Minera Santa Tecla S.A., in Vigo, 
capital stock of twelve million pesetas; and Sierra de Gredos S.A., in 
Salamanca, capital stock of eight million pesetas; Secret report of the 
German Economics Minister to the Foreign Minister, Berlin, October 18, 
1938, Documents on German Foreign Policy, Ser. D, Vol. Ill, 7G9-771 ; 
Stohrer to the Foreign Minister, San Sebastian, November 12, 1938, ihid., 

57 Memorandum by Stohrer, San Sebastian, August 11, 1938, ibid., 

58 Secret report from Bernhardt to the German Ambassador in iSpain, 
Salamanca, September 26, 1938, ibid., 748. 


Morocco, a completely German enterprise for the exploitation of 
Spanish mines in North Africa.^ ^ 

The strategy worked. On November 19 the Spanish Foreign 
Minister informed Stohrer that the Government had decided to 
comply with all the German demands, to allow the free importa- 
tion into Spain of five million reichmarks' worth of machinery for 
use in working the mines, and to permit the export of ores to Ger- 
many for a period of five years. ^° Once again Hitler had come out 
on top, and deliveries of war materials to Spain was resumed. 

The story of German economic intervention in Spain does not 
end with this last capitulation of the Nationalist Government in 
the late autumn of 1938. Although by the close of that year the 
military strife was practically ended and the outlines of a new 
authoritarian state had begun to appear, the economic tug-of-war 
went on apace. It increased in intensity during World War II until 
it constituted one of the pivotal factors in Allied and Axis dip- 
lomacy.^-^ Hitler had won the first round of the struggle by cap- 
italizing on the military necessities of the Franco armies, and by 
dangling the alluring bait of continued assistance before the eyes 
of the insurgents in order to force them into agreements for which 
they had no taste. As long as the military situation remained 
adverse there was little the Nationalists could do but swallow their 
pride and give in to German demands. But once the prize of vic- 
tory was within reach the atmosphere changed, and the native 
Spanish skill for driving a bargain began to assert itself with in- 
creasing vigor.^^ 

5 9 Secret communique from the Economic Minister to the Foreign 
Minister, Berlin, October 18, 1938, ibid., 770; Secret report from Bernhardt 
to the Ambassador in Spain, Salamanca, November 2, 1938, ibid., 781; 
Secret report from Stolirer to the Foreign Ministry, San Sebastian, 
November 12, 1938, ibid., 78S-791. 

60 Teleg-ram from Stohrer to the Foreign Ministry, San Sebastian, 
November 19, 1938, ibid., 795-796. "Contrary to the Spanish laws, the 
Nationalist Government had agreed to 75 percent German participation in 
three companies, and 60 pei^cent in two companies. In addition, it had 
agreed that the Mauritania mining company in Tetuan be entirely re- 
leased from the provisions of Spanish law concerning capital participa- 
tion." Memorandum by Woermann, Under Secretary of State, Bez'lin, 
November 21, 1938, ibid., 802; Secret communication from the Spanish 
Foreign Ministry to the German Embassy in Spain, Burgos, December 19, 
1938, ibid., 808-809. 

61 For an excellent discussion of the important wolfram crisis see 
Carlton J. H. Hayes, Wai'tiine Mission in Spain 194.2-194.5, New York, 
1946, 194-238. 

62 An outstanding example of this bargaining skill occurred after the 
fall of France in 1940. Although Franco assured Hitler of his friendship 
and of his willingness to participate in the European war, he put such a 


A wiser man than Hitler might well have recognized in the 
character of the Spanish race the Achilles heel of all dreams of con- 
quest and power in the Iberian Peninsula. The Spanish people are 
a grateful people; they do not readily forget those who have be- 
friended them. Their innate honesty automatically prompts them 
to repay favors received with favors of their own. But they are 
also a proud and independent race who love liberty and detest the 
very thought of foreign domination and oppression. Any attempt 
at outside interference in the internal affairs of their country evokes 
a storm of popular protest and discontent. Through their insatiable 
desire to gain control of the economic resources of Spain, the Ger- 
mans thus unwittingly planted the seeds of their eventual defeat in 
the Peninsula. Spain did not become the friendly ally or benevo- 
lent neutral in World War II that Hitler hoped she would be.**^ 
Nor did the active aid which Germany received from Spain during 
the war prove very noteworthy. From a military standpoint it was 
insignificant;^^ from the economic and political standpoint it was 
overshadowed by far greater concessions to the Allies. ^^ In Spain 
as elsewhere, Nazi greed and Nazi desire for conquest overreached 
itself, and the German nation lived to pay the price. 

Eugene H. Korth, S.J. 
Marquette University 

high price tag on that participation in the form of territorial coiicoJ^,sion3 
and aid for his armies that rejection of the offer was a practical cer- 
tainty. As Carlton Hayes pointed out: "He surely knew he was asking 
a much bigger price than Hitler would pay, and yet by giving fair ivords 
to the Fiihrer he warded off action by the Germans and also by Spain, 
and the more he was subsequently pressed for aid, the higher he raised 
the price." The United States and Spain: An Interpretation, 148. 

63 This hope was strengthened when Spain joined the Axis powers 
in signing the Anti-Comintern Pact in March, 1939. 

64 "The most flagrant military contribution which Falangist Spain 
made to the cause of Fascism was the notorious Blue Division- — the 'vol- 
unteers' from Iberia who, after September of 1941, were dispatched to 
Germany and to the eastern front to fight in the 'crusade against Bol- 
shevism.' Officially sponsored by the Falange, with the public endorse- 
ment of the government and the special blessing of the Bishop of Ma- 
drid, the Blue Division's numbers reached a maximum in its first six 
months of some 17,000 or 18,000 men, and fell to a low of 3,000 to 4,000 
just prior to its final withdrawal late in 1943. The military effective- 
ness of these men was negligible. They returned to Spain not with glory 
but with Russian loot and venereal disease; only as thieves and rapists 
had they left their mark on the Russian front." Emmet John Hughes, 
Report from Spain, New York, 1947, 235. 

65 For a reliable account of Spain's difficult role in World War II 
see Hayes, Wartime Mission in Spain. 

Tarascon's Dream of an American 
Commercial Empire in the West 

In 1794, fleeing from a distraught and bleeding France, Louis 
Anastasius Tarascon arrived in Philadelphia seeking refuge in young 
America, already long a home for displaced persons/ Like other 
Frenchmen before him, notably the Huguenot refugees at the end 
of the 17th century, he was to find opportunity and challenge in his 
new homeland. And like those stalwart emigrants, he was to add 
his measure to its national growth." 

Born in Tarascon, Department of the Rhone, February 10, 1759, 
he came to America in the full bloom of life. Quickly, he turned 
his attention to mercantile interests. As an importer of silks and 
other goods from Germany and France, for he was gifted in the 
ways of trade and language, he quickly made his mark. "He was 
a man of great sagacity, and soon began to entertain enterprising 
ideas of the opening glories of the West."^ Arriving at a time 
when the Jay Treaty negotiations were in progress, Tarascon would 
soon see the western frontier of America freed from British intimi- 
dation. The West would beckon the adventuresome and enter- 
prising. Tarascon would respond to the lure, for he early under- 
stood the potential of embroyonic American production and world 

Immediately after his American arrival, he associated himself 
in partnership with Lewis and Victor Jeumel.'* Their enterprise, 
though apparently small in scale, seized upon native manufactures 
as one of their stock items in trade transactions, acutely sensing 

1 The Magazine of History with Notes and Queries, Extra Number, 
No. 148, XXXIV (1929), 233. Hereinafter cited MHNQ. 

^ Charles W. Baird, History of Huguenot Emigration to America, 2 
vols., New York, 1885, passim; Lucian J. Fosdick, The French Blood in 
America, Boston, 1906, 125 et seq., details America's gains from these emi- 

3 History of the Ohio Fall Counties, 2 vols., Cleveland, 1886, I, 
488 a-b; Sherman Day, Historical Collections of the State of Pennsylvania, 
Philadelphia, 1843, 88. 

4 Newman F. McGirr, "Tarascon of Shippingport at the Falls of 
the Ohio," West Virginia History, VII (1946), 90, records, citing from 
Hardie's Philadelphia Directory, 1794, the partnership, but under the name 
of Journel, located on 51 S. Second Street. In the 1797 edition, the name 
of Tarascon's partners are spelled Journal. Such misspelling of French 
names was a common American occurrence. 



commercial opportunities at hand.^ Such action was a display of 
foresight and astute business aaimen that set Louis Tarascon apart 
from many of his fellow countrymen. 

Early realizing the prospect of a thriving Am.erican-European 
trade, in 1799 he sent two of his clerks, Charles Brugiere and James 
Berthoud, from Pittsburgh to Nev/ Orleans to assess the possibility 
of forging a connecting trade link from the Ohio-Mississippi val- 
leys to European markets. His motivation was to explore the fea- 
sibility of sending fully rigged ships, built in Pittsburgh, down the 
Ohio and Mississippi into the Gulf to foreign ports, creating an 
inland-trade empire that would reach the West Indies and the Con- 

When the two clerks returned a favorable report, in conjunc- 
tion with, his brothers, the firm of John A. Tarascon, Brothers, 
James Berthoud & Co. was established.^ In 1802, having built "a 
large wholesale and retail store and warehouse, a shipyard, a rig- 
ging and sail loft, an anchor smith shop, a block manufactory, and 
in short every thing necessary to complete vessels for sea," the firm 
launched its first constructed ship, the schooner Amity, 100 tons. 
Loaded with Pennsylvania flour, it was sent down the Ohio and 
Mississippi to the island of St. Thomas in the West Indies.^ The 
following year, the Pittsburgh, 250 tons, was launched. With the 

5 Harrold E. Gillingham, "The Philadelphia Windsor Chairs and Its 
Journeyings," Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, LX 
(1931), 301-302, who spells the name, correctly, Jeumel. In 1797 the part- 
nership shipped twelve of these chairs to the firm of Dallest & Calier, 
Cadiz, on board the John. 

6 By 1798, Tarascon had divorced himself from the Jeumel Brothers' 
partnership and was engaged on his own as a merchant. His address 
is given in Hardie's Philadelphia Directory, 1798, as 204 S. Second, and 
in 1800 the location of his business is 211 S. Second. Cited in McGirr, 
"Tarascon of Shippingport," 90. Thus his sending two of his clerks to 
New Orleans was an independent action. Day, Historical Collections, 88. 

7 Whether Louis Tarascon's two brothers, John Anthony and an 
unnamed one, other than for initials, H. J., accompanied him to America 
in 1794 or followed him subsequently is not known. The formal partner- 
ship with Berthoud, due in no doubt to the pooling of capital, is noted in 
Hardie's Philadelphia Directory, 1802, as being established Vv'ith an address 
at 217 Mulberry Street. By 1803-04, only the finn of Tarascon, Jun., 
James Berthoud & Co. is listed, located on 55 N. Second Street. From 
1805-06, the Philadelphia Directory only lists L. A. Tarascon, merchant, 
69 Chestnut. Cited in McGirr, "Tarascon of Shippingport," 90. 

During this interval of partnership with Berthoud, the Pittsburgh 
Gazette, Jan. 8, 1802, indicates he was running a separate business as a 
general merchant. This leads this writer to the surmise that the part- 
nership was a pooling of resources in ship construction and commerce, 
but not in individual business enterprise. 

8 Day, Historical Collections, 88, who gives the date, erroneously of 
the launching of the Amity, 1801. The correct date, December 23, 1802, 
with tonnage noted, is found in the Pittsburgh Gazette, Dec. 31, 1802. It 


same cargo, it was sent down river to Philadelphia and on to 
Bordeaux. On return from the maiden voyage, it brought back a 
cargo of wine, brandy, and other French goods, a portion of which 
were transhipped to Pittsburgh by wagons at a cost of six to eight 
cents a pound for freight to the resident firm's warehouse.^ 

The Tarascon dream became a startling reality — mayhap, a 
forerunner of the St. Lawrence Seaway, a portent of things to 
come. In rapid succession other ships were built and sent to sea 
from the Pittsburgh ways: in January, 1804, the brig Nanina, 250 
tons; March, the ship Louisiana, 300 tons; by May, the Western 
Trader, 400 tons, the largest of ships constructed by Tarascon & 
Berthoud.^° But for all this enterprising endeavor, the firm had 
to face one bleak fact: these ships could 

never attain any permanent place in the commerce . . . because they were 
one-way carriers only, because the narrowness of the rivers restricted their 

should be obsei-ved that this was not the first ship built and launched on 
the Ohio. For previous evidence on this score, Charles H. Ambler, A 
History of Transportation in the Ohio, Glendale, Cal., 1932, 83, notes that 
the first schooner, with prior claim, was built in 1793. Another schooner, 
the Polly, was constructed in 1795. Ibid., 84. Whether the Amity ever 
returned upriver to Pittsburgh is unknown; in all likelihood, no. The 
downstream trip from Pittsburgh to New Orleans v/ould take a month. 
The return trip, a wearisome one, would hardly be suitable for any craft 
other than a barge or keel boat. Sailing vessels, constructed on the 
Ohio, were "exclusively dov;nstream craft." Such ships were constructed 
"with a view to through journeys to the Atlantic coast and neighboring 
islands." Frank H. Dixon, "A Traffic History of the Mississippi River 
System," Doc. 11, National Waterivays Commission, Washington, 1909, 

9 Day, Historical Collections, 88. Again, the date of launching is 
incorrect. The Pittsburgh Gazette, Feb. 8, 1803, reports the second ship's 
water baptism. 

10 Pittsburgh Gazette notes all of these launchings. McGirr, "Taras- 
con of Shippingport," 92-93. Of these three ships, the Louisiana achieved 
some fame. Launched March 30, 1804, it sailed down river to the Gulf, on 
to Trieste, Italy, arriving April, 1805. It was sold to E. W. Tupper, 
Marietta, Ohio, who later renamed the vessel, Louisiana of Marietta. Archer 
B. Hulbert, "Western Ship-Building," American Historical Revieiv, XXI 
(1915), 726-727. 

Ambler, History of Transportation in the Ohio, opposite p. 94, re- 
produces William Mason's 1805 map of Pittsburgh, wherein he notes the 
anchorage of several ships, among them the brig Na72i')m, the schooner 
Amity, the ship Pittsbxirgh, and perhaps the Western Trader, although 
it is labeled the Ctistoms Trader. Such a drafted scene would appear 
imaginative. True, these were Tarascon & Berthoud vessels, but one 
must be suspect of their return upriver. As Dixon, A Traffic History, 
11, points out, it would be impossible for any ship more than 200 tons 
to get around the Falls of the Ohio. The best seasons for such naviga- 
tion, if such was possible for sailing ships, would be February to June, 
October to December. Tonnage would definitely preclude the Western 
Trader and the Pittsburgh; possibly the Amity. McGirr, "Tarascon of 
Shippingport," 91-92, presents an overly optimistic view. 


necessaty freedom of movement, and because the irregularity of water 
supply and the dangers of navigation made boats of deep draft impracti- 
cable, n 

By 1806, realization of this fact materially alter Tarascon's busi- 
ness interests. In that year, he and his brother John moved to 
Shippingport, Kentucky. 

In 1803, James Berthoud had purchased from Colonel John 
Campbell a portion of land near Shippingport. In 1806, the Taras- 
cons acquired the bulk of that site, at the time more commonly 
called the lower landing of the Falls. ^^ The reason behind this 
move was well advertised in a pamphlet written by Louis Taras- 
con and Berthoud in 1806: An Address on Trade with the Western 

The pamphlet urged the citizens of Philadelphia to "take the 
proper measures" to insure the continued flow of western trade 
east through that city. Tarascon argued that this could be achieved 
by first improving roads and other communications between Phila- 
delphia and the headwaters of the Ohio at Pittsburgh, connecting 
other parts of Pennsylvania by roads to that river-port city. Once 
the roads were built, "a sufficient number of waggons" would 
have to be provided, "on public or private account, to run regu- 
larly, speedily, and economically between Philadelphia and Pitts- 
burgh, and the other head waters" to complete the transportation 

To facilitate navigation, improvement of the portage between 
Presqu'isle and Le Boeuf was recommended. With such achieved, 
"a sufficient number of packets" then could ply "constantly and 
regularly, between Pittsburgh and Louisville, at the head of the 
rapids of the Ohio, from whence, to Shippingport . . . other packets 
to ply in the same manner, between Shippingport and St. Louis." 
The only hindrance for through traffic by river packets from Pitts- 
burgh to St. Louis was the necessity for cutting a two-mile canal 
around the fails between Louisville and Shippingport. This, too, 
was recommended. 

11 Dixon, A Traffic History, 11. 

12 McGirr, "Tarascon of Shippingport," 94; MHNQ, XXXIV (1929), 

13 The pamphlet was addressed to the citizens of Pennsylvania, 
particularly the city of Philadelphia. It was published in the latter citj?^, 
1806. Reprint. Keepsake Number U, University of Kentucky Library 
Associates, 1957. An original copy is in Henry E. Huntington Library, 
San Marino, Cal. 


The final feature of Tarascon's plan was pointed: 

To erect ship yards below the rapids, for the purpose of building ves- 
sels, to sail down the lower Ohio, and Mississippi, taking on their way, 
the produce of the inhabitants of the banks of the river; to carry the same 
to foreign countries, either for the account of citizens of Pennsylvania, 
or of citizens of the Western Country, but always to bring back the returns 
to Philadelphia. 

After all, argued Tarascon, did not "the natural channel of com- 
mercial intercourse between the luestern parts of the United States 
and foreign countries" lie on a road from Pittsburgh to Philadel- 
phia P^^ 

In support of his proposal, Tarascon made note of his previous 
shipbuilding experience at Pittsburgh, which said he, 

was an error of which we have been convinced by a dear bought exper- 
ience which our country will profit by. The navigation between Pittsburgh 
and Louisville cannot prudently be carried out, but on boats and rafts and 
it is below the Rapids, that vessels fit for the sea must be constructed and 

Concluding his appeal for subscribers, for this was a business 
prospectus, he gave voice to one of the major concerns of the day: 
fear that the westward expansion of America might bring disunity. 
With this in mind he phrased his final argument: 

Besides, those commercial connections will produce a greater intercourse 
between the inhabitants of the eastern and western countries and identify- 
ing more and more their manners and customs, as well as their interest, 
will strengthen the bonds of friendship between them and greatly contribute 
to consolidate and, we hope, to perpetuate the American Union. is 

But the conditions of international diplomacy and the timerity 
of Philadelphia merchants, defeated the appeal. Perhaps Taras- 
con's motivation in moving west, shipping from the west to the 
sea, was a ruse to get around the handicap of Jefferson's embargo 
and the darkening prospects of a military clash with the British 
then threatening on the horizon. When that rupture occurred, the 
War of 1812, what mercantile profits he had amassed through his 
early enterprising ways were apparently lost. Yet the dream of 
the future commercial greatness of America and the business po- 
tential of the West, did not die in Tarascon's thoughts. For al- 

14 Ibid., 4-6. Italics in original. 

15 Ibid., 12. 

16 Ibid., 13. 


most two decades, it was to lie fallow, waiting for the right mo- 
ment and circumstance to spring forward, matured, grandiose, and 
visionary. Like so many before and after him, Tarascon went 
broke in the West. Yet he clung to his dream and the hope for 
the future. His poverty did not stifle creative ideas. ^''' 

By 1820, the dream of an inland-world trade empire for western 
America loomed again on the horizon. John Floyd of Virginia, 
in 1820, under direction of the House of Representatives, was 
authorized as chairman of a committee to inquire into the ex- 
pediency of settling and occupying the Columbia basin.^^ When 
Congress convened in December, 1821, another attempt was made 
to bring the question of Oregon into debate. Floyd again found 
himself appointed chairman of a new special committee of in- 
quiry. The resulting report and recommendation was identical to 
the previous delivered by the committee in 1820.^^ This renewed 
American interest in the West was in no small measure due to 
the diplomatic settlements achieved in the wake of the War of 
1812. A rebirth of American nationalism and future commercial 
greatness shone bright, stimulated by the Convention of 1818 with 
the British, and the Adams-Onis Treaty with Spain, 1819."*^ 

The portent of the future of the West, from a commercial 
view, had been prophesied by John Bradbury during his western 
travels, I8O9-I8II. He saw full well the potential, writing: "The 
political and commercial advantages that will arise to the United 
States from the acquisition of Louisiana are incalculable. . . ."^^ 

17 That the brothers fell into hard times is eloquently attested to 
by the fact that in 1818 the Trustees of Louisville authorized Robert 
Breckinridge to buy Louis Tarascon's surveyor instruments. This was 
probably due to Louis and John's investment in a flour mill, construc- 
tion having begun in 1815, at Shippingport. The mill was six stories 
high and was powered by water from the Ohio Rapids. It was a total 
failure: it was far ahead of its time. J. Stoddard Johnston, Memorial 
History of Louisville..., 2 vols., Chicago and Nev/ York, [1896?], I, 67, 

18 Annals of Congress, 16th Cong., 2nd Sess., 679. Floyd was 
greatly influenced by Thomas Hart Benton. Samuel F. Bemis, John Qiiincy 
Adams and the Foundations of American Foreign Policy, New York, 1950, 
485-486. The committee report is found in Annals of Congress, 16th 
Cong-., 2nd Sess., 945-959. 

19 House Report, No. 18, 17th Cong., 1st Sess. Floyd's activities are 
fully discussed in George H. Ambler, The Life and Diary of John Floyd, 
Richmond, 1918, 53-74. 

20 For example, see the letter from Thomas H. Benton to Governor 
Preston of Virginia, Nov. 14, 1819. Benton Papers, Missouri Historical 
Society. Quoted in my article, "The Sublettes of Kentucky. . . ," The 
Register of the Kentucky Historical Society, LVII (1959), 20. 

21 John Bradbury, Travels in the Interior of America in the Years 
1809, 1810, 1811, Reuben G. Thwaites, ed.. Early Western Travels, 32 vols., 
Cleveland, 1906, V, 270-271. 


The Tarascon brothers had understood this when the purchase of 
the territory was consummated in 1803, and they saw ripe com- 
mercial advantage in it: witness their move in 1806 to Shipping- 
port. Subsequently, they were only defeated in their enterprise by 
ciraimstance, diplomacy, and time. 

Another traveler, about the same time as Bradbury's excursion, 
was unduly pessimistic, Henry M. Brackenridge. As he saw it, 
the removal of "impediments to the settlements of that vast waste" 
of the Trans-Mississippi West, would not be "formed for centuries, 
if ever." His great fear lay in the West's vast distances and its 
lack of ties to the East.~^ Louis Tarascon appreciated this fear 
and saw commercial ties between East and West as the solution. 

As reports on the explorations and activities of the intrepid fur 
trappers of Missouri became known, thanks to an active America 
press,^^ Louis Tarascon revived his dream of an American empire 
of trade. The American fur traders were apostles of American 
business; this Tarascon undoubtedly understood and applauded. 
As the fur men explored the West; as their exploits became com- 
mon knowledge, he was emboldened to prescribe another plan of 
daring and energetic action. ^^ 

Under cover of a letter to Senator Richard M. Johnson of Ken- 
tucky, he phrased his proposal: "To the people of the United States, 
on the propriety of establishing a Waggon Roade, from the River 
Missouri to the River Columbia, of the Pacific Ocean. "^■'' It was 
a plea for a continental American empire built on solid economic 
foundations, connected by arteries of transportation. 

To reinforce his petition to Congress, he published in Louis- 
ville, the same year, a detailed pamphlet explanation. This in- 
cluded the necessity for the construction of a canal around the Ohio 
Falls, a long held recommendation dating back to 1806. In his 
eyes, once a continuous river-road from the East to St. Louis was 
achieved, a wagon road west to the Columbia estuary would com- 
plete the essentials for the realization of potential American com- 
mercial greatness and national unity. He penned: 

2" Heni-y M. Brackenridge, Journal of a Voyage up the Rivei- Mis- 
souri ... [1811], ibid., VI, 156, 160-162. 

23 Reference to Niles' Register, the Daily National Intelligencer, and 
most particularly the Missouri and Kentucky newspapers, 1822-30. 

24 For an excellent summary of the fur men's activities, see Carl P. 
Russell, "Trapper Trails to the Sisk-Ke-Dee," in The Westerners Brand 
Book 19U, Chicago, 1946, 57-79. 

25 A copy of this rare broadside is in the Heniy E. Huntington 
Library, San Marino, Cal. 


Dnce open the road to the mouth of the Columbia River and compara- 
:ively we almost touch the coast of Asia — in forty days we may bring to 
:he hearts of our country ail those articles of luxury and use, presented 
:o our view by the countries bordering the Pacific and Indian oceans. 26 

Coincidentally with Tarascon's proposal, demonstrable proof of 
the practicability of a wagon road across the plains to the Rocky 
Mountains and beyond was voiced in Niles' Register, December 
4, 1824. Andrew Henry, a long time Missouri resident and ex- 
perienced fur man, a partner with William Ashley in a trapping 
enterprise on the upper reaches of the Missouri River, returned 
to St. Louis with dramatic news.^^ EHiring the course of a two 
^'ear hunt in the company's preempted domain, he and his party 
discovered a "passage by which loaded wagons [could] reach the 
lavigable waters of the Columbia River." The Arkansas Gazette, 
relying on the account published in the St. Louis Enquirer, was more 

rhis route lies South of the one explored by Lewis and Clarke, and is 
inhabited by Indians friendly to us.- — ^Doctor Floyd, a perserving and in- 
:elligent member of Congress from Virginia, has urged with much effect 
;he propriety of forming a colony at the mouth of the Columbia; and in 
:his age of experiment and improvement, we may expect to see the prej- 
adices of our Eastern Brethern giving place to more enlightened views of 
general policy; and may look forward to the accomplishment, in a short 
:ime, of a project, which a few years past was ridiculed, as visionary. 28 

The ridicule in question vv^as undoubtedly an oblique reference to 
an argument expounded in Congress that the Rocky Mountains 
should be considered as the natural boundary of the United States. ^^ 
Even the staunchest exponent of American westward expansion, 
Senator Thomas Hart Benton, had momentarily concurred in such 

26 The petition is reproduced in U.S. Semite, Exec. Doc, No. 108, 18th 
Cong., 2nd Sess., I, 3-12. Jotn-nal of the U.S. Senate, No. 107, 18th Cong., 
2nd Sess., 31, 55, 83. Levds A. Tarascon, "An Exposition of Some of the 
Reasons Why Measures Should be taken for the Construction of a Canal 
Round the Falls of the River Ohio . . . And for the Opening of a Waggon 
Road, From the River Missouri to the Navigable Waters of the River 
Columbia...," (Louisville, 1824), 7. 

27 The partnership was formed in 1821 and was activated the fol- 
.owing year. Hiram M. Chittenden, The American Fur Trade of the Far 
West, Reprint; 2 vols., Stanford, Cal., 1954, I, 251-252, for a sketch of 
Henry; Dale L. Morgan, Jedediah Smith and the Opening of the West, 
[ndianapolis and New York, 1953, 26-27. 

28 Nov. 16, 1824. 

29 Voiced by Representative Albert H. Tracy, 1823. Annals of Con- 
gress, 17th Cong., 2nd Sess., 598. 


a view.^*' Others, however, notably Francis Baylies, Representative 
from Massachusetts, had countered, urging that a passage through 
the mountainous barrier be sought so that the nation could acquire 
its "national boundary," the Pacific Ocean. "^^ In this vievv^, he 
found strong endorsement from John Floyd. ^" 

Tarascon, no doubt, had some detailed knowledge of the extent 
of the fur traders' activity in the Far West. The defeat of Ashley 
and Henry's company at the hands of the Arikara Indians at the 
Mandan Village on the Missouri in late spring, 1823, had m.ade 
national news and had embroiled Congress in a torrid debate. When 
the Army punitive expedition, commanded by Leavenworth, failed 
to avenge that defeat, even more heated words, both in Congress 
and the press, ensued. The Kentucky Gazette dutifully reported 
the failure of the Leavenworth expedition, and the Louisville Vublk 
Advertiser supported the appeal for military posts and roads to 
secure to the nation its rightful share in the Far Yv^estern fur 
trade. Tarascon's petition no doubt reflected his awareness of the 
fur men's activities on the far flung frontier. 

But even with this unexpected report of Henry's explorations 
and comment, the petition fell on a dumb Congress. On Decem- 
ber 13, 1824, Tarascon's petition for a wagon road west to the 
Columbia was presented to the Senate. It was tabled without de- 
bate. Under Senator Johnson's urging, December 27, the docu- 
ment was placed before the Committee on Roads and Canals — to 
no avail. On January 12, 1825, Senator Brown asked the Com- 
mittee to discharge consideration of the proposal. They responded 
in the affirmative. A dream, for the time being, came to an abrupt 
end. The prophets in the wilderness were too prophetic! 

Defeated by the short-sightedness of the Solons, Tarascon did 
not surrender his hope for a western American commercial em- 
pire. His silent and unknown allies, the stalwart fur trappers of 
Missouri, continued to etch graphically the soundness of his pre- 
mature plan, in spite of the Congressional majority view, that w^agon 
roads west were feasible. 

In 1826 when William Ashley returned from an extensive upper 
Missouri basin journey, Charles Keemle, editor of the Missouri 

30 Thomas H. Benton, Alrridgment of the Debates of Congress, 16 
vols, New York, 1858, VII, 50, 74-81; Register of Debates in Congress, 
18th Cong., 2nd Sess., 712. 

31 Annals of Congress, 17th Cong., 2nd Sess., 682-683. 

32 Floyd, in a speech, Dec. 17, 1822, remarked: "The route to the 
mouth of the Columbia is easy, safe, and expeditious." Ibid., 407. 


Herald and St. Louis Advertiser, announced the results in the 
November 8th issue: 

The recent expedition of General Ashley to the country west of the Rocky 
Mountains . . . has proved, that overland expeditions in large bodies may 
be made to that remote region. . . The tuhole route lay through a level and 
open country, better for carriages than any turnpike road in the United 

Ashley had forecast such a possibility when traveling west to the 
annual fur trade rendezvous in 1825. He had taken along in his 
trade goods and baggage train a four-pound cannon, mounted on 
a gun carriage, drawn by two mules, indisputedly the first wheels 
to travel west north of the St. Louis-Santa Fe trade route.^^ 

In 1830, Tarascon found for support of his early dream an 
even greater endorsement. In that year, the trapper firm of Smith, 
Jackson and Sublette, who had bought out the Ashley-Henry con- 
cern, took "a caravan of ten wagons, drawn by five mules each, 
and two dearborns, drawn by one mule each" from St. Louis 
through the central plains region to the annual rendezvous held 
at the Wind River. Leaving on April 10, they arrived without 
mishap on July 16.^^ Wagon wheels had traversed the Great 
Plains — as Tarascon had proposed in 1824 without assurance that 
such was possible ! The Philadelphia National Gazette informed its 
reading public that within "a few years, a trip to the Pacific, by 
way of the Rocky Mountains, will be no more of an undertaking 
than was a journey from the Atlantic cities to Missouri twenty 
years ago."^^ 

After this dramatic accomplishment, striking proof of Taras- 
con's vision, wagon wheels became rather commonplace on the west 
bound trails out of St. Louis. In 1832, Bonneville took wagons 
with him on his two year trek. In 1834, the first Oregon bound 

33 Ashley to General Henry Atkinson, Dec. [?], 1825. Ashley Papers, 
Missouri Historical Society; St. Louis Enquirer, Mar. 11; Philadelphia Na- 
tional Gazette, Apr. 10, 1826. 

34 Missouri Republican, Apr. 13, 1830; Harrison C. Dale, ed., "A 
Fragmentary Journal of William L. Sublette," Mississippi Valley Historical 
Review, VI (1919), 99-110; John E. Sunder, Bill Sublette, Norman, Okla., 
1959, 84-89, for full details. Official details of the venture were reported 
in a joint letter of the firm to Thomas H. Eaton, Secretary of War, Oct. 
29, 1830. Sublette Papers, Missouri Historical Society; printed in U.S. 
Senate, Exec. Doc, 20th Cong., 2nd Sess., Serial No, 181, Doc. 67. A more 
available copy is reproduced in Morgan, Jedediah Smith, Appendix A, 

35 Nov. 26, 1830. 

180 . DOYCE B. NUNIS, JR. 

missionaries found wagons to be an essential ingredient for their 
travel comfort, as did the Whitman-Spalding party of 1836. All 
of these western journeys were called to the nation's attention by 
press reports and published narratives.^^ 

Louis Tarascon undoubtedly found in them an invigorating 
stimulus. ^"^ In the twilight of his life, he responded. Writing 
in three pamphlets, two in 1836, one in 1837, he renewed, with 
eloquent vigor, his cry for the expansion of American enterprise 

In a pamphlet published in Louisville, March 1836, entitled. 

Republican Education, And gradual Western March of enlightened, la- 
borious, virtuous, and happy generations, from all the present and future 
United States and Territories of North America, through their Rocky 
Mountains, to their north-west coasts on the Pacific Ocean ; thence, in time, 
further on — the only means, not only of extending knowledge and hap- 
piness all around the whole earth, but the only one, also, of maintaining 
their union; nay, more, the only one of maintaining any one of their re- 

he elaborately, but forcefully, stated his view. His was the dream 
of an American empire built on education as a unifying link, 
welded by commerce. And he artfully took cognizance of the 
fact that the continental limits of America, as he envisioned them, 
belonged to the United States — although the final settlement, dip- 
lomatically, rested ten years hence from his writing. ^^ 

In pursuit of his Utopian ideal, Tarascon traveled up the Mis- 
sissippi into the Wisconsin Territory searching for a town site. 
There he hoped to establish a settlement that would be both a 
realization of his liberal democratic thoughts and his forward eco- 
nomic views. To this planned city he gave the name Sfartspohit. 
Under cover of a pamphlet, November, 1836, "L. A. Tarascon, To 
His Friends. . . ," he outhned his long dreamed of purpose.^^ 

[I have] Returned from a country which, ten years ago, at the beginning 
time of our steam navigation from St. Louis higher up on the upper Mis- 

36 Washington Irving, Advejitures of Captain Bonneville, Portland, 
Ore., n.d., Ch. 1; Chittenden, American Fur Trade, I, 431, II, 647. 

37 Tarascon understood the enterprise of fur trade. In his pamph- 
let, written in 1824, as cited in note 26, above, he observed that a wagon 
road west would assure the riches of the western fur trade to the United 

38 The first edition of this pamphlet was published in Louisville in 
1836, a second edition in New York, September, 1837. Reprinted in 
MHNQ, XXIV (1929), 188-210. 

39 The first edition of this pamphlet was published in Louisville, 
November, 1836; a second edition in New York, September, 1837. Text, 
MHNQ, 213-265. 


sissippi, when yet almost unknown by the majority of our citizens, I had 
visited in search of the best site on the banks of our Western rivers, whence 
in conjunction with their navigation, to start the wagon-road which, for 
most important commercial and political motives, I had, in the year 1824, 
when there was not yet any thought of traversing continents on railroads, 
offered to Congress to, without public cost and at public profit, make 
from that site, through the Rocky Mountains, to our Bay of Columbia, 
alias Oregon, on our northwest coasts of the Pacific Ocean, and which, 
lately, by a navigation proved to be as fine and practiced by steamboats 
and crev/s as good as any other in the world, I have again visited in view 
of selecting the spot of land most proper for the site of Startspoint, the place 
where to begin the execution of my published plan of republican educa- 
tion and gradual Western march. . . .40 

From his visionary tower, the mid-west was the heart of an 
American inland-empire of trade. His justification was explicit: 

Its standing at the head of the uninterrupted long line of steamboat 
navigation of the Mississippi from the sea higher up, and its near equal 
distance between our shores on the Atlantic and the Pacific Oceans, will 
make it the central point of our United States, and steam travelling through 
it on land between them, while steamboats will on one side ply on the 
Pacific, between our Bay of Columbia and eastern Asia and all the other 
lands round that immense Ocean; on the other, on the Atlantic, between 
our eastern and southern ports and western Europe and all the other lands 
rouqd, and in that other great basin north of the Capes of Good Hope 
and Horn, will, in spite of all attempts through Spanish dominions, by mak- 
ing it the surest, cheapest, shortest and most pleasant of all the possible 
ways of intercourse between all those separate parts of the habited earth, 
make the whole of our United States the grand mart of the world, and that 
country its centre for commerce, sciences, arts and enjoyments. 4 1 

Then with steady intent based on his prior experience, he noted: 

Was not the navigableness of the Western rivers by vessels of burden 
fit for sea doubted, when, in the year 1801, with full confidence, I caused 
to be built at the head of the Ohio on the Monongahela, the remembered 
ship Pittsburgh, of more than three hundred tons, which made the first 
opening of their navigation, and did not that opinion continue prevailing 
until the arrival of that ship at Philadelphia? 

Would not, ten years ago, many of you considered as ridiculous the 
idea, that before long we would fly on railroads? And is it not evident 
now that by steamships in twelve days from Europe to North America, 
at our eastern ports; by steam railroads in ten, from our said ports to our 
Bay of Columbia, on our northwest coasts, and from it in eight, by steam- 
ships to Asia, we will be able, before many years, to perform in thirty 
days the voyage from Paris or London to Canton or Japan ?4 2 

40 Ibid., 215-216. 

41 Ibid., 217-218. 

42 Ibid., 221. 


As to his current state of solvency, he made no apologies. 

. . . should I possess yet the grand pecuniary means that I had when, by 
the ships Pittsburgh, Louisiana, Western Trader, and other vessels, brigs 
and schooners, sent from the head of the Ohio to the Atlantic, and by 
the first big keel boats to the Missouri, I made the opening of the present 
immense navigation of the Western rivers and induced Eastern eyes, much 
more than before, to look westwardly, I would now . . . appropriate the 
whole of them. . . M 

In summation, he prophesied the American destiny. 

All of the same family, but separated by seas, by lakes, by rivers, by 
mountains, and generally ignorants, full of prejudices and unhappy, na- 
ture, (and when I say nature, I mean the same unknown essence of all 
things, that others are calling Theos, Deus, Dieu, God, or any other name,) 
nature tends to our universal union, instruction, and happiness. To ef- 
fect that beneficence, she has elected our nation for her pioneer agent; and 
to enable us to execute that sublime mission, she has placed us on 
the best and vastest field of action that does exist on earth; all that 
connected land, nine thousand miles round, that extends betv/een the two 
grand oceans, by which to attain men in their farthest recesses and most 
secret inlets; and she has electrified, magnetized all our hearts and minds 
with those passions. It is for that grand design that, while many of 
us, when taking shares in steamboats, canals, and railroads, are thinking 
of nothing but of making money, she makes us, without telling it, cover 
our country with them, and she makes us travel, navigate, and pursue 
commerce with all parts of the earth: and it is also for it that, while many 
others, when looking to the far seas, are thinking only of more whales 
and seal skins, she makes us slowly prepare; and, I hope, soon will start 
for the south pole, the greatest discovery expedition that has, at any time, 
taken place in the world; — and greater ones yet shall we not plan and 
start, when our national navy yards shall be in our Bays of Oregon and 
Vancouver, as well as in our Atlantic ports ?44 

Indeed, a prophet in the wilderness, a dreamer of American 

In his last eloquent plea on this subject, a pamphlet published 
in 1837, Louis Tarascon gave voice to his convictions of con- 
tinued American unity in this wise: 

Our nation, say I, has so well succeeded that she now consists of tT\'ent}'- 
six states and two Territories, with a population of more than fifteen 
millions, all linked together, not by a common tie of consanguinity — for 
she is a medley of men from all quarters, of all shapes and colours — but 
by a natural attraction of joining each other, and by an illusion, the great 
passion of wealth or commercial interest, and extended as far as the 43d 

43 Ibid., 223. 

44 Ibid., 231. 


degree of north latitude on the upper Mississippi and on the Missouri, 
and it seems certain that before long, through the Rocky Mountains, she 
will be extended to the far northwest coast on the Pacific Ocean, whence, 
on a theatre vaster than the Atlantic one, by enlarged means of knowledge, 
commerce and liberality, to complete all union. 45 

His final dream was a colonial scheme for establishing set- 
tlements on the upper Mississippi in the Wisconsin Territory, or 
in Illinois. The reasons he put forth were both powerful and 
democratically appealing. It was an eloquent testament, both to his 
vision and sensitivity. 

Not only the commerce from Pan's to Canton by the shortest of ways through 
New York, or Rocky Mountains, and our bay of Columbia, now as pre- 
viously, on motion of John Floyd in Congress, called the Oregon, on our 
northwest coast of the Pacific Ocean, as in 1825 announced in France 
by de Chateaubriand, and in New York by De Witt Clinton, or Cad- 
wallader D. Colden, in an editorial article of the Statesman, a New York 
paper, entitled Empires travelling ivest, as soon as they had read, in my 
memorial published by order of the Senate of these United States, my 
offer of, without public cost and at public profit, making a public wagon 
road from the river Missouri, near the mouth of the river Kansas, through 
those mountains within the 42d degree of north latitude to that great bay, 
on or near the 46th, probably at Astoria; and while making it, of civilizing 
the natives or Indians on the way, not by telling them nonsense about 
the impossible other world after death; but by speaking them reason about 
this real one, to be happy while they are on it— by, according to their mode 
of living employing them as hundreds of provisions for the road makers, 
by paying them fairly for venison and skins, destroying panthers, rattle 
snakes, wolves, and other obnoxious animals — by employing their squaws 
in our cornfields and our dwelling houses, and most expressly by educa- 
ting their children with ours, at establishments of equal republican edu- 
cation, all along the said roads; and, when so educated, and of marriage- 
able ages, as it has been often successfully the case in wise Virginia, in 
unproud Canada, and among the medley of our most ancient European 
ancestors, all from savage nations come from Asia, mixed with Arabians, 
by intermarrying them. 

No; not that commerce only from Paris to Canton, already spoken 
of, as a future marvel, but an immense one, which since '76, nay, since 
Columbus, perhaps eternity, the world is tending to — an universal one 
from all parts of the earth to unite all mankind, through the two oceans, 
on our central land — and a commerce for which great preparations are 
now effected in the following ways, from Maine to Orleans in each of 
our ports, all our great merchants, all our rich men, all men viewing to 
wealth, (and except very few, all are so viewing,) all our statesmen, all 

45 Ibid., 176. This pamphlet was published by H. D. Robinson in 
New York, 1837. 

46 Ibid., 182-184. 


its inhabitants, all tools of destiny are joining their forces for formation 
of means concentrated in it — for them there is two sides, the eastern one, 
through the Atlantic Ocean; the western, through the land — though linked 
together, and long time to be so, because no land produces all that an- 
other does, and for many other causes, each one of those ports endea- 
vours, by sailing, or steaming on that ocean, to have direct, and as cheap 
as possible, commercial intercourses with all the islands in, and all the 
continental markets round it — and, on the western side, by lines of steam 
rail-roads or distance destroyers, straight to the Wisconsin, to have also 
direct, and as cheap as possible, commercial intercourse v/ith that central 
point and place of rendezvous, whence all in a body, on many rails to 
fly to the Oregon, the grand northwestern bay, where, by the means of 
innumerable electrified, or steam ships, constantly plying on the grand 
Pacific Ocean, to closer bind the tie of the universal commerce which is 
to unite all the world on our central land — commerce, nevertheless, which 
will cease of being and will be superseded by universal brotherhood of 
gifting and gifted friends, as soon as all mankind, having acquired knowl- 
edge and habit of light work, will not any more dispute for creeds nor 
property; but, nevertheless also, commerce which will yet last a long time, 
because the destruction of ignorance and drone-ism cannot be effected in 
a few days only. ^ 6 

Such was the final thought of Louis Anastasius Tarascon and his 
dream of an American Empire in the West.'^'^ 

DoYCE B. NuNis, Jr. 

University of California 
Los Angeles 

47 As to Louis Tarascon's subsequent life, little is known. From the 
evidence at hand, he moved to New York. There he wrote his last pamph- 
let in 1839. This was an appeal for non-segreg'ated education. After that 
date, advanced in years, his name does not appear again in print. McGirr, 
"Tarascon of Shippingport," 89. 

Louis's brother, John, died in 1825. Katherine G. Healy, comp., 
"Calendar of Early Jefferson County, Kentucky, Wills," Filson Historical 
Quarterly, VI (1932), 296. Descendants of the family, from John, sur- 
vived. History of the Ohio Falls Cities..., I, 488 b; 496 k-l-m; G. Glenn 
Clift, comp. & ed., "Kentucky Marriages and Obituaries," The Register of 
the Kentucky Historical Society, XXXVI (1938), 321. They are looked 
upon, by Kentuckians, as one of their great pioneering families. Samuel 
M. Wilson, "Pioneer Kentucky in its Ethnological Aspect," ibid., XXXI 
(1933), 289. 

New Orleans Courts Under Military 
Occupation, 1861-1865 

With the fall of Fort Jackson and St. Philip, the legal system 
of Louisiana, as it applied to New Orleans, also collapsed, and by 
the time Major General Benjamin F. Butler arrived in the city on 
May 1, 1862, to begin the military occupation of the former Con- 
federate port, only a few of the inferior courts were open. But- 
ler's first intention seems to have been not to interfere with the 
civil courts, though he did announce that all crimes involving the 
military would be brought to trial in the courtmartial.-^ 

The disorganized state of the municipal judiciary soon forced 
him to take more action, however, and on May 20, his military com- 
mandant. General George F. Shepley, suspended the "several Re- 
corders of the city . . . from the discharge of the functions of their 
offices. . . ." From that time forward, he directed, "all complaints 
for the violation of the peace and good order of the city, of its 
ordinances, or of the Laws of the United States" would be heard 
in the Provost Court where Major Joseph M. Bell presided. The 
District courts, which heard civil cases, had already ceased to func- 
tion. Hearing of Shepley's order that one judge was to hear all 
cases from the six recorder's courts, the New Orleans Co7n7nercial 
Bulletin emitted a figurative whistle and expressed the opinion that 
Judge Bell would have a "vast amount of work on his hands. "^ 

Butler may have had more than a judicial reorganization in mind 
in making this change, for by abolishing all the inferior civil courts, 
he forced the citizens of New Orleans to take all their legal com- 
plaints to courts within the Federal jurisdiction. In such courts no 
lawyer could practice who had not taken the oath of allegiance to 
the United States Government, and no suit could be brought by 
any persons who had not similarly indicated their loyalty to the 
Union. Judge Bell was indeed swamped with cases, and by Oct- 
ober, Butler had ordered the reopening of three of the District 
courts. In the meantime, a large part of the legal fraternity and 

1 See his proclamation of May 1, 1862 in Private and Official Cor- 
respondence of Gen. Benjamin F. Butler During the Period of the Civil 
War, 5 vols., Norwood, Mass., 1917. 

2 New Orleans Picayune, May 21, 1862; New Orleans Commercial 
Bulletin, May 22, 1862. 



a number of citizen plaintiffs had found it to their advantage to 
return to their former allegiance.^ 

The Provost Court, in one form or another, was to be a judicial 
landmark in New Orleans throughout the war, and its reputation 
was never good. Complaints about its operation soon began to be 
heard. In August the Daily True Delta charged that, in addition 
to taking the oath of allegiance, plaintiffs in cases heard in this 
court had to pay $1.00 in United States Treasury notes to institute 
proceedings, and fifty cents for each witness they intended to call 
up, all in advance. This money was to be paid to the clerk of the 
court, and apparently it never went any further than that."* 

Judge Bell was soon transferred to another Butler-created tri- 
bunal — the Court of Military Commission — and another Butler ap- 
pointee, a New England civilian named J. B. Kinsman, was im- 
ported to occupy the bench of the Provost Court. "The appoint- 
ment to the position of Judge of the Provost Court vacillated be- 
tween private citizens and officials seemingly without improvement 
as far as the ends of justice were concerned," noted a special com- 
mission which reported on affairs in the Department of the Gulf 
in 1865. Judge Kinsman's tenure was fairly short-lived, for he left 
the Department shortly after Butler did in December, 1862, and 
Judge Charles A. Peabody, sent by President Lincoln to head the 
new "Provisional Court," was asked by Shepley to handle the 
duties of the Provost Court as well.^ 

Judge Peabody often found it impossible to take care of the 
work of both courts, and as a result more and more of the sessions 
of the Provost Court were presided over by one Augustus DeB. 
Hughes, clerk of the court. The travesties of justice reported in 
this court mmltiplied. "... it is a matter of standing wonder," com- 

3 See New Orleans Picayune, May 23, 1862; Neiv Orleans Commercial 
Bulletin, June 6, 1862; New Orleans Bee, October 15, 1862. Judge Bell 
was so overwhelmed with cases that on June 25 he published a notice 
that his court would no longer entertain any but suits of a "strictly crim- 
inal or militai^y character." Ibid., June 25, 1862. The recorders' courts 
were reconstituted by July 1. 

4 New Orleans Daily True Delta, August 16, 1862. 

5 Report of the Special Commission . . . , September 23, 1865 . . . , Vol. 
737, Record Group 94, Records of the War Department, Adjutant Gen- 
eral's Office, National Archives, Washington, D.C.; Neio Orleans Pi- 
cayune, September 4, 1863. The Court of Military Commission also 
proved a lucrative operation for the Federal authorities. On June 4, 
1862, Judge Bell i-eported to Butler that he had collected $3,827 in fines 
between May 9 and June 1, and that he had expended $3,731 for "inci- 
dental expenses." Report of Judge Bell, Court of Military Commission, 
June 4, 1862, in Benjamin F. Butler Papers, Manuscripts Division, Li- 
brary of Congress, Washington, D.C. 


mented the Picayune in the fall of 1863 in discussing Hughes's 
court, "that sober, quiet men from the economical North, who had 
come here to reform abuses and charm the rebeUious back into 
loyalty, could ever screw their consciences up" to the approval of 
his acts. But consciences had been pricked. In May, Butler's suc- 
cessor, Major General N. P. Banks, was advised by his Provost 
Marshal General that the hours of the Provost Court — 7 to 10 
A.M. daily — constituted a "denial of justice," since anyone arrested 
after 10 A.M. each day was forced to spend the rest of the day 
and all night in the Parish Prison. He recommended that Banks 
appoint additional judges so that the court could have a later morn- 
ing session and an afternoon session too; but Banks, apparently dis- 
gusted by the reports which had reached him about this court, 
created one of his own at the beginning of June and appointed one 
of his officers, Colonel Charles C. Dwight, Provost Judge.^ 

The jurisdiction of the new court was to include all cases in- 
volving violations of Federal military orders by military personnel, 
all civil crimes committed by military personnel, and "all other 
causes arising under the military jurisdiction. ..." With so wide a 
range of actionable cases possible, the new court offered fully as 
many avenues for the enrichment of its personnel as the old one 
had. When Banks replaced Colonel Dwight with a civilian friend 
of his own, Alexander A. Atocha, in August, 1863, most of the 
avenues were soon being explored.^ 

Persons appearing in cases heard by the court were required to 
post bond in the amount of $5.00, which, commented the Picayune, 
constituted rank injustice "when we consider the number of arrests 
made for trifling offenses, the number of bonds which have been 
furnished, and the number and enormous amount of the fines im- 
posed. . . ." Bitterly its editor continued that it was small wonder 
that the Provost Court "is looked upon as a fat place by its peculiar 

6 James G. Bowen to Banks, May 20, 1863, in Letter Press, Vol. 
297, Correspondence of the Provost Marshal General, Record Group 98, 
Records of the War Department, Department of the Gulf, National Ar- 
chives, Washington, D.C. ; Neiv Orleans Daily True Delta, June 6, 1863 ; 
New Orleans Picayune, September 2, 1863. The Hughes court was abolished 
in General Order No. 65, New Orleans, Letter Press Vol. 297, Correspon- 
dence of the Provost Marshal General, National Archives. See also Bowen 
to J. A. Hopkins, New Orleans, August 31, 1863, ibid. 

7 New Orleans Daily True Delta, June 6, 1863; Special Order No. 
198, New Orleans, August 13, 1863, in Endorsement Book, Vol. 309, 
Correspondence of the Provost Marshal General, National Archives. 
Atocha, though a native Orleanian, had grown up in New York and came 
to New Orleans with Banks in 1862. He served for a time v/ith the 
Sequestration Commission. 


and well-salaried officials, and as a grinding oppression by our citi- 
zens generally."^ 

Apparently Judge Atocha mastered the revenue sources of the 
court very quickly, for he soon felt he could afford to keep a wife. 
On October 17, he imported a bride from New York and vvas 
married in a brilliant ceremony, illuminated by the presence of 
much Army "brass." Though he presided in cases argued by such 
outstanding Louisiana legalists as Christian Roselius, Atocha's legal 
knowledge seems to have been somewhat deficient. The Special 
Commission, checking into his court records in 1865, noted shock- 
ingly disparate and inequitable sentences imposed by him. And 
by March, 1864, other deficiencies had become apparent. Asked 
to submit a detailed accounting of all funds which had passed 
through his hands, Atocha evidently was not able to do so. In 
May he found it conveniently imperative to return to the North for 
a while. He departed in a cloud of scandal.^ 

Banks next offered the judgeship to young Colonel Henry C. 
Warmoth, a twenty-one-year old Missourian who was personal aide 
to General John A. McClernand of Illinois. For a man of his 
tender years, Warmoth's rise in the military service had been suf- 
ficiently spectacular as it was; the reasons which moved Banks to 
insist upon his accepting the Provost Court appointment are, hov/- 
ever, still not very clear. Warmoth noted in his diary that the 
position had been offered to him by Bank's secretary. Captain James 
Tucker, during a reception at the Banks home on May 25. He had 
declined it because he thought the court illegal and unconstitutional 
and because "it was currently believed it was for the purpose of 
making some persons rich & ... it had been so conducted as to 
bring those persons connected with it into disrepute. "■^'^ 

8 New Orleans Picayune, September 2, 1863. 

9 Ibid., October 20, 1863 ; Report of the Special Commission . . . , Sep- 
tember 23, 1865 . . . , Vol. 737, Record Group 94, Records of the War De- 
partment, Adjutant General's Office, National Archives. Murder, for 
example, drew variously terms of eight months, one year, and five years; 
larceny was punished by life imprisonment; treason, by three months' 
imprisonment. See also Bowen to Atocha, March 31, 1864, in Letter Press, 
Vol. 298, Correspondence of the Provost Marshal General, Record Group 
98, ibid.; Henry L. Pierson to id., April 19, 1864, ibid.; and Bowen to 
Clerk to the Provost Court, New Orleans, May 26, 1864, Vol. 299, ibid. 
Atocha was subsequently brought to trial on charges of corruption but 
was fi^eed. See Atocha to J. Schuyler Crosby, New Orleans, May 13, 1865, 
in Letters Received (Civil), 1865, Box 10, ibid.; and J. B. Nott to Bowen 
[October] 21, 1864, in Letters Received (Civil), 1864, Box 5, ibid. 

10 Diary, VI, in Henry Clay Warmoth Papers, Southern Historical 
Collection, University of North Carolina Library, Chapel Hill, North 
Carolina, entry for May 25, 1864. 


Banks refused to be put off, however, and a few days later, 
overriding Warmoth's objection that acceptance would doom him 
"to perpetual infamy," he persuaded him to accept the post. War- 
moth entered upon his duties next day and soon was enthusiastically 
meting out sentences on a stern and wholesale basis. He tried 
thirty cases on his second day on the bench — "Some quite impor- 
tant ones" — and though he reported that "everybody said I did 
well," he described the work as a "very great strain upon the 

Apparently it was a strain on other things as well, among them 
loyalty and honesty. When a ship captain who was one of his 
best friends was brought before him charged with allowing two 
demijohns of whisky to be unloaded illegally from his steamer, 
Warmoth fined him heavily, remarking "I know no friends in the 
discharge of my duty." He sentenced the keeper of a bawdy house 
and four of her girls to one to two months each in the workhouse, 
but privately offered to release them for $50.00 each. They v/ere 
able to raise only $175.00 but he accepted that and let them go. 
A soldier accused of stealing a watch chain was sentenced to ten 
years in prison, and an officer who was charged with having ridden 
a horse to death was fined $400.00.^" 

He had little sympathy for the defendants brought before him. 
When Mrs. Victoria Anderson was charged with sending her four- 
teen-year old daughter to the military prison with a message for 
some prisoners who subsequently escaped, he sentenced both Mrs. 
Anderson and the child to prison for a year, though it was estab- 
lished that the mother was illiterate and had six small children at 
home dependent upon her care. And a German coffeehouse keeper, 
accused by two Negroes of receiving a couple of sacks of stolen 
government oats, received a similar sentence, though the oats were 
not found on his property. -^^ 

11 Ibid., and entries for May 31, June 2, 4, 1864; Banks to Mc- 
Clemand, New Orleans, May 31, 1864, in Warmoth Papers, Correspondence, 
Januai-y — May, 1864; Special Order No. 143, New Orleans, [June] 1, 
1864, ibid. 

12 Warmoth Diary, VI, entry for June 8, 1864; Statement of Charles 
H. James, September 15, 1864, in Letters Received (Civil), 1864, Box 8, 
Record Group 98, Records of the War Department, National Archives; 
R. K. Dioss to Bowen, July 2, 1864, ibid.; manuscript record of the case of 
U.S. vs D. N. Ensworth, August 3, 1864, ibid., Box 6. Banks termed this 
judgement "inequitable" and ordered it reduced. 

13 See John W. Corrigan, John Bulkley et al. to Hurlbut [September 
28], 1864, in Letters Received (Civil), 1864, Box 5, Record Group 98, 
Records of the War Department, National Archives; Compendium of 


Warmoth was relieved from duty on October 25, 1864, and 
ordered to return to his regiment. Arrived in Louisville, Ken- 
tucky, he hastily resigned his commission and hurried back to New 
Orleans. On January 10, 1865, he was licensed to practice law in 
the state of Louisiana and was soon doing so well that his name 
was mentioned as a candidate for appointment to the State Supreme 
Court. He was at the time not yet twenty-two years old.-"^* 

Though it was established as a military court, the Provost Court 
heard a large number of purely civil cases. It was not, however, the 
only court hearing cases of this kind. As has been pointed out, 
Butler found it necessary to reconstitute the District courts of three 
of the city's six districts in October, 1862. The juisdiction of these 
courts was limited to probate matters and to "any civil cases be- 
tween party and party, not involving any question of political or 
military character." The restriction concerning cases of a political 
or military character meant that these courts had a relatively limited 
jurisdiction, for, other than successions, very few cases came to 
trial in New Orleans during the Civil War, that did not have a 
political or military character. Moreover, the stiff oath required 
of prospective jurors made jury trials, or even the organization of 
a grand jury, next to impossible. In November, Butler forbade the 
transfer or alienation of property by any person who had not taken 
the oath of allegiance, and this cut down still further the number 
of cases eligible for trial in the District courts. -^^ 

President Lincoln himself sought to remedy the lack of a 
system of higher courts for Federal Louisiana by creating a "Pro- 
visional Court" in October, 1862, authorized to "hear, try, and de- 
termine all causes, civil and criminal, including causes in law, equity, 

Charges Against Burghuber and Lutz, October 21, 1864, ibid. The judge- 
ment was ordered set aside by Judge G. Norman Lieber, who succeeded 

14 Special Orders Nos. 289, 291, New Orleans, October 25, 1864, and 
Special Order No. 265, Louisville, Kentucky, November 16, 1864, in War- 
moth Papers, Correspondence, 1865; Internal Revenue Tax Receipt, ibid.; 
T. A. Post to Warmoth, St. Louis, March 9, 1865, ibid. 

15 New Orleans Bee, October 15, 1862. Loyal Unionists Rufus K. 
Howell, W. Handlin, and E. Hiestand were named to the Sixth, Third, and 
First District Courts respectively. They also handled cases from the 
other three districts; ibid., May 22, 1863. The oath for jurors excluded 
from jury service all who had "aided the rebellion" by so much as a one 
dollar contribution. See also General Orders No. 73, New Orleans, Sep- 
tember 18, 1862, in War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official 
Records of the Union and Confederate Arinies, 130, vols. Washington, D.C., 
1880-1901, Series I, Volume XV, 572-573. This work is hereinafter re- 
ferred to as Official Records. 


revenue and admiralty. ..." This court, which was to act in lieu 
of the Federal courts dissolved by the act of secession was to be 
headed by Judge Charles A. Peabody of New York. He was 
empowered to appoint a prosecuting attorney, marshal, and clerk 
for the court who like himself were to hold their appointments 
during the Presidential pleasure throughout the military occupation 
of Louisiana. ^^ 

Though Lincoln had declared it to be a court of record, the 
Provisional Court proved a source of embarrassment to the legal 
minds of Louisiana, most of whom regarded it as clearly uncon- 
stitutional and illegal. Undeterred by this opinion. Judge Peabody 
opened the doors of the court on December 31, 1862, and he acted 
continuously under the Presidential order until the end of the war. 
Judge Peabody claimed less authority than his commission vested in 
him, but even with this self -limitation on his jurisdiction he managed 
to conflict with the military authority. In March, 1863, Banks sent 
his Chief Quartermaster, S. B. Holabird, to Washington in the 
hope of getting a ruling that would clearly establish the subordinate 
role to be played by the Provisional Court, which he felt "ought 
only to adjudicate upon subjects turned over or transferred to it 
by the military branch of the Government." General-in-Chief Henry 
W. Halleck answered reassuringly that "neither this court nor its 
officers should be permitted to interfere with or embarrass your 
movements," and told him that if he found it necessary, he could 
completely disregard the court and its officers. -^"^ 

The Banks-dominated legislature sought to do away with the 
Provisional Court in 1864, arguing that the civil government had 
been restored and that the President had recognized the regular 
constitutional courts, and as a result the Administration did impose 
further limits on the Provisional Court's jurisdiction. "But it con- 
tinued to exist," as one student has pointed out, "doubtless for the 
purposes for which Lincoln created it . . . rendering decisions in dis- 
putes or litigations in which foreign residents were involved or 

16 Official Records, Ser. I, Vol. XV, 581. 

17 Willie Malvin Caskey, Secession and Restoratio7i in Louisiana, Uni- 
versity, Louisiana, 1938, 154; New Orleans Daily Tnie Delta, December 31, 
1862; Banks to Holabird, New Orleans, March 27, 1863, in Official Records, 
Ser. I, Vol. XV, 694-95; Halleck to Banks, Washington, April 18, 1863, 
ibid., 702. Banks was excessively jealous of his prerogative in the De- 
partment of the Gulf where civilian officials were concerned. See his 
letter of December 6, 1863, to Lincoln, and the President's reply of 
December 24, 1863, in Roy P. Easier (ed.), The Collected Works of Abra- 
ham Lincoln, 9 vols., New Brunswick, New Jersey, 1953. 


concerned." The Provisional Court was ultimately abolished by 
Congress in July, 1866.^^ 

In addition to this creation of President Lincoln's, regular Fed- 
eral courts were reconstituted as the occupation went on. In June, 
1863, the United States District Court was reopened with elaborate 
ceremonies, many speeches, and a wild popping of champagne corks. 
United States Attorney Rufus Waples warned that the old court 
records were in such chaos that it would be some time before the 
court could go into the claims that had accumulated since 1861, 
but the reopening of the court was widely regarded as a significant 
step in the restoration of Louisiana to the Union. ^^ 

By November, 1863, there v/ere so many courts in operation in 
New Orleans that the old Cabildo on Jackson Square could not 
house them all and a number of them were forced to move over 
into the Presbyter on the other side of St. Louis Cathedral. There 
is evidence that many of the same complaints made about the 
Provost Court could be repeated concerning these newer Federal 
creations, however, and the judicial situation in the city as a whole 
remained the object of much criticism throughout the war period. ^° 

Elisabeth Joan Doyle 

Wheeling College 
West Virginia 

IS Caskey, Secession and Restoration in Louisiana, 155-156. 

19 Netv Orleans Daily True Delta, June 25, 1863. E. H. Durell was 
named presiding judge. The celebration produced one minor casualty — a 
champagne cork hit one of the guests in the leg. 

-0 Ibid., November 10, 1863. The existing courts were the U. S. Pro- 
visional Court; U. S. District Court; Provost Court; First, Second, Third, 
and Sixth District Recorder's Courts, Fourth District Justice's Court; and 
Coroner's Court. See also J. R. Franklin to Banks, New Orleans, February 
10, 1864, in Letters Received (Civil), 1864, Record Group 98, Records of 
the War Department, National Archives; J. Madison Wells to Hurlbut, 
New Orleans, March 14, 1865, ibid., Box 11; and A^e^' Orleans Times, 
April 11, 1865. 


An Historical Reviev7 


An Historical Review 





CAMPAIGN OF 1936 Donald R. McCoy 195 


OF 1864 IN ILLINOIS James P. Jones 219 

THE LOYOLA LEO XIII SYMPOSIUM . . . Edward T. Gargan 231 








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An Historical Review 



Alfred M. Landon and the 
Presidential Campaign of 1936 

For over twenty years, jokes about Alfred Mossman Landon have 
been standard in the comedians' repertoire. Punch Hnes like "What 
ever became of Landon" or "Finally, they made Alf Landon look 
good" were heard during the 1958 Congressional election campaign. 
Historians have scarcely been more kind to the 1936 Presidential 
candidate of the Republican party. As often as not, Landon' s 
1936 efforts have been given as little attention as those of the 
Union party of that year. Yet, the Landon campaign of 1936 
should not be neglected by historians. It should not be forgotten 
that Landon's candidacy was supported by the votes of almost 
17,000,000 people. More important for historians, his campaign 
pointed out substantial New Deal defects and pointed up major 
problems afflicting Republicanism. The campaign is also of interest 
in that it built the basis for the revival of the Republican party 
despite the party's overwhelming defeat in 1936. 

To understand the Landon campaign for President, attention 
must be given to the Kansan's background. Since 1914, when he 
served as a county chairman for the Bull Moose party, Landon was 
identified with the progressive element of Kansas politics. As such 
he assumed roles of leadership in Henry J. Allen's successful guber- 
natorial campaigns in 19 18 and 1920, in William Allen White's 
independent anti-Ku Klux Klan bid for the governorship in 1924, 
and in electing Clyde M. Reed Governor in 1928. Upon Reed's 
victory in the 1928 Republican primary election, Landon became 
Republican state chairman, a position which he held until Governor 
Reed was defeated for renomination in 1930. At that time, the 
Kansas Republican party was rent by factionalism, so badly so that 
Democrat Harry Woodring slipped into office as Governor. Lan- 



don, strengthened politically by prominence won in a mid-winter 
struggle against monopoly and for conservation in the oil industry, 
decided early in 1931 that he had the best chance of any Republican 
to unite his party and to win the governorship. He was able to 
win handily the Republican gubernatorial nomination in 1932, using 
successfully his progressive political ties and an effective appeal to 
the Republican Old Guard for party unity. After a three-v/ay elec- 
tion battle with Governor Woodring and the notorious goat-gland 
doctor, John Brinkley, Landon was elected Governor of Kansas. 

Once in office, Landon strengthened his party further by draw- 
ing together its factions. He strengthened state governm-cnt by 
working closely not only with Kansas Republicans but with Demo- 
crats in the state and on the national level. As a result of this and 
his own administrative abilities, Landon maintained vital state 
services and provided relief, welfare and reform at least equivalent 
to other states in the region. These accomplishments were accom- 
panied by balancing of the budget, reduction of popular taxes and 
adherence to the state constitution, a remarkable achievement for 
the time. Moreover, the Governor took considerable interest in 
regional and national problems, using a progressive approach.^ In 
1934, he won reelection by a comfortable majority of 62,000 votes, 
the only Republican governor in the nation returned to office that 

1 As Governor of Kansas, Landon, in a series of letters had supported 
or urged upon the federal government diplomatic recognition of the Union 
of Soviet Socialistic Republics, a $1,000,000,000 loan to the U.S. S. II. to 
stimulate trade, better government farm credit machinery, the Civil Works 
Administration, the Civilian Conservation Corps, government aid for 
college students, utility regulation, water consei'vation and flood control, 
forest conservation, natural resources planning, drought relief, banking 
stabilization, and regulation of the petroleum industry. On other in- 
teresting issues, he deplored the anti-Jewish activities of the Nationalist 
Socialist government in Germany, and urged and supported legislative 
investigation of racial discrimination in Kansas state institutions; Landon 
to Franklin D. Roosevelt, October 26, 1933, Januarv 16, 1934, February 11, 
1934, June 2, 1934, January 7, 1935, February 19, 1935, April 19, 1935, 
September 16, 1935, Landon to Harry Hopkins, June 18, 1934, Landon to 
Elbert Thomas, April 15, 1935, Landon to Eugene Meyer, July 23, 1935, 
Papers of Alfred M. Landon (Kansas State Historical Society, Topeka) ; 
all letters and speech manuscripts hereinafter cited are from this collec- 
tion unless otherwise noted. The Call (Kansas City, Missouri), March 22, 

2 See William Allen White, What It's All About, New York, 1936, 
Chapter IV, for a fairly reliable account of Landon's political background. 
For general accounts of Kansas politics during the Woodring and Landon 
administrations, see Ruth Friedrich, "The Threadbare Thirties," in John 
D. Bright (ed.), Kansas: The First Century, 2 vols., New York, 1956, II, 
89-103; and William F. Zoniow, Kansas: A History of the Jayhaivk 
State, Norman, Oklahoma, 1957, 244-255. 

landon's presidential campaign of 1936 197 

Landon's election victory in 1934 marked him as one of the 
leaders in his party for he was successful at a time when few Repub- 
licans were successful at the polls. Although he was aware of his 
prominence, he disclaimed any intention to work actively toward the 
Republican Presidential nomination. He did not believe there was 
much chance that the "nomination would come as far West as 
Kansas."^ Yet by spring of 1935, Kansas friends like Roy Roberts 
and Lacy Haynes of the Kansas City Star, Oscar Stauffer of the 
Stauffer newspapers, William Allen White, and Republican Na- 
tional Committee counsel John D. M. Hamilton began to discuss 
Landon as Presidential material. With their widespread journal- 
istic and political contacts their words reached many listeners. The 
stumping of the Middle West by Richard Lloyd Jones of the Tulsa 
Tribune in behalf of his "Kansas Lincoln," and the efforts back 
East of William T. Mossman, Landon's uncle and an industrial 
public relations man, and of former Kansans like Ben Hibbs of 
Country Gentleman also helped to lay the basis for a Landon boom.^ 

Landon did not take this activity too seriously. His strategy 
was to do his work in Kansas, and let whatever might develop 
do so without any unusual effort on his part. This policy, rein- 
forced by his successful record and his friends' efforts, brought 
many Republican politicians, editors and writers to Kansas to see 
him; others used the mail to exchange views. Governor Landon 
endeavored to impress upon them that the 1936 Republican nominee 
must be a man who could with fairness ferret out some New Deal 
policies that were good and make them workable by the application 
of "clear-cut, definite, and vigorous administrative leadership." 
This must be done within the framework of a "genuine budget 
balancing, tax reduction program," one that would eliminate waste 
in government and permit Americans to use their tax savings to 
build up personal purchasing power. The Governor felt that a 
continually unbalanced budget could lead to a debasement of the 
nation's monetary system, and very possibly to an economic dis- 
aster similar to that suffered by Germany in the 1920's. He saw 
the government policies directing an economy of scarcity as false 

3 Landon to William T. Mossman, November 24, 1934 and February 
19 1935 

4 William Allen White to Landon, July 3, 1935, July 19, 1935, Papers 
of William Allen White (Manuscript Division, Library of Congress) ; John 
D. M. Hamilton to Landon, July 1, 1935, July 11, 1935, July 30, 1935; 
Richard Lloyd Jones to Landon, June 4, 1935; Ben Hibbs, "Governor 
Landon Answers," Country Gentleman, Philadelphia, CVI (January, 1935), 
12 ff. 


and unsettling in a land of abundance. America's hope was in 
pushing its standard of living up to the level allowed by its poten- 
tial productivity. Landon stressed that these economic factors, the 
government's record of broken promises, and the President's prac- 
tice of glossing over them, could impose unbearable strains on our 
system of government and on even the most hardy character attri- 
butes of our society.^ 

Landon also urged upon his contacts that the Republican nominee 
not be the product of a convention controlled by the old leader- 
ship, "the bitter enders," for that would drive those holding liberal 
and moderate views to Roosevelt. If the old leadership controlled 
the party, it would seek power figuratively "to hang, quarter, and 
shoot at sunrise." This would result in a definite swing to the left 
nationally. Landon asserted that the nominee should be one agreed 
upon by ail elements of the Republican party, and agreed upon 
well before the meeting of the 1936 National Convention in order 
to allow him an opportunity to develop, unhampered by competi- 
tion, his ideas, campaign techniques and political knowledge even 
before his formal nomination. The alternative would be to present 
the country in June, 1936, with a nominee who would have to 
unite his party, gain his seasoning, and formulate his campaign 
and conduct it all at the same time.^ As the Republican party could 
not feasibly nominate anyone but a political newcomer, Landon' s 
formula was sensible if the party was to make the strongest show- 
ing possible in 1936, and, of course, tailor-made for Governor 
Landon. Yet it was naive in view of the practices of democratic, 
de-centralized American politics. While the events leading to 
Landon's nomination for President involved no great struggle, the 
competition was sufficient to stimulate factionalism and keep the 
candidates for the nomination concerned largely with convention 
matters rather than the election campaign. 

During the early summer of 1935, there was considerable doubt 
as to Landon's political ambitions. Frank Knox, the Governor's 
leading Middle Western competitor for national attention, thought 
that Landon was only seeking Senator Arthur Capper's seat should 
that lawmaker retire. William Allen White reported in July that 
the Kansas Governor was apparently hesitant about deciding to 

5 Landon to William T. Mossman, May 14, 1935; Landon to W. M. 
Kiplinger, May 14, 1935; Landon to Mossman, August 23, 1935; Landon 
to Mark Sullivan, April 9, 1935, October 17, 1935, November 4, 1935. 

6 Landon to Richard Lloyd Jones, July 29, 1935; Landon to Nicholas 
Roosevelt, June 18, 1935; Landon to William T. Mossman, July 25, 1935. 

landon's presidential campaign of 1936 199 

strive for the Presidential nomination in 1936.'^ Landon was 
hesitant, but in July and August he received considerable atten- 
tion in the nation's press. He was the subject of favorable editorials 
in not only the Kansas, Oklahoma and Kansas City press but ia 
newspapers across the nation. This swelling of publicity encouraged 
him late in August, 1935, to write his uncle that "possibly we will 
want to go after the first choice."^ By fall, however, events were 
to make Landon a definite candidate for the Republican nomination. 
Eastern business and political interests, prodded mainly by the 
energetic John D. M. Hamilton and encouraged by the increasing 
editorial attention for Landon, were beginning to show real interest 
in the Kansas budget-balancer. Attacks by controversial public 
figures like Harry Hopkins seemingly revealed that Landon was a 
man feared by the opposition. Furthermore, William Randolph 
Hearst, preparing to declare for Landon, had laid plans for pub- 
licity through his newspaper and magazine chains to make the 
Landon family "America's First Family."^ 

While these developments were to help Landon immensely in 
gaining the nomination, he was well aware that they could also 
smother him politically. Hearst and the Eastern interests, he insisted, 
should come to him; he refused to commit himself to them.-^^ As 
for opposition attacks, Landon refused to answer them or even to 
take a public stand on a national issue — a wise policy for a student 
of politics who, as he well knew, had much to learn. Other con- 
tenders for the Republican nomination, the Governor tried not to 
antagonize. ^^ His campaign strategy throughout the fall, winter 
and spring of 1935-1936 was simply to create an impression as 
a friendly, agrarian liberal who was also a most efficient executive. ^^ 

7 Frank Knox to Annie Knox, March 30, 1935, Papers of Frank Knox 
(Manuscript Division, Library of Congress) ; William Allen White to 
Herbert Hoover, July 24, 1935, White Papers. 

8 Landon to William T. Mossman, August 20, 1935. 

9 Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins — An Intimate Histot'y, 
New York, 1948, 80; T. Williams, Jr. to Landon, April 7, 1936; 
John Tebbel, The Life and Good Tivnes of William Randolph Hearst, New 
York, 1952, 260. 

10 Landon to William T. Mossman, October 3, 1935; Landon to W. 
A. Sheaf fer, March 14, 1936; Landon to George H. Sibley, March 24, 1936; 
Richard E. Berlin to Landon, January 13, 1936; Landon to Berlin, January 
18, 1936. 

11 Governor Landon refused to oppose Senator William E. Borah in 
the Nebraska and Ohio primary elections, and in Iowa he had his repre- 
sentatives stave off a local drive for Landon delegates in order not to 
offend Senator Lester Dickinson; Landon to W. M. Kiplinger, March 27, 
1936; Landon to Irving Stone, July 20, 1943. 

12 See Landon's few nationally publicized pre-Convention talks: 
"Speech by Governor Alf M. Landon of Kansas before State Chamber of 
Commerce of Ohio, Cleveland, Ohio, November 6, 1935," "Address at 


Within the Repubhcan party, he was exceedingly successful in this. 
By mail and by personal interview in Topeka, Landon was able 
effectively to supplement the activities of his supporters in gaining 
more supporters. The exchanges of views which he carried on 
not only yielded important information and insights for the Gov- 
ernor but allowed him the opportunities he so greatly needed to 
wrestle with the national issues. They also showed his engagingly 
gregarious personality to good advantage, and few of Landon" s 
visitors remained unimpressed with his willingness to discuss issues 
with them and especially with his desire to hear their views. -^^ Yet, 
the Governor did not allow himself to become attached intellectually 
or factionally by his visitors. This he accomplished partly by rely- 
ing heavily on newspapermen and writers for ideas and political 
advice, in fact to such extent that he could have been called the 
candidate of the working press. These newsmen included almost 
all of his leading Kansas supporters, Raymond Gram Swing, then 
of the ultra-liberal Nation, Raymond Clapper and Eugene Meyer 
of the Washington Post, William Hard, Nicholas Roosevelt of the 
New York Herald-Tribune, Douglas Aikman, W. M. Kiplinger, 
Mark Sullivan, as well as divers Hearst editors, especially Richard 
E. Berlin and Merryle S. Rukeyser. While Landon was more 
cautious with some of these men than with others, it is noticeable 
that they represented a variety of political interests — even the Hearst 
men, who seemed to agree only on how splendid their employer was. 
While Landon tapped visiting and corresponding politicians, 
writers and editors for information, he rarely committed himself 
on issues in writing and only in generalities, if at all, in person. 
This was all part of the stay at home, be yourself, appeal to all, 
be committed to none strategy which the Governor adopted and 
which his advisers endorsed. Landon had, of course, little choice 
concerning Presidential primary elections, because, as William Allen 
White wrote him, "primaries cost money. You have no money. 

Topeka, January 29, 1936," "Address at Lincoln [Nebraska], February 
29, 1936," and "Frankly Speaking: In Which Governor Alfred M. Landon 
of Kansas Is Interviewed on Questions of the Day by H. V. Kaltsnborn," 
May 7, 1936. 

13 Anonymous typed report on Landon to William E. Borah, n.d., 
"Presidency/Landon" file, Papers of William E. Borah (Manuscript Di- 
vision, Library of Congress) ; Landon to William T. Mossman, October 
3, 1935; W. M. Kiplinger to Landon, December 13, 1935; Landon to 
Kiplinger, January 8, 1936, March 27, 1936; Nicholas Roosevelt to Landon, 
February 14, 1936; William Allen White to Landon, February 15, 1936; 
Landon to Raymond Clapper, April 1, 1936; Landon to Oscar Stauffer, 
November 23, 1936. 

landon's presidential campaign of 1936 201 

You cannot get much honest money. "■'^* Even in terms of a per- 
sonal campaign organization, Landon had little support. The 
Landon for President Committee had little money. In fact, it had 
spent only about $100,000 by May of 1936, and the greater part 
of this came after Landon was established as the leading candi- 
date for the nomination. He did not use a national press clipping 
service until as late as October, 1935; neither he nor the Com- 
mittee employed a public relations man; in fact, the Committee 
had no letterheads until March, 1936.-^^ To win the nomination 
Landon relied upon his record, personality, the enthusiasm of his 
friends, and his apparently favorable position in regard to the 
important Middle Western and farm votes. These were, however, 
sufficient. As Landon wrote after the 1936 elections, "I can say 
that I made less effort for the nomination than any nominee in 
our time."-^^ 

The Landon forces felt that they had the nomination clinched 
early in the spring of 1936. Their task, until the Republican Na- 
tional Convention met in Cleveland, Ohio, was to keep the Gover- 
nor's supporters in line and to work for the adoption of an accept- 
able platform. Roy Roberts, Lacy Haynes, John D. M. Hamilton, 
and various Republican members of Congress from Kansas, especially 
Senator Arthur Capper, continued their effective efforts for Landon 
with journalists and Eastern and Middle Western politicians. Fred 
Seaton and George Sibley campaigned strenuously among Young 
Republicans, while Oscar Stauffer and Hamilton were successful 
in holding considerable party grass-roots and delegate support for 
Governor Landon with the Landon for President Committee. On 
the development of the platform, Charles P. Taft, served as gen- 
eral coordinator in the drafting of the Landon planks, and William 
Allen White served as the Governor's chief emmissary in contact- 
ing key Republican leaders before the Convention and also in work- 
ing as the Governor's agent on the Resolutions Committee. ^'^ Gov- 
ernor Landon continued to do his part at once by serving as com- 
mander-in-chief of his forces and by impressing upon those who 
contacted him that the party needed unity and greater liberalism, 
and the nation needed moderation. 

14 William Allen White to Landon, February 15, 1936. 

15 White, op. cit., 17 ff. ; Landon to H. Alexander Smith, Jr., October 
18, 1935, Landon to W. M. Kiplinger, March 27, 1936. 

16 Landon to Leslie Edmonds, November 12, 1936. 

17 White, What It's All About, 17-20 and 28-37; George H. Sibley to 
Landon, April 4, 1936; William Allen White to Landon, April 21, 1936; 
Walter Johnson, William Allen White's America, New York, 1947, 454 ff. 


When the Cleveland Convention of the Republican party met 
in June, it was apparent that it vv^as dominated by amateurs. Al- 
though a number of prominent Republicans were candidates for the 
Presidential nomination, and while former President Hoover could 
not be considered out of contention, it was also apparent even be- 
fore the keynote address that Governor Landon had the majority 
sentiment with him. Therefore, the main task of the Convention 
was to devise a platform, one acceptable to the Landon forces and 
to all but the most extreme party elements. Despite William Allen 
White's efforts, the recommendations of the Resolutions Committee 
did not provide the measure of liberalism demanded by Governor 
Landon. The Governor therefore took the bold action of wiring 
his interpretation of three key platform planks to the Convention 
before his name was presented for balloting. ^^ This telegram stated 
his declaration for an amendment to the Constitution authorizing 
state regulation of maximum hours, minimum wages and working 
conditions for women and children, for a airrency convertible to 
gold when this could be done without injuring the economy, and 
for expanding the merit system, to all government positions below 
the rank of Assistant Secretary.^^ These telegraphed platform 
amendments revealed the Kansan's concern for following what he 
regarded as sound middle paths, reform, flexibility and efficiency, 
but not centralization of power or extraordinary use of power. 
They also reflected his conviction that only compromise meant unity 
and real progress nationally. By nominating Landon — and on the 
first ballot, at that — the Convention in essence adopted his pla:- 
form interpretations. 

One issue remained to be settled at the Convention: the Yice 
Presidential nomination. Governor Landon had shov/n some in- 
terest in seeing an anti-Roosevelt Democrat named in order to en- 
courage Democratic dissidents like Alfred E. Smith and Bainbridge 
Colby to support the Republican national ticket. ^° In the press 
of events, however, Landon and his closest advisers were unable to 

18 White, Wliat It's All About, 21-37; Harold R. Bruce, "Presidential 
Campaigns," in Edward B. Logan (ed.), The American Political Scene, 
New York, 1936, 165 f. ; Johnson, William Allen White's America, 456 f.; 
New York Times, June 12, 1936. 

19 Landon to John D. M. Hamilton, June 11, 1936. 

-0 Nicholas Roosevelt to Landon, November 29, 1935, Landon to N. 
Roosevelt, December 5, 1935, Paul Block to Landon, March 24, 1936, April 
23, 1936; William T. Mossman to Landon, May 1, 1936; Richard Lloyd 
Jones to Landon, June 3, 1936, June 4, 1936. Smith, Colby and other 
prominent Democrats supported Landon in the 1936 campaign, working 
mainly through an organization called the Jeffersonian Democrats; New 
York Times, July 19, 1936, October 2, 1936. 

landon's presidential campaign of 1936 203 

afford the idea serious consideration. His representatives at the 
Cleveland Convention therefore worked for Arthur H. Vandenberg 
with Landon's approval since the Michigan Senator was viewed 
as a moderate who could work well with the Governor and yet be 
accepted by the party conservatives. However, by the time Roy 
Roberts and John D. M. Hamilton had persuaded other Convention 
leaders to agree on Vandenberg, the Senator had indicated that he 
would not accept the nomination."^ In his stead, Frank Knox, who 
was most acceptable to party conservatives, was given the nomina- 
tion. Landon was not unhappy with this choice as he felt the Chi- 
cago publisher, an old Bull Mooser, really to be a moderate. 

The biggest immediate problem facing Landon after the Con- 
vention was party organization. He believed the party's greatest 
handicaps to be defeatism, a paucity of effective organization, and 
intelligent leadership. He was critical of Hoover for delaying 
proper reorganization of the National Committee after his defeat 
in 1932. He was also unhappy with the national organization for 
selecting for National Committee Chairman during Roosevelt's first 
term a man who had never previously even been in a precinct fight. 
Landon did not know whether an effective Republican organization 
could be built in time for the fall campaign, but he was determined 
to try to do so.^" The Kansan viewed the Republican National 
Convention as a beginning. First of all, the Convention had dis- 
played remarkable unity in nominating both Landon and Knox on 
the first ballots respectively, and also in accepting with little fuss 
a platform which represented a marked departure from the con- 
servative party documents from 1920 through 1932. Landon him- 
self had shown, in wiring the Convention his platform interpreta- 
tions, an element of leadership which bolstered the morale of many 
Republicans. The Governor was to build on these beginnings. He 
demanded a shake-up of the Republican National Committee staff, 
with the energetic John D. M. Hamilton becoming Chairman. 
Another step taken was to locate the headquarters of the National 
Committee in Chicago for the campaign. Landon's personal cam- 
paign staff was to be located in Topeka, headed by his tactful 
campaign manager Oscar Stauffer. Attention was given to lib- 
eralizing the National Committee's Eastern headquarters, directed 
by Joseph Martin, at New York. Here Frank Gannett and Agnes 
Meyer, representing the liberal elements of the party, served as 

21 Arthur H. Vandenbei'g, Jr. (ed.), The Private Papers of Senator 
Vandenberg, Boston, 1952, xi. 

22 Landon to William T. Mossman, April 22, 1936. 


watch dogs to ward off conservative domination. These moves 
Landon hoped would not only transfer the party organization from 
Eastern conservative control and onus, but give it a vitality it had 
heretofore lacked, in fact, a vigor which he hoped would survive 
the campaign regardless of the election results."^ 

In preparing the actual campaign, the emphasis was on youth 
and diversity of sources of advice. This was best seen in the people 
who were closest to Landon. His group of Kansas supporters and 
confidants was politically conglomerate and young. Willard May- 
berry, the Governor's secretary, was 34, John D. M. Hamilton 
was 47, Lacy Haynes, 46, Roy Roberts, 49, and Oscar Stauffer, 50. 
The Governor himself was only 49. Charles P. Taft and Ralph 
Robey, imported as Landon's key advisers, one liberal and one 
moderate, were 39 and 37, respectively. Other important advisers 
represented a wide variety of interests and included economist 
Ben M. Anderson of Chase National Bank, Leonard Ayres of 
Cleveland Trust Company, William B. Bell of American Cyanamide, 
former Under Secretary of State J. Reuben Clark, Eugene and 
Agnes Meyer of the Washington Post, Roosevelt's former Comptrol- 
ler General Lewis Douglas, veteran publicist William Hard, farm 
bloc Congressional leader Clifford Hope, former Secretary of the 
Treasury Ogden Mills, Gifford Pinchot, Earl H. Taylor of Country 
Gentleman, and Raymond Gram Swing.^'* Landon's Democratic 
supporters contacted him mainly through Colonel Henry Breckin- 
ridge and, ironically enough, the one Republican to defeat Alfred 
Smith for Governor of New York, Nathan L. Miller.-^ 

Landon's appeal to the voters in the campaign of 1936 was 
conducted largely in three ways: National Committee headquarters 
and Campaign headquarters publicity; the pre-Convention stand- 
bys, correspondence and interviews; and speech tours. National 
Committee publicity efforts were generally concerned with em- 
phasizing the key planks of the Republican platform and criticism 
of the Roosevelt administration. About 400,000,000 copies of some 
200 different pamphlets and leaflets were distributed, as were 
elaborate fact books about the deficiencies of the New Deal. Na- 

23 Agnes Meyer to Landon, August 2, 1936; Landon to Arthur H. 
Vandenberg, August 3, 1936 ; Landon to John D. M. Hamilton, August 
7, 1936; Lacy Haynes to Landon, August 30, 1936. 

24 Ogden Mills to O. Glenn Saxon, September 28, 1936; Ben M. 
Anderson to Saxon, October 15, 1936; Papers of Ogden Mills (Manuscript 
Division, Library of Congress); Landon to Karl Lamb, April 4, 1957; Jay 
N. Darling to Landon, October 6, 1936. 

25 E.g., Henry Breckinridge to Landon, July 27, 1936, Nathan L. 
Miller to Landon, September 29, 1936. 

landon's presidential campaign of 1936 205 

tional Committee press releases flooded the offices of press repre- 
sentatives in Chicago, New York and Washington, and William 
Hard conducted a series of hard hitting weekday broadcasts through- 
out the campaign aimed at explaining Landon's record, the Repub- 
lican platform, and the deficiencies of the Roosevelt administra- 
tion."^ Landon's headquarters concerned itself mainly with ar- 
ranging publicity for the Governor's activities and speeches, while 
serving as a clearing house for suggestions for National Commit- 
tee headquarters and Landon. Aside from publicity, both head- 
quarters, and the Republican Congressional campaign organization 
in Washington, were greatly interested in spurring the resurrec- 
tion of local and state party groups in the nation. For examples, 
John D. M. Hamilton, as National Committee chairman, conducted 
an unprecedented series of extensive tours to encourage such groups, 
and Governor Landon took a keen interest in making contacts with 
state and local leaders to accomplish the same end. 

For appeal to the voters, Landon personally placed greatest 
stock in his speeches.. While he did not write all of his own 
speeches, he outlined all but two, working each draft over several 
times to see that they were faithful to his ideas and idiom. ^"^ The 
Governor made six extensive speech tours in addition to occasional 
side trips. Of the twenty-six states he toured, those in the Middle 
West and East were most frequently visited. The South and the 
Northwest were by-passed and only a brief trip to California and 
the Southwest was made. From August 20 to election day, he 
spent all or part of forty-two days traveling. In themselves, Lan- 
don's speeches were meant to reflect a middle-of-the-road path, one 
which would be acceptable to the great majority of Republicans, 
to dissident Democrats, and to the public. They were designed 
to be as constructive as they were critical, and to look to the future 
rather than to defend the past. Furthermore, they were meant 
to be, like Landon himself, the direct antithesis to President Roose- 
velt — flat but sound, homely but forthright. ^^ 

Of the issues raised in the Landon speeches, the most important 

26 Also distributed by National Committee headquarters were 
18,000,000 Landon and Knox portrait posters, 42,000,000 campaign buttons, 
15,000,000 automobile stickei's, and 4,500,000 pieces of rotogravure pub- 
licity; Ralph D. Casey, "Republican Propaganda in the 1936 Campaign," 
Public Opinion Quarterly, Princeton, I (April, 1937), 34, 43. 

27 Landon to Raymond Clapper, November 10, 1936. 

28 Landon to Raymond Clapper, November 16, 1936; Landon to Wil- 
liam E. Borah, August 8, 1936. See also James M. Burns, Roosevelt: The 
Lion and the Fox, New York, 1956, 270. 


was that of free enterprise versus a managed economy. As the 
Governor stated it: 

The present administration apparently beheves that there is no future 
for this country. It has accepted the idea that we have reached our peak 
• — that ahead of us is a large standing army of unemployed; that, in con- 
sequence, the government must play a greater and greater part in manag- 
ing the details of our daily lives instead of confining itself to the expanding 
field of regulation in the public interest. 

The Republican party, on the other hand, utterly rejects this philosophy. 
It believes that America is still on the upgrade, that we can eliminate 
unemployment, that the government should tighten the rules governing 
business, but that it should not attempt to manage business. . . . 

In short, as Landon later put it, under the latter policy "the 
government tells us what we ca.nnot do. Under the other, the gov- 
ernment tells us what we ?7iust do."^^ 

The major support of this issue included a review of the New 
Deal record. This review led the Governor to conclude that the 
Roosevelt administration had failed miserably in its search for 
recovery. As he pointed out, $25,000,000,000 had been spent and 
yet 11,000,000 Americans were still seeking real employment. Lan- 
don held this situation to be a result of the administration's in- 
ability to build the confidence necessary to spur American enter- 
prise and initiative to create new jobs. This in turn resulted from 
the government's record of irresponsibility and broken promises. 
Governor Landon declared that the government had often promised 
economy, but had not come within $3,000,000,000 of balancing 
the budget. The government had promised to hold the line on 
taxes, yet fourteen laws had been passed involving new or in- 
creased tax levies. This included a doubling of the proportion of 
taxes borne by the little fellow. As for the future of the invest- 
ment capital essential to recovery, the Kansan declared that there 
was no assurance that today's investments would not be destroyed 
tomorrow by an administration which apparently believes that "the 
way to real and lasting prosperity is by the spending of borrowed 
money" and "that the more we borrow, the easier it will be to get 
out of debt."^° 

Landon added a number of instances of political irresponsibility 
to these financial factors in his explanation of the government's 
failure to instill economic confidence. He observed that the great 

29 Landon speech, Youth Conference, Topeka, Kansas, September 18, 

30 Landon speech, Municipal Auditorium, St. Louis, Missouri, October 
31, 1936. 

landon's presidential campaign of 1936 207 

authority initially requested and granted the government on a non- 
partisan basis for the emergency had been used for party and even 
personal political advantage. This was seen especially in the 225 
percent increase in the government's patronage list^-^ and in the 
use of relief administration for political purposes. Even more to 
be deplored, the Governor contended, were the sinister political 
attempts to appeal to the voters on the grounds of class, race and 
religion, and the contempt for the Constitution often expressed 
by the President.^" As injurious to building confidence in the 
government was the President's unwillingness in the 1936 cam- 
paign to take the people into his confidence as to his future plans. 
Landon emphasized that 

There can be an honest difference of opinion as to whether the proposals 
of the administration for one man government hold the solution of our 
social and economic problems, but there can be no difference of opinion 
on this: The President's theory of government should be presented frankly 
to the people at the polls. He has no right to ask for votes without tell- 
ing the people his intentions. Frankness in government is just as vital as 
truth in securities. ^ 3 

Turning to the positive side of Governor Landon's campaign, 
we find, as might be expected, that the program area receiving the 
most thorough attention was agriculture.^^ The importance of mak- 

31 Landon speech, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, October 27, 1936. 

3 2 Landon speeches, Cleveland, Ohio, October 12, 1936, Naturalized 
Citizenship League, New York, New York, October 29, 1936, and Madison 
Square Garden, New York, New York, October 29, 1936. 

33 Landon speech, Baltimore, Maryland, October 26, 1936. One of 
Governor Landon's major goals during the campaign was to draw out 
President Roosevelt as to his proposed future policies. Landon assumed 
that if Roosevelt answered the questions on key issues, the President would 
either embarrass himself by taking extreme positions or would commit 
himself to moderate policies. Landon felt that if President Roosevelt 
evaded his questions, he could not, if re-elected, claim a popular mandate 
for any particular policy. Roosevelt generally evaded answering Landon's 
questions by standing on his record. Landon's approach was best seen in 
his Madison Square Garden speech. The President in his next major 
address, as James M. Burns has observed, replied to the Republican 
nominee without really answering him; J. Reuben Clark to Landon, No- 
vember 9, 1936; Landon to Earle Evans, March 26, 1937; Landon speech, 
Madison Square Garden, New York, New York, October 29, 1936; New 
York Times, November 1, 1936; Burns, Roosevelt, 391. 

34 President Roosevelt expected this. On one of his "non-political" 
tours, he called a meeting for early September, 1936, in Des Moines, of 
the governors of the states afflicted by the drought, including Governor 
Landon. Roosevelt was well prepared and hoped that the Kansan might 
embarrass himself on farm and conservation questions in this encounter. 
The Governor was, however, also well prepared. The only significant 
result of the meeting was that it provided a considerable amount of news- 
paper copy of the two major party nominees and on the drought problem. 
For two conflicting estimates of the Landon-Roosevelt encounter, see Burns, 
Roosevelt, 277, and Rexford G. Tugwell, The Democratic Roosevelt: A 
Biography of Franklin D. Roosevelt, Garden City, New York, 1957, 425. 


ing the farmer "a good provider and a good customer" was em- 
phasized. This was to be achieved basically by increased demand 
for farm products, stimulated partly by returning the unemployed 
to work, partly by government development of new crops and new 
crop uses, and partly by a program of cash benefits to operators 
of family-sized farms. Incidentally, such a program was designed 
to lower retail prices thereby benefitting the consumer. ^° The 
farmer would be further helped by tariff revision aimed at elimin- 
ating competitive foreign products, especially dairy and livestock 
commodities, from the American market. The farmer was promised 
aid in recapturing his former foreign markets through reciprocal 
trade on non-competitive products and government help in disposing 
of American farm products abroad. Landon also called for the 
elimination of most-favored-nation clauses in treaties with nations 
which held an international farm trade advantage over the United 
States, because they refused to grant us similar privileges. Of 
course, the cash benefit program was to aid in supporting American 
agricultural income while selling our surpluses on domestic and 
foreign markets at competitive prices. ^^ The Landon farm program 
also promised drought relief promptly given, seed loans, a federal 
crop insurance program, equalization of rural and urban educational 
opportunities, permission to carry surplus reserves on the farm and 
yet receive income support benefits, and fulfillment of outstanding 
New Deal obligations to individual farmers. ^^ 

Two other important issues to farmers concerned farm home 
ownership and conservation. On the former, Landon promised to 
extend sufficient credit at reasonable rates for reliable tenant 
farmers to purchase farms and for refinancing of the farm homes 
of present owners.^^ Regarding conservation, the Governor called 
for a program far more aggressive than that followed by the New 
Deal. He indicated that a national inventory of all natural re- 
sources was first needed for proper planning. The Landon pro- 
posals included the demand for a comprehensive land use and ero- 
sion control program, but beyond that stressed the importance of an 
accompanying program of water conservation aimed at drought and 
flood control. ^^ 

•55 Landon speech, Des Moines, Iowa, September 22, 1936. 

36 Landon speech, Minneapolis, Minnesota, September 24, 1936. 

37 Landon speech, Des Moines, Iowa, September 22, 1936. 

38 Landon speeches. Ibid., and Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, October 23, 

39 Landon speeches, Des Moines, Iowa, September 22, 1936, Spring- 
field, Massachusetts, September 14, 1936, and Columbus, Ohio, October 10, 

landon's presidential campaign of 1936 209 

A second major appeal of the Landon campaign was to work- 
ingmen and businessmen. The keynote here was that national 
prosperity depended upon labor getting back to real work at good 
wages. This in turn called for putting business to work. While 
the Governor's program to accomplish these things could not be 
easily implemented, it could be simply stated. The government, 
under Landon, would work to put investment and consumer capital 
into circulation to create the necessary demand for labor. This 
could be done largely by inspiring the confidence of capital and 
management in the government. Honesty, efficiency, budget re- 
duction, and budget balancing were the methods to be used by 
government to inspire this confidence. These things could be 
achieved by strengthening the Bureau of the Budget and the Comp- 
troller General, eliminating the overlapping efforts and irresponsi- 
bility of emergency agencies, implementing sound executive reor- 
ganization, and cleaning house of patronage employment and po- 
litically motivated executives. *° To allay the suspicions of labor 
that only business would benefit from such a program, he empha- 
sized the need for workingmen to be united, and government pro- 
tection of the rights of labor to organize without employer inter- 
ference and to peaceful picketing. Governor Landon declared that, 
in the interest of both business and labor, he would work for mu- 
tual understanding between them based on perfection of collective 
bargaining techniques and government conciliation services. "^^ 

The Republican candidate's programs on relief and social se- 
curity were also designed to interest labor and business. He recog- 
nized that relief would have to continue while the economic ad- 
justments necessary to provide full employment were made, but he 
advocated completely honest and efficient relief administration. 
Added to the relief program would be provisions for job training 
to make relief recipients more eligible for employment. The pro- 
gram would be administered basically by local communities and be 
financed by local resources with supplementary federal grants-in- 
aid. Landon stressed that no one in need would lack for adequate 
and prompt relief.*" 

As for social security, the Kansas Governor believed that it was 
necessary in a highly industrialized society to provide a publicly 

40 While these themes are to be found in many of Landon's speeches, 
see particularly Acceptance Address, Topeka, Kansas, July 23, 1936, Chi- 
cago, Illinois, October 10, 1936, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, October 26, 
1936, and Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, October 27, 1936. 

41 Landon speech, Newark, New Jersey, October 28, 1936. 

42 Landon speech, Cleveland, Ohio, October 12, 1936. 


financed pension "as a matter of social justice." Landon's plan was 
simple and direct. He called for replacement of the Social Security 
Act of 1935 with a program of federal grants-in-aid to the states 
to give all American citizens over age 65, not just half of them, the 
minimum income necessary to protect them from want. This pro- 
gram was to be supported by a direct and widely distributed tax 
certain to constitute immediately, and perhaps in the future, a 
smaller burden on the working population than the administration's 
payroll deduction plan. As for other social security measures, 
Landon promised effective assistance to the blind and crippled, 
promotion of child welfare, improvement of public health services, 
and encouragement of honest and practical state programs of un- 
employment insurance.'*^ 

One other Landon program must be mentioned. As with Pres- 
ident Roosevelt, foreign policy pronouncements were given secon- 
dary consideration by Landon. Yet they were significant in terms 
of future developments. The Governor's central promise was to 
do everything possible to keep the nation out of war. This, he 
declared, required a positive program of world peace. World ac- 
ceptance of mediation and even arbitration of international disputes 
based on an expansion of international law must be promoted. The 
nation must again encourage reduction of armaments and take the 
profits out of war. More significantly, Landon demanded that 
America help to lower world trade barriers to create the economic 
conditions necessary to international prosperity and the strengthen- 
ing of the forces against war in other lands. America must be 
willing to join with the representatives of other powers to discuss 
world problems, and must make clear its policies of non-aggression 
and non-interference. To strengthen our insurance against war, we 
must have bi-partisan consultation on foreign policy, and build a 
more effective Department of State and foreign service based on 
merit and good morale. Should war come in the world, we must 
realize that isolation is impossible. Neutrality not isolation, the 
Governor averred, offered our best hope to avoid involvement al- 
though it must be a neutrality based on the understanding that we 
refuse to pledge ourselves not to go to war under any circumstances. 
Should we ourselves go to war, "the protection of the doughboy 
should be put above protection of the dollar."'*'* 

43 Landon speeches, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, September 26, 1936, and 
Newark, New Jersey, October 28, 1936. 

44 Landon speeches, Charleston, West "Virginia, October 30, 1936, and 
Indianapolis, Indiana, October 24, 1936. 

landon's presidential campaign of 1936 211 

One other Landon campaign issue worthy of mention actually 
drew on many miscellaneous issues and took strands out of the 
major issues. Yet, for the Governor the facets of this issue were 
of great moment. This potpourri issue might be referred to as 
civic righteousness, and it represented Landon's concern for the 
plight of the free man in a free society. Repeatedly he warned of 
the danger to individual and national character "to dole out bread 
for votes," or to trade our souls for prosperity.^^ Urging the neces- 
sity of keeping schools free from both federal control and from the 
influence of selfish private interests, he vigorously opposed the 
imposition of loyalty oaths on teachers when not required of others. 
He even defended the freedom of teachers to express and work for 
their political and social ideals out of school."*^ Before an Ameri- 
can Legion convention, Governor Landon stressed the importance 
in a free society of maintaining labor's rights. He also deplored 
fomenting of racial feeling, the efforts to capitalize on intolerance 
of race or creed,^"^ later saying that "if ever in this country there is 
an attempt to persecute any minority on grounds of race, religion 
or class, I will take my stand by the side of the minority."*^ He 
called for "open hearings — a court of appeals" for civil servants 
threatened with dismissal, and demanded that there the "accuser 
should face the accused."'*^ The inquisitorial tactics of Congres- 
sional committees, and the employment of secrecy by executive 
agencies in determining policies directly affecting farmers and 
businessmen were condemned.^ "^ Most of all, Landon emphasized 
the need for an alert citizenry in maintaining a fair, democratic 
government of the people.^ -^ While many observers felt the Repub- 
lican nominee only to be exercising his knowledge of platitudes in 
these statements, to him they represented facets of the most impor- 
tant issue of the 1936 campaign — the preservation and extension 
of the best in the national character. 

Governor Landon's campaign speeches represented many things. 

45 E.g., Lowell, Massachusetts, September 12, 1936. 

46 Landon speech, Chautauqua, New York, August 24, 1936. Landon 
wrote that "The evidence of the need of this speech is the fact that I 
have received a large number of letters from [American] legionnaires all 
over the country protesting against it." Landon to W. W. Waymack, 
September 2, 1936. 

47 Landon speech, American Legion Convention, Wichita, Kansas, 
September 7, 1936. 

48 Landon speech, Naturalized Citizenship League, New York, New 
York, October 29, 1936. 

49 Landon speech, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, October 27, 1936. 

50 Landon speeches, Minneapolis, Minnesota, September 24, 1936, and 
Los Angeles, California, October 20, 1936. 

51 E.g., Landon speech, Charleston, West Virginia, October 30, 1936. 


Through him was voiced something of a concensus of the m.ost ra- 
tional RepubHcan feelings, chiefly those that were sensitive to the 
needs of unifying and liberalizing the party so that it might achieve 
its avowed goal of injecting moderation in government. More 
directly, they were expressions of the ideas and ideals of the man 
himself. On the matter of the Roosevelt administration, he granted 
that some significant advances had been made in areas needing the 
intercession of the federal government. For his part, Landon be- 
lieved in aid to farmers, the importance of treating labor fairly, re- 
lief to the impoverished and destitute, in social seairity, conserva- 
tion, regulation of business, and in the comity of nations. Where 
he took issue was in the choice of methods used to seek solutions 
in these areas of need. His conclusions were that the adminis- 
tration had met in stopgap fashion many of the short-term problems 
of the nation, but had in its haste and confusion jeopardized re- 
covery in the long run, seriously threatening the traditional in- 
dividual liberties that only a framework of stable fiscal policy, ef- 
ficient administration, federalism, and separation of powers could 
insure. As he put it, "This Administration wields the same axe 
which has destroyed the liberties of much of the old world — an 
unbalanced budget, inflation of the currency, delegation of power 
to the Chief Executive, destruction of local self-government."^'^ 
The Republican nominee's fear was not that the Roosevelt govern- 
ment would destroy American liberties but rather that it v/ould 
unwittingly establish the basis for such an event in the future. 
Should he succeed of election, Landon had enough confidence in 
his own ability and the country's good sense to achieve recover}^ 
and reform without risking the loss of America's liberties, character 
and dynamic qualities. Should he lose, he hoped that he would 
at least have rallied effective support for sounder executive policies. 
Landon's campaign did not, of course, carry him to victory in the 
election. Yet, a review of his speeches and ideas does not even 
largely explain why. Whether he was right or wrong in his goals 
or a bit of both was almost immaterial to the issue of election. 
The answers to the question as to why he lost are to be found 

Landon contended that he expected to lose because v/ith the 
economic improvement experienced in the country in 1936, it was 
unlikely the voters would vote for a change.^ -^ The Governor also 

5 2 Landon speech, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, October 26, 1936. 
53 Landon to Oscar Stauffer, November 23, 1936; William Allen 
White to Landon, July 19, 1935, White Papers; Peter Wyden, "He Shows 

landon's presidential campaign of 1936 213 

charged that the Republican party was afflicted with an abundance 
of "stuffed-shirt and blind leadership." "It is," he said, "too much 
to hope a candidate to correct that in the midst of a campaign." 
Moreover, Landon knew "the Republican party has a lot to live 
down." Then too, ". . . much of the ground I covered in the closing 
weeks of the campaign was discredited because of the Liberty 
League, Economy League, etc. One trouble was that I had no 
one [except Charles P. Taft] to pick up the progressive and mod- 
erate side of my speeches. "^^ 

Governor Landon might have added that three-and-a-half years 
of demoralization and disintegration had atrophied the functional 
organs of the Republican party.^^ During the 1936 campaign, it 
was difficult to rebuild the Republican National Committee or- 
ganization and impossible to make effective political groups out 
of most state and local party units. Important party rifts were 
apparent during the campaign in at least California, Missouri, New 
Jersey, New York and Pennsylvania. While the National Com- 
mittee experienced a remarkable revival in 1936, it still revealed 
some pitiful political gaps. For example, the Committee had twenty- 
four workers in its industrial division but only three people on its 
labor staff.^^ The responsibilities of the various National Com- 
mittee divisions were not clearly defined and Committee publicity 
failed adequately to support the party's national standard-bearers.^^ 
Moreover, the Republican effort was fragmented because not one 
but several campaigns were conducted. Herbert Hoover and John 
D. M. Hamilton ran personalized speaking campaigns largely be- 
cause Landon could not very well dismiss or even effectively dis- 
cipline an ex-President or, in the middle of the campaign, a Na- 

Them How to Lose," St. Louis Post-Dispatch, October 23, 1949. While there 
is no direct evidence that Landon, during the campaign, was convinced he 
was going to lose the election, it should be noted that the private and 
public polls especially followed by his campaign headquarters in Topeka 
clearly showed a decisive Roosevelt victory. 

54 Landon to Rajanond Clapper, November 16, 1936. 

55 Chester C. Bolton to Ogden Mills, March 29, 1934, March 30, 1934, 
Mills to George H. Lorirner, November 9, 1934, Mills Papers; William 
T. Hutchinson, Loivden of Illinois: The Life of Frank O. Lowden, 2 vols., 
Chicago, 1957, II, 677-681; Malcolm Moos, The Republicans: A History 
of Their Party, New York, 1956, 401. 

56 Fred Brinkerhoff to Landon, July 25, 1936; C. D. Hicks to William 
B. Bell, August 30, 1936; Henry S. Caufield to Landon, September IS, 
1936; Landon to Arthur Vanderbilt, August 7, 1936; Landon to John 
D. M. Hamilton, November 11, 1936; Republican National Committee, 
Alphabetical Directory by Departments, August 17, 1936, Chicago, 1933. 

57 Casey, "Republican Propaganda," loc. cit., 27-44. Casey also argues 
convincingly that National Committee headquarters officials erred in not 
agreeing upon a few dominating issues. Instead, they launched too many 
appeals for the public to digest. 


tional Committee chairman, whom he considered otherwise very 
efficient. As for Frank Knox's campaign independence, it appears 
that Governor Landon overestimated the Vice Presidential nominee's 
ability to correlate his efforts with Landon's.^^ Then too, problems 
of communication between campaign headquarters at Topeka, Chi- 
cago, New York, Washington, and en route with the various cam- 
paigners, complicated attempts made to achieve a relatively con- 
certed political effort. Another significant fact was that a number 
of Republicans, lulled to sleep by the optimism of the Literary 
Digest polls, did little to contribute to the campaign. Also working 
to this end may have been the extraordinary enthusiasm early in the 
campaign of many leading Republicans and their later switch to 
pessimism. ^^ Other Republicans, dismayed by the party's past, had 
left or were to leave the party, like the La Follette brothers and 
Senator George Norris. Some like Senator James Couzens remained 
in the party but supported President Roosevelt, while still others 
like Senators William E. Borah and Hiram Johnson backed none 
of the candidates for President. Though great efforts were made 
by the Republicans to commit a number of these men, they met 
with no success. ^° 

Then there was the intentional strategy of holding Landon's 
speaking delivery to mediocrity to make Roosevelt appear flippant 
by contrast. This not only failed but stole from Landon's speeches 
much of their effectiveness and made him appear personally medi- 
ocre.^^ It was of course ironic that a man who used his personality 
to such great advantage with small groups and individuals to win 
the nomination could rarely project it to large groups.^" Governor 
Landon's efforts were also hurt by his speaking in an idiom which 
was not pleasing to labor or to city dwellers. They could not 
eat the pioneer virtues to which he so often alluded; they could 

58 The unhappy impact of contradictory Republican campaign state- 
ments and speeches is reflected in the reactions of Frank O. Lowden and 
one of his political associates in Hutchinson, Lowden of Illinois, 691 f. 

59 See Ogden Mills to Gordon O'Neill, June 18, 1936, November 6, 
1936, Mills Papers. 

60 E.g., Landon to William E. Borah, August 3, 1936; William Allen 
White to Borah, July 7, 1936, July 20, 1936, August 1, 1936; E. A. Rumely 
to Borah, October 9, 1936, October 16, 1936, Borah Papers. Many of the 
points mentioned in this paragraph are discussed at some length in Henry 
0. Evjen, "The Republican Strategy in the Presidential Campaigns of 
1936 and 1940," Ph. D. dissertation, Western Reserve University, 1950. 

61 Landon to Frank Altschul, September 2, 1936; Moos, The Repub- 
licans, 399. 

62 Henry Breckinridge to Landon, November 18, 1936; Grove Patter- 
son, / Like People: The Autobiography of Grove Patterson, New York, 
1954, 151. 

landon's presidential campaign of 1936 215 

not swallow the Republican party, nor digest the eulogies to econ- 
omy and efficiency. Certainly, Landon suffered from the apparent 
inconsistencies in his own speeches. He was unable to explain 
satisfactorily how he could lower trade barriers and yet afford 
additional tariff protection for farmers; how he could maintain and 
possibly expand existing services, and yet balance the budget and 
perhaps reduce taxes; how he could effectively use state and local 
governments to conduct relief and social security programs. 

It must be considered too that the Governor's campaign suffered 
from the unfounded charges and distortions of some of his oppo- 
nents. Liberals and radicals charged the Kansan with being in- 
sincere, a Wall Street and Liberty League tool, an instrument of 
Hearst, and an encourager of Lemke, Coughlin and G. L. K. Smith. 
Rumors portrayed Landon as a militant prohibitionist, an anti- 
Semite, and saying that $1.08 per day per family was sufficient for 
relief subsistence. Despite his record, he was shown as being 
virtually the descendent of Teapot Dome oil intrigues. His vaunted 
Kansas record, while outstanding among agriculturally oriented 
states, suffered from his opponents comparing it with the endeavors 
made in the more wealthy and populous industrial states. His 
uniquely successful effort at budget balancing was sneered at by 
those who claimed that it resulted from federal aid.^^ Probably 
much of the attack on Landon stemmed from the fact that, being 
from a less important and remote state, he was not well known 
before his nomination either to the nation or even his own party. ^^ 
This defect he was unable to correct during the campaign. 

63 Representative of opposition criticism of Landon are Harold L. 
Ickes to Amos R. E. Pinchot, mimeographed, October 19, 1936, Papers of 
Harold L. Ickes (Manuscript Division, Library of Congress) ; Earl Brow- 
der, Democracy or Fascism: Report to the Ninth Annual Convention of 
the Communist Party, New York, 1936, passim; Norman Thomas, After 
the New Deal, What?, New York, 1936, 3; Progressive National Com- 
mittee Supporting Franklin D. Roosevelt for President, Declaration of 
Principles, New York, 1936; John W. Wells, Meet Mr. Landon, Topeka, 
1936; Burt Comer, Tale of a Fox, Wichita, 1936. For other illuminating 
matei'ials see the miscellany of criticism to be found in the weekly press 
release written by Charles Michelson and published by the Democratic 
National Committee, Dispelling the Fog, Washington; RoUa Clymer's 
weekly "Digest of Landon Mail Received at Jayhawk Hotel Branch 
[Topeka]" in the Landon Papers; "Presidency/Landon" file, Borah Papers; 
George H. Mayer, The Political Career of Floyd B. Olson, Minneapolis, 
1951, 297; and Wilbur L. Cross, Connecticut Yankee: An Autobiography, 
New Haven, 1943, 344 f. 

64 William Allen White to Landon, April 21, 1936. United States 
Supreme Court Justice Harlan Fiske Stone, an astute observer of the 
national scene and a Republican, indicated in the spring of 1936 that he 
and others around Washington knew very little about Landon; Alpheus 
T. Mason, Harlan Fiske Stone: Pillar of the Law, New York, 1956, 404 n. 


Ironically, some of the Governor's most appealing organizational 
efforts haunted him. By striving to reduce conservative control 
of the party and bring in new faces, Landon, an amateur in na- 
tional politics, surrounded himself too often with other amateurs. 
Furthermore, coming from a state with few industries and no large 
cities, he was handicapped in his awareness of the subtleties of 
labor and urban problems and tensions. Because of these things, 
he did not have the experienced aid and knowledge he needed and 
therefore found himself with too many tasks to be done.^° In 
turn, because of this, he attempted to cover too many issues during 
the campaign with the result that many of the most significant 
issues did not receive the attention they deserved. This was also 
true of the National Committee. Then too, some of the issues, 
like spending and the Constitution, which received the most atten- 
tion, appealed only to a very limited number of people.^ ^ Landon 
made no commitments on patronage or on policy beyond that stated 
in his speeches, which deprived him of opportunities to control 
some of the activities of extreme elements in the party. ^'' Yet, by 
attempting in his campaign to harmonize the viewpoints of all 
major elements in the party, Landon dampened the enthusiasm of 
some of his most influential supporters. Friends like William 
Allen White^^ could not realize that the candidate had to try to 
represent the whole party, especially if he was to have a chance 
of creating a vigorous opposition party, to educate the party to 
some of the political realities of the 1930's, or to win election. 

Landon and the Republicans, of course, did not lose the election 
merely because of their own deficiencies. The unpleasant flavor 
of the long depression had conditioned a majority of voters to be 
unreceptive to the Republican campaign efforts. Then too, the 
political operations of the New Deal were at least as important 
as Republican defects in deciding the election result. But, the Nev/ 
Deal should have been effective. In Franklin D. Roosevelt, it 

65 Landon to W. M. Kiplinger, March 27, 1936; James L. Wright to 
Landon, August 3, 1936; Landon to Wright, August 10, 1936; Landon to 
William T. Mossman, August 3, 1936. 

6 6 Walter Lippman to Malcolm W. Bingay, October 14, 1936, enclosed 
in Bingay to Landon, October 16, 1936; Landon to Bingay, October 24, 
1936; George A. Hormel to Landon, October 24, 1936. 

67 Landon to James McMullin, May 11, 1936; Landon to Karl Lamb, 
April 4, 1957; William Hard to William E. Borah, October 20, 1936, 
Borah Papers. 

68 For some of White's reactions, see White to Henry J. Allen, May 
8, 1936, White to Thomas J. Norton, November 11, 1936, White to George 
W. Non-is, November 14, 1936, White Papers. See Johnson, William 
Allen WJiite's America, 452-461 for a sympathetic analysis of White's 

landon's presidential campaign of 1936 217 

possessed not only a remarkably skillful political commander, but 
a personable candidate who could point to a well-known national 
record of accomplishment. His administration controlled more 
federal, state and local patronage, and possessed more in-office 
leadership than any prior political group. It had spent almost 
twice the public money spent by any peacetime American govern- 
ment, and had obligated to it through relief activities about one- 
sixth of the population. The Roosevelt forces were not reluctant 
about using all this for political purposes. ^^ The Republicans, 
even with their grand campaign fund, could scarcely hope to com- 
bat such a political force as was constructed by the New Deal. 

It should be emphasized, however, that the Landon campaign 
did more than just reveal Republican deficiences. Under hostile 
circumstances, the campaign helped to perpetuate certain ideas 
which have continued to receive attention in America, among them 
the concepts of an economy of plenty, the possibilities of new 
frontiers, unity of the people, efficiency, economy, state and local 
rights, exaltation of the Constitution, and a regulatory government 
rather than a managed state. Governor Landon also pointed out 
numerous New Deal defects, and indicated paths of action which 
the New Deal itself followed. During the campaign, government 
officials were prompted to take positive action to eliminate some 
of Landon's issues. Some examples of this were the President's 
extension of civil service regulations to postmasters, Harry Hopkins' 
sudden interest in dealing with the political intimidation of Works 
Progress Administration workers, the stepping up of the govern- 
ment's drought relief program, and the establishment of a committee 
to devise crop insurance proposals. After the campaign, the gov- 
ernment began to show interest in developing better crop uses and 
cultivating foreign agricultural markets. '^° Possibly the Landon 
and Republican campaigns also were partly responsible for a down- 
grading of the planned society elements in the government, the 
great battle in Congress to block Roosevelt's Court Reorganization 
proposals, increased executive and legislative interest in efficiency, 
and stepped up conservation efforts. Certainly, the campaign served 

69 Bureau of the Census, United States Department of Commerce, 
Historical Statistics of the United States, 1789-19^5, Washington, 1949, 
299 ff. ; Broadus Mitchell, Depression Decade, New York, 1947, 315. 

70 Burns, Roosevelt, 276; Sherwood, Roosevelt and. Hopkins, 81, 83; 
Harold L. Ickes, The Secret Diary of Harold L. Ickes, 3 vols., New York, 
1953-1954, I, 684; Chester C. Davis, "The Development of Agricultural 
Policy Since the End of the World War," in United States Department 
of Agriculture, An Historical Survey of American Agricidture, Washing- 
ton, 1941, 317-323. 


to publicize these issues before the government seriously wrestled 
with them. 

Perhaps the most interesting function of the campaign was the 
way it marked out a road for the reconstruction of the Republican 
party. This the Landon forces accomplished partly by broadening 
the control of the party to include Middle Westerners, liberals 
and young bloods, and partly by initiating the rebuilding of the 
party's political machinery. Landon, in his speeches and personal 
contacts, also educated many Republicans to a recognition that such 
things as organized labor, government regulation of business, con- 
servation, farm relief, and social security were realities in American 
life. Of course, the Landon campaigns for nomination and es- 
pecially election represented only the beginning of the struggle for 
the intellectual and organizational reconstruction of the Republican 
party, a struggle which was to be carried on for many years fol- 
lowing. Yet, in viewing his efforts it is not too fantastic to suggest 
that Landon not only was significant in carrying out the role of 
opposition candidate under most difficult circumstances but played 
an important part in shaping the development of his party into what 
within a generation would be known as Modern Republicanism. 

Donald R. McCoy 

University of Kansas, 

John A. Logan and the Election 
of 1864 in lUinois 

From 1866 to his death twenty years later, John A. Logan 
was Illinois' best known Republican politician. Those who heard 
"Black Jack" lash Democratic opponents in his best "Bloody Shirt" 
style forgot that before the Civil War Logan was a Democrat. A 
loyal follower of Stephen A. Douglas, Logan served in the House 
of Representatives from 1859 to 1861 as a member of the party 
he later denounced as the party of treason. 

Coming from Egypt, the pro-Southern section of southern Illinois, 
Logan favored compromise in the secession crisis. His refusal to 
rush to the colors immediately after Sumter led his Republican 
opponents to charge Logan with aiding the Confederacy. Logan 
did not openly support war for the Union until June, 1861, and 
even then he hoped for last minute compromise. After the 1861 
special session of Congress, Logan decided compromise was futile 
and announced he would no longer "stand out against the storm. "■*■ 
In August he returned to Egypt and organized the 31st Illinois 
Infantry Regiment. 

With his entry into the army Logan slowly abandoned his pre- 
war politics. Due to the absence of his comments on political 
issues, Logan's change was generally unknown. It was not until 
he returned to Illinois in July, 1863, after Vicksburg's fall, that his 
former constituents became aware of his altered feelings. In 
Illinois' 1863 election, Logan, a war Democrat, spoke for Unionist 
candidates and denounced all peace men, including many of his 
former friends whom he flayed as Copperheads. The former pro- 
Southern compromiser roared at a DuQuoin, Illinois, crowd, "I 
will tell you what sort of a peace I am for. I am not for a piece 
of a country."^ He also endorsed harsh measures to suppress the 
rebellion and even supported the use of Negro troops. 

Logan's 1863 speeches were a major break in his political career. 
He returned to the front in October still a Democrat, but a stanch 
war Democrat willing to campaign for pro-war candidates no 
matter what their party affiliation. Since "Black Jack" was a 

1 John A. Logan to Mary Logan, July 4, 1861, John A. Logan Mss., 
Library of Congress. 

2 John A. Logan, Speech of General John A. Logan on Return to 
Illinois After the Capture of Vicksburg, Cincinnati, 1863, 20. 



potent force in Illinois politics, especially in bitterly divided Egypt, 
this outspoken support of most administration policies was welcomed 
in Washington. 

As election year 1864 approached, Illinois politicians watched 
Logan to discern some evidence of his feelings. Would he stand 
by his 1863 speeches or would he return to his more moderate 
1861 position? Logan commanded the 15th Corps in Sherman's 
Georgia campaign, and while the army moved on Atlanta the 
question remained unanswered. Then, on September 2 Atlanta fell 
and Sherman's weary troops went into camp, where Sherman's 
fertile mind began to ponder the next move against the rebels. 
Logan's thoughts, however, moved in other directions. As after 
Vicksburg, a lull gave him a chance to go home and parlay his 
military fame in the political arena. 

As Sherman's legions struck deep into the heart of the Con- 
federacy, political events of 1864 gathered momentum. Union 
failure to end the war in the spring and summer increased the 
clamor for peace and made Democratic chances of unseating Lincoln 
in the fall appear excellent. Furthermore, Republican politicians 
were not helping their own cause. Factional strife between Lincoln 
and the Radicals brought on Salmon P. Chase and John C. Fremont 
booms. Both movements gradually disappeared to be followed 
by a Lincoln victory in June at Baltimore. Tennessee Unionist 
Andrew Johnson was named Lincoln's running mate. The Balti- 
more platform called for a united effort to put down the rebellion 
and demanded abolition of slavery. 

Democrats met in Chicago August 29 to choose their nominees. 
Both war and peace men were included in the convention and a 
war Democrat, General George McClellan, and a peace man, George 
Pendleton of Ohio, were the party's candidates. The platform 
was composed by the peace faction and called the war a failure. 
It demanded peace as soon as possible. 

In Illinois, Democrats seemed to be ahead in the spring and 
summer. They nominated James Robinson for governor while 
Republicans chose Richard Oglesby. In Egypt Josh Allen was cer- 
tain to receive the Democratic nomination for Congress from the 
13th District, Logan's old seat. For a time the Republican candi- 
date was in doubt, but in July Andrew J. Kuykendall, an old com- 
rade of Logan's in the 31st Illinois and a former Democrat, won 
the nomination to oppose Allen. The Illhiois State Register, Spring- 
field's Democratic paper, greeted Kuykendall with hostility: "The 
miscegens of the 13 th district have nominated that patriotic 'war 


democrat' Kuykendall for Congress. Good Lord Kuyk, what can 
one man do? We don't think you'll find your "war democracy' a 
very paying card in Egypt. "^ 

Logan kept his eye on the political scene as he fought through 
Georgia. As early as March he had written his wife, "I under- 
stand that Josh Allen will soon . . . commence his canvass for Con- 
gress. I do hope that [L N.] Haynie will run against him and 
beat him. He can do it and God knows it would do me good to 
hear of his defeat."^ Logan said little else about politics until 
nominations had been made and then he struck at Allen again. 
"Josh Allen wrote me a letter, the infernal scroundrel, merely 
wanting me to write a letter to him saying that I was not for 
Kuykendall. I shall not answer his letter, but hope Kuykendall may 
beat him of which I have no hopes. "^ 

In August and September, as national candidates were nominated 
and politics moved to stage center, Logan was deluged with political 
letters. Two old Democratic friends, Charles Lanphier, editor of 
the State Register, and Democratic journalist James W. Sheahan of 
Chicago, wanted Logan to speak for the Democrats. Lanphier 
asked him to campaign for four days in Springfield: "They are 
pressing us here, have all the money, and with the pride about 
'Lincoln's home,' they will turn heaven and hell to beat us."^ 
Sheahan wrote after McClellan's nomination requesting Logan's 
endorsement of McClellan. He asked: 

Will you refuse both [party and country} when they jointly ask your 
voice in this election.'' In God's name Dear Logan, by all your hopes for 
your country and yourself, let not the Democracy ask your arm and be 
refused. . . . That party gives us a rational and a naiional platform, will 
you refuse to give your voice in behalf of our Hon. soldier, patriot, Demo- 
crat, and Statesman, McClellan.'* 

P.S. Lincoln has gone to the devil. Illinois will give Mc[Clellan} 
35,000 majority.7 

Logan seems to have ignored these pleas entirely. Until Atlanta 
fell he showed no indication that he would participate in the election 
in any capacity. 

3 Illinois State Register, July 8, 18G4. 

4 Logan to Mary Logan, March 4, 1864, Logan Mss. HajTiie was a 
pre-war friend of Logan's who had followed Logan's change of politics. 
Allen had been Logan's pre-war law partner, but with the outbreak of war 
the two men had become estranged. Allen was Egypt's most famous 

5 Logan to Mary Logan, August 6, 1884, Logan Mss. 

6 Lanphier to Logan, August 7, 1864, Logan Mss. 

7 Sheahan to Logan, August 31, 1864, Logan Mss. 


In September an old friend, I. N. Haynie, wrote Logan to ask 
his support. He regretted Logan's absence from Egyptian politics, 
and accurately stated the general's feelings when he wrote "I am 
sure that you cannot be a disinterested spectator of a field in which 
you were in days past so conspicuous a leader." Haynie told Logan 
Egyptian Democrats were nothing but peace men, but hoped at least 
six counties in Logan's old district might give Union majorities.^ 
Three days after Haynie's report. Republican Congressman Elihu B. 
Washburne wrote Logan from Washington. He congratulated him 
on his role in Sherman's victory and turned to politics. The Chicago 
platform, he commented, "proclaims the experiment of war has 
been a failure, that you and the noble soldiers who have been 
fighting under you have accomplished nothing." Washburne ex- 
pressed the wish that Logan might go to Illinois and campaign for 
Lincoln. "We want your clarion voice to echo over our state and 
arouse the Union and patriotic people to the salvation of the 

Washburne's appeal for Logan's support was seconded by the 
President shortly afterward. If Lincoln wrote Logan a personal 
letter the document has disappeared, but Logan wrote long after 
the war, "When I left on leave after the Atlanta campaign to 
canvass for Mr. Lincoln, I did it at the special and private request 
of the then president. This I kept to myself and have never made 
it public. "-^^ 

The request for Logan's leave that Sherman received came 
from Secretary of War Edwin Stanton, no doubt with Lincoln's 
approval. On September 20 Sherman wrote Logan's immediate 
commander. General O. O. Howard, consenting to Logan's leave. 
He remarked caustically, "There seems a special reason why he 
should go home at once."^^ Though military success had made 
Sherman more cooperative in sending soldiers home to take part in 
political campaigns, he still complained "our armies vanish before 
our eyes and it is useless to complain because the election is more 
important than the war."-^^ In his memoirs Sherman wrote curtly, 
"General . . . Logan went home to look after politics. "■^■^ On 

8 Haynie to Logan, September 9, 1864, Logan Mss. 

9 Washburne to Logan, September 13, 1864, Logan Mss. 

10 Logan to William T. Sherman, February 18, 1883, Logan Mss. 

11 Official Records of the War of the Rebellion, Series 1, XXXIX, 
pt. 2, 426. (Hereafter cited as O. R.) 

12 William T. Sherman, Home Letters of General Sherman, M. A. 
DeWolfe Howe, ed., New York, 1909, 314. 

13 William T. Sherman, Memoirs of General W. T. Sherman, New 
York, 1875, II, 130. 


September 21 Logan turned over corps command to General Peter 
J. Osterhaus and bade his men good-by. He shook hands with 
many, promising to come back. He told the corps they could "feel 
safe" under Osterhaus, and was loudly cheered when he boarded 
the train. ^'* 

Before Logan decided to return, both parties were claiming his 
support. The Illinois State Register advised Illinois Democrats that 
Generals John M. Palmer, John McClernand, Logan "and other 
distinguished and influential gentlemen who have not, of late, 
acted with the Democratic party, will give their influence to secure 
the election of Gen. McClellan."^^ Several days later the Repub- 
lican Illinois State Journal questioned the Register's claim in light 
of all that had been said against Logan by Illinois peace men. The 
paper intimated that Logan and other war Democrats would back 
Lincoln. ^^ Later, when they were sure of Logan's support for 
Lincoln, Illinois Republicans did not claim Logan had abandoned 
the Democrats, rather they continued to call him a "war Democrat" 
to win increased support from Democrats. •'^'^ 

Logan's journey northward took about a week, and when he 
reached Illinois, the Democrats announced his arrival with no 
mention of politics. -"^^ The Illinois State Journal, on the other hand, 
blared in a banner headline: "Gen. John A. Logan Coming Home." 
It claimed, "He will be enthusialtically welcomed by every loyal 
man in Illinois." Republicans had read of a recent Logan speech 
supporting Lincoln. ^^ 

Logan had said so little about his probable course that even 
his wife was not sure whom he would support. He had written 
nothing concerning politics except opposition to Josh Allen, but 
from this she felt he would stump for Lincoln. Logan's brothers 
thought he would come out for McClellan. In her Reminiscences 
Mary Logan tells of a bet she made with one of them. A span 
of mules was the prize won by Mary when her husband returned 
and spoke for the President. The mules were used to pull the 
Logans' carriage around Egypt. ^*^ 

Logan's first public appearance was scheduled for Carbondale 

14 Theodore Upson, With Sherman to the Sea, O. 0. V/inther, ed., 
Baton Rouge, Louisiana, 1943, 132. 

15 Illinois State Register, September 6, 1864. 

16 Illinois State Journal, September 8, 1864. 

17 Ibid., September 21, 1864. 

18 Illinois State Register, September 27, 1864. 

19 Illinois State Journal, September 24, 1864. 

20 Mary Logan, Reminiscences of a Soldier's Wife, New York, 1913, 


on Saturday, October 1. Before that speech, few were certain 
which candidates would be beneficiaries of Logan's "clarion voice." 
Two days later before Logan took the stump Josh Allen wrote 
him from Marion. Allen spoke of Logan's "extensive influence" 
throughout Illinois and asked, "if compatible with your sense of 
duty and conviction of right," that he back McClellan. Allen 
assured Logan his "true friends" were Democrats. Logan's former 
partner did not ask support for his own candidacy, but concluded, 
"No one would hail with greater delight than myself the era when 
your relations and mine should be as of your [sic}.""-^ 

Logan did not reply to Alien in writing but reserved his answer 
for the rostrum. On October 1, dashing off a note to Republican 
leaders, "I will be in Springfield on the 5th of October ready for 
duty," he walked to Carbondale square for his first address. He 
had been swamped with questions since he reached the city but 
had parried them ail. Logan looked appropriately tired when he 
mounted the platform on a warm fall day and looked out on 
familiar faces. ^^ 

From his first words it was evident he would not support Mc- 
Clellan. He delivered a tirade against "men among us who 
sympathize v/ith the infamous and damnable treason." He spoke 
of his Democratic background but refused to "act with or support 
any man or set of men, no matter by what name they may be called, 
that are not in favor of exhausting all the men and means under 
the control of the Government in order to put down this accursed 
rebellion." His familiar voice rising to a roar, he said: 

When I find the leaders of the party I acted with, betraying the trust 
of the people reposed in them; when I find them repudiating the doctrine 
of Jackson, who was for hanging traitors to the highest tree . . . and for 
preserving the Union at all hazards, either with blood or without it, 1 am 
compelled to follow you no farther. I cannot go with you into the pre- 
cincts of treason and disloyalty. 

The crowd roared as he finished. "I will act with no party who 
is not in favor of my country, and must refuse my support to the 
nominees of the Chicago platform. "^^ 

After the Carbondale speech Logan boarded a train for Spring- 
field. A ceremony complete with cannon and speeches vv'as to 
have greeted the Egyptian, but a downpour of rain interfered. 

21 Allen to Logan, September 29, 1864, Logan Mss. 
"2 Mary Logan, Reminiscences, 170. 

23 Alto7t Telegraph, October 7, 1864; Carbondale New Era, October 
12, 1864. 


Several hundred braved the rain to greet Logan and hear Governor 
Richard Yates say, "Napoleon never had a better or prouder 
General than John A. Logan.""* Logan responded "I have come 
from the field, and feel happy ... to see the old stars and stripes." 
He told the small gathering there were only two sides, patriots 
and traitors, and declared his determination to fight the Chicago 

The Illinois State Register greeted Logan's arrival sarcastically, 
saying he had "reported for duty" to the abolitionists. It asked the 
former Democratic congressman how it felt to be supporting men 
who had called him "Dirty Work" in 1861. Lanphier's paper 
professed to be mystified by Logan's traitorous conduct to his 
old party. "^ 

On October 5, Logan closeted himself with Republican leaders 
to work out a schedule of sixteen speeches. Most of these were to 
be in Egypt, with an occasional foray into northern Illinois. ^^ The 
same night in Springfield, Logan delivered his second speech, 
almost a reiteration of the Carbondale address. He again called on 
Jacksonian Democrats to act as 'Old Hickory" would have acted in 
preserving the Union. He added, "I believe Mr. Lincoln is a 
devoted patriot struggling honestly to preserve this country." "He 
has done some things that I have not thought best," Logan con- 
tinued without specifying "but that he has tried faithfully to sus- 
tain the Constitution ... is a position ... no man can gainsay." Of 
Lincoln's running mate, Logan said, "If Lincoln should die this 
man Johnson has trains enough to run the machine. He is a 
patriot, a soldier, and a statesman. ... I am for these men whether 
I have a friend left in the Democratic party or not.""^ Logan was 
followed on the platform by Republican Senator Lyman Trumbull, 
who seconded Logan's statement before the audience of 8,000.^^ 

The State Register stepped up its attack on the apostate, reit- 
erating the 1861 Republican charge that Logan had raised troops 
for the South. Lanphier wrote, "John, we should be sorry to think 
you couldn't fight any better than you talk."^*^ Then the paper 
implied that Logan's campaigning constituted desertion from the 
army. It reported the Confederate attempt to cut off Sherman's 

24 Illinois State Journal, October 5, 1864. 

25 Ibid. _ 

26 Illinois State Register, October 5, 1864. 

27 Illinois State Journal, October 6, 1864. 

28 Ibid., October 6, 1864. 

29 Alton Telegraph, October 6, 1864. 

30 Illinois State Register, October 7, 8, 1864. 


line of communications, putting Union troops in grave danger. 
"Yet Major Generals Logan and Palmer . . . are in Illinois making 
speeches for Lincoln." Democrats everywhere took up the cry 
and Logan was condemned for playing politics when he should 
have been at the front.^-^ 

Logan left Springfield and spoke in Belleville on October 10, 
then moved on to Centralia and DuQuoin. At DuQuoin, scene of 
his 1863 address, Logan was joined by Oglesby. I. N. Haynie 
tried to get Yates to join the group, but the governor was unable 
to attend. ^^ At DuQuoin Logan reminded his listeners of his 
earlier address, and endorsed Oglesby for governor. Logan fol- 
lowed Springfield Republican Shelby CuUom on October 15 at 
Clinton, and launched his first attack on Josh Allen. Allen, Logan 
claimed, had proposed dividing Illinois into two parts in 1861, the 
Southern part to join the Confederacy. Logan stated that he 
refused to join Allen's plot and "told him that he would see any 
man who would attempt such a project hanged as high as Haman.""^ 

Logan's Egyptian speeches continued to strike at Allen. While 
he endorsed Lincoln and Oglesby, he worked even harder for 
Kuykendall. In August he was pessimistic of Kuykendall's chances, 
but in October his hopes soared. He wrote his wife, "I spoke 
yesterday to a large crowd, mostly Republicans. . . . This district [the 
13th} is now safe I think. "^^ 

Alton, center of Egyptian Republicanism, furnished Logan's 
audience on October 20 and he told them he was ready to go to any 
length to put down the rebellion. "I am willing to subjugate, 
burn, and I had almost said exterminate rather than not put down 
this rebellion. I am in favor of taking Negroes. I have no con- 
scientious scruples concerning slavery; but the South has violated its 
contract. "^^ Moving into deepest Egypt, he spoke in Jonesboro, 
Cairo, and Benton. In Jonesboro he returned to the subject of 
Josh Allen: 

Now let me say a few words about this man Allen. I know him well, 
and a greater traitor and humbug walks not unhung. When the war first 
broke out, and at about the time that I returned from Congress to this 

31 Ibid., October 16, 1864. 

32 Haynie to Yates, October 7, 1864, Richard Yates Mss., Illinois 
State Historical Library, Springfield. 

33 Missouri Democrat (St. Louis) in Illinois State Journal, October 
17, 1864. 

34 Logan to Maiy Logan, October 19, 1864, Logan Mss. 

35 Illinois State Journal, October 21, 1864; Alton Telegraph, October 
21, 1864. 


district, in order to raise a regiment and to enter the field and service of 
my country, I met Josh Allen stalking about the Southern part of the 
State, trying to turn it over to the rebels; and he made a proposition to 
me to stump the district for the Confederacy to induce the Southern half 
of Illinois to secede with me, and I told him I'd see him in Hell first. ^ 6 

This brought a heated denial from Allen. He proclaimed his 
innocence and professed astonishment at Logan's charge. "I pro- 
nounce the charge . . . said to have been made by General Logan, 
as unqualifiedly false — false in its conception by him, and das- 
tardly in its repetition by the poor parasites of ill-gained power. ""'^ 

Logan, accused by Democrats of aiding the Confederacy in 
1861, echoed Allen in denying charges of treason. He wrote a 
note dealing with these charges to Egyptian Republican D. L. 
Phillips, which was printed in the Chicago Tribune. Logan called 
these allegations "false in every particular," and denied he had 
ever assisted any man to go South. His opponents were slander- 
ing him because he had stood by his country while they aided 
rebels. ^^ The Jonesboro Gazette defended Allen and berated Logan, 
its former hero, calling him a "mysterious combination of buffoonary 
and blackguardism," and pointing to Logan's pro-Confederate atti- 
tude in 1861.2^ 

The campaign, bitter all over Illinois, was especially intense in 
Egypt where Logan and Allen traded accusations at every oppor- 
tunity, while Kuykendall was forgotten much of the time. Logan 
concluded most of his addresses with appeals in Kuykendall 's name 
and bore the brunt of campaigning. Though Kuykendall spoke 
regularly, it was obvious that if Allen were to lose Logan would 
be the chief reason. 

Pennsylvania, Indiana, and Ohio chose state officers in October 
in elections indicative of the November result. Republicans ran 
well in October and forecast complete victory the following month. 
Many troops had been furloughed at Yates' request to aid Lin- 
coln's cause, and Logan everywhere met comrades from the Army 
of the Tennessee. The week before election day, Logan swung 
through Harrisburg, Vienna and Metropolis, then left the state 
for one big Union speech in Evansville, Indiana. Lincoln estimated 
Illinois in the McClellan column during the final week. Elihu 
Washburne had written of "imminent danger of losing this state," 

36 Illinois State Journal, October 29, 1864. 

37 Jonesboro Gazette, November 4, 1864. 

3 8 Logan to D. L. Phillips in Chicago Tribune, October 25, 1864. 
39 Jonesboro Gazette, October 29, 1864. 


but just before election day he wrote to a worried President, "Logan 
is carrying ail before him in Egypt. "'*° 

The nation voted on November 8 and next day even Lanphier's 
paper admitted "the returns so far look unfavorable for the Democ- 
racy."^-*^ Returns soon indicated a national landslide for Lincoln, 
for McClellan was able to carry only Kentucky, Delaware, and New 
Jersey as the President amassed a 400,000 vote majority. Illinois 
wound up safely Republican by 30,736 votes. In addition, Oglesby 
beat Robinson, and eleven of the state's fourteen seats in Congress 
went to Republicans.^^ 

Congressional and presidential races in Egypt were exciting to 
the end. The 13th District, always Democratic, went Republican. 
Kuykendall defeated Allen 11,742 to 10,759. Allen won nine 
counties to six for Logan's candidate, but Kuykendall won several 
by landslides. Johnson County, which had given Logan immense 
majorities as a Democrat, voted for Kuykendall 1,225 to 367, but 
Logan's native county, Jackson, refused to follow his lead and went 
to Allen. ^^ Even the neighboring 12th District became Republican. 
There W. R. Morrison, the Democrat, was beaten by Republican 
Jehu Baker, for whom Logan had campaigned. The Lincoln-Mc- 
Clellan race in the 13th was also evidence of Logan's electioneering 
ability and popularity. In a district that had soundly defeated him 
in 1858 and I860, Lincoln won a close race.*'^ 

Most were willing to credit Logan for the section's amazing 
political reversal. Washburne's words were echoed by the Illinois 
State Journal and the Alton Telegraph. The latter felt: 

The Union party is indebted in a great measure to him for the glorious 
result. . . . He it was that went to the field of battle and came back covered 
with glory, and exposed the machinations of Josh Allen. To this fact 
then, more than any other, this glorious triumph over Copperheadism is 
attributable. 4 5 

After the war the Chicago Tribune recalled "how he revolutionized 
Egypt in the fall of 1864."^^ In 1864 newly elected Governor 
Oglesby joined these voices as he thanked Logan for 

40 Carl Sandburg, Abraham Lincoln, The War Years, New York, 
1939, III, 275. 

41 Illinois State Register, November 9, 1864. 

42 Arthur C. Cole, The Era of the Civil War, Springfield, Illinois, 
1919, 328. 

43 Illinois State Journal, November 21, 1864. 

44 Ibid., November 22, 1864. 

45 Alton Telegraph, November 18, 1864. 

46 Chicago Tribune, August 6, 1866. 


the generous and very effective cooperation and support of your heart and 
tongue in the late canvass. This however, General is but a small part of 
the rich results of your noble efforts in behalf of the whole cause. I feel 
sure your bold attacks in Egypt . . . will never be forgotten nor cease to be 
honored by all Illinois. ^7 

Election over Logan thought of his return to the army. Al- 
though he was exhausted and complained of an "inflammation in 
the throat," he wrote Sherman asking if he should come back at 
once, but Sherman, about to march to the sea, replied, "It is not 
possible to overtake your command. Remain at home until you re- 
cover. "^^ To obtain an extended leave Logan wrote Lincoln. He 
asked for thirty additional days and Lincoln answered immediately 
granting the ieave.'*^ Logan spent a few days resting with his 

Never quiet for long, he was off again in mid-November. 
"Black Jack" travelled to Chicago and delivered a Union speech 
before returning to Egypt at month's end. Logan's extended leave 
and his trip to northern Illinois may have been brought on by a 
sudden "Logan for Senator" movement. Letters written two months 
later indicate Logan's interest in the senatorship, but in November 
he stuck to an earlier vow to "eschew politics" and returned to the 
army before the legislature met.^*^ I. N. Haynie was interested in 
promoting Logan's candidacy. He arranged with the editor of the 
Mt. Vernon, Illinois, Unconditional Unionist to mention Logan 
as Egypt's senatorial favorite, promising to send a copy of the 
endorsement to every paper in the state. Haynie told Logan "it 
is my design to stir things up hot."^^ Several other papers took 
up the Unionist's call for Logan, but the state's leading Republican 
organ, the Illinois State Journal, was not carried away.^" The paper 
supported Yates for the Senate, but announced its admiration for 
Logan who it believed would not be a candidate.^^ Democrats, 
smarting under the election defeat, accused Logan of thinking more 
about the senatorship than the war.^* When Yates was finally 
elected, Logan was on his way back to resume command. Haynie, 

47 Oglesby to Logan, November 20, 1864, Logan Mss. 

48 O. R., Ser. 1, XLIV, 465. 

49 Ibid., Ser. 1, XXXIX, pt. 3, 751. 

50 Logan to Mary Logan, January 20, 22, 1865, Logan Mss. 

51 Haynie to Logan, November 19, 25, 1864, Logan Mss. 

52 Two of Logan's supporters were the Central Illinois Gazette 
(Champaign), December 2, 1864; Carbondale New Era in Illinois State 
Journal, December 12, 1864. 

53 Illinois State Journal, November 26, 1864. 

54 Jonesboro Gazette, December 24, 1864. 


disappointed at Logan's refusal to stay in Springfield until the 
legislature met, wrote Mary, "there is no question but that the Sen- 
atorship was within his grasp if he had been able to be present 
during the contest. All parties concede that Genl. Logan will be 
invincible two years hence. "^^ 

Logan's activity in Illinois in 1864 was significant. He sup- 
ported Union candidates and opposed those he felt favored peace. 
His speeches rang with appeals for war support, but mentioned few 
other issues. Abolition and Reconstruction were almost completely 
ignored. It is difficult to characterize Logan as a Republican in 
1864. He was obviously a Unionist, one of many pre-war Demo- 
crats who joined Republicans behind Lincoln under the Union 
banner. But to date Logan's conversion to Republicanism from 
1864 is misleading. In his speeches and letters he did not seem 
to think of himself as a Republican. Logan was regarded by 
others as a "war Democrat," or a "Unionist," not a Republican. 
His activities in 1864 were a step in the direction of the Republican 
Party, but he was not a Republican in 1864, nor did he completely 
embrace the Republican program until 1866 when he was nominated 
by that party for Congress. He was elected, and until his death 
stood as a personification of conservative Republicanism. The 
election of 1864 was an important episode in his change of party, 
and his efforts for the party he later joined told heavily in its 
victory in a key state in one of the nation's most important elections. 

James P. Jones 

Florida State University, 

55 Haynie to Maiy Logan, January 4, 1865, Logan Mss. 

The Loyola Leo XIII Symposium 

On March 18, Loyola University of Chicago held a symposium 
to honor the sesquicentennial of the birth of Leo XIII on March 2, 
1810. The conference on "Leo XIII and the Modern World" 
brought together for the major papers scholars from six colleges 
and universities in the United States. These scholars were joined 
by the Apostolic Delegate to the United States, His Excellency, 
Archbishop Egidio Vagnozzi, who contributed the luncheon address 
on "Pope Leo XIII and the Problem of Human Liberty." Leo's 
appeal to the modern world was reaffirmed during the conference 
by the papers read and by the attendance of more than five hundred 
students and scholars from universities in this country and Europe. 

The introductory paper was given by Edward Gargan, of Loyola 
University, who served as General Chairman of the Symposium. 
This paper surveyed contemporary press reaction in America to 
Leo XIII's pontificate. Leo's career was followed closely by the 
popular and academic press of America. This was true not only 
of the journals of the Catholic community, but also of the journals 
of Protestant scholarship. The North American Revieio, The At- 
lantic, and Harper's were typical of the popular magazines that 
considered his activity of great interest. 

Leo XIII was admired in the press for the dignity and holiness 
of life he exhibited. His statements were not, however, uncritically 
received. The Encyclical Aeterni Patris, The Restoration of Chris- 
tian Philosophy to Schools, issued in August of 1879, was, for 
example, interpreted as a step-backward by Professor Archibald 
Alexander, of Columbia College, in an article "Thomas Aquinas 
and the Encyclical Letter" published in the Princeton Review for 
January, 1880. On the other hand. The Andover Review of January, 
1886, considered the Encyclical Immortale Dei, The Christian Con- 
stitution of States, a marked change in papal attitude from that 
represented twenty-one years earlier in the Syllabus of Errors. And 
with less reservation, in 1891, The Andover Review thought Rerum 
Novarum undeniably socialist in tone, but likely to exercise an in- 
fluence "toward freedom and elevation of the working classes." 
The more popular journal The Atlantic Monthly reviewing in 1894 
all of Leo's encyclicals up to that date was especially appreciative 
of his Au millieu des solUcitudes, encouraging French Catholics 
to support the Third Republic as a legitimate form of government. 



The Atlantic wondered, however, whether Leo's impact on his 
Church would or could be reciprocated in the world at large. 
Harper's and The North American Review stressed in their accounts 
of Leo the lessening of American apprehension towards Catholics 
during his reign. This feeling Vv^as traced to Leo's interest in 
America and what was understood to be Catholic appreciation of 
the liberties enjoyed in the American climate and society. 

American sympathy for Leo was summarized in a special article 
by seven representative religious leaders of Protestant, Catholic 
and Jewish faiths in The North Ainerican Review for July 25, 1903. 
Archbishop John Ireland of St. Paul in this collected eulogy recalled 
most v/armly Leo's eager interest in America. "Some day," he wrote 
"a long chapter will be written on Leo and America — his apprecia- 
tiv^e understanding of our institutions and liberties, his genial love 
of the country and its people, his wise and large-minded direction 
to the Church in America, his friendliness of attitude, in more than 
one instance, towards national affairs." The brief examination of 
contemporary response to Leo XIH's pontificate suggested a con- 
sensus as to the issues and developments of the utmost importance 
in his reign. Problems such as the relationship of scholastic phi- 
losophy to modern thought, the Church's view of political and 
social needs, the Pope's thought as viewed in an American climate 
and in relationship to the growth of Christianity in its entirety 
were given important discussion by Leo's contemporaries. These 
issues have remained the significant problems for the study of Leo 
in our time and were the subjects of the subsequent papers. 

In his paper "The Church and the World in the Nineteenth 
Century," Kenneth Scott Latourette, Sterling Professor Emeritus iii 
Missions and Oriental History, Yale University, approached Leo 
XIH's achievement against the background of the historical forces 
that in the nineteenth century threatened the "very existence of 
Christianity" and the vital currents in the life of the Church that 
brought it unexpected success in this century. He saw Leo's work 
accomplished despite the prestige of a "secularized democracy" 
often antagonistic to Christianity and supported by a scientific atti- 
tude hostile to Christianity's place in the intellectual order. The 
Church at the outset of this century, he observed, appeared "inex- 
tricably bound to a society and political structure that was passing." 

From this dark beginning, Leo's pontificate was regarded as 
drawing upon a renewed successful effort in the life of the Church. 
This renaissance was seen as taking place "first of all" because "the 
Papacy became a more effective center of the Catholic Church's life 


than even at the apex of the Middle Ages." This development was 
in turn accompanied by success in many areas, among these "the 
revival of existing orders and congregations," vv^hose spirit was 
matched by "the foreshadowing of the devotion of the laity seen 
in the twentieth century in Catholic Action. . . ." These develop- 
ments were described as complemented by the geographic expan- 
sion of the Catholic Church accomplished through the immigration 
movement of the nineteenth century and the successful missionary 
activity also characteristic of this century. 

The accomplishments of the Catholic Church and the energy so 
magnificently expressed in Leo's pontificate was found by Latourette 
to be also present in the history of the Protestant Churches in the 
nineteenth century. He stressed the parallel accomplishments in 
Protestantism exhibited in wide missionary success and in devo- 
tional progress as illustrated by Pietism and Evangelicalism. He 
believed that Protestant achievement in the nineteenth century his- 
torically prefaced the importance of the Ecumenical movement 
within Protestantism in the twentieth century. In summary, Pro- 
fessor Latourette thought that the success of Protestanism in the 
nineteenth century alongside of Catholic progress established the 
historical perspective from which to evaluate Leo XIILs own his- 
torical achievement. 

Serving as commentator on Professor Latourette's paper, Mon- 
signor Harry C. Koenig emphasized the use that Leo XIII made of 
encyclicals to guide the Church's life. He did not believe that the 
progress of Protestantism in the nineteenth century lessened the 
historical separation between Catholicism and Protestantism in the 
twentieth century. On the contrary, he concluded that the persis- 
tence of doctrinal differences seemed to underscore a contemporary 
historical situation in which "Protestants and Catholics have alto- 
gether diverse concepts of unity." 

In his contribution on "Leo XIII and the Social Crisis," Mon- 
.signor Joseph N. Moody of Ladycliff College, found Marx and 
Leo in agreement as witnesses to the alienation and isolation of the 
industrial worker in Europe's economy. The pope was presented 
as grieved that this tragic situation almost irresistibly led the worker 
into the false expectation that industrial progress and wealth would 
satisfy his needs as a person. At the same time, Leo was aware 
of the temptation to the worker to choose class war as the means 
to his salvation. In this concern the pope, according to Monsignor 
Moody, separated himself from the Marxists by his refusal to con- 
sider the class struggle as historically necessary to the worker's 


improvement. Through Rerum Novarum the pope significantly 
depreciated the expectation of class war, a prospect gaining wide 
acceptance in working class movements throughout Europe. Rerum 
Novarum was interpreted as optimistically confident that the work- 
er's plight, essentially due to injustice, was correctable through 
social doctrines nourished by a passion for justice. 

Monsignor Moody observed that the accent on justice was present 
in Catholic social thought throughout the nineteenth century and 
that this stress had reached considerable clarity of expression by 
the 1830's. The de-Christianization of European thought and in- 
ternal differences between churchmen served, however, to frustrate 
the development of social Catholicism. Here again, it was Leo s 
role to offer decisive help to a minority of Catholics anxious to 
give life to the concepts of social Catholicism. Leo's leadership 
was regarded by Monsignor Moody as not entirely expected, but 
when offered, this leadership was indebted to the social thinkers 
v/ho preceded and were contemporaries of the pope. Monsignor 
Moody called special attention to the recent edition of the various 
drafts of Rerum Novarum in the important volume L'Enciclica 
"Rerum Novarum," Testo authentico e redazioni preparatorie dai 
documenti originali. (A cura di Mons. Giovanni Antonazzi. Pre- 
fazione di S. E. Mons. Domenico Tardini. Roma, Edizioni di 
Storia e Letteratura, 1957.) 

During the composition of Rerum Novarum, both liberal and 
conservative opinions were presented to Leo XIII until the final 
text was prepared with its important recognition of the rights of 
the working class to independent voluntary organizations, and the 
consequent rejection of corporative theory. In conclusion, Monsignor 
Moody re-emphasized the moral center of Leo's social teaching and 
the pope's refusal to endorse specific technical solutions to changing 
problems. In this, he believed, the pope could be considered as 
anticipating "the call of the more recent popes for the lay apostolate; 
for while he was insistent on the authority of the hierarchy, he saw 
the entire Church as responsible for the application of just princi- 
ples to economic life." 

Commenting on the paper, Paul Mundy, of the Sociology De- 
partment of Loyola University, acknowledged his ready agreement 
with the main argument of the paper. He thought, hovv^ever, that 
sufficient attention had not been given to explaining the time lag 
between the social crisis of the entire nineteenth century and the 
leadership provided by Leo. He also asked if Monsignor Moody 
had not failed to recognize adequately the "ethical complaint"* 


implicit in Marx's doctrine. Mundy furthermore suggested that 
the difficulties of Leo XIII's time are not yet over and that some 
recognition of the perennial aspects of social distress must remain 
a part of any evaluation of Leo and the social crisis. 

At the luncheon, His Eminence, Albert Cardinal Meyer of 
Chicago, read a greeting and blessing from His Holiness Pope John 
XXIII to all participating in and attending the sessions of the 
symposium. In his address on "Pope Leo XIII and the Problem 
of Human Liberty" the Apostolic Delegate, His Excellency, Arch- 
bishop Egidio Vagnozzi characterized Leo "as the first of the modern 
Popes who, completely detached from the care and trouble of tem- 
poral sovereignty, placed their position and mission at the sole 
service of the spiritual welfare of mankind." Reviewing the Leonine 
teaching on liberty the Apostolic Delegate stressed Leo's insistence 
that ''true liberty" required obedience to the laws of God and to 
the just laws of the state. He thought that the American Declara- 
tion of Independence in deriving man's liberty from the Creator 
was a similar statement of the views later expressed by Leo. 

The Apostolic Delegate drew attention to the difficulties in- 
volved in interpreting Leo's reassertion "with great clarity and firm- 
ness that only in the Catholic Church is to be found the full measure 
of religious truth and the divinely prescribed form of worship. ..." 
This position, he argued, does not mean "that the Catholic Church 
expects the state to be intolerant of religions other than the Cath- 
olic." The Apostolic Delegate stressed that Leo XIII acknowledged 
the role of custom and usage in gy'^^.v^g sanction "for each kind of 
religion having its place in the State.' " He proposed that Pope 
Pius XII developed Leo's thought "with even greater clarity" when 
he told a Union of Italian Catholic Jurists on December 6, 1953: 

The affirmation: religious and moral error must be impeded when it is 
possible, because toleration of them in itself is immoral, is not valid ab- 
solutely and unconditionally. God has not given even to human authority 
such an absolute and universal command in matters of faith and morality. 
Such a command h unknown to the common convictions of mankind, to 
Christian conscience, to the sources of Revelation and to the practice of the 
Church. . . . 

In conclusion, relating the ideas of Leo XIII and liberty to the 
modern age and to America, the Apostolic Delegate declared: 

As far as the United States is concerned, I feel that it is a true interpre- 
tation of the feelings of the Hierarchy and of American Catholics in 
general to say that they are well satisfied with their Constitution and 
pleased with the fundamental freedom enjoyed by their Church; in fact, 


they believe that this freedom is to a large extent responsible for the 
expansion and consolidation of the Church in this great country. Whether 
they remain a minority, or become a majority, I am sure that American 
Catholics will not jeopardize their cherished religious freedom in ex- 
change for a privileged position. 

Professor James Collins, of St. Louis University, began the 
afternoon session with a paper directed to "Leo XIII and the Phil- 
osophical Approach to Modernity." Leo was described as "pre- 
eminently the pope of the open tradition in philosophy, which joins 
a firm rooting in our Christian philosophical heritage with a 
critical yet generous response to modern thought." Insisting that 
Leo desired a continual philosophical commerce between Christian 
and modern philosophy, Collins developed three essential aspects 
of Leo's teaching. The first constituted his guidance on "the best 
way of philosophizing," the second his counsel on the method for 
recapturing the wisdom of St. Thomas, and the third his advice to 
"complete the old by the aid of the new." 

Great care was taken by Collins to establish the significance 
of Leo's preference for speaking about "philosophizing rather than 
philosophy." In giving priority to the verbal form, and hence the 
operational nature of philosophy, Leo was interpreted as providing 
the maximum support for an approach to philosophy having as 
its goal the meeting of the personal activity of the philosopher and 
"the reasonable pattern of being" he seeks to penetrate. Leo could 
never speak solely as a philosopher, and thus it was noted that in 
his role "as supreme teacher of revealed truth," he emphasized that 
"the best way of philosophizing" presumes "obedience to the Chris- 
tian faith," which as he taught "helps the understanding, and not 
only detracts in nowise from its dignity, but adds greatly to its 
nobility, keenness, and stability." Through this counsel Leo re- 
affirmed the relationship of faith and philosophy against a phil- 
osophical tradition that would demand their separation. Leo saw 
the Christian philosopher as obligated to master the classical phi- 
losophers, the Fathers, the Scholastic Doctors, especially St. Thomas, 
and the fruits of modern philosophical inquiry. 

In interpreting Leo's praise of the wisdom of St. Thomas, Col- 
lins stressed the idea that a philosopher's Thomistic allegiance com- 
mitted him to "a sustained engagement with all of the tendencies 
of modern philosophy." Such an engagement was viewed as im- 
plicit in Thomas's own work, his problems and methods. To illus- 
trate the historical relationship between Thomism and modern phi- 
losophy, Collins recalled that the Catholic philosophers of the nine- 


teenth century who prepared the way for the Thomistic revival 
were all deeply indebted to various schools of modern philosophy. 
As examples he cited such figures as Sanseverino, Taparelli, Libera- 
tore, and Kleutgen. In entering into their work, the pope was 
seen as calling for a more precise "textual and contextual under- 
standing of St. Thomas and the moderns," if their pioneer work 
was to be perfected. 

Professor Collins offered as essential evidence of Leo's accent 
on the relationship of Christian philosophy and modern philosophy 
the passage in Aeterni Patris where the pope cautions against the 
misuse of tradition. This is the place where Leo warned: ". . .if 
anything is taken up with too great subtlety by the Scholastic doctors, 
or too carelessly stated — if there be anything that ill agrees with 
the discoveries of a later age, or, in a word, improbable in what- 
ever way — it does not enter our mind to propose that for imitation 
to our age." Giving special attention to this admonition, Collins 
analyzed in detail the meaning to be given to Leo's caution against 
"too great subtlety," that which is "too carelessly stated," that which 
is obsolete in view of modern discoveries, and philosophical attitudes 
bearing an air of improbability. He argued that this fourfold 
warning must be understood as a positive counsel to the Christian 
philosopher to be ever alert to "the springs of consent" that open 
the mind and heart of each successive philosophical generation. 

In summary, Collins observed that Leo's phrase "strengthen 
and complete the old by the new" represented his most precious 
advice to the Christian philosopher. He found this advice clearly 
followed by those philosophers who welcomed and were guided 
in their philosophizing by the encyclical Aeterni Patris. Here he 
cited the work of Cardinal Mercier, Father Marechal, Monsignor 
Olgiati, Father Copleston, and Maritain. These Christian phi- 
losophers were indebted in common to the wisdom of St. Thomas 
and joined together in a common concern to build with the best 
materials of the past and the present. 

The Reverend Robert F. Harvanek, S.J., General Prefect of 
Studies, Chicago Province of the Society of Jesus, in his comments 
took sharp issue with Professor Collin's presentation of Leo's open- 
ness to modern philosophical concerns. He argued that Leo's em- 
phasis was undeniably on the task of the restoration of Christian 
philosophy, and more specifically "the tradition of Catholic phi- 
losophy." He felt that Professor Collins had underestimated Leo's 
rejection of much of modern philosophy since the sixteenth century. 
In illustrating his position Father Harvanek suggested that New- 


man's "enthusiasm" for Aeterni Patris was aroused because of the 
recall to tradition rather than from any eagerness to focus attention 
on modern developments. The Prefect insisted that the Christian 
philosophers' confidence in approaching modern thought was a poise 
developed after Leo. It was his view that Pius XII in Humani 
Generis had made the historically significant statements on "the 
Catholic scholar's relationship to non-Catholic theories and doctrines 
in all areas of human learning. . ." 

Professor Samuel William Halperin, of the University of Chi- 
cago, followed with a paper on "Leo XIII and the Roman Ques- 
tion." He began with an accounting of the troublesome political 
legacy Pius IX left to his successor as a consequence of the loss 
of the papacy's temporal power. Unable to accept the conditions 
enacted by the Italian state in the Law of Guarantees of May, 1871, 
Pius IX unceasingly demanded that the temporal power be restored. 
This power was believed to be absolutely necessary to the inde- 
pendence and freedom of the Holy See. Failing to achieve the 
restoration of his power, Pius IX had adopted the non expedit of 
1868 as the most effective means of unending protest against the 
Italian monarchy. 

When Leo XIII inherited the obligations and burdens of these 
policies, he was, according to Halperin, a man who "never forgot 
that he was living in the nineteenth century and that the church's 
methods of combat had to be adapted to the realities of the present." 
From the opening days of his pontificate, it was noted, Leo exhibited 
moderation in searching for a solution to the Roman Question. He 
desired, Halperin believed, a settlement that would have trans- 
formed the existing de facto situation enjoyed by the pope within the 
Vatican enclave into a de jure status with its acknowledgment of 

Though Leo XIII may have aspired to such a workable com- 
promise, all his hopes were to be frustrated during his reign. In 
tracing out these difficulties, Halperin underscored the consequences 
for the political maturation of the Italian monarchy. When the 
juridical sovereignty of the Vatican could not be arranged, Leo 
XIII felt obliged to continue his predecessor's use of the non expedit. 
The discouragement of Catholics from participation in the political 
life of their country in turn deprived Italy of a vital conservative 
tradition necessary to the effective development of its parliamentary 
and constitutional life. In the absence of this tradition partisans 
of the left and anti-clericals enjoyed a political monopoly not en- 
tirely beneficial to the political growth of Italy. Emboldened by 


their advantage, the forces of the left frequently welcomed po- 
litically opportune outbursts of anti-clericalism. Such campaigns 
fastened Leo XIII to the non expedit even though there are evi- 
dences, according to Halperin, which indicate that Leo knew in 
his last years that it was a failure in both theory and practice. 

Halperin further demonstrated that just as the Roman Question 
had a profound impact on the internal political life of Italy, so 
did it determine much of the diplomacy of the Vatican during Leo's 
reign. He believed that Leo XIII gradually was convinced that he 
would receive no help from Germany or Austria-Hungary in solv- 
ing the Roman Question and therefore adopted the policy of 
rapprochement towards France. The Roman Question was credited 
by Halperin as a major factor in forming Leo's counsel of Raillie- 
ment to the Catholics of the Third Republic. Reviewing the sub- 
sequent history of the Roman Question and its resolution in the 
Lateran Accords of 1929, Halperin observed that the final settle- 
ment was cast in a pattern already perceived by Leo. On this he 
concluded with the historically significant judgment: 

The role of Mussolini as a party to the Lateran Accords of 1929 shadowed 
them at the time of their signature. Actually, however, they responded to 
a profound historical need. They have survived the vicissitudes of the past 
many years. They should survive many more. 

In her comments, Margaret M. O'Dwyer of Loyola University, 
praised Professor Halperin's valuable exposition of the difficulties 
the nineteenth century papacy and Italy experienced in resolving 
problems apparently amenable to solution in the twentieth century. 
She called attention to Father John Courtney Murray's reminder 
that Leo XIII regarded the attacks on the independency of the 
papacy as part of a wider "conspiracy" to undermine the moral 
prestige and mission of the Church. In addition she suggested that 
perhaps the stand of Pius IX and Leo XIII was a necessary prepara- 
tion for the success of the present century in resolving the Roman 
Question. "It may be," Miss O'Dwyer proposed, "that their stand 
was necessary so that the future be not prejudiced." 

Reverend Thomas T. McAvoy, C.S.C. of the University of Notre 
Dame, opened the evening session with his paper "Pope Leo XIII 
and America." At the outset he recalled the surprise in Europe 
that Catholicism flourished in the United States. This was an 
astonishment provoked by the accepted idea that Catholicism and 
democrac}' were incompatible. The issue of Catholicism and the 
American political spirit and culture was, according to Father 


McAvoy, the great theme dominating the history of Leo and Amer- 
ica. For the Church in America two great problems existed within 
this context. The first, was the manifold problem attending upon 
the Americanization of the Catholic immigrant. The issue involved 
not only questions of parochial and diocesan discipline, but very 
acutely the development of parochial education. The second task 
was that of fitting the Church in America more formally into the 
universal canonical organization and discipline. 

The American Church had been, as Father McAvoy noted, rela- 
tively free of constant contact and communication with Rome. Dur- 
ing Leo's reign the prospect of a more intimate and steady rela- 
tionship between America and Rome was not eagerly accepted by 
American churchmen formed by the earlier experience. This hesi- 
tation was illustrated by a dramatic retelling of the stages, if not 
stratagems, necessary to bring the American hierarchy to accept the 
prospect of a permanent papal delegation to the United States. 
Archbishop Francisco SatoUi on the eve of his announcement that 
he was to be the first Apostolic Delegate to America, was assured 
by the hierarchy, assembled in New York, that they did not wish 
such an office in this country. 

After the establishment of the Delegation it appeared that the 
liberal coalition of Bishops Keane and Ireland, and Cardinal Gib- 
bons had the greatest influence with the new Apostolic Delegate. 
Yet the conservative elements in the hierarchy were soon heard by 
the Delegate and in Rome. So successful were they that eventually 
they succeeded in presenting, for a time, their adversaries as opposed 
to parochial education, as benevolent towards secret societies, and 
as skirting indifferentism in their friendly relations with non- 
Catholic religious bodies. The controversy and tension between the 
members of the American hierarchy quickly tested the wisdom of 
Rome in bringing the Church in America more precisely within the 
ancient discipline and organization of the Church. 

Father McAvoy presented Rome, during Leo's pontificate, as 
skillfully adjudicating the many differences between the hierarchy 
in their efforts to fit the Church within the framework of the 
American system. His review of Rome's many successes seemed to 
justify his conclusion concerning Leo and America: 

Certainly not all the problems of the Church in America were solved dur- 
ing his regime, but he could at the end write a letter of love and praise for 
his sons in the United States who were working hard to reconcile the Church 


and the Age. The Church in the United States has increased in number 
and wealth since 1903, but the best achievements had their origin in the 
golden era of Pope Leo XIII. 

The second evening paper "Leo XIII and Contemporary The- 
ology," was read by the Reverend Gustave Weigel, S.J., of Wood- 
stock College, Maryland. In agreement with those who preceded 
him. Father Weigel found the characteristic mark of Leo to be his 
readiness to adapt to nev/ times. This receptivity to changing cir- 
cum.stances, it was pointed out, was arrived at after experiencing 
and valuing much in the old order that was to be replaced. As 
Professor Collins had stressed the spirit in which Leo approached 
the act of philosophizing, so did Father Weigel underscore the 
openness of spirit Leo encouraged as proper to the theologian's 
task. It was suggested that Catholic theology, despite the presence 
of fine and competent theologians enjoyed little attention from the 
nineteenth century until after the impact of Leo XIII. 

Though "no great theologian himself," Leo, according to Father 
Weigel, employed a variety of means to stimulate and give a vital 
direction to Catholic theology. One significant means was offered 
through his appreciation of history. The pope evoked not only a 
response from the professional historian, but he also reminded the 
theologians of his generation of the importance of a return to the 
sources. "From Leo's time onward," Father Weigel observed, 
"Catholic theologians are deep in history and realize today more 
than ever that research and investigation are the very foundation of 
their theologizing." Accompanying the pope's desire that the 
sources be known was his insistence that a return to Scripture was 
equally necessary to the theologian. Hence Leo founded the Bibli- 
cal Commission in 1902. And prior to the establishment of the 
Commission, he issued in 1893 the significant encyclical Providen- 
tissimus Deus. In this statement Leo did not, according to Father 
Weigel "go as far as the encyclical Divino Afflante Spirit u of Pius 
XII in 1943, but we must remember that Leo's directives were 
definitely path breaking." 

It was further observed that Leo's encouragement of historical 
perspective and vigorous scriptural studies freed the theologians 
from timidity, if not fear, with regard to the scientific philological 
methods. This confidence brought the human dimensions of scrip- 
tural exegesis more intimately into the work of the theologian. At 
the same time the theologians within the Church were stimulated 


to take up the problems raised by the study of the hterary forms 
in which Scripture presents itself. Father Weigel believed that 
Leo's insistence on the primary importance of Thomistic philos- 
ophy gave the theologian a much needed metaphysical basis for his 
constructive work. He argued furthermore that the most signifi- 
cant results of Leo's counsel to the theologians was the support 
this theological stress gave to Leo's own pronouncements on the 
moral issues germaine to the political and social issues of his day. 
Summarizing the implications of Leo's achievements here he con- 

Not only did he aid theology by drawing attention to its formal structure 
but he also gave the theologians matter on which to work. He dealt with 
many themes but perhaps the most relevant of all was his doctrine on the 
due relations between Church and secular society in which it perforce must 
work. Beyond any doubt today's theology bears a heavy Leonine stamp. 

The final paper was given by Raymond Schmandt of Loyola 
University, who also served as co-chairman of the symposium. In 
his paper, Retrospect and Prospects," he proposed that any assess- 
ment of Leo XIII give generous attention to the personality of the 
pope. Such attention, he observed, would require serious exam,- 
ination of Leo's thirty-two years as Bishop of Perugia. He thought 
it significant that biographers have in the main neglected these im- 
portant years. He regretted that the symposium had not been able 
to consider Leo's relation with England or France, with Russia or 
Germany or his guidance of the Church in the Asian and African 
worlds. He thought, however that no historian could regret the 
loss of the temporal power to the papacy in the nineteenth century. 
Reviewing the endless trouble the papacy experienced from Caro- 
lingian times until Leo's day, Schmandt wondered if in any final 
balance the papal territory had not incurred as much loss of free- 
dom for the papacy as it seemed to guarantee independence. 

With regard to Leo's fundamental pronouncements in the politi- 
cal and social order, Schmandt asked: 

Could Leo have spoken so favorably of American democracy or French 
republicanism if he had been a reigning monarch, busy combatting revolu- 
tionary republicanism in his own state. Could he have v/ritten Renim 
Novaruf?i in the face of a Chartist Movement or a strike of Roman street 
sweepers or grave diggers.'' 

In reviewing the papers of the symposium Professor Schmandt 
recalled their common theme of Leo's flexibility. He believed that 


it was unfortunate that many American Protestants are less aware 
of Leo as Pope and more aware of an image of the papacy drawn 
from Pius IX' s reign. In a last word to the symposium he ob- 
served: "It is something of a national disgrace that there has not 
been a biography of Leo XIII written by an American since 1903. 
Perhaps one of the fruits of this symposium may be such an under- 
taking." As a step towards that biography the papers of the Leo 
XIII Symposium will be published in the near future. 

Edward T. Gargan 
Loyola University, Chicago 

Book Reviews 

Baroque Times in Old Mexico. By Irving A. Leonard. The University of 
Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1959. Pp. xi, 260. |6.50. 

Seventeenth century Hispanic America has been a generally neglected 
area in the vineyard of historical research. Professor Leonard notes that too 
often it "seems a sort of night's rest . . . between two strenuous days of 
history." He rightly argues that this seemingly uneventful era was a 
formative period of ethnic and cultural consolidation out of which the pat- 
tern of future Hispanic American history evolved. 

Professor Leonard is interested in cultural and intellectual history and 
here on the periphery of European civilization there is a general absence of 
striking events and historical landmarks. The author phrases it well when 
he states that in this area the historian works ""more in the climate of 
feeling of the time than among the flora and fauna of historical evidence." 
He has, therefore, presented a series of biographical sketches interwoven 
with social vignettes and literary assessments which serve to present a mosaic 
of seventeenth century life. 

As a social and literary historian Professor Leonard has done well. We 
are given various bits and pieces of seventeenth century life: biographical 
sketches of Fray Garcia Guerra, Archbishop-Viceroy of New Spain; Sister 
Juana Ines de la Cru2, nun, poetess, intellectual, the ""last great lyric poet 
of Spain"; and Don Carlos de Siguenza y Gongora, scholar and scientist, a 
forerunner of the eighteenth century's devotion to the experimental method. 
He adds fascinating descriptions of contemporary mascaras, parades of per- 
sons representing historical, mythological and biblical personages. Intermixed 
is a wealth of historic lore and analyses of seventeenth century literary trends. 

Unfortunately the work is marred by Professor Leonard's insistence that 
we see the seventeenth century as a progress from medieval authoritarianism 
still holding sway over men's minds as the century opened to a point at the 
end of the century where man stood on the threshold of intellectual free- 
dom. The author's basic assumption seems to be that the seventeenth cen- 
tury is important only in that it precedes the Enlightenment. His evidence 
is carefully selected and interpreted to support his assumptions. 

The picture of scholasticism is admitted by the author to be ""over- 
simplified." It is also distorted. There is confusion over the scholastic 
relationship between philosophy and theology and little appreciation of 
the distinction between medieval scholasticism and deteriorated later forms. 
Surely the thought of the seventeenth century is worth being judged without 
the use of such tired generalizations as ""the abdication of the mind to the 
dogmatic prescriptions of a medieval Church." Professor Leonard's argu- 
mentation thrughout is a priori. He is speaking to an audience of believers 
— believers in the experimental rationalism of the modern world. In his 
work he does less than justice to non-experimental truth. Indeed he does 
not give it a hearing. 

The reader finds an assumption that seventeenth century blindness and 
opposition to scientific progress vitiates and destroys its theological premises. 


Is it not more reasonable to assume that the error of the seventeenth cen- 
tury was in thinking that its theological system was dependent upon a 
particular scientific concept of the world? On the other hand, was it not 
the eighteenth century's error to assume that the new order of science had 
rendered traditional Christian theology invalid? It would seem that Pro- 
fessor Leonard views the matter through eighteenth century eyes. 

Edmund W. Kearney 

Chicago Teachers College 

Cuba. Island of Paradox. By Ruby Hart Phillips. McDowell, Oblensky, 
New York, 1959. Pp. 434. Illustrated, $4.95. 

Searchers after an understanding of contemporary Cuba and Fidel 
Castro's "26th of July" movement are likely to be disappointed with this 
volume by a resident of Cuba since the 1920's and New York Times cor- 
respondent since 1937. After reading it, one senses that the journalistic 
vantage ground is inadequate for an analysis of a country's problems. Watch- 
ing Havana street fighting, interviewing politicians, generals and ambas- 
sadors, and reporting news does not necessarily provide sufficient materials 
to explain the island's paradoxes. In organization the book is essentially 
a diary surveying Cuban politics and centering upon reminiscences about 
the colorful careers of Machado, Batista and finally Castro. Acquaintance- 
ship with major political figures enables Mrs. Phillips to present a lively, 
frequently informative, but occasionally repetitious account disclosing other- 
wise obscure historical details. Still, her undocumented work does not 
satisfactorily explain today's Cuba for either the specialist or the novice. 

Even less valuable is her advice for improving United States relations 
with Latin America. She rather harshly admonishes that rising anti-United 
States sentiment in Latin America stems from "years of vacillating, hesi- 
tant and cowardly policy . . . and failure to protect United States citizens 
and their property." Unless the United States "becomes impervious to the 
shouts of "imperialism' in the interests of its self-defence and its own un- 
challengeable rights, our great American nation will find itself crippled in 
its efforts to hold the line against the rising influence of Soviet Russia." 
The United States should ensure free elections in Latin America and "should 
never recognize any government in Latin America which obtains power by 
force of arms, without regard to whether the leader is a 'dictator' or a 
"liberator.' " 

She gravely implies that North American liberals now urge a dangerous 
policy of economic aid or even outright gifts to Latin America. Admitting 
a need for monetary assistance, she insists it should be dispensed by the 
Inter-American Development Bank and only after thorough investigation. 
(One wonders if this is necessarily un-liberal.) Professors and writers, in- 
cluding Carleton Beals, R. L. Buell, A. F. Zimmerman, Ernest Gruening 
and Hubert Herring, stand accused of trouble-making in the 1930's by 
filling the heads of Latin American students and professors with ideas of 


United States imperialism. To her their efforts to improve Inter-American 
relations were misguided and the Cultural Relations Association was a 

Mrs. Phillips offers consructive criticisms for the future. Arms and 
ammunition should not be provided to dictators and disregard for human 
rights should be deplored publicly. Diplomatic representation should be 
improved in quality and she scores appointments based upon political reward, 
business experience or innocuous records in diplomatic service. To this 
list of suggestions could be added the need for better studies of present-day 
currents in Latin America. 

Victor C. Dahl 
Portland State College, Oregon 

The United States to 1863. By Michael Kraus. Ann Arbor, Michigan, 
The University of Michigan Press. Pp. xiii, 529. $7.50. 

The United States since 1863. By Foster Rhea Dulles. Ann Arbor, Mich- 
igan, The University of Michigan Press. Pp. ix, 546. $7.50. 

How can anyone justify the publication of another general history of 
the United States.'' There are perhaps ten or twelve very satisfactory 
treatments available. I presume the justification in this case was the pub- 
lication of the planned fifteen volume University of Michigan History of 
the Modern World, edited by Allan Nevins and Howard M. Ehrmann. 
Another justification may be found in the assertion made on the jacket of 
the book by Michael Kraus, informing us that "Every generation must 
write its own history, reshaping the past in the light of its own experience. 
The names and occasions of our history are familiar, but the vantage point 
is unique, and the facts assume new meaning in our time." An example 
of the author's meaning is found in his treatment of the Alien and Sedi- 
tion Acts of 1798. Writing as pronounced liberal. Dr. Kraus informs us 
that the legislation passed by the Federalists in 1798 "look like so much 
madness that they are difficult to comprehend." Considering the condi- 
tions existing in 1798, such an appraisal seems extreme indeed. Then, in 
comparing this earlier period with a later one, the author writes: "At a 
later date Senator Joseph McCarthy carried on a campaign of terrorism led 
by a hysterical fear of the Communist peril within the United States. Though 
he made a shambles of traditional American liberties he obtained the will- 
ing support of multitudes. In 1798 much of the same excitement, prej- 
udice, and overwrought apprehension possessed large bodies of citizens 
(p. 292)." When one recalls that not one person went to jail because 
of McCarthy's investigations, one wonders just how he made such a 
"shambles" of American liberties. True, he did oppose the promotion in 
rank of an Army officer known to be a Communist, but there were quite 
a few other Americans who wondered at least mildly why this promotion 
was made. 

Likewise, Dr. Kraus is a bit careless at times in giving the whole story. 
One gets the impression that Spain received five million dollars for Florida 
in 1819 from his account: "On Washington's birthday, 1819, the Spanish 


minister and Secretary Adams, after protracted negotiations, signed the 
treaty transferring Florida to the United States for $5,000,000 (p. 377)." 
Actually, as I am sure the author well knows, the money mentioned was 
to be used by our government to satisfy the claims of Americans for depre- 
dations caused by the Indians coming north from Florida into our territory; 
no money went to Spain. 

The volume by Dr. Dulles begins with the meeting between Grant 
and Lee on April 9, 1865, and ends with the announcem.ent made on 
August 3, 1959, to the effect that President Eisenhower and Premier 
Khrushchev had agreed upon an exchange of visits. We recall that the 
Russian visited us but that the American was in due time informed that he 
was not wanted in Russia. Between the two events mentioned, the author 
presents an excellent account of recent American history. "Written likewise 
from the liberal point of view, the author is nevertheless willing to admit, 
for example, that the New Deal was heavily weighted in favor of labor 
unions and against business and management. He seems unwilling to ad- 
mit, however, that labor unions can be as great a menace to the nation 
as business monopolies ever were, and for the same reasons. Any monopoly 
is a threat to national welfare, whether operated by Mr. Patton, president 
of the Republic Steel Corporation or by Mr. McDonald, president of the 
United Steel Workers. It is admittedly too much these days to ask any- 
one to be conservative, but just a little less liberalism would be very wel- 
come to many people and, incidentally, would have improved the merits of 
both volumes reviewed. 

Paul Kiniery 

Loyola University, Chicago 

Ongrn of the A7nerrcan Revolution, 17^9-1766. By Bernhard Knollenberg. 
The Macmillan Company, New York, I960. Pp. 486. $8.50. 

This book is unique inasmuch as in the first paragraph of the intro- 
duction the author, after informing us that his book is the fruit of an 
effort to ascertain why the British mainland colonies in North America 
v/ere on the verge of rebellion ten years before the Revolution broke out, 
at once reveals the conclusions his study led to. He holds that a series 
of provocative British Acts between 1759 and 1764 contributed to mount- 
ing colonial discontent. These Acts were: 1759, an order to the Governor 
of Virginia that struck at the roots of self-government; 1761, the legaliz- 
ing of general writs of assistance, and an order of the Privy Council mak- 
ing the commissions of judges revocable at the will of the king; 1762-1763, 
disallowance of a Massachusetts act incorporating a missionary society among 
the Indians, and the efforts of the Archbishop of Canterbury and the 
Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts to introduce 
bishops into North America; also in 1763 the Proclamation which delimited 
Indian and white territory; the enforcing of the Sugar Act of 1733, and 
of the law against the cutting of white pines; the impressment of sailors, 
to man the British vessels that patrolled the coast to enforce the Sugar Act; 
the increase of the British standing army in the colonies, and the failure 


of the forces to protect the frontier at the time of Pontiac's uprising; also, 
neglect to give the colonists any assurance that still greater tax burdens 
would not be placed upon them; and finally in 1765 the passing of the 
Stamp Act despite the petitions and protests of colonial legislatures and 
influential colonists. 

Before he undertakes a consideration of these various measures that 
proved so offensive to the colonists he raises the question whether the idea 
of independence was entertained before 1765. In answer he admits that 
such fears were expressed in England, but he contends that there is no 
evidence that the colonists were of this frame of mind or that their protesta- 
tions of loyalty were not wholly sincere. 

After an inquiry into why the island colonists and Florida did not 
join in the Revolution there follows an analysis of why so many Acts of 
this type should have been concentrated in this five year period. The ex- 
planation he finds in the confused state of British politics in the early 
days of the reign of George III, in the king's dislike of Pitt and distrust 
of Fox and his implicit confidence in Bute. Other factors were the inex- 
perience of those who now administered colonial affairs, the ignorance 
alike of Ministers and Parliament of the colonial mind and temper, pres- 
sure from British constituents for easing their tax burden, and the emo- 
tional storm aroused by John Wilkes which focussed attention on him to at 
least partial exclusion of due consideration of measures affecting the 

With all this as background and setting Knollenberg finally considers 
one by one the acts listed above, but not in the order in which they were 
given. In fact there is a lack of order, a somewhat confused and haphazard 
approach. The evidence he accumulates is convincing and it fully explains 
colonial resentment. Indeed the reader must marvel at the obtuseness of 
the British government to the consequences of its legislation, and he may 
find it difficult to absolve it of deliberate purpose to ride rough-shod over 
colonial rights. Certainly no real effort was made to give adequate attention 
to the problems or to adjust matters in a statesmanlike manner. 

To avoid leaving the study hanging in the air the author adds as an 
epilogue a brief review of events between 1765 nad 1774 which reveals 
how each intervention by the British served only to arouse additional re- 
sentment till the sheddinp of blood at Lexington and Concord made re- 
bellion inevitable. 

This book is assuredly the best that Knollenberg has written. The tone 
is calm, the attitude impartial; and when uncertainty exists it is admitted. 
Statements are supported by a generous wealth of references to documents. 
In general Knollenberg sides with Mcllwain as to the righteousness of the 
cause of the colonists. The bibliography while extensive, is limited quite 
properly to books actually cited in the text. But to dismiss the religious 
phase of the Quebec Act with the mere observation that it was "an addi- 
tional grievance' robs it of its force as a factor in precipitating the 
Revolution. Though he was born in Indiana Knollenberg's knowledge 
of the geography of Ohio is hazy — the Cuyahoga River is not in present 
central Ohio, neither is Sandusky in present norhwestern Ohio. But these 
are errors extraneous to the main subject and they do not detract from 
the worth of the book. While it cannot be said that this book adds any- 


thing startingly new, the analysis, summaries and documentation make it a 
worth-while addition to the bibHography of the Revolution, helpful alike 
to the general reader and the scholar. 

Charles H. Metzger, S.J. 

West Baden College 

Wse of the Dotvntrodden. By Joseph Ledit, S.J. Translated from the 
Mexican edition by Joseph Ledit, S.J., and Antonio Santacruz. Society 
of St. Paul, New York, Canfield, Derby, Detroit, 1959- Pp. 260. 

This book presents the unique movement that, without arms or govern- 
ment backing, has brought Mexico out of near cataclysm into a rejuvenated 
life. The book, like the movement, pays little attention to politics, and in 
this way avoids the failures of historians who paint the picture of our 
southern neighbor as a tragi -comedy of primitive culture in the twentieth 
century. Here the basic Mexican question is boldly met: why did its liter- 
acy, its economy, its self-government, its disregard for the protection of 
fundamental rights of life and liberty, the very ownership of land, fall 
to such a low estate between the presidencies of Porfirio Diaz and Avila 
Camacho; and what has happened to reverse that sad trend and, not only 
stop a communistic overthrow but bring to its people a large victory in 
the contest over the great contemporary problem of production and social 

The author, a distinguished collaborator with the International Labor 
Office in Montreal, spent the best part of ten years in a meticulous study 
of both the underlying problem and its remarkable solution. To get his 
evidence he had to have the complete confidence of the makers of this 
social regeneration, and he needed the mental equipment that enables one 
to look beyond politics to the vital forces of a mature and determined people. 
His handling of his materials — and they are first-hand and full — is both 
judicious and objective. The final chapter, on the dissolution of the cen- 
tral power in the operation, shows this patience and impartiality that one 
demands in examinating so strange and complicated a process as is here 
unfolded. While his command of English yields occasionally to lapses 
into frenchification, and the type-setter betrayed him more than once, yet 
the merit of the work urges a reader to overlook superficial imperfections 
in following the very rewarding account of this most modern story. 

Revolution in Mexico between 1913 and 1940 claimed 1,200,000 lives 
according to the testimony of one of its notable engineers, Candido Aguilar 
(p. 48). The makers of these upsets certainly followed totalitarian prin- 
ciples, and this course naturally called on them to make a direct and entire 
attack on the one force that will not yield to the totalitian party, namely 
religion. It was all a most negative program, loud in profession of philo- 
sophical correctness, a barren of results despite several well-meaning though 
futile efforts to give back to the people their land and their freedom from 
overbearing government. Peonage and the hacendados, both children of 
the 19th century and not relics of old Spain, added to the closing of the 


extant school system, served the creation of a ruling inner circle that fat- 
tened on the continuing revolution. Labor "liders" followed the induce- 
ments offered by his circle and thus made workers' justice impossible. 
Bitter hatreds marked a politics that tended to be cruel rather than paternal. 
That amiable people lived through paroxisms of fear and betrayal in a 
constant state of tension and with no sight of a viable democratic regime. 

Finally, after trying all manner of reconstructive or military efforts 
even to the 1926-1929 epoch of the "Cristeros," a group of highly in- 
tellectual and dedicated men decided on a totally new approach. Employ- 
ing a secret "base" of directive planning and administration, they singled 
out in turn the popular resuscitation of free education, the right to work 
and enter labor organizations, the employers' consent to uphold and fulfill 
the just expectations of workingmen, and finally true private ownership of 
land and fair opportunity to develop the land and market the commodities 
without a feudal subservience to the vast network of the political ring. 

Carranza rang in the opening of the Communist era. In 1943 Avila 
Camacho definitely closed it when he used this movement to destroy 
Communist power in Mexico and to support the newly enjoyed social jus- 
tice. Victory, however, while large, is yet not complete. There remains the 
political arena. But if the movement holds to its foundations of employ- 
ing fearless masses of unarmed men to undo the intrigues of the entrenched 
politicians, the sentiment of the country will be able to complete what is 
undoubtedly one of the social high moments of our century. 

W. Eugene Shiels 
Xavier University, Ohio 

Notes and Comments 

Medicine and Society in America: I66O-I86O, by Richard Har- 
rison Shryock, published this year by New York University Press, 
is a contribution to the history of medicine. Dr. Shryock traces 
the emergence of the medical profession over a period of two cen- 
turies in four very interesting lectures which he delivered in 1959 
as the Anson G. Phelps Lecturer in New York University. In 
the first lecture, "Origins of a Medical Profession," Dr. Shryock 
reveals how trained physicians emerged from the groups of "healers" 
and brought scientific medical treatment to American society. This 
and the second lecture on "Medical Thought and Practice" far 
from being dry are replete with human interest as they tell of the 
progress of medical founders from Cotton Mather and Benjamin 
Rush to the more revolutionary medics of the 1800's. "Health and 
Disease, 1660-1820," the third lecture, describes the relation of 
public health to population growth in the early times of epidemics 
and numerous maladies afflicting our colonists. The state of public 
and private health became both the challenge and the test of the 
value of scientific medical training and practice. The fourth lec- 
ture, "Medicine and Society in Transition, 1820-1860," could aptly 
be captioned "Victorian Sentimentalism Invades Medical Practice." 
This transition period, rather decline of the medical profession, did 
not lack all progress, as the establishments of hospitals, nursing in- 
stitutions, dental training, pharmaceutical education, and especially 
medical periodicals attest. The ample footnotes at the end of each 
part contain an excellent bibliography. The book should command 
wide attention. With index it is in 182 pages and sells for four 

* * * * 

Felix Alfred Plattner and Albert Lunte made and extensive 
automobile tour of South and Middle America in 1957 and 1958. 
Starting south of Buenos Aires they travelled in Argentina, lower 
Brazil, Paraguay, Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, Colombia, Central America, 
and Mexico, taking photographs of Jesuit churches and art works in 
the cities and old missions. They chose particularly the wood carv- 
ings, statuary, paintings and decorations made by German Jesuit 
fathers and brothers in the seventeenth and eighteen centuries for 
the eye of their camera as well as the edifices designed and erected 



by the missionaries from Germany. Early in I960 Plattner had his 
photographs puMished excellently in book form by Herder in Basel, 
Freiburg, and Wien under the title: Deutsche Meister des Barock in 
Sudamerika hn 17. und 18. Jahrhundert. The 119 pictures are intro- 
duced by an historical account of the work of the German Jesuits 
in America, and after the collection of pictures each "Bild" is 
described with references to authorities. The book will prove a 
worthwhile purchase. 

Florence Sabin, Colorado Woman of the Century, by Elinor 
Bluemel, published in 1959 by the University of Colorado Press, is 
a deserved tribute to one of the nation's great physicians and scien- 
tists. It is a simple biography, sympathetically written, of the 
woman who spent some fifty of her eighty-two years of life mak- 
ing valuable contributions to medical knowledge and whose statue 
in Statuary Hall is Colorado's choice representation from among 
those of its famous citizens. Dr. Florence Sabin (1871-1953) was 
closely associated with the development of Johns Hopkins Medical 
School for the first quarter of this century and after her professor- 
ship there she became a member of the Rockefeller Institute for 
Medical Research from 1925 to 1938. As member emeritus she 
continued her research until 1953. The list of her prizes, awards, 
and honors numbers thirty-three. The bibliography of her writings 
covers almost eight pages. The inspiring volume is well-printed 
and happily illustrated and is indexed. Its list price is $5.00. 

The Louisiana Historical Association underwent a thorough 
reorganization in 1958 and in January I960 gave birth to the 
new historical quarterly, Louisiana History, published in coopera- 
tion with Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, under the 
editorship of Edwin Adams Davis and his associate A. Otis Hebert, 
Jr. In the opening article Kenneth Trist Urquhart traces the his- 
tory of the organization in his "Seventy Years of the Louisiana 
Historical Association." Chartered in 1889 the Association moved 
into the new Memorial Library and Museum next to the Howard 
Memorial, and since then has done a notable work of gathering 
and preserving materials. The format of Louisiana History is 
pleasing and its 96 pages contain interesting articles, book re- 
views, notes and illustrations. We wish it a successful career. 





Names of the contributors are in small capitals; titles of articles in 
this volume are in quotation marks; titles of books and 'periodicals reviewed 
or mentioned are in italics. Book reviews are entered under author and title 
of book, and under the name of the reviewer; no entries are made for sub- 
ject of the book except in the case of biographies. The following abbrevia- 
tions are used: tr., translator; ed., editor; revs., reviews; revd., reviewed. 

Acta Sanctorum,, 39 

Adams, John, and Middle Ages, 30- 

Adams-Onis treaty, 175 

Aeterni Patris, of Leo XIII, 231 

Aldham, Capt. W. Cornwallis, 23-24 

"Alfred M. Landon and the Presi- 
dential Campaign of 1936," by 
Donald R. McCoy, 195-218 

Allen, Henry J., 195 

Allen, Josh, 220—228 

Almodovar, Duke of, see Malo de 

Alton Telegraph (Illinois), 227-228 

American Catholic Quarterly Re- 
vieiv, 71 

American Protestant Association 
(A.P.A.), 74, 76, 79 

Amity, ship, 171 

Anderson, Victoria, 189 

Aquinas, St. Thomas, 39, 236 

Arcadians, 15 

Arikara Indians, 178 

Arkansas Gazette, 111 

Arizona and the West, noted, 127 

Ashley,^ Williams, 178-179 

Asuncion, Paraguay, 118 

Atlantic Monthly, 231-232 

Atocha, Alexander A., 187-188 

Augustine, St., 39 

Ayutla, revolution of, 21 

Azcarraga y Palermo, Manuel, 88- 
90, 92, 96 

B. A. Goldschmidt Co., 19 
Ballinger, Richard, 113-114 
Banks, Gen. N. P., 187-192 
Baroque Times in Old Mexico, by 

Irving A. Leonard, revd., 244 
Baylies, Rep. Francis, 178 
Bell, Maj. Joseph M., 185-186 
Benton, Sen. Thomas Hart, 177-178 

Berthoud, James, 171 

Blaine, James G., 69-70, 73-75, 78 

Blair, Francis P., 133, 135, 138-140 

Blair, Montgomery, 133 

Bluegrass Craftsman, Being the 
Reminiscences of Ebenezer Hiram, 
Stedman, Papermaker, 1808-1885, 
ed. by Frances L. S. Dugan and 
Jacqueline P. Bull, noted, 63 

Bluemel, Elinor, Florence Sabin, 
Colorado Woman of the Century, 
noted, 252 

Book Reviews, 53-59, 121-126, 244- 

Borah, Sen. William E., 214 

Boston Pilot, 71 

Brackenridge, Henry M., 176 

Bradbury, John, 175-176 

Breckinridge, Col. Henry, 204 

Brinkley, John, 196 

Bristow, Henry, 26 

British Foreign Office, 19, 24 

British Guiana, 149 

British-Spanish relations, 163-164 

Biyan, Wm. Jennings, 109-110 

Bull Moose party, 195, 203 

Burgos, Decree of, 161 

Butler, Sen. Benjamin F., 185 

Cabot, Sebastian, 116-120 

Cairo, 111., 226 

Calderon, Fernando, 117, 119 

Campbell, Col. John, 173 

Canary Islands, 152 

Cannon, Speaker Joseph G., 105-115 

Capper, Sen. Arthur, 198, 201 

Catholic Church, 15, 18, 39-40, 67- 

79, 231-243 
"Catholicism and Presidential Elec- 
tions, 1865-1900," by Vincent P. 

De Santis, 67-79 
Catholic Review, 73 




Carbondale, 111., 223-225 
Caracas Company, 97-98, 104 
Charles III of Spain, 80 
Chase, Salmon P., 220 
Chicago, 203, 224-225, 229 
Chicago Tribune, 227, 228-229 
Chiriqui, colonization idea, 131, 139 
Civil War, 5, 6, 9, 185-192, 219-230 
Clark, Champ, 113 
Clark, J. Reuben, 204 
Clay, Henry, 132, 149 
Clayton-Bulwer treaty, 147 
Cleveland, Grover, 73-74, 78 
Cleveland, Ohio, convention in, 201- 

Cloghessy, James F., "The Philip- 
pines and the Royal Philippine 
Company," 80-104 
Colby, Bainbridge, 202 
Colfax, Schuyler, 68 
Collins, James, on Leo XIII, 236-238 
Columbia R., trade on, 175, 184 
Committee on Emancipation and 

Colonization, 142-144 
"Committee of Mexican Bondholders 
and European Intenvention in 
1861," by Phillip J. Sheridan, 
Committee on Rules, Congress, 105- 

Comonfort, Ignacio, 21 
Comyn, Tomas de, 80, 81, 83-86, 

90-94, 99, 100 
Coruiia, 152 

Country Gentleman, 197, 204 
Cowley, Henry Wellesley, 28-29 
Cox, Sen. S. S., 134-135 
Couzens, Sen. James, 214 
Crosier on the Frontier, A Life of 
John Martin Henni, Archbishop of 
Mihvaukee, by Rt. Rev. Msgr. Pe- 
ter Leo Johnson, revd., 123-124 
Curtis, George W., 73 

Dahl, Victor C, revs.. Ruby, H. 

Phillips, Cuba, Land of Paradox, 

Daily Ttnie Delta (111.), 186 
Darwinism, 8, 16-17 
Delane, John Thadeus, 26, 28 
Delbos, M. Yvon, 154-155 
Democratic party, 195-196, 202-214, 

215n., 219-230 
Denmark, 148 
de Saligny, Dubois, 28 
De Santis, Vincent P., "Catholi- 
cism and Presidential Elections, 

1865-1900," 67-79 
Deutsche Informationen (Paris), 

Dietrich, Sen. Charles H., 105 
Dillon, Richai'd H. Embarcadero, 

revd., 124 

Doolittle, Sen. James R., 139-141, 

Douglas, Gen. Lewis, 204 

Douglas, Stephen A., 219 

Douglass, Frederick, 137 

Doyle, Elisabeth Joan, "New Or- 
leans Courts Under Military Oc- 
cupation, 1861-1865," 185-192 

Dulles, Foster Rhea, The United 
States Since 1865, revd., 246 

Dunlop, Capt. Hugh, 22 

DuQuoin, 111., 219, 226 

Dwight, Col. Charles C, 187 

"Economic Aspects of German In- 
tervention in the Spanish Civil 
War, 1936-1939," by Eugene H. 
KORTH, S.J., 151-169 

Egypt, (southern Illinois), 219-227 

Ellis, John Tracy, Guide to Ameri- 
can Catholic History, revd., 59 

Emmanuel L. Philipp — Wisconsin 
Stahvart, by Robert S. Maxwell, 
revd., 121-122 

Ernst, Dorothy J., "Search for 
Fortune along the Mississippi: 
Pratt Letters," 44-52 

Estado, see Comyn 

Exposicion of 1813, 94-97, 100, 101 

Federalist, The, 32, 36 

Fernandez de Enciso, Martin, 119- 

Feudalism, 36-39 
Fitzgerald, Rep. John J., 112-113 
Foote, Shelby, The Civil War, A 

Narrative, Vol. I, Fort Sumter to 

Perryville, revd., 122 
"Founding Fathers and the Middle 

Ages," by H. Wayne Morgan, 

Fleming, Walter F., 136 
Floyd, John, 175, 178 
"Francis Parkman on the Nature of 

Man," by Richard A. Thompson, 

Franco, Generalisimo Francisco, 

Franklin, Benjamin, 12 
Fremont, John C, 220 

Gallant Pelham, American Extra- 
ordinary, by Charles G. Milham, 
revd., 56-57 

Garcia, Diego, 119 

Gardiner, C. Harvey, Mexico 1825- 
1828: The Journal of Edivard 
Thornton Tayloe, noted, 62 

Garfield, James A., 71-72 

Gargan, Edw.ajid T., "The Loyola 
Leo XIII Symposium," 231-243 

Gardner, Rep. A. P., 112 

German-Spanish relations, 151-169 



Gibbons, James Cardinal, 78 
Gildersleeve, Geniveve N., Women 

in Banking, noted, 178 
Glavis, Louis R., 113 
Goring, Herman, 157, 163 
Grace, William R., 72 
Graham, William, 27 
Grant, Pres. U. S., 69 
Great Eastern, ship, 146 
Greece, founding fathers and, 30-43 
Greeley, Horace, 68-69 
Guide to American Catholic History, 

by John Tracy Ellis, revd., 59 

Haiti, 131, 133, 141, 147, 149 

Hale, Sen. J. P., 137, 145 

Hallam, Henry, cited, 41-42 

Halleck, Gen. Henry W., 191 

Halperin, Prof. Samuel W., cited, 

Hamilton, Alexander, 32-33, 35 

Hamilton, John D. M., 197, 199, 201, 
203, 205, 213 

Hamilton, Raphael N., revs., Cro- 
sier on the Frontier, 123-124 

Hanna, Mark, 79 

Hard, William, 204, 205 

Harper's Weekly, anti-Catholicism 
of, 68, 70-71 

Harvanek, Rev. Robert F., cited, 

Hayes, Carlton J. H., cited, 154 

Hayes, Rep. E. A., 107 

Hayes, Rutherford B., 71 

Haynes, Lacy, 197, 201, 204 

Haynie, L N., 222, 226, 229 

Hearst, William Randolph, 199, 215 

Hechler, Kenneth, 113 

Henry VIII, 119-120 

Henry, Andrew, 177 

Hepburn, Rep. W. P., 110-112 

Hibbs, Ben, 197 

Hickey, Patrick J., 73-74 

Hisma (Spanish Moroccan Trans- 
portation Co.), 156-168 

Historia Politica, see Malo de Luque 

Hitler, Adolph, 151-169 

Hoar, George Frisbie, 73 

Hokah, Minn., 45, 47, 51 

Holabird, S. B., 191 

Holy Roman Empire, 35-37 

Hoover, Herbert, 202, 213 

Hopkins, Harry, 217 

Hopkins, James F. and Mary W. M. 
Hargreaves, eds.. Papers of Henry 
Clay, Vol. I, noted, 61 

Howard, Gen. O. O., 222 

Hughes, Augustus DeB., 186 

Hughes, Paul L., Crown and Parlia- 
ment in Tudor-Stuart England, 
revd., 53-54 

Humani generis, of Pius XII, 238 

Hume, David, cited, 40-41 

Illinois, politics in, 219-230 
Illinois State Journal, 223, 227-229 
Illinois State Register, 220-221, 223, 

Informe sobre las Filipinas, see Mas 

y Sans 
Insurgency, 105-115 
Ireland, Archb. John, 78-79, 232, 

Iroquois Indians, 15-16 
Iturbide, Augustin de, 18-20 

Jackson, Kenneth M., revs. C. G. 
Milham, Gallant Pelharn, 56-57 

Jacobson, Jerome V., ED., Notes 
and Comments; revs. J. T. Ellis, 
A Guide to Americayi Catholic 
History, 59 

Jagor, Fedor, 93-94 

James Ford Bell Collection, publica- 
tions noted, 64 

Jefferson, Thomas, 12, 14; on Mid- 
dle Ages, 30-43 

Jerome, St., 39 

Jesuits, 15-16, 68 

Jeumel, Lewis, 170 

Jeumel, Victor, 170 

John XXIII, Pope, 235 

"John A. Logan and the Election 
of 1864 in Illinois," by James P. 
Jones, 219-230 

Johnson, Andrew, 220 

Johnson, Sen. Hiram, 214 

Johnson, Peter Leo, Crosier on the 
Frontier, A Life of John Martin 
Henni, Archbishop of Milwaukee, 
revd., 123-124 

Johnson, Sen. Richard M., 176, 178 

Jones, James P., "John A. Logan 
and the Election of 1864 in 
Illinois," 219-230 

Jones, Richard Lloyd, 197 

Jones, Robert Huhn, revs. Shelby 
Foote, The Civil War, A Narra- 
tive. Vol. I, Fort Sumter to 
Perryville, 122-123 

Jonesboro, 111., 226-227 

Jonesboro Gazette (111.), 227 

Jordan, Edward, 133 

Jordana, General, 162, 166 

Juarez, Benito, 22-29 

Kansas, 195-219 

Kansas City Star, 197 

Kearney, Edmund W., revs. I. A. 
Leonard, Baroque Times in Old 
Mexico, 244 

Keemle, Charles, 178-179 

Kentucky Gazette, 178 

Kiniery, Paul, revs. K. P. Williams, 
Lincoln Finds a General, Vol. V, 
55-56; M. Kraus, The United 
States to_ 1865, and F. R. Dulles, 
The United States Since 1865, 



Kinsman, J. B., 186 

Kiplinger, William, 200 

Know-Nothing societies, 71, 73, 75 

Knollenberg, Bernard, Origin of the 
American Revolution, 1759-1766, 
revd., 249 

Koenig, Msgr. Harry C, cited, 233 

KORTH, Eugene H., "Economic As- 
pects of German Intervention in 
the Spanish Civil War, 1936- 
1939," 151-169 

Knox, Frank, 199, 203, 213 

Kraus, Michael, The United States 
to 1865, revd., 246 

Ku Klux Klan, 68, 195 

Kuykendall, Andrew J., 220-221, 
226, 227 

La Follette, Sen. Robert, 214 

Landon, Alfred A., 195-218 

Lane, Sen. James K., 49-50 

Langenheim, Adolf, 156, 157 

Lanphier, Charles, 221, 225, 228 

La Plata R., 117-120 

Latimer, Henry, 116 

Latourette, Kenneth Scott, cited, 

Lawlor, S.N.D., Sr. Mary, Alexis de 
Tocqiieville in the Chamber of 
Deputies. His Vieivs on Foreign 
and Colonial Policy, revd., 55-56 

Ledit, Joseph, Rise of the Doivn- 
trodden, revd., 249 

Leo XIII, Pope, 76, 231-243 

Leonard, Irving A., Baroque Times 
in Old Mexico, revd., 244 

Liberia, 132, 133, 146, 147 

Liberty League, 213 

Lincoln, Abraham, and Negro Col- 
onization, 131-150; 190-192; and 
1864 election, 195-218 

Literary Digest, 214 

Litvinov, Maxim, 155 

Locke, John, 6-7 

Lodge, Henry Cabot, 77 

Logan, John A., 219-230 

Logan, Mary, 223 

London Daily Telegraph, 159 

London Ti^nes, 159 

Louisiana, ship, 172 

Louisiana, courts, 185-192 

Louisiana History, noted, 252 

Louisville, Ky., shipping, 173 

Louisville Public Advertiser, 178 

LowiTT, Richard, "The Making of 
an Insurgent," 105-115 

Loyal Ainerican, 75-76 

Loyola University, Chicago, sympo- 
sium, 231-243 

McAvoy, C.S.C, Rev. Thomas, cited, 

McCaleb, Walter F., cited, 18-19 

MccOY, Donald R., "Alfred M. Lan- 
don and the Presidential Cam- 
paign of 1936," 195-218 

McClellan, Gen. George, 220-224, 

McClernand, Gen. John A., 188, 223 

McCLUGGAGE, ROBERT W., revs. R. p. 
Sharkey, Money Class, and Party, 

McDonald, Forrest, We the People, 
The Economic Origins of the Con- 
stitution, revd., 58-59 

McKinley, William, 79 

Madison, James, and Middle Ages, 

Madison, Rep. E. H., 112 

Mallet, J., 86-89, 92, 93 

Malo de Luque, Eduardo, Duke of 
Almodovar, 80-88, 92, 94-97, 103 

Manifest Destiny, 141, 143 

Manila Galleon, 83, 89, 92, 93, 100- 

Marquez, Leonardo, 24-25 

Martin, Sen. Joseph, 203 

Mas y Sans, Sinibaldo de, 84-85, 
86-89, 96, 99 

Mata, Jose, 27 

Matthew, George B., 23-25, 27 

Maxwell, Robert S., Emanuel L. 
Philipp — Wisconsin S t alw ar t, 
revd., 121-122 

Mayberry, William, 204 

Metzger, Charles H., revs. B. 
Knollenberg, Origin of the Ajner- 
ican Revolution 1759-1766, 247 

Mexico, 1861 intervention, 18-29 

Meyer, Albert Cardinal, cited, 235 

Mignoni, Francisco B., 18-19 

Milham, Charles G., Gallant Pelham, 
American Extraordinary, revd., 

Mills, Ogden, 204 

Milwaukee, trade, 44-47 

Miramon, Gen. Miguel, 22-27 

Mississippi R., shipping, 44-52, 171- 

Missouri, trade in, 47-56 

Missouri Herald, 178-179 

Mitchell, Rev. James, 133, 135-136, 
138, 147-149 

Montero y Vidal, Jose, 81, 92, 96 

Montes, Henrique, 117 

Moody, Msgr. Joseph N., cited, 233- 

Morgan, H. Wayne, " The Found- 
ing Fathers and the Middle Ages," 

Morris, Gouverneur, 35 

Morroco, Spanish, 152, 156, 158, 161, 

Mossman, William T., 197 

Mundy, Paul, cited, 234-235 

Mussolini, Benito, 153, 154 



Nanina, brig, 172 

Nast, Thomas, 68-69 

Nazis, 151-169 

Nation, The, 200 

Nebraska, see Norris, George W. 

"Negro Colonization : The Climate of 
Opinion Surrounding Lincoln, 
1860-65," bv Robert H. Zoellner, 

Nelson, Rep. John M., 112 

Newberry Library, 94, 103 

New Deal, 195, i97, 204-210, 216- 

New Orleans Commercial Bulletin, 

"New Orleans Courts Under Mili- 
tary Occupation, 1861-1865," by 
Elizabeth Joan Doyle, 185-192 

Neiv Orleans Picayune, 187 

New York Courier and Enquirer, 

New York Herald, 72 

New York Herald Tribune, 200 

New York Times, 72 

New York Tribune, 70, 144, 145 

Niles Register, 111 

Norris, Sen. George W., 105-115, 

North American Review, 231-232 

Notes & Comments, 60-64, 127-128, 

NuNis, DOYCE B., "Tarascon's 
Dream of an American Commer- 
cial Empire in the West," 170-184 

Ocampo, Melchor, 23 
O'DWYER, Margaret M.,revs. Mary 
Lawler, S.N.D., Alexis de Tocque- 
ville in the Chamber of Deputies. 
His Views on Foreign and Colon- 
ial Policy, 55-56; cited on Leo 
XIII, 239 
Oglesby, Richard, 220, 226-228 
Ohio R., shipping, 171-173, 176 
Oregon, trade in, 175-184 
Osterhaus, Gen. Peter J., 223 

Palmer, Gen. John M., 223, 226 
Pampas, Argentina, 116-120 
Pan, Jose Felipe del, 90-92, 96, 103 
Papers of Henry Clay, Vol. I, The 

Rising Statesmayi, 1797-1814-, 

noted, 61 
Parana, R., 117-120 
Parkman, Francis, 3-17 
Payne-Aldrich tariff, 113 
Peabody, Charles A., 186, 19 
Pendleton, George, 220 
Pericles, 43 
Perry, Richard L., Sources of Our 

Liberties, noted, 60 
Philadelphia National Gazette, 179 
Philadelphia, shipping, 173-174 
Phillimore, Robert, 26 

Philippine Islands, 80-104 

Phillips, D. L., 227 

Phillips, Ruby Hart, Cuba, Island 
of Paradox, revd., 245 

Pinchot, Gifford, 113-114, 204 

PiTxiN, William A., revs. R. S. 
Maxwell, Emanuel L. Phillip — 
Wisconsin Stalwart," 121-122 

Pittsburgh, ship, 171-172, 181 

Pittsburgh, shipping, 171-174 

Plan General, 97-104 

Plattner, Felix, Deutsche Meister 
des Barock en Siidamerika im 17. 
und 18. Jahrhundert, noted, 

Plutarch's Lives, 31, 43 

Pradeau, Dr. Alberto F., La Ex- 
pulsion de los Jesuitas de las 
Provincias de Sonora, Ostimuri y 
Sinaloa en 1767, noted, 61 

Pratt, Albert H., letters of, edited, 

Protestantism, in presidential elec- 
tions, 67-79, 233, 243 

Reardon, John J., revs. Forrest 
McDonald, We the People, The 
Economic Origins of the Consti- 
tution, 58-59 

Reed, Clyde M., 195 

Republican party, 195-218, 219-230 

Rerum Novarum of Leo XIII, 231, 

Retana, W. E., 82, 84 

Rice, Cecil Spring, 77 

Roberts, Roy, 197, 201-204 

Robertson, David, 25-29 

Robertson, William, 40 

Robey, Raph, 204 

Robinson, James, 220 

"Roger Barlow: First English Trav- 
eler in the Pampas," by S. Sam- 
uel Trifilo, 116-120 

Roman Question, 238-239 

Roman Republic, 30-43 

Roosevelt, Franklin D., 198, 204-217 

Roosevelt, Theodore, 75-77, 106-108, 

Root, Elihu, 72 

Roselius, Christian, 188 

Rowak, 156-168 

Royal Philippine Co., 80-104 

Russell, Lord, 25-29 

Russia, 153, 155-156 

St. Louis, Mo., trade, 173, 177, 179, 

St. Louis Advertiser, 179 
St. Louis Enquirer, 111 
San Francisco Argonaut, 72 
Sangroniz, Jose Antonio de, 165 
Santa Fe Trail, 179 
Schmandt, Raymond, cited, 242-243 
Schneider, Wilbert M., The Ameri- 
can Bankers Association, Its Past 
and Present, noted, 128 



Schiyrock, Richard H., Medicine and 
Society in America, 1660-1860, 
noted, 251 

Schuman, Frederick, 154 

Schurz, Carl, 140 

Schurz, William Lytle, Manila Gal- 
leon, 92-94, 96, 101 

"Search for Fortune along the Mis- 
sissippi," by Dorothy J. Ernst, 

Sharkey, Robert P., Money, Class, 
and Party: An Economic Study 
of Civil War and Reconstruction, 
revd., 125-126 

Shea, John Gilmary, 71-72 

Sheahan, James W,, 221 

Shepley, Gen. George F., 185 

Sheridan, Philip J., "The Com- 
mittee of Mexican Bondholders 
and European Intervention in 
1861," 18-29 

Sherman, Gen. William T., 73, 220, 
222, 226, 229 

Shiels, W. Eugene, revs. R. H. Dil- 
lon, Embarcadero, Being a Chron- 
icle of True Sea Adventures from 
the Fort of San Francisco, 124- 
125; J. Ledit, Rise of the Dow7i- 
trodden, 249 

Shippingport, Ky., 173-174 

Smith, Alfred E., 202, 204 

Smith, Caleb, 133, 147 

Social Security, 209-210 

Sociedad, Financiera Industrial, 157 

Society of Jesus, see Jesuits 

Solanazar Company, 159 

Sellery, George Clark, Some Fer- 
ments at Wisconsin, 1^01-19I^7 : 
Memories and Reflections, noted, 

Spain, Nationalist, 151-169 

Springfield, III, 220-224, 225, 229 

Standard Oil Co., 113 

Stanton, Edwin, 222 

Stauffer, Oscar, 197, 203, 204 

Sullivan, Mark, 200 

Sumner, Charles, 137 

Swing, Raymond G., 200 

Taft, Charles P., 201, 204, 213 
Taft, William H., 112-114 
Tammany Hall, 68, 73, 78, 113 
Tarascon, John A., 171-172, 176 
"Tarascon's Dream of an American 

Empire in the West," by Doyce 

B. NuNis, 170-184 
"The Making of an Insurgent," by 

Richard Lov^itt, 105-115 
"The Philippines and the Royal 

Philippine Company," bv James 

F. Cloghessy, 80-104 
The London Times, 26, 29 

Thompson, Richard A., "Francis 

Parkman on the Nature of Man," 

Thorne, Robert, 116-119 
Tilden, Samuel J., 71 
Topeka, Kans., 203; see also Lan- 

don, Afred A. 
Toynbee, Arnold, 154 
Transmediterranean Co., 159 
Trifilo, S, Samuel, "Roger Barlow: 

First English Traveler in the 

Pampas," 116-120 
Trimble, William R., revs. P. L. 

Hughes, Crown and Parliament in 

Tudor-Stuart England, 53 
Trumbull, Sen. Lyman, 138, 225 
Tucker, Capt. James, 188 
Tulsa Tribune (Okla.), 197 

Unconditional Unionist, 229 
U.S.S.R., see Russia 
United Order of Deputies, 75 
United Mexican Mining Co., 20 
University of Michigan Press, 127 

Vagnozzi, Archb. Egidio, 231, 235- 

Vandenberg, Arthur H., 203 
Vassall Morton, 4, 9, 13 
Vera Cruz, 20-24, 27-29 
Viana, Francisco L. de, 81, 82, 92, 

Von Jagwitz, Eberhard, 163 

Wade, Mason, 17 

Warmoth, Col. H. C, 88-190 

War of Reform, 21 

Washburne, Rep. Elihu B., 222, 227 

Washington Chronicle, 70 

Washington, George, 131 

Washington Post, 200, 204 

Weigel, S.J., Rev. Gustave, cited, 

Wells, Jr, Daniel, 44-42 
Wells, Gideon, 133 
Western Trader, ship 172 
White, William Allen, 195-216, 

Whitehead, Charles, 25-28 
Willey, Sen., 135, 140 
Williams, Kenneth P., Lincohi Finds 

a General, Vol. V., revd., 55-56 
Wisconsin, 44-48 
Woodring, Harry, 195-196 

Yates, Gov. Richard, 225 
Ybari-a Co., 159 

Zamora, Gen. Manuel G., 22 
Zoellner, Robert H., "Negro Colon- 
ization: The Climate of Opinion 
Surrounding Lincoln, 1860-65," 
Zuloaga, Gen. Felix, 22 


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